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Henry Winter Davis (1817-1865), brilliant and fiery Baltimore 
Congressman of the Civil War era, was b o m  in Annapolis, Maryland. 
Educated at Kenyon College in Ohio and the University of Virginia, 
Davis began his law career in Alexandria, District of Columbia, in 
1840. In 1847, as a reward for his support of the Whig party, he was 
appointed state's attorney for Alexandria. After his wife's death he 
moved to Baltimore. When the Whig party dissolved in Maryland after 
the 1852 presidential election and was replaced by nativistic and 
temperance organizations, Davis shrank from political involvement.
But after a "grand tour" of Europe in 1855, he returned to America 
to oppose the influence of the Catholic Church in politics. His 
pamphlets denouncing the interference of religious organizations in 
politics established him as a spokesman for the American or Know 
Nothing party. In 1855 he was elected to Congress from the Fourth 
Congressional District of Maryland.
Winter Davis quickly established himself in Congress as an 
independent by refusing to ally with his fellow Southerners in the 
speakership contest, thereby allowing Nathaniel Banks, an American- 
Republican, to be elected. In 1856 Davis backed the American party 
candidate for President, Millard Fillmore, helping him to win his only 
state, Maryland. Davis opposed the admission of Kansas under the 
Lecompton Constitution, and when Congress rejected it, Davis began to
plan for a union of Republicans, Americans, and Anti-Lecompton 
Democrats in 1860. As the first step in uniting all those opposed to 
the Democracy, he supported a Republican for Speaker in 1860, but the 
southern "oppositionists" failed to follow Davis1 move. Although he 
supported the Constitutional Union party in Maryland, Davis campaigned 
for Lincoln in the North. Davis soon broke with Lincoln after he was 
passed over for a Cabinet appointment and the Maryland Union party was 
slighted in patronage.
Davis was a conspicuous member of the House Committee of Thirty- 
Three and presented resolutions which would have remedied all but the 
most extreme demands of the South. He worked hard to rally Union 
sentiment in Maryland to oppose secession and after the war commenced 
stood practically alone in his "unconditional" support of the Union. 
Defeated for re-election, Davis led the call for a constitutional 
convention in Maryland, the first step toward statewide emancipation.
Re-elected to Congress in 1863, Davis became one of the most 
vitriolic critics of the Lincoln administration. Angered by the 
dismissal of his friend, Admiral Du Font, Davis denounced Secretary 
Welles and exposed inefficiency in the Navy Department. Distressed by 
the State Department's silence over the French invasion of Mexico, 
he offered a resolution condemning the French. Davis challenged 
Lincoln's plan of reconstruction offering instead the Wade-Davis Bill. 
When Lincoln pocket vetoed the bill, Davis issued the Wade-Davis 
Manifesto, the first move in a conspiracy to force Lincoln off the 
Union party ticket. The Radicals' plan collapsed when the Democrats 
nominated McClellan, but Davis continued in his opposition to the
President until Lincoln dismissed Davis' arch-opponent, Postmaster 
General Montgomery Blair.
Davis' strident opposition to Lincoln cost him his party's 
nomination in 1854. But even as a "lame duck" Congressman in 1865, 
he forcefully opposed the Lincoln administration.
Winter Davis was one of the first men to break with President 
Johnson and one of the first to publically declare for Negro suffrage. 
On December 30, 1865, at the age of forty-eight, Davis died after a 
brief illness. His career, first as a Whig, then an American, a 
Constitutional Unionist, a Unionist, a Republican, and finally a 
Radical Republican illustrates the political realignment of the period 
and magnifies many neglected aspects of American history.
viii
PROLOGUE
On February 22, 1866, Washington's Birthday, the Congress of 
the United States suspended its normal business for an unusual and 
unprecedented memorial service for a private citizen. The Radical 
Republicans had arranged a ceremony in memory of Henry Winter Davis 
of Maryland. Although he died a private citizen, Davis had been a 
prominent member of Congress since 1855.
At noon the Hall of the House of Representatives was crowded 
with spectators and dignataries. The flags above the Speaker's desk 
were draped in black, an excellent portrait of Winter Davis hung above 
the Speaker's chair. The Marine Corps band played music from an ante­
room while members of the United States Senate entered. After a prayer 
by the chaplain and the reading of the Declaration of Independence by 
the Clerk, Speaker of the House Schuyler Colfax called the ceremonies 
to order. Before introducing the speaker of the day, he hailed Winter 
Davis' courage and his inflexible "hostility to oppression, whether of 
slaves on American soil or of republicans struggling in Mexico against 
monarchical invasion." Then he presented Senator John A. J. Creswell 
of Maryland.1
Creswell, formerly Davis' political lieutenant, praised his late
^Congressional Globe. 39th Congress, 1st Session, Appendix, 159; 
"Arrangements for the Memorial Address on the Life and Character of 




leader as one of the country's most able, eloquent, and fearless 
defenders. Davis' sudden death at forty-eight had cut short a brilliant 
career. "At forty-eight years of age Washington had not seen the 
glories of Yorktown even in a vision, nor had Lincoln dreamed of the 
presidential chair," Creswell stated. With praise and compassion he 
reviewed Davis' career— his birth in Annapolis, his education, his move 
to Baltimore, his years in the American party, his congressional career, 
his bold stand in Maryland against secession, and his "crowning glory 
... his leadership of the emancipation movement" in Maryland.2
The ceremony, including Creswell's address, was impressive. Davis' 
family, his widow and two small daughters, his cousin, United States 
Supreme Court Justice David Davis, friends, and colleagues were present. 
Conspicuously absent, although formally invited, were the President of 
the United States, Andrew Johnson, and the Cabinet. Only Secretary of 
War Edwin M. Stanton and Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCulloch dared 
attend.
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles objected to the memorial 
service. In his opinion Winter Davis had "possessed genius, a graceful 
elocution, an erratic ability of a certain kind, but was an uneasy 
spirit, an unsafe and undesirable man, without useful talents for his 
country or mankind." The service for "this distinguished 'Plug Ugly' 
and 'Dead Rabbit'," Welles charged, was "copied almost literally from 
that of the 12th in memory of Mr. Lincoln." Welles judged the memorial 
service to be "a burlesque, which partakes of the ridiculous more than
2Congressional Globe, 39th-lst-Appendix, 159-64.
the solemn, Intended to belittle the memory of Lincoln as much as to 
exalt Davis, who opposed It." Welles resolved that he would not attend 
and presented his view to President Johnson. The President likewise 
declined to honor In death a man he opposed In life.3
Later that afternoon friends of the President assembled at 
Grover's Theater In Washington to listen to speeches by Montgomery 
Blair, Davis' bitterest opponent in politics, and by others berating 
the Radical Republicans and applauding the President. After their 
meeting adjourned they marched up Pennsylvania Avenue to the White 
House to serenade the President.
Johnson was jubilant at the sight of the partisan crowd and 
went out on the portico of the White House to give them a fighting 
speech. "I fought traitors and treason in the South: I opposed the
Davises, the Toombs', the Slidell's ...," he shouted to the cheering 
crowd; "now when I turn around and at the other end of the line find 
men— I care not by what name you call them— who will stand opposed to 
the restoration of the Union of these States, I am free to say to you 
I am still in the field."
"Give us the names at the other end," cried one man in the 
audience. "Name them!" cried another.
"You ask me who they are," shouted the President. "I say Thaddeus 
Stevens of Pennsylvania is one; I say Mr. Sumner of the Senate is
3Howard K. Beale (ed.), Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the 
Navy under Lincoln and Johnson (New York, 1960), II, 438.
another; and Wendell Phillips is another.ntt
Had Henry Winter Davis lived he surely would have been named by 
Johnson that night. A vitriolic critic of Johnson, Davis opposed him 
and his reconstruction policy almost from Johnson's assumption of the 
Presidency. But Davis was gone and Johnson had ignored his passing.
^Claude G. Bowers, The Tragic Era: The Revolution after Lincoln
(Boston, 1929), 103-104; Edward McPherson (ed.), The Political History 




A few months before he died, Henry Winter Davis began his 
autobiography. Disappointed over recent political defeats and uncertain 
of his political future he wrote complainingly: "The glories of the
world have passed before me, but have not lighted on my head. I have 
lived during great events in which I have not been permitted to be an 
actor." He died before he could finish his defense of his "uneventful 
life," and the part completed describes without candor his childhood 
and college years. But the influence of his autocratic father, whom 
he both admired and resented, is clearly indicated.1
Of commanding presence, endowed with a keen mind, and unswerving 
in a cause he felt just, the Reverend Henry Lyon Davis was a man to 
esteem; but Parson Davis was also an arrogant self-righteous man who 
was constitutionally opposed to- getting along with either his superiors 
or his parishioners. He was the model his son would follow: intelli­
gent, independent, unbending, and dictatorial. "My father," Henry 
Winter wrote, "was a man of genius, endowed with varied and profound 
learning, eminently versed in mathematics and natural science, abound­
ing in classical lore, endowed with a vast memory and gifted with an
Mavis' manuscript autobiography is located in the Henry Winter 
Davis Mss at the Maryland Historical Society. It was published as the 
first three chapters of Bernard C. Steiner's Life of Henry W. Davis 
(Baltimore, 1916). Quotations are from the Steiner edition, p. 7.
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accurate, concise, clear and graceful style."2
Henry Lyon Davis was born in Charles County, Maryland in 1775.
The son of Naylor and Jane Lyon Davis, slaveholding farm people of 
Prince George's County, Maryland,3 he entered Dickinson College in 
Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in 1791. Dickinson in that period was a hub of 
learning for sons of wealthy Maryland planters and Pennsylvania 
merchants. Among Davis' classmates at Dickinson were Jesse Wharton, 
later Congressman and Senator from Tennessee, and a fellow Marylander, 
Roger Brooke Taney, a life-long friend. In October, 1792, Davis was 
appointed by the Trustees of Dickinson to teach ancient languages. Two 
years later he became principal of the "Latten School" and at the end 
of that year he was graduated with the degree of A.B.4
Davis chose the Episcopal ministry and, after serving as a tutor 
at Charlotte Hall School in southern Maryland, was ordained in 1796. 
Thereafter he served a series of parishes, beginning with All Faith 
Church in St. Mary's, then King and Queen in St. Mary's in 1801, Trinity 
Church in Charles County in 1802, and in 1804, St. Stephen's Church in 
the northern Chesapeake county of Cecil.5
2Steiner, Davis, 8.
3Naylor Davis owned 12 slaves and a farm of 174 acres in tobacco 
growing Prince George's County. See Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census, Heads of Families at the First Census— 1790 (Washington, 
1907), 93; and Chancery Records, June Term 1802, Book 56, folio 474, 
Maryland Hall of Records.
Sfhitefield J. Bell, Jr., College Historian of Dickinson College, 
to Willard L. King, 6, 12 December 1951, David Davis Mss, Chicago 
Historical Society; Willard L. King, Lincoln's Manager, David Davis 
(Cambridge, 1960), 1.
5Ethan Allen, Clergy in Maryland of the Protestant Episcopal, 
Church (Baltimore, 1860), 24.
7
The Episcopal Church and the Federalist party were the major 
articles of Davis' philosophy. His son described him as "a Federalist 
of the most elevated stamp— early embraced and always adhered to." As 
he objected to laxity among the clergy, so he objected to abuses of the 
Republicans. As was the custom, Davis declared a fast day before the 
presidential election of 1808. His parishioners objected that his 
sermon was more like a stump speech for George Clinton, the Federalist 
candidate, than an orthodox sermon. To this charge Davis replied to his 
bishop: "Tom Painites and Jeffersonians will always say that a fast day
is an electioneering measure, or a piece of hypocrisy." But he thanked 
God that he could preach and pray for their conversion. He continued 
his electioneering sermons but modified them so that "even Madison 
himself could not censure such a fast." To his bishop he complained 
that Madison would surely be elected and that even on the Eastern Shore 
"Clinton's friends are deserting him in crowds and falling back into the 
ranks of Jacobinism." He predicted that "in less than two years every 
man who fears death will be obliged to swallow an oath of allegiance 
to Bonaparte." His staunch Federalist politics and his magisterial 
avowal of them did little to endear him to his predominately Jefferson­
ian parishioners.7
In February 1816, after 12 turbulent years as Rector at St.
6H. L. Davis to T. J. Claggett, 11 November 1805, 20 January 
1806, Protestant Episcopal Church, Diocese of Maryland Mss, Duke 
University; George Johnston, History of Cecil County, Maryland,
(Baltimore, 1881), 454.
7Steiner, Davis, 8; H. I.. Davis to T. J. Claggett, 10 September,
7 October 1808, Protestant Episcopal Church, Diocese of Maryland Mss,
Duke University.
8
Stephen's, and with charges of intemperance surrounding his resignation, 
the Rev. Mr. Davis moved to Annapolis as Rector of St. Anne's parish 
and Vice Principal of St. John's College. As minister of the most 
prestigious Episcopal Church in Maryland, he easily entered Annapolis 
society where he met Jane Brown Winter, eldest daughter of the wealthy 
merchant, Walter Winter, and granddaughter of the influential Episcopa­
lian scholar, the Rev. Issac Campbell. Miss Winter was described as 
"a lady of graceful and simple manners, fair complexion, blue eyes, 
auburn hair, and with a rich and exquisite voice." They were married 
on September 22, 1816. Little is known of her life except that she 
suffered from chronic ill health, came from a family plagued by mental 
illness, and was herself subsequently deranged.8
As Vice Principal of St. John's College, Davis was an inspiring 
lecturer and strict disciplinarian. His first change was a rule 
prohibiting any student from frequenting billiard tables in the town.
His second was to order 200 copies of the college rules with the 
injunction that "every Scholar above the age of fourteen be required 
solemnly to promise to observe said rules." His passion for discipline 
caused friction with the St. John's Board of Visitors and Governors.
In October 1816 when Davis requested the adoption of additional 
discipline rules, the Board turned him down flat with a recommendation
8Steiner, Davis, 10, 16-17; Horace E. Hayden, Virginia Genealogies 
(Wilkes-Barre, Pa., 1891), 165; Maryland Gazette. 3 October 1816; Chan­
cery Papers 1453, Frederick County, 1817, Henry Davis, Jane Davis, & 
Elizabeth Winter vs. William Winter, Lunatic, Maryland Hall of Records; 
Ethan Allen, "Eastern Shore Parishes, Vol. I: Cecil, Kent and Caroline,"
Mss, Maryland Hall of Records, 60; Bishop James Kemp to William Duke, 15 
January 1818, Protestant Episcopal Church, Maryland Diocesan Library, 
Maryland Historical Society; David Davis to Julius Rockwell, 27 December 
1855, David Davis Mss, CHS.
9
that he simply enforce the existent regulations.9
On August 16, 1817, the Davis' first child, Henry Winter, was born 
at the St. Anne's parsonage. Two months later, St. John's College had 
to close because of financial difficulties. When it reopened the 
following year, Parson Davis was appointed to instruct mathematics. To 
moderate Davis' rigidly regimented teaching, the Board passed detailed 
instructions on what was to be taught and how. Many of the Board 
agreed with Davis' new methods, however, and in June of 1820, a 
majority finally consented to name him Principal or President of St. 
John's. But in the following month, the Board, apparently distrustful, 
selected a new Chairman who held opposing views to the Principal's.
From the time Davis took over as Principal he was involved in a 
continuous struggle with the Board for control of the College. Each 
proposal he submitted to the Board was turned down, including one to 
allow him to change rooms because on cloudy days his classroom was "much 
too dark for a man of failing eyes." Other proposals disapproved were
for changes in the discipline rule, the establishment of standard dress,
and tuition scholarships.
This discord between Parson Davis and the Board became open war­
fare when Davis placed an announcement in the Maryland Gazette calling 
for "All Graduates of this or other colleges" to act as examiners for
the senior class. Previous to this announcement it had been the
practice for the Board to appoint a committee to listen to the orations
9A11 information regarding St. John's College unless otherwise 
noted is from the "Minutes, 1786-1826" of the Board of Visitors and 
Governors of St. John's College, St. John's College Archives, Maryland 
Hall of Records.
10
of the graduating students. Davis sought to establish a new system of 
public examinations to demonstrate the excellence of his students. The 
Board, composed of wealthy merchants and lawyers but not necessarily 
college graduates, was offended by Davis' action and called for a letter 
of explanation. Davis replied that he had not violated any rule of the 
college, but that he would cancel the exercises "and give public notice 
of my disappointment." Many on the Board considered Davis' letter 
disrespectful and a motion was made to dismiss him, but he was saved 
by one vote. By the end of the summer, however, he had incurred the 
animosity of a majority of the Board by his uncompromising behavior.
On September 22, 1821, he was demoted to Professor of Mathematics and 
Natural Philosophy.10
By removing his as principal but retaining him as professor, the 
Board obviously felt that they had silenced Parson Davis. But when the 
Board met several weeks later, Board President William Marriott 
announced that Dr. Davis had brought suit against the Board of Visitors 
and Governors. The members then heard complaints against Davis' conduct 
brought by Dr. William Rofferty, "an Irish Democrat" as Henry Winter 
described him, regarding the order of daily instruction. As the Board 
wished to confer regarding the charges they asked Dr. Davis to leave 
the room. Indignantly Davis refused to leave claiming he was a board 
member by virtue of his still valid appointment as Principal. Again 
the Board asked him to leave and again he refused. Exasperated by his 
truculent behavior, even Davis' supporters deserted him, and by a vote
10Tench Francis Tilghman, "Exteunt, Roaring," Maryland Historical 
Magazine, 63 (March, 1963), 94-99.
11
of ten to six he was relieved of all duties at St. John's.1*
One month later Parson Davis opened a private school In Annapolis. 
To his new school Davis brought his nephew, later United States Supreme 
Court Justice and Senator David Davis. Young David was sent to 
Annapolis by his mother and stepfather to be educated and raised by 
his uncle for one year. At the end of two years, David's stepfather, 
Franklin Betts, a Baltimore bookdealer, asked for David's return.
Parson Davis refused to send the boy back, alleging that Betts was 
unfit to care for David and charging him with squandering David's 
inheritance. Betts took Davis to court. "My wife is extremely uneasy 
and unhappy about her little boy now with the Rev. H. L. Davis," Betts 
informed the Chancery Court. "She has heard and she believes it that 
Mr. Davis has taken to Drinking to excess— she has also heard that the 
Society in Annapolis have notified Mr. Davis that he will not be 
wanted to preach after this year." The court ordered the return of 
young David to Betts, who eventually expropriated David's entire 
inheritance, and as was alleged by Mrs. Betts, St. Anne's Parish soon 
dismissed their Rector.13
^Steiner, Davis, 8-9; Henry Winter Davis incorrectly stated:
"My father was removed from the presidency of St. John's by a Board 
of Democratic trustees because of his Federal politics." This may well
have been the case at the Wilmington Academy, but not St. John's. See
Tilghman, "Exeunt, Roaring," 94-99.
12Maryland Gazette, 15 November 1821.
13Franklin Betts to H. L. Davis, 21 July 1825, Franklin Betts to
Chancellor Theodorick Bland, 15 October 1825, Chancery Papers, 7435, 
Cecil County (1841), Maryland Hall of Records. Also see King, Lincoln's 
Manager, David Davis, 7-8; Ethan Allen, Historical Notes of St. Anne's 
Parish (Baltimore, 1857), 106-108; Walter B. Norris, Illustrated History 
and Guide Book to St. Anne's Parish, Annapolis (Annapolis, 1947), 8.
12
Dr. Davis moved to Wilmington, Delaware, in 1826, where he became 
Principal of Wilmington Academy. In addition to the academy, he opened 
a grammar school and hoarded students in his home. This adventure 
began auspiciously but soon began to suffer because of Davis' ill 
health and his growing addiction to liquor. By early 1828 he was at 
odds with the citizens of Wilmington, whereupon he closed the school and 
moved to a farm near Woodbine, Howard District (now county) of Anne 
Arundel County, Maryland. "I shall never cease to regret that I 
suffered myself to be seduced to Wilmington," Davis wrote a friend,
"where I sunk so much money, and experienced so much opposition." He 
had gone there with "high hopes," and consequently the "shock of 
disappointment was violent." Unable to admit his shortcomings, he 
blamed his troubles on his staunch Federalists beliefs: "Had I
condescended to write for the Jackson Gazette, I might have prospered.1,1 ** 
Leaving preaching and teaching, Davis became a farmer. "By the 
blessing of God I am now comfortably settled on my own farm," he wrote 
a friend, "and have servants more than enough to cultivate it." Like 
other slaveholders, he felt the moral burden of the peculiar institution. 
"As my black people reach 25 years, I emancipate them, and send them to 
Liberia, having first taught them to read."15 His new found prosperity 
lasted only two years, and in 1830 the Davis family was again on the 
move, this time to Elkton, Maryland. Unable to obtain a parish because
11+Wilmington Gazette, 13 June, 3 November 1826; Wilmington American 
Watchman, 30 May 1827; H. L. Davis to T. McDowell, 4 March 1828, David
Davis Mss, CHS.
15H. L. Davis to T. McDowell, 4 March 1828, David Davis Mss, CHS;
Steiner, Davis, 14.
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of charges of Intemperance, Parson Davis worked a farm in Elkton for 
two years. During that time he sought unsuccessfully the aid of his 
former classmate at Dickinson College, Roger B. Taney, recently 
appointed Attorney General of the United States, to secure an appoint­
ment as Chaplain in the Army.16 Failing at farming, Davis took to 
liquor and finally moved in with his cousin, Dr. David Davis at George­
town Cross Roads, Kent County, Maryland. With his health failing, he 
farmed out his children— young Henry Winter to various relatives and 
eleven year old Jane to other relatives in Jefferson County, Virginia.
In the last months of 1836 he died, an impoverished man.17
Parson Davis' life had been a series of bitter conflicts with his 
fellow clergymen, his parishioners, and his superiors. A gifted orator, 
learned, fiercely determined, he commanded respect from his family and 
even his adversaries. But he was inflexible, stern, and dictatorial 
and seemed not to have commanded their love— not even from his son who 
followed his father's habits and principles.
"My father's death," recalled Henry Winter, "embittered the last 
days of the year 1836 and left me without a counsellor." But Henry had 
often been left without his father. Even when he lived with his father 
in the St. Anne's parsonage, he was raised "under the sharp discipline 
of my aunt Elizabeth Brice Winter." An exceptionally bright child, 
he was taught to read before he was four years old, "though much 
against my will." His aunt directed most of his early education at
16H. L. Davis to R. B. Taney, 3 August 1831, in Carl B. Swisher, 
Roger B. Taney (New York, 1936), 145.
17Steiner, Davis, 15; see also the Will of Henry Lyon Davis, Liber 
JFB, No. 1, p. 32, Maryland Hall of Records.
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home, except for a brief period when he attended St. John's Grammar 
School.18
When the Rev. Mr. Davis was dismissed from St. Anne's, nine- 
year-old Henry was sent off to the home of his aunt in Alexandria,
D. C., where he attended a private school run by a Mr. Wheat. At the 
end of the school term his aunt returned him to his father in Wilmington, 
where he attended Wilmington Academy for a single term. After his 
father's failure at Wilmington, he moved with his family to the farm 
near Woodbine, Maryland. There he spent more time in the woods hunting 
than in the house studying. "Before I was eleven I was inspired with 
the sporting fever and roamed the country with a gun larger than I well 
could bear," he recalled, "superintended by a trusty servant, Frank 
Gamer, to see that I did not shoot myself instead of the birds."19
Young Henry's relationship with Frank Garner and his father's 
other slaves was an important influence on his later life. "My 
familiar association with the slaves while a boy gave me great insight 
into their feelings and views," he reflected over thirty years later. 
"They spoke with freedom before a boy what they would have repressed 
before a man." His father's slaves felt wronged and yearned for free­
dom. "They were attached to my father and loved me, yet they habitually 
spoke of the days when God would deliver them." Davis vividly 
recollected that the slaves warned him that "Master will have many a 




heaven at the last day."20
Henry and his sister Jane were responsible for teaching the slaves 
to read so that they could be manumitted according to their father's 
directions. "Most of them, young and old learned to read well, but 
none of them could ever be induced to take their freedom on condition 
of going to Liberia." Records reveal that only one slave was ever 
legally manumitted during their father's lifetime and there is no 
record that he consented to go to Liberia. But the wrong of slavery, 
despite the prevailing view in Maryland that slavery was moral and 
beneficial to the slave, lasted with Henry and his sister so strongly 
that after their father's death, they freed all the slaves they jointly 
inherited.21
When his father no longer could support his family on the farm 
in Elkton, Henry went to a relative's home at Georgetown Cross Roads. 
After a winter there, he was again shipped off to his aunt's home in 
Alexandria. In order to prepare him for college, she enrolled him at 
the Rev. Loring Woart's Academy in Alexandria, now the Episcopal High 
School of Virginia. "I never have met a man who could lead, control 
and influence youth as Mr. Woart did," Davis wrote. "He joined in our 
sports on the lawn, led the skating matches, the swimming expedition, 
spoke ex-cathedra in the schoolroom, and in the long winter evening read
20Ibid., 13.
21Ibid., 14; Anne Arundel County Deeds. Liber C, No. 3. 1816-1844, 
p. 420-421, shows that on 1 September 1828, H. L. Davis manumitted John 
Thomas, age 34, in consideration of one dollar. Six months later Thomas 
was issued a certificate to allow him to travel on the roads of Mary- 
land, Anne Arundel County Certificates of Freedom, 1810-1834, p. 301, 
Maryland Hall of Records.
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Scott's novels to an entranced crowd." From the Rev. Mr. Woart as much 
from his father, Davis learned "a high lesson in the art of elocution"—  
the power that the spoken word had on an audience. That lesson remained 
with him.22
In the fall of 1833 Henry Davis left Alexandria for Kenyon College 
in Gambier, Ohio. His father and aunt raised the necessary $88 for 
tuition, room and board for one year so that he could follow his cousin 
David to college. "I crossed the Alleghenies by the National Road, on 
the top of the stage for the benefit of the scenery. It was my first 
view of the great ridge," he reminisced. "When I crossed the Ohio I saw 
the new and strange West .... Gone were the smooth and open lands, the 
aristocratic old mansions and the swarm of slaves to which I had been
accustomed in Maryland and Virginia." He wrote home that he was pleased
"with the general appearance of the country."23
The stage arrived at Gambier, Ohio, on October 28th "in a snow­
storm, the ground frozen where it was bared by the wind— after having 
broken down four stages, one of them four times, on the horrible roads." 
Kenyon College had been founded in 1824 by Bishop Philander Chase, the 
first Episcopal Bishop in the Northwest Territory, with the help of 
Henry Clay. "Kenyon was then the centre of a vast forest," Davis 
wrote, "broken only by occasional clearings."
Young Henry was boarded in a large dormitory so ill constructed 
that "not only wind but light penetrated" through the planks. "It was
22Steiner, Davis, 15-16; David Davis to Henry Winter Syle, 7 May
1875, David Davis Mss, CHS.
23Steiner, Davis, 21.
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like camping out," he recalled. "The snow drifted straight through, 
covered the bed and made drifts on the floor." As students were not 
allowed servants, they cut their own wood, made their own fires, and 
drew their own water. "Such a life was healthy," he later thought,
"and to young men of sixteen not unpleasant." 2 **
His first year at Kenyon was in the preparatory school studying to 
pass the examination to be admitted to the freshman class. He wrote 
that the most stimulating study of the first year was the translation 
of "the whole Sallust's 'Bellum Catilinarium,' a work which was much 
more a lesson in English writing than in Latin construction and tended 
more than anything could have done to fix the habit of brief, sincere 
and pointed expression" on him.
Henry spent his first vacation at Kenyon rather than make the 
long and difficult trip to Maryland. He studied diligently that summer 
and on October 29, 1834, he passed the entrance examination and at the 
age of seventeen was enrolled in the freshman class. He delighted in 
his wonderful opportunity to become a learned man like his father. He 
tackled all the freshman subjects— natural science, political economy, 
logic, and metaphysics. Foremost among his interests, however, was 
history. To his regret he discovered that of modern historical works 
only Niebuhr's History of Rome and Gibbon's Rise and Fall of the Roman 
Empire were then known in the backwoods of Ohio. Gibbon's massive work, 
which Davis referred to as "the morning star of historical investiga­
tion," remained his favorite work of history throughout his life.25
2**Ibid., 22; see also Gordon K. Chalmers, The College in the 
Forest— 1824 (New York, 1948), 7-10.
25Steiner, Davis, 28-32.
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Kenyon College was under the direction of Bishop Charles Pettit 
Mcllvaine described by Davis as "a man of the world as well as a man of 
God— but not a man of the Western world of that day." Mcllvaine had 
been a chaplain at West Point where he instructed and counseled both 
Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee. Although unsuccessful as a bishop, 
at the college Mcllvaine was "of infinite use in breeding gentlemen out 
of the rough material there collected," Davis thought. Henry Davis was 
captivated by Mcllvaine's speeches and labeled him "a master of the 
highest art of oratory. To listen to him on Sunday was a lesson in 
oratory which would be had nowhere else in the United States, unless at
the feet of Webster or Clay." From him Davis acquired the finer points
of public speaking that had only been sketched by his father and the 
Rev. Mr. Woart. Other professors at Kenyon were Dr. Benjamin F. Bache, 
his chemistry teacher who became his life-long friend, C. Putnam 
Buckingham who instructed mathematics, and Dr. William Sparrow, lecturer 
in moral science. Sparrow's deep thought and expressive language were 
particularly attractive to Henry. But Sparrow's Virginia background 
bent him to apologize for the institution of slavery which Henry found 
conflicted with reality.26
At Kenyon young Davis found two literary and social societies, the 
Nu Pi Kappa and the Philomathesian. In 1833 there had been only one
society but it split. In that year the Nat Turner rebellion, the
Virginia Convention debate on emancipation, and the establishment of 
William Lloyd Garrison's The Liberator hardened feelings about slavery,
26Ibid., 36-39.
and like other organizations, the Kenyon literary society divided 
sectionally. Faced with a decision of which to join, Henry chose the 
N.P.K., the Southern society. "The negro question was an element of 
division, but not bitter nor exciting," he later explained. "The 
societies were rivals, not foes, and the associations followed predilec­
tion and not origin." His decision brought down on him the stem rebuke 
of his father. "I was from the South," he replied to his father, "had 
been b o m  and bred in the South, and why, when there was a Southern 
society on the hill, I should join the Northern, I cannot conceive."27
National politics also stirred the interest of the students, 
reaching a high point in the presidential campaign of 1836. Davis 
wrote that in this election his "lofty and impractical notions of what a 
President ought to be" almost made him desert the weak and incapable 
Whig, William Henry Harrison, and "against my distrust of all Demo­
crats"— which he learned from his father— support Martin Van Buren. It 
was, he later recalled, "the only weakness of my life in that respect." 
His Whiggery remained steadfast, but another issue introduced in the 
election disturbed him— the demand for the abolition of slavery by 
zealous abolitionists. "Imprinted on my memory," he wrote, "was the 
growing disgust for Abolitionists which then began to take the place of 
old and universal sympathy for emancipation."28
By spending all his vacations at Kenyon, Henry was able to skip
27Ibid., 25-26, 33-34; the Nu Pi Kappa file in the Kenyon College 
Archives, Gambier, Ohio, disclosed a membership list with Henry W. Davis
enrolled as the fifty-seventh member and a Treasurer's Report signed by 
H. W. Davis.
28Steiner, Davis, 32, 39-40.
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the sophomore course and enter the junior class directly after his 
freshman year. After two more years of study, mainly of "metaphysics 
and morals, varied by a spell on the public roads of Ohio," he was 
graduated with honors on September 6, 1837. He had acquired a classical 
education of which his father would have been proud had he still lived. 
But his years of study at Kenyon did not satisfy Henry Davis. "I knew 
something of books, but nothing of man," he lamented, "and I went forth 




THE LABOR OF LAW
After four years in Ohio, twenty year old Henry Davis returned 
home. He vacationed for some time in Charlestown, Virginia, at the 
stately mansion of Bushrod Washington. But soon his "scholastic airs" 
began to conflict "with the habits of the landed gentry into whose talk 
of oxen and horses I was foolish enough to enter," he recalled. "The 
world was all before me where to choose, and Providence my guide," he 
wrote, but his immediate problem was finances. His father's estate 
consisted of twenty-five slaves but no cash, securities, or land. In 
his will, Parson Davis declared his slaves freed one year after he died 
on the condition that they be turned over to the Maryland State Colon­
ization Society to be sent to Liberia. There he thought their chances 
for "comfort and prosperity" would be better. "Had the adult ones been 
willing to go to that country, I should have liberated them several 
years ago," he wrote on his death bed. "But the freedom I bequeath to 
them is suspended on their consent to return to the land of their 
fathers. In the United States they cannot be free." As none of the 
slaves consented to immigrate to Liberia, they were eventually 
manumitted by Henry and his sister Jane at great financial loss to 
both. But both strongly opposed the institution of slavery and would
21
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not own slaves under any condition.1
Possessing a college education but no means to support himself, 
Davis was forced to choose a profession but he disliked the occupations 
that were open to a young man of his standing. His father had 
"dedicated" him to the ministry, "but the day was gone when such 
dedications determined the life of young men," he wrote. Theology as 
a subject of "historic and metaphysical investigation" interested him, 
"but for the ministry I had no calling." Business was likewise an 
uninviting alternative. "For all forms of mercantile pursuits I had 
no taste and great disgust," he confessed. "It was then a prevailing 
sentiment in Maryland and Virginia that trade was not suited for a 
gentleman." He of necessity obtained a position as a tutor and lived 
with his Aunt Elizabeth in Alexandria for two years. The "drudgery" 
of teaching was relieved only by studying literature and preparing 
for law school.2
Law appeared to Henry as the only recourse open to a gentleman.
Of the two routes to becoming a lawyer— reading law in the office of a 
practicing lawyer or attending a university— Davis preferred the 
university. While waiting to accumulate enough money to enter law 
school, he received "a very advantageous offer from a gentleman in 
Mississippi, and I was about to accept it," he wrote, "but the final 
letters were delayed and I remained in Virginia." His Mississippi 
scheme brought a "cry of horror" from his Aunt Elizabeth who believed
1Will of Henry Lyon Davis, Liber JFB, No. 1, p. 32, Maryland
Hall of Records; Steiner, Davis, 40-41.
2Steiner, Davis, 41-44.
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Mississippi to be "a sink of iniquity" and "a broad road to destruc­
tion." Hastily she sold some land which enabled Davis to enter the 
University of Virginia law school.3
On September 9, 1839, "aided by my aunt's munificence," Davis 
arrived at Charlottesville for a year of the study of law. The 
University of Virginia, designed by Thomas Jefferson, consisted of "a 
miniature of the Pantheon of Agrippa at the head of a broad lawn,"
Davis recalled, "on either side of which were two rows of dormitories, 
after the fashion of negro cabins, broken at regular intervals by the 
professor's houses."
The students at Virginia differed drastically with those at 
Kenyon. "The tone and bearing of the students was high and manly." he 
noted, "but their cultivation was not equal to it." He thought their 
"sense of personal dignity and self-importance was developed to an 
exaggerated degrees" so that "the duel was the only soap for tarnished 
honor.” Poorly educated in English and mathematics, they were assumed 
to be competent in their studies since they were gentlemen. Many came 
to Virginia with no purpose of taking a diploma— attending classes only 
occasionally while drinking and gaming to excess. In contrast to 
Kenyon, the literary societies were in a state of decline. Denied the 
forum of active debating societies, Davis was limited to the moot court 
to try his forensic wings.
In the dormitories and boarding houses, constitutional theories 
were a favorite topic of discussion. "I had sat at the feet of Clay
3Ibid., 44-45; Mary to Jane W. Davis, 13 June 1840, David Davis
Mss, CHS.
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and Webster as the rest had of Jefferson and Calhoun,11 Davis recalled.
He and a small group of dissenters were "always a minority on the 
defense" when constitutional topics arose for discussion. He admitted 
that he was usually routed by the superior numbers, but he would never 
concede the right of nullification or secession. Such opinions were 
unpopular at Virginia and he was "vigorously denounced for a Federal­
ist. "**
Davis felt estranged from the aspiring Virginia gentlemen.
"Perhaps my Ohio residence made me sensitive".to the northern position, 
he thought. "I remember being rather disgusted by the change from 
Maryland to Ohio— from the cultivation and distinction of classes to 
the rough dead level of the West." On his return from Ohio he felt "a 
sort of revulsion" toward slavery "which I certainly had not carried 
with me to the West." But at the University of Virginia, the students 
considered slavery to the "natural, the only tolerable possible state 
of the negro."
The course of study for students in law was not confined merely 
to reading law. Davis recalled that he "got a smattering of French 
and German, with a compound pronunciation of both," a basic course in 
geology, and the "outer bark of English and Scotch Mental Philosophy" 
from Professor George Tucker. Tucker, Davis thought, "gave his students 
vertigo by the narrow circle in which he revolved." But during his year 
in residence, the main course of study was "the crab-bed and jealous 
jade of the law."
Professor John A. G. Davis was the Law School. He lectured
**Steiner, Davis, 45-48.
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extensively on the Virginia Statutes and decisions of the Virginia 
Court of Appeals. Henry thought that Professor Davis was a "preacher 
of Jeffersonianism"— he used The Federalist as a textbook on the 
Constitution but read it "by the light of the Jeffersonian Commentator." 
In addition, Whig constitutional authorities were denounced, Webster's 
arguments were answered by a "shrug of the shoulders," and Justice 
Joseph Storey's anti-slavery position made his constitutional studies 
"suspected." Davis felt that Jefferson's ideas were "expounded ex­
cathedra— with a glance to the Holy Mount," Monticello. Evaluating 
his professor as a guide to the complexities of the law, Davis wrote 
"that Professor Davis was no light in that labryinth!"5
In addition to attending lectures, students engaged in an exten­
sive course of reading, chiefly Coke on Littleton. In the field of 
international law, Vattel's textbook was basic, and Justice Storey's 
treatises, while "not orthodox" on the Constitution, was "unavoidable" 
in the study of equity law. The only book Davis enjoyed was Stephen's 
The Scientific Art of Pleading. "The study of that beautiful work was 
admirably calculated to form the mind of a scientific lawyer," he 
recalled, "and I for long years have done it homage at the end of many 
a well-fought and successful struggle."
Studying law was "torture" for Davis. "The invisible distinctions" 
and "the endless diversities of the recondite principles" bored him.
The months of endless cramming shortened his patience of details and 
slackened his determination to master the law. "Sometimes I have thrown 
the book across the room in wrath, and once my fellow students attest
5Ibid., 48-56.
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having caught me kicking it over the floor in a moment of mental 
agony," he wrote. But "still I mastered it." On July 3, 1840, Davis 
and twelve other were graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Laws. 
Later in life he ascribed all his ability and success as a lawyer to 
his year of intense study at the University of Virginia. "I have found 
myself armed where others have been naked in the day of battle— familiar 
with matters which were mysteries to competitors."*’
By the fall of 1840 Davis returned to Alexandria, District of 
Columbia, to begin his legal career. It was customary for every law 
student to get professional experience in the office of some established 
lawyer before practicing on his own. No records have been found to 
indicate whether Davis served such an apprenticeship. It seems probable 
that he did, at least for some brief period— possibly in Charlestown, 
Virginia. It is also quite difficult to judge how successful his 
practice was during his first years. No business records exist for 
any of his career; court dockets for these years are unavailable; his 
autobiography stopped short of the period. Senator John A. J. Creswell 
later claimed that "his ability and industry attracted attention, and 
before long he had acquired a respectable practice, which thenceforth 
protected him from all annoyances of a pecuniary nature."7 On the 
other hand, there are indications that Davis was less than submerged
6Ibid., 55; Registrar's Records, Alderman Library, University of 
Virginia.
7Henry Winter Davis, Speeches and Addresses Delivered in the 
Congress of the United States and on Several Public Occasions (New York, 
1867), xix; Henry Winter Davis to William A. Carter et al. n.d.,
William A. Carter Mss, Bancroft Library, University of California, 
Berkeley.
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with clients. Alexandria, one of the three towns of the District of 
Columbia along with Washington and Georgetown, was a river port for 
northern Virginia and depended on trade for its prosperity. The Panic 
of 1837 had disrupted both exports and imports and depressed the town's 
economy. Alexandria's population in 1840 of 8,459 showed an increase 
of only 218 in the last ten years and only 241 in the last twenty. 
Alexandria had slipped in prominence from the days when George Wash­
ington was the town patriarch, and when Robert E. Lee was a boy. A 
town of that size could not support the numerous lawyers who lived 
there.8
The major industry in Alexandria was the import-export trade which 
was controlled by two large establishments, A. C. Cazenove & Sons and 
Wm. Fowle & Son, Dry Goods Merchants. After some years, Davis was 
retained as counsel for both of these firms through his marriage to 
Constance Tabor Gardner, granddaughter of Anthony-Charles de Cazenove. 
The senior member of A. C. Cazenove & Sons was a Swiss refugee from the 
French Revolution who arrived in the United States in 1794. A close 
friend of the du Pont family and through them of Thomas Jefferson, he 
was urged by Jefferson to establish his business in Alexandria. By 
the time the federal government moved to Washington, D. C., Cazenove's 
firm was one of the largest mercantile establishments in the South. 
Cazenove's eldest daughter, Eliza, married William Collins Gardner, 
a native of Newport, Rhode Island, who joined his dry goods business.8
8Kabler, Alexandria, passim.
9John B. Askling, "Anthony-Charles Cazenove, Political Refugee, 
Merchant and Friend, 1775-1852," n.p., n.d.; Genealogy of the Cazenove 
Family, Mss., Eleutherian Mills Historical Library.
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Eliza and William Gardner's third child, Constance, was the 
darling of the Cazenove family. Frail, delicate, and bright, she had 
soft dark eyes and long dark brown hair. Plagued by illness as a child, 
she contracted consumption, the nineteenth century term for pulmonary 
tuberculosis, before she was twenty. Despite her poor health, she was 
one of the most eligible belles of Alexandria society. Henry Davis was 
probably introduced to her by his sister Jane who was a friend and 
companion of Connie's.
Henry courted Constance for five years during which her health 
continued to fail. They were engaged to be married in 1844, but her 
father's death in November delayed the event. Her health became so bad 
the following winter, that her family decided she should visit Newport 
to gain strength. At Newport she received news of the death of a 
beloved uncle and that event seriously set back her recovery. It also 
cancelled plans the young couple had made to be married at the end of 
the summer in Newport. Constance's mother told her friends that the 
second family tragedy postponed the marriage, "probably forever," and 
Mrs. Gardner and Connie both offered to release Davis from the engage­
ment. Davis refused the offer and finally on October 30, 1845, Henry 
Winter Davis and Constance Tabor Gardner were married in St. Paul's 
Episcopal Church in Alexandria.10
10David Davis to wife, 7 March 1848, David Davis Mss, CHS; 
Alexandria Gazette, 29 November 1844, 3 November 1845; Sophie M. Du Pont 
(hereafter cited as SMDP) to Samuel Francis Du Pont (hereafter cited as 
SFDP), 21 January 1844, Henry Francis du Pont Collection of Winterthur 
Mss 9-21532, hereafter cited as WMss; SMDP to Clementine Smith, 7 April 
1845, WMss 9-21570; Louis A. Cazenove to Eleutheria du Pont Smith, 6 
June 1845, L. A. Cazenove Mss, LC; SMDP to Constance Gardner, 29 July 
1845, WMss 9-21576; Sophie M. Du Pont Diary, 9 August 1845, WMss 
9-40396; SMDP to SFDP, 5 September 1845, WMss 9-21585.
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After a brief honeymoon to western Virginia, the newlyweds 
returned to Alexandria and moved into Mrs. Gardner's large, gloomy 
brick home on King Street. Disappointed by his humdrum law practice, 
Davis found his solace at home. He and Connie spent long hours 
discussing literature, theology, but most frequently, government. 
Marriage proved socially and economically advantageous for Davis. 
Connie's relatives constituted the apex of Alexandria society— the 
men, gifted and wealthy, and the ladies, cultivated and refined. His 
wife's grandfather was town patriarch A. C. Cazenove; her brother-in- 
law was Cassius F. Lee of the Lee family, who was Clerk of the 
Alexandria Court; her cousins, William H. Fowle and Louis A. Cazenove 
were town councilmen. At first treated as something of an interloper, 
Davis was gradually accepted into the family.
The most important of the connections Davis made through his 
marriage to Connie was the friendship of the wealthy and influential 
Du Pont family of Delaware. Sophie Madeline Du Pont was Connie's 
childhood friend. Davis came to know both Sophie and her husband, 
Captain Samuel Francis Du Pont of the United States Navy. Du Pont and 
Davis came to know and trust each other; for fifteen years each man was 
the other's most trusted counselor.
The Davis-Du Pont friendship began indirectly. Within months 
after the wedding, Constance's health began to improve. The cold winter 
followed by an early humid spring caused a relapse, however, and that 
summer on doctor's order she traveled north to escape the savage heat 
and humidity of Alexandria. After the June term of court, Davis joined 
his wife at the Du Pont's luxurious home, Louviers, outside of 
Wilmington, Delaware. "I was surprised to find him so very young
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looking, seemingly almost a boy next to Connie," Mrs. Du Pont wrote her 
husband, then absent fighting in the Mexican War. Though almost thirty 
years old, Davis still had a boyish look about him. Six feet tall, with 
regular features, a ruddy complexion, flashing dark brown eyes, and 
bushy auburn brown hair, he was a strikingly handsome man. He did not 
appear quite so handsome to Mrs. Du Pont who admitted she was prepared 
to dislike him. "He is rather good looking, not handsome; with an 
unprepossessing voice and unpleasant laugh," she informed her husband.
"He makes Connies very happy, which is most important, but tho he is 
three years older than her, he strikes me all the time as too young 
for her— and not the kind of man in appearance or manner you would have 
felt proud to see her wed." After three days, Mrs. Du Pont's opinion 
changed drastically. "I like Mr. Davis very well— He suffers a good 
deal au premier abord." She still thought him too young and lacking 
polish and refinement, but she considered him "smart, and always saying 
smart things." She also admired his wit and intelligence, and his 
"extreme devotion to Connies ... constantly perceptible in a thousand 
little delicate attentions."11
Economically Davis1 marriage brought him advantage. His connec­
tion with the Cazenove family brought him clients in addition to the 
family’s dry goods business. However, the drawing of wills, the 
settling of estates, and the company's insurance claims proved 
uncongenial to Davis. He yearned for the exciting contests of politics—
n SMDP to SFDP, 5 January 1846, WMss 9-21616; SMDP to SFDP, 29 
January 1846, WMss 9-21626; SMDP to SFDP, 29 March 1846, WMss 9-21635; 
SMDP to Eleutheria du Pont, 18 July 1846, WMss 9-21651; Constance G.
Davis to SFDP, 27 July 1846, WMss 9-21652; SMDP to SFDP, 30 July 1846, 
WMss 9-21653; SMDP to SFDP, 3 August 1846, WMss 9-21653-A.
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especially national politics. It was an attraction that had drawn him 
for years before his marriage, but was now enhanced because of Connie's 
interest.
His earliest recollection of politics was his father's admonition: 
"My son, beware the follies of Jacksonianism!" At Kenyon he debated 
the issues of the presidential election of 1836, and after wavering for 
a short time came down for the Whig party. During the election of 1840 
he heard his first political speech, an attack on General Jackson by 
William C. Rives. At the Charlottesville court house, law student 
Davis hung in a window to listen to Rives vindicate his "consistency" 
in a four-hour speech. "Length and not brevity was the test of merit 
in Virginia," Davis noted, and in Virginia politics "consistency in a 
public man was what chastity is to a woman." His first political rally 
gave him "a new idea of the contests of real life," he recalled, and 
awakened him to "the fervid appeals which sway multitudes."12
In March, 1844, Henry Davis made his entry into politics with a 
series of editorials in the Alexandria newspaper written under the 
pseudonym of "Hampden." His initial article called for the people to 
rally to "a noble cause," the candidacy of Henry Clay, and praised the 
Whig party as "friends of the rich and poor, the high and low," in 
contrast to the "ruthless and violent" Democrats. His first essays 
reflected energy and purpose but were bombastic in tone and empty of 
specific ideas.13 As the articles continued over the next months, his 
thinking became more precise as his style became less florid. He began
12Steiner, Davis, 9, 61.
1 Alexandria Gazette, 13 March 1844.
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to argue issues— the National Bank, a natural currency, a protective 
tariff, and executive usurpation of congressional authority. He 
defended the National Bank as essential to the business of the nation.
He called for a national currency to be provided by the bank. He 
denounced Jackson as responsible for the reckless destruction of the 
currency, the Panic of 1837, and the depression which followed. The 
Democratic party's "Sub-Treasury" system he deemed "grinding and 
oppressive." Passionately he argued for a protective tariff calling 
free trade "a wild vision" conjured up by Locofoco Democrats. "Our 
policy now is and should be, to give a permanent and reasonable 
protection to every interest which belongs to agriculture, commerce and 
manufactures" thus enabling "this great empire" to be protected from 
"foreigners."14
Arbitrary government was the topic of his most thoughtful essays. 
Following in the great tradition of English Whiggery, Davis castigated 
General Jackson for yielding to "his unrestrained will" and "despotic 
temper," and for negating the will of Congress. When Jackson was 
elected, Davis wrote, he was an avowed friend of the National Bank 
but "from some cause, supposed to be personal, he became the deadly 
enemy of the Bank." His war on the Bank and his two vetoes of a bank 
bill passed by Congress were unlawful exercises of power that threatened 
to change the nature of government, Davis claimed. Tyler, the incumbent, 
he denounced for his abuse of the veto power. By their misuse of the 
veto, Davis charged, Jackson and Tyler were like the man who "surrenders 
himself to the caprices and lawless desires of his will, and thus
14Ibid., 21 March, 18 June, 11, 20 July 1844.
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resembles in his properties, the characteristic features of 'the 
b e a s t . 15
In addition to his editorializing, Davis joined in organizing 
a Clay Club in Alexandria and was active in its rallies. As in the 
national Whig campaign of 1844, the local meeting featured the new 
symbols of Whiggery— log cabins, liberty poles, and hard cider.
Usually visiting politicians and the leading men held the platform 
and whipped up the crowd for their candidate. Davis’ editorials must 
have attracted some notice for on the Fourth of July, 1844, after 
several notables had spoken, he was invited to come forward. His maiden 
political speech was on the Whig party as the true constitutional 
republican party embodying the conservative principles of Madison. 
Learned, plodding, and dull, it had none of the eloquence and sarcasm 
that later were his trademarks.16
Although the Whigs carried Alexandria, they fared badly else­
where. Victory for Clay depended upon carrying New York state, which 
he lost by less than six thousand votes. Throughout the country charges 
of fraud in the New York City election were raised. Naturalized 
citizens were said to have been appealed to as a distinct class and 
urged to vote the Democratic ticket. Davis' close friend, Edgar 
Snowden, editor of the local newspaper, wrote that naturalized citizens 
in New York were illegally rounded up and voted as a block. Snowden 
urged the Whig party to oppose the "influence of Foreigners, as a 
separate and distinct class" and to press for an alteration of the
15Ibid., 26, 27 September 1844.
16Ibid., 8 July 1844.
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naturalization laws. Other editorials in the Alexandria newspaper 
charged that the Democratic party was ruled "not by Americans, but 
by Germans and Irishmen, and other foreigners."17
In Alexandria a meeting of the Clay Club brought together the 
largest crowd of the season. Representative J. M. Causin of Maryland 
was the featured speaker, but Henry Davis made the speech that "swamped 
the multitudes." "We never listened to a finer intellectual treat," 
the newspaper reported. Davis discussed the cause of Clay's defeat "and 
very forcibly exposed the disorganizing, fradulent and treasonable 
designs and principles of some of the leaders of the Locofoco party."
In his 1844 campaign editorials Davis had shown a decided nativistic 
bent. When he discussed the tariff, he relied on the argument that 
"the first desire of the patriot is the WELFARE OF HIS OWN COUNTRY." 
Protection of American industry from "foreign rivals" was his main 
rationale for a tariff. His post election speech was highly nativistic.
After Davis spoke, the Clay meeting passed a series of resolutions. 
They declared that the majority of the American people preferred Clay 
and "that foreigners have ungratefully bitten the hand that helped him." 
They urged the revision of the naturalization laws so that "emigrants, 
bred in a state of political tutelage, should not be invested with the 
sovereignty of the people" until they lived in the United States for a 
sufficient period of time. Soon the wave of nativism that swept the 
country passed. The dispute over the Oregon boundary, the Mexican War, 
the Wilmot Proviso, and the slavery question overshadowed the more
17Ibid., 6 November 1844; National Intelligencer. 2 December 1844.
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intangible fear of foreign control.18
Of more pressing concern to Alexandria was the move to return 
that town to the Commonwealth of Virginia. When the Constitution of 
the United States was written, a compromise between the North and the 
South placed the capital city on the Potomac River. The District of 
Columbia was formed by Maryland and Virginia ceding territory to the 
federal government. As little government business was transacted on 
the Virginia side of the Potomac, by the 1830s it was thought that 
maintaining Alexandria as part of the capital was a waste of money.
The move for retrocession of Alexandria lay dormant until the depres­
sion that followed the Panic of 1837. Since the National Bank had been 
destroyed, only states could charter banks, and Alexandria, not part of 
any state, was without a bank. The commerical growth of the town was 
thus stifled and Alexandria became a stagnant port while Baltimore and 
Norfolk grew.
In July 1846 the Senate finally passed a House bill to return 
Alexandria to Virginia if the citizens of the town voted for retro­
cession and if the Virginia legislature concurred. Rapidly groups 
formed in Alexandria and Richmond for and against retrocession.
Opponents had the advantage from the outset. Fear of rising taxes and 
fear of being excluded from the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal dampened the 
retrocession movement.18
Editorialist H. W. Davis, in another series of "Hampden" articles,
18Alexandria Gazette, 13 March, 17 July, 21 November, 6 December
1844.
19Ibid., 28, 29, 30 July 1846.
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led the retrocession movement. His articles covered such topics as 
the canal, banks, and commercial growth. His principal argument 
was a legal one. Justice was slow In Alexandria, he claimed. In 
Virginia's courts action could be obtained much quicker. He charged 
that the laws of the District were "a curiosity shop of legal 
antiquities" where the "bewildered lawyer flounders in search of the 
law." The return of Alexandria to the Commonwealth of Virginia, he 
argued, would increase justice, increase commerce, and provide for a 
railroad, now impossible without a charter. In early September the 
citizens voted overwhelmingly in favor of retrocession. On March 20, 
1847, the legislature of Virginia, prodded by a strong lobby from 
Alexandria, passed an act re-annexing Alexandria. The Mayor declared 
a holiday and the whole town celebrated.20
In recognition of his services to the Whig party in the 1844 
election and to Alexandria in the recent retrocession contest, Henry 
Davis was admitted to the Whig party councils. And when the courts 
were changed over in June of 1847 from the District of Columbia to the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Davis was selected as Attorney for the 
Commonwealth. As district attorney he had few criminal cases to 
prosecute, but attending to the legal business of the town brought 
Davis relief from his routine common-law practice as well as an 
additional source of income.2*
Davis took a prominent part in the presidential campaign of 
1848 in Virginia. He was a leading figure in the Alexandria delegation
20ibid., 8, 13, 19 August, 3 September 1846, 20 March 1847.
21Ibid., 17, 29 June 1847.
to the Virginia Whig convention in February which recommended a 
candidate to the national convention. Supporters of Henry Clay and 
Zachary Taylor had been lining up votes for months. Although Davis 
looked to Henry Clay as the greatest living American, he joined with 
the rest of his delegation to support General Taylor, a war hero, as 
the most "available" candidate. The convention convened in Richmond 
with the largest crowd in attendance ever for a Whig convention. Davis 
was appointed to the powerful rules committee and presented its report 
in a brief but effective speech. After listening to many speeches 
supporting the candidates, the convention nominated Taylor. Although 
nominated by his delegation to be a presidential elector, Davis was 
passed over by the party officials, but was, however, selected as the 
county elector from Alexandria. In June he attended the Whig national 
convention in Philadelphia and represented Alexandria at the meeting to 
ratify the nomination of Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore.22
Davis had long supported the candidacy of Zachary Taylor. As a 
Southern slaveholding man, with a brilliant military record and broad 
national appeal, Taylor was the ideal candidate for the Southern Whigs. 
Taylor's candidacy got a boost when the Democracy floundered on the 
slavery question. After the Democrats nominated Lewis Cass in May, 
antislavery leaders repudiated him as a "tool of the South," and the 
New York Van Burenites or "Barnburners" bolted the party and nominated 
Van Buren at a convention of the Free Soil Party. But in Virginia 
slavery was not an issue in 1848— the debate over slavery had been 
settled since the famous Virginia Convention debates of 1832.
22Ibid., 27 January, 26, 29 February, 5 June 1848.
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As county elector, Davis led the Taylor campaign in Alexandria.
He participated in a series of joint debates in town, and traveled to 
Prince William County, Occoquan, Lexington, Ball's Cross Roads, West 
End, and Charlestown to speak on behalf of General Taylor. Frequently 
he denounced President Polk for his abuse of the veto power. At 
Charleston he reveiwed the history of the veto from Washington to 
Polk, castigating Jackson, Van Buren, Tyler and Polk as seeking 
"kingly power." The local audience thundered its approval. "Scorching, 
scathing, aye, blasting was the power of words as they escaped from a 
bosom warmed up with a sense of the wrong that had been committed and 
the Constitution that had been outraged by the abuses of the Veto 
power," wrote the local editor of Davis' address. "It was indeed a
splendid effort and for close reasoning, elevated thought, and eloquent
delivery, has not been surpassed during the canvass."23
The night before the election Davis addressed a rally in his home 
town. Attracted by his growing fame as a speaker, an immense crowd 
packed Liberty Hall, and many persons had to listen from outside.
Dressed in a light gray long-tailed coat with black waistcoat and black
trousers, standing tall and erect, the thirty-one year old lawyer was
a commanding figure. With great ability he addressed the crowd 
covering "the whole subject of the errors and abuses of the present 
administration .... with pungency and force," reported the local paper. 
After defending General Taylor as a man of courage and character, Davis 
closed "amidst the heartiest and most enlivening cheers."21*
2 3 Ibid., 29 July, 8 August, 9, 14 September, 31 October 1848; 
Charlestown Free Press, 7 September 1848.
2^Alexandria Gazette, 2 November 1848.
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On election day Alexandria voted better than two to one for "Old 
Rough and Ready" and within a few days it was known that Taylor had 
been elected. But even before Taylor was inaugurated, Davis began to 
question his leadership. He objected to Taylor's choices for the 
Cabinet except for the nomination of John M. Clayton as Secretary of 
State. He wrote an article denouncing the composition of the proposed 
cabinet which Captain Du Pont tried to have published in the National 
Intelligencer. But Joseph Gales, the editor, rejected it as "too 
strong" even after "all the necessary pruning."25
A congressional contest followed closely upon the presidential 
election. There John S. Pendleton, the incumbent Whig Congressman from 
the Ninth Congressional District, was opposed by Jeremiah Morton, an 
independent with Democratic backing. Davis, now chairman of the 
county Whig party, took the stump for Pendleton. In a new series of 
"Hampden" editorials, Davis blasted Morton for his "extremism" and 
his advocacy of force if sectional conflict couldn't be settled.
"Mr. Morton is always extremely careful to conceal the grim visage of 
civil war beneath the veil of general, equivocal expression," Davis 
charged. He attacked Morton’s advocacy of a Southern Convention, 
saying such a meeting would be only a preliminary to following John C. 
Calhoun into civil war.
Had Davis stopped there, his denunciation of Southern extremism 
would have rallied Alexandria citizens to Pendleton's cause. Although 
southern in background, Virginians were generally reluctant to demand
25Ibid., 8 November 1848; SFDP to SMDP, 23 February 1849, WMss 
9-1106; SFDP to SMDP, 2 March 1849, WMss 9-1107.
the extension of slavery into far distant New Mexico and California 
if it threatened civil war. But Davis, a political amateur and 
unconcerned about adverse reactions, launched into a loose construction­
ist discussion of the rights of Congress— an argument that had always 
been implied in his denunciation of executive abuses. There was no 
clause in the Constitution, he claimed, "which either expressly or 
by implication forbids Congress to exclude slavery from a territory."
He reasoned that as slavery was a fit topic for local legislation, and 
as Congress was the local legislature for the territories, then Congress 
could abolish slavery in the territories. This frank avowal of the 
philosophy of the Wilmot Proviso was too extreme for his conservative 
neighbors, and Pendleton went down to defeat by an overwhelming 
majority.2®
After the election, the debate over Davis' letters continued in 
the newspapers. In reply to one letter which labeled Davis' position 
as treasonable, Davis pushed his position to an extreme. Like Charles 
Sumner and other antislavery leaders, Davis possessed an "illogical 
logicality"— he extended a principle to its outer limits. This time 
he argued that Congress had the same power over the relationship between 
master and slave as it had over others relations— husband and wife, 
master and apprentice, parent and child. If Congress had the authority 
in a territory to say where "a man may marry three wives or one; 
whether the marriage contract shall be for life or dissoluble at the 
will or caprice of the parties," to say whether apprenticeship shall be
26Alexandria Gazette, 25, 28 April 1849.
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abolished, then surely It could legislate the relationship between 
master and slave— and thus abolish slavey in the territories.27
Davis was constitutionally unable to understand the depth of 
feeling that surrounded the slavery controversy. He often said he was 
"convinced that the question is agitated solely for electioneering 
purposes— that all reasonable men must know that slavery will never be 
forced on the Californians." Despite the use of a pen name, Hampden's 
true identity became well known throughout the town. When the Whigs 
met to nominate a candidate for the legislature, Davis who had actively 
sought the position, was passed over.28
Davis' position on slavery became a barrier between himself and 
many of friends, but he refused to retreat from his position. His 
wife's family became estranged from him and he came to rely solely on 
his ailing wife. She was his confidant and editor. But rapidly her 
already poor health began to fail. As early as March 1848, David Davis, 
visiting from Illinois, reported that Constance was "fast sinking into 
a hopeless consumption .... She is a perfect skeleton, coughs all the 
time and is confined to her room and bed a great deal."29
During the summer of 1848 she and her husband traveled north and 
her health improved. But in early 1849 she had another relapse. Her 
doctor seemed "not discouraged about Constance because he said he had 
seen her quite as sick and rally soon," reported a cousin. "Her
27David Donald, Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War 
(New York, 1960), 116.
2Alexandria Gazette, 17 February, 3 May 1849.
29Clementina Smith to SMDP, 9 January 1849; WMss 9-25693.
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greatest suffering is from pain in the kidneys." Within a month she 
began to recover. "She is better than she was some weeks ago," Mrs.
Du Pont wrote, and "has recovered her appetite, and has not her chills 
every day." Yet Mrs. Du Pont mournfully noted that Constance did not 
expect to recover and "there seems to be a perfect peace prevading 
her soul" in expectation of death.30
Spring came early in 1849 with a torrid heat wave in early May.
Too sick to be moved North or to western Virginia, Constance remained 
at home, tended by her husband and her mother. After talking with 
Henry for most of the morning of May 12, she was seized by a breathing 
spasm and died that afternoon. A friend reported that "the alternate 
rigidness and quivering of [Davis'] features, as he struggled with the 
anguish of his heart, caused me to look upon him on the day of her 
funeral as one of the most afflicted men I had ever seen." For the 
first time in his life he was obliged to stand alone— without his father, 
his aunt Elizabeth, or his beloved Connie. Alienated from his neighbors 
over the slavery issue, he found Alexandria beginning to wear on him.
His law practice though remunerative was unpleasant. He yearned to 
leave.31
30SMDP to Clementina Smith, 13 February 1849, WMss 9-21791; SMDP 
to SFDP, 22 February 1849, WMss 9-21792.
31Richard B. Duane to SMDP, 16 May 1849, WMss 9-25711; SMDP to 
Clementina Smith, 16 May 1849, WMss 9-21801; Alexandria Gazette, 16 May 




In January 1850, at the age of thirty-three, Henry Davis moved to
Baltimore. "My change of residence was in accordance with an inclin­
ation long indulged," he confided to Mrs. Du Pont, "and in consequence 
of a sorrow too severe to endure daily contact with scenes that renewed
it at every glance." For years he had wanted to escape the stultifying
atmosphere of Alexandria. Recognizing, however, that his wife's illness 
required special attention and that she would be best cared for and 
happiest in Alexandria, he remained there until her death. "I am here—  
and she is gone," he mourned, "and without her books seem an abomina­
tion, labor is an irksome drudgery, professional success tasteless."
He hoped that the move would ease the pain of Connie's loss, but soon 
found that he "carried the fountain of bitterness within." By moving 
to Baltimore, he also anticipated an increased law practice. But even 
after a year he informed his cousin David that he had "fair prospects—  
and little practice, good promise and small performance."1
Baltimore in 1850 was a burgeoning commercial center, not as 
important as New York but beginning to rival Philadelphia. The advent 
of the clipper ship brought a new prosperity to the Maryland seaport. 
Merchants carried on a large tobacco trade with Bremen, Holland, and
*HWD to David Davis, 15 October 1851, David Davis Mss, C.H.S.;
HWD to SMDP, 24 February 1850, WMss 9-25732.
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France, sent large quantities of wheat and flour to England, and most 
Important of all, exported flour, cotton goods, com, and coal to South 
America. Its primary industries were iron manufacturing, sugar refin­
ing, flour milling, and copper smelting. The city boasted three rail­
roads in addition to its magnificent port. Baltimore might resemble New 
York and Philadelphia in its commercial life, but if differed from them 
in an important way— Baltimore was a southern city. The institution of 
slavery linked Baltimore to southern culture and customs.2
Baltimore offered far more opportunities for a young lawyer than 
Alexandria had. In addition to the Maryland courts— the Superior Court, 
the criminal court, the court of common pleas, and an orphans' court—  
the Federal District Court sat in Baltimore presided over by the Chief 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Roger B. Taney. In January 
and July the Maryland Court of Appeals met in Annapolis. In addition 
Davis continued to plead cases for his old clients in Alexandria and 
increased his practice before the Supreme Court in Washington. As his 
practice grew, Davis had to shuttle between Baltimore, Alexandria, and 
Washington, as well as making frequent trips to Frederick and Cambridge, 
Maryland, Charlestown and Richmond, Virginia, and Philadelphia. Explain­
ing to Mrs. Du Pont the problems of appearing in so many courts, he 
wrote that he had "a complex and massive body of law to master, and 
knowledge of the spirit and character of the people to acquire, if I
2Joseph C. G. Kennedy, History and Statistics of the State of 
Maryland; Seventh Census, 1850 (Washington, 1852), 30-51; James W. 
Livingood, "The History of the Commerical Rivalry between Philadelphia 
and Baltimore for the Trade of the Susquehanna Valley, 1780-1860," 
(Princeton University: Ph.D. dissertation, 1937), passim.
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would appear respectable when business visits me."3
Unable to find a house to rent, Davis moved Into a boarding house 
on East Fayette Street where he met George Baldwin Milligan, son of 
Judge John Jones Milligan of Delaware. "I felt as If I knew him when 
he Informed me he knew your family quite well," Davis wrote Du Pont. 
Milligan and George Turnbull, both young lawyers like Davis and both 
recent arrivals in Baltimore, rapidly grew attached to each other in an 
informal lawyer's club. They lived in the same boarding house, ate 
their meals together, attended social functions together, and although 
they never formed a legal partnership, they practiced law together.If
Moving to Baltimore altered Davis' routine of living but slightly. 
Rising before seven, he translated portions of Gibbon's Decline and Fall 
of the Roman Empire into Greek, read smatterings of Latin, bathed in 
cold water, shaved with warm water, and ate breakfast after dressing.
He usually did not eat again until dinner, when he dined with Milligan 
and Turnbull. Probably his father's alcoholism bore on him greatly 
for it seems that Davis never touched hard liquor, though he often 
shared a bottle of wine with friends. Evenings were spent either 
preparing briefs or discussing politics, his favorite pastime.5
As Davis rose in the legal profession and Milligan and Turnbull 
got married, he acquired a new group of legal friends— possibly the 
most talented group of lawyers in America at that time. At a meeting
3HWD to SMDP, 24 February 1850, WMss 9-25732.
**HWD to SFDP, 13 March 1850, WMss 9-5701.
5Davis, Speeches and Addresses, xviii; Whitelaw Reid, "Henry
Winter Davis," New York Times, 14 January 1866.
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in December 1852 twelve members of the Baltimore bar formed the Friday 
Club, often called the Lawyer's Club. George William Brown, Severn 
Teackle Wallis, Frederick W. Brune, George W. Dobbin, Charles H. Pitts, 
William H. Dorsey, William Henry Norris and Davis were the most 
prominent lawyers of the twelve. Three of them were arrested during 
the Civil War for their southern sympathies— Brown, then Mayor of 
Baltimore, Wallis, a leader of the Maryland legislature, and Pitts. 
Wallis' brother-in-law, Brune, was from one of the wealthiest families 
in Maryland. Dorsey and Norris were considered the leading legal 
scholars. At their alternate meetings on alternate Friday evenings 
they discussed the law and debated politics from a Whig perspective.
All under forty years old in 1852, all with financial security if not 
wealthy, they were the young men Baltimorians .expected to eventually 
run the city. It was chiefly their love of debate that drew them 
together. Abraham Lincoln's law partner, William Herndon, wrote that 
the law in those days was not firmly established. "The old lawyers 
had to make their own case .... The practice of law from 1818 to 1860 
made men eloquent, because they were original." People swarmed to the 
court houses throughout the nation to see and to hear and to learn. 
"Eloquence was in demand as people loved to hear talk— talk. The 
lawyers knew this and it stimulated them— made them more ambitious to 
succeed and conquer." And the eloquent lawyers could succeed for 
"people judged men more or less by the power of talk." The Friday Club 
offered this group of young lawyers the opportunity to polish their 
oratory both legal and political.6
6Friday Club Minute Book, MdHS; Carroll Dulaney, "Day by Day,"
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Upon leaving Alexandria, Davis resigned his first political 
position, Attorney for the Commonwealth. Captain Du Pont warned him 
that moving to Baltimore would end his political career. "I foresaw 
that it virtually excluded me altogether and yet I came," Davis replied. 
"Political life may come or stay away as it pleases— and it will 
probably, nay almost certainly— not come— for Baltimore is strongly 
Locofoco— and I am not sufficiently enamoured of its loveliness to 
embrace it."7
During the early 1850s politics in Maryland— particularly in 
Baltimore— were undergoing a transition. The Baltimore "Court House 
Clique," led by Attorney General Reverdy Johnson, was the controlling 
element in the Whig party. In 1850 the clique traded off Johnson's 
old United States Senate seat to former governor Thomas Pratt in return 
for Pratt's support of William Price's son-in-law, William B. Clarke 
of Washington County, for governor. Although Davis supported Clarke, 
speaking for him at Frederick and at a mass rally in Baltimore on the 
eve of the October election, he privately considered Clarke "a heavy 
stupid ass."8
Clarke's loss to E. Louis Lowe began the destruction of the Court 
House Clique. "The Whigs were beaten so badly that it was perfectly 
ridiculous— as the man said about the death of his children," Davis
Baltimore News and Post, 11 June 1935; W. H. Herndon to Mrs. L. Swett, 
20 February 1890, Lincoln Papers, Illinois State Historical Society.
7HWD to SFDP, 13 March 1850, WMss 9-5701.
Baltimore Clipper, 11 January, 29 April, 23, 28, 29 May 1850;
J. P. Kennedy Journal, 8 June, 6 September, 6 October 1850, J. P.
Kennedy to Robert C. Winthrop, 9 September 1850, J. P. Kennedy Mss,
Peabody Institute, HWD to SFDP, 1 November 1850, WMss 9-5939.
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scoffed. Public knowledge of the deal between Johnson, Pratt, Price, 
and Clarke became widely known, and many opposed Clarke because he 
was a "clique man." The Court House Clique's "favor is fatal as death," 
Davis concluded, for Baltimore Whigs "staid by their desks by the 
thousands— voted for Lowe by the hundreds, and not a few gave their 
money for the defeat of the Whig candidate." Davis predicted that the 
defeat would serve as a "salutory lesson" for Maryland Whigs and no 
longer would they allow "the clique" to control their party.9
National events also helped break up the clique control of the 
Whig party. Controversy over the admission of California, fugitive 
slaves, and other sectional differences divided the clique from the 
independent Whigs. Henry Clay's compromise measures were opposed by 
President Taylor, and he was sustained by Attorney General Johnson and 
the Court House Clique. When Taylor suddenly died, Millard Fillmore 
ascended to the presidency. Fillmore supported Clay's compromises and 
reconstructed his cabinet, ousting Reverdy Johnson, the clique leader, 
and eventually installing John Pendleton Kennedy, the leader of the 
independents.
In the shifting currents of politics, Davis maintained his 
loyalty to the Whig party and to sectional harmony. While in Washington 
pleading a case before the Supreme Court, he heard and was impressed by 
Henry Clay's speech advocating compromise and Daniel Webster's
9Baltimore Clipper, 30 May 1850; Samuel Barnes to Henry Clay,
3 September 1850, Sionssat Mss, MdHS; HWD to SFDP, 1 November 1850, WMss 
9-5939; James A. Pearce to Thomas Corwin, 5 October 1850, Corwin Mss,
LC. For an overview of Maryland politics in this period see W. Wayne 
Smith, "The Whig Part in Maryland, 1826-1856," (University of Maryland: 
Ph.D. dissertation, 1967).
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conciliatory Seventh of March oration. Davis too opposed the extrem­
ists, denouncing them for trying "to beguile the people by the dream of 
peaceable secession." He praised the people for finally realizing that 
the:y would "have to fight out the quarrel of their would-be leaders" 
and for demanding compromise. Lacking any real understanding of the 
sectional crisis, he blamed the talk of secession on Robert Toombs and 
Alexander Stephens and their need "to vindicate their impeached 
allegiance to the South." If Congress failed to pass the Compromises 
of 1850, he had a remedy: "Tie Toombs and Root and Stephens and
Giddings— as boys do cats— over a pole and let them cut each others 
throats— for they chiefly fanned the flame with adverse yet emulous 
breath."10
To all sectional agitation Davis professed himself totally 
opposed. He would not countenance talk of disunion. "I found myself 
often while talking with a southern friend and looking him quietly in 
the face— almost unconsciously surmising how long it might be ere I 
might stand before him with a musket in my hand," Davis wrote Du Pont.
He was overjoyed that "the school boys in Congress"— after "a due 
quantity of trembling and flinching"— finally passed Clay's compromise. 
Those who continued to spout sectional anathemas after the passage of 
the bills he likened "to the man who the day after the battle of New 
Orleans was found firing his musket on the field with great vigor— and 
when asked his motive said he was continuing the fight on his own hook!" 
Pleased that the sectional crisis was abated, Davis prayed: "May that
10HWD to SFDP, 13 March 1850, WMss 9-5701.
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be the last and worthy end of Calhounism."11
While advocating compromise in politics, Davis became fiercely 
involved in a controversy rocking the Episcopal Church, of which he was 
a member. His interest in theology he inherited from his father, his 
brother-in-law, the Reverend Edward Syle, and the Du Ponts. Holding 
pronounced Low Church views, he was strongly opposed to the views of 
the Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church of Maryland. Bishop 
William Rollinson Whittingham was one of the most ardent advocates of 
what came to be known as the "Oxford Movement." This "Anglo-Catholic" 
movement began at Oxford University and spread throughout the United 
States in the 1840s. It sought to establish greater authority in the 
church leaders, more doctrinaire preaching, and less diversity of 
opinion. Davis1 father and Bishop Charles Mcllvaine, Davis' mentor 
at Kenyon College, had resisted such tendencies. Davis viewed the 
Oxford Movement as an attempt to "Romanize" the Episcopal Church, and 
his attitude toward the Roman Catholic Church was uncompromising— almost 
bitter. He felt that the "Papal Church" set the letter above the 
spirit of the law, authority above conscience, and dogmatic formula 
above faith.12
Upon moving to Baltimore, Davis affiliated with Christ Episcopal 
Church, whose rector, the Reverend Dr. Henry Van Dyke Johns, was of 
a decided Low Church, anti-Oxford position. The Reverend Dr. Johns and 
Bishop Whittingham had been covertly hostile since Johns' ordination in
n Ibid.; HWD to SFDP, 10 September 1850, WMss 9-5889.
12William W. Manross, A History of the American Episcopal Church 
(New York, 1935), 273; E. Clowes Chorley, Men and Movements in the 
American Episcopal Church (Hamden, Conn., 1961), 237-239.
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1842. Open hostilities erupted only after Davis joined Dr. John's 
congregation. The dispute arose over the Bishop's visit in the spring. 
Johns' charged the Bishop with usurping authority, with trying to turn 
the Episcopal Church into a Soman Catholic Church, and with violating 
the rights of the duly elected Maryland convention. Before the quarrel 
went to the Maryland Episcopal Convention for adjudication, Davis 
authored a secret pamphlet signed by "Ulric von Hutten," the most 
ardent anti-Catholic of Martin Luther's supporters during the Protes­
tant Reformation. The pamphlet was described by Davis as an 
"irreverent laugh in my sleeve at so sacred a personage as a Bishop."
He said he had all due respect for those "in authority," but the Bishop 
or anyone who "goes beyond his rights, is not one 'in authority'—  and 
so cannot claim protection under that clause." The convention settled 
the dispute by passing a canon giving the Bishop the rights he claimed.13
"Ulric von Hutten" created such a sensation in the Episcopal 
Church that the following year Davis was enlisted to aid in the 
prosecution of Bishop George Washington Doane of New Jersey on charges 
of financial irregularities. Davis matched his wits against Doane's 
defense lawyers, former Secretary of the Treasury William Meredith and 
Maryland Judge Ezekiel Chambers. Although he professed he had "small 
hope of carrying the matter," he succeeded after a few days of the trial 
in extracting a complete confession from Bishop Doane. But then Doane 
invoked a canon of 1844 which permitted a bishop to confess to a misdeed
13HWD to SFDP, 30 May 1850, WMss 9-5794; HWD to SFDP, 6 September 
1850, WMss 9-5885; HWD to SFDP, 27 September 1850, WMss 9-5905; HWD to 
SFDP, 1 November 1850, WMss 9-5939; Baltimore Sun, 17 October 1850; 
Manross, American Episcopal Church, 282.
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and thus escape a trial, censure, and dismissal. Davis was infuriated 
at the trick. "It must be most humiliating to Doane's satelites who 
maintain his absolute innocense ...," Davis snapped, "but it recoils 
terribly on the Court which mistook a confession for punishment!!1,14
Rankled by the Bishops' decision to let Doane go free and 
"persuaded that the Bishops are not fit to be trusted with government 
of themselves," he published the proceedings of the court "holding my 
Lords Bishop to their trial before their masters." His Epistle 
Congratulatory by Ulrich von Hutten, the first of many appeals directly 
to the people in Davis' life, was a masterpiece of sarcasm and invective. 
He claimed that laymen who committed the acts the Bishop admitted to 
would have been convicted of "felony, perjury, falsehood, cheating, 
breaches of trust, living sumptuously every day, and gambling 
speculations at other peoples risk." These charges on "Wall-street 
would be iniquities," but by a Bishop they are "pious." He mourned for 
the thousands of the church "who erroneously supposed the Bishop's 
morals and life a fit example for the flock." His Epistle had a 
devastating effect. "Here the High Churchmen are as mad as possible," 
he reported, "Most of them hold their peace— but look queer when they 
meet me."*5
14SFDP to HWD, 22 October 1850, WMss 9-1257; SFDP to HWD, 8 April
1852, WMss 9-1297; HWD to SFDP, 13 October 1852, WMss 9-6496; Baltimore 
Sun, 16 July, 13 October 1852; J. Mason Campbell and Hugh Davey Evans to 
W. R. Whittingham, 14 February 1852, Whittingham Mss, Duke University; 
SFDP to SMDP, 16 October 1852, WMss 9-1338.
15Manross, American Episcopal Church, 281; HWD to SFDP, c. June
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Before the trial of Bishop Doane was concluded, Davis became 
involved in a third controversy, this time in defense of the ecumenical 
movement in the Protestant churches. Davis' minister, Dr. Johns, took 
part in a series of special services with the Eutaw Street Methodist 
Church. For that conduct, Johns was charged with misconduct by the 
Bishop. An investigating committee was established and a condemnatory 
report published. The following year, Davis attempted to have the 
report expunged from the record. His defense of Dr. Johns' was unusual. 
He lamented the inability of all Protestant denominations to cease 
quarreling over metaphysical dogmas and to unite to meet the common foe—  
the Roman Catholic Church. If divided, Protestantism "can never over­
come the Papacy" for the power of Rome "is not merely Spiritual, it is 
political, and it is a unit." He predicted "a day of terrible conflict" 
which was coming to America— a day when Protestantism would have to be 
defended from the onslaught of Catholics. "Protestants must forget and 
bury their divisions," he claimed, "or they must fail in the hour of 
trial."16
To Davis, and to many other Americans, that "day of terrible 
conflict" had already occurred in Europe. Of all the uprisings in 
1848-1849, that of the Magyars to free Hungary from Austrian dominance 
seemed to be the most heroic. The rebel leader, Louis Kossuth, and his
SFDP, 6 November 1853, WMss 9-6874; An Epistle Congratulatory to the 
Right Reverend Bishops of the Episcopal Court at Camden from Ulric von 
Hutten (New York, 1853).
16Chomey, Men and Movements, 274; SFDP to SMDP, 1 June 1852,
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followers had been crushed by the Roman Catholic Hapsburg empire with 
aid from Russia. Fleeing Hungary, Kowsuth sought temporary refuge in 
Turkey, and then toured England and the United States. Arriving in New 
York in late 1851 he was lionized by idolizing crowds all over the city. 
From New York he traveled to Philadelphia where the citizens greeted 
him with a torchlight parade. At Baltimore as elsewhere Kossuth pleaded 
for aid. After the speech Davis worked his way up to Kossuth and 
obtained an hour-long private interview. Davis thought him a remarkable 
man. They discussed the Hungarian's need for arms and money, and Davis 
assured him that no arms-purchase law prevented him from procuring 
arms.17
Davis hoped that the government would come to Kossuth's support, 
although he was beginning to fear that the Hungarian's cause might 
become emersed in domestic politics. In Washington Millard Fillmore 
received Kossuth's party, but although the President was friendly he 
announced that the United States would not become involved in the 
affairs of a foreign nation. Davis was "disgusted with Fillmore's true 
say-nothing, do-nothing speech." Kossuth met an even cooler reception 
from Henry Clay. Davis and Du Pont agreed that the Whigs blundered 
by not taking up Kossuth's cause. Du Pont predicted that if the Whigs 
adopted an interventionist platform, they would win the next president­
ial election. Davis agreed. "I cannot believe the negro question can
17Prisilla Robertson, The Revolutions of 1848; A Social History 
(Princeton, 1952), 187-307; Reinhard H. Luthin, "A Visitor from Hungary," 
South Atlantic Quarterly, 47 (January 1948), 31; HWD to SFDP, 14 Decem­
ber 1851, WMss 9-6223; SFDP to HWD, 15 December 1851, WMss 9-1273; 
Baltimore Sun, 29 December 1851; HWD to SFDP, 29 December 1851, WMss 
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utterly busy all American sympathies," he wrote. "The tremendous 
victory of Jefferson was owing to the strong sympathy of our people for 
France and her freedom as much as to any domestic cause."18
Well in advance of the presidential election, he had begun work 
on a book on the European situation, "an appeal to the people— on the 
great topic of the day— the battle of light and darkness— and the 
position of America in that conflict." Like De Tocqueville and other 
commentators, he thought the United States and Russia, the two expanding 
countries, were doomed to conflict. His book was to show how despotic 
Russia plotted the overthrow of free governments and the necessity of 
an Anglo-American alliance to contain Russian and Austrian tyranny. 
Throughout the bleak winter of 1851-1852 Davis worked on his political 
treatise. Planning a book of 250 pages in December, he was surprised 
when it had bloomed to 450 pages by March. After contacting several 
publishers in New York and Philadelphia, Davis settled on James Waters 
of Baltimore to publish his book. He wished to have it out well before 
the November presidential election, and he was sorely disappointed when 
it was not ready until the first of December. But it mattered little 
that Davis' The War of Ormuzd and Ahriman, as his political treatise 
was called, failed to appear before the campaign. For concern over 
foreign policy, and particularly the Kossuth issue, "proved a fire of 
damp straw, quickly burning out in places and refusing to burn at all 
in others," he explained.19
18SFDP to HWD, 2 January 1852, WMss 9-1280; HWD to SFDP, 3 January
1852, WMss 9-6257; HWD to SFDP, 9 January 1852; WMss 9-6263; National 
Intelligencer, 3 February 1852.
19HWD to SFDP, c. 10 November 1851, WMss 9-6249; HWD to SFDP, 23
As the presidential election of 1852 approached, Davis worried 
about the divided Whig party. President Fillmore, without backing 
except for the prestige of the office he inherited, refused to step 
aside. The other leading contender, General Winfield Scott, a military 
hero considered a dupe of anti-slavery Senator William H. Seward, could 
not carry the Southern Whigs. As early as March 1852, Davis predicted 
that'"the fuss and feather1 will beat the’head schoolmaster'" as General 
Scott and President Fillmore were labeled. "Our chief hope," Davis 
calculated, "is that our adversaries are more divided than we are." As 
the conventions approached, Davis cast aside his admiration for Fillmore 
and decided to support Scott. "Not that I love Fillmore less— but 
victory more." He hoped that "after a long and hard pull" Maryland 
might go for Scott. The rest of the South he conceded to the Democrats. 
"No Whig can get much support in the South," he estimated, "— any Loco 
will out bid, out promise, and out lie him— and these are the elements 
of victory."20
In Baltimore and Maryland generally the feeling was strong in 
favor of Fillmore. At the Whig city convention in May, the majority 
of the delegates supported Fillmore. Later in the month the Whig state 
convention met in Baltimore and it too was strongly packed for the 
President. Adopting resolutions supporting Fillmore, it also went on
December 1851, WMss 9-6235; HWD to SFDP, 17 March 1852, WMss 9-6350-A;
HWD to A. Hart, 20 April 1852, Gratz Collection, HSP; Henry Winter Davis, 
The War of Ormuzd and Ahriman in the Nineteenth Century (Baltimore,
1852). Ormuzd and Ahriman are the Oriental names for the divinities of 
good and evil.
20Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union (New York, 1947), II, 25; HWD 
to SFDP, c. March 1852, WMss 9-6311; HWD to SFDP, 6 May 1852, WMss 
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record in favor of the Compromise of 1850 "as a final settlement of all 
the questions" and in support of "the wise maxims of Washington 
respecting our foreign policy"— clearly a reaction against Kossuth. As 
evidence of the declining influence of the Court House Clique, several 
new men were elected as delegates to the national Whig convention and 
as presidential electors— including Henry Winter Davis as the elector 
for Baltimore. "He made no effort for it," Captain Du Pont wrote of 
Davis' election, "but was evidently much gratified, and contrasted 
this with the people of Alexandria who when their property was at stake 
always run to him, but for anything else preferred cobblers and tailors 
and all others for political preferment." When Mrs. Du Pont pressed 
him about his choice for President he replied: "As I am one of the
Maryland electors and bound to traverse the State from the Alleghany 
to St. Marys swearing that whoever is nominated is best— I won't commit 
myself beforehand."21
Conveniently situated Baltimore was the site of both the Democra­
tic and Whig national conventions in 1852. The Democracy met on June 1 
with Buchanan and Cass supporters competing for undecided votes. On 
the forty-ninth ballot, dark horse candidate Senator Franklin Pierce 
was nominated. Although Pierce excited little enthusiasm, his 
nomination was generally agreeable to all factions of the party. The 
Whig convention met on June 16. The Fillmore-Webster forces were not 
sufficient to stop General Scott who was nominated on the fifty-third
2Baltimore Clipper, 5, 21 May 1852; SFDP to SMDP, 1 June 1852, 
WMss 9-1306; Baltimore Sun, 7 June 1852; HWD to SMDP, 10 June 1852, 
WMss 9-25832; HWD to SFDP, 11 June 1852, WMss 9-6386.
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ballot.22
Early in July, Davis went to Washington to visit General Scott.
"He received me very kindly, was very talkative, very communicative, 
very clear and emphatic as to his views on the compromises— gave me a 
full history of his relations with Seward," Davis wrote. He came away 
from this meeting convinced that Scott, "a little grandiloquent, 
somewhat egotistic, decidedly lofty" would nevertheless not play 
"second to any man or be so pliant as to be led by W. H. Seward!" With 
this single reservation removed, Davis plunged into his first national 
campaign.23
The first grand rally of the Whig party was held at Niagara, New 
York, on July 27, the anniversary of the Battle of Lundy's Lane, the 
site of Scott's War of 1812 victory. When Davis accepted an invitation 
to speak at the occasion, he had no idea how long and difficult the trip 
to Niagara would be. He took a train to Philadelphia, another to New 
York, and after one hour of rest, a third to Buffalo. Just as his 
carriage arrived at the Niagara festival grounds, his name was called 
to join the dignataries on the stand. Former Senator Thomas Ewing of 
Ohio spoke for one hour, Governor Washington Hunt of New York for 
another, and then "General Somebody Jones" was called to speak and a 
crowd estimated at thirty thousand gathered. When General Jones excused 
himself from speaking, Governor Hunt called on Davis. "I thus got the 
audience excited by his much exaggerated reputation." Davis' speech
22Baltimore Sun, 16 June 1852; Baltimore Clipper, 17, 22 June 1852; 
Robert J. Rayback, Millard Fillmore; Biography of a President (Buffalo, 
1959), 357.
23HWD to SFDP, c. July 1852, WMss 9-6442.
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was a tremendous success. Appearing from nowhere, he attracted the 
attention of the national press. "The multitudes who greeted me—  
a perfect stranger as I walked about through the hotels and along the 
streets— and in the cars on my return" convinced Davis of its result. 
"If they blow the bubble a little more I feel sure it will burst," he 
added. "I get the benefit of it now— but I shall very sensibly feel 
the burden of it for the rest of the canvass."21*
The notoriety Davis achieved from his Niagara speech brought him 
additional invitations. His demanding schedule soon fatigued him and 
then fatigue turned into severe illness. "All things are right in the 
political world— except myself," he reported, "— I am so used up as to 
voice." By mid-August he was recovered sufficiently to address a Whig 
rally in Frederick, Maryland. Although congressmen from several states 
also spoke, Davis attracted the most notice in the press. "I am 
inclined to conclude," wrote the correspondent of the Baltimore 
Clipper, "that from present indications the words of the lamented 
Clay will be fulfilled, when he remarked, pointing his finger to Mr. 
Davis, he said that 'he would stand first among the great men of his 
State.'" Everywhere Davis was afforded a similar reception— at 
Cambridge, Richmond, Washington, and New York. His speeches were 
intellectual but packed with emotion. They were directed at the best 
educated among the audience but touched all. A master of sarcasm, he 
riddled the Democracy and its threats of secession with the skill of a 
seasoned politician. Unquestionably Davis emerged from the campaign
24New York Times. 28 July 1852, SFDP to SMDP, 29 July 1852, 
WMss 9-1318; HWD to SFDP, c. 1 August 1852, WMss 9-6416.
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with national stature.25
Although most politicians were certain of Pierce's victory, the 
result was more lopsided than men had anticiapted. Scott carried only 
four states— two border states, Kentucky and Tennessee, and two in New 
England, Massachusetts and Vermont. Baltimore gave Pierce a majority 
that the rest of the state could not overcome. "Can you hear my still 
small voice from beneath the over-whelming mass of six thousand Locofoco 
majority piled over me?" Davis asked. "Verily whether Whigs or Locos 
are most astonished it would be difficult to determine." He considered 
Pierce's election a national misfortune and predicted that the 
Democrats' greed for the expansion of slavery would soon embroil the 
United States in a foreign war or even a civil war.26
As the campaign bore heavily upon him physically, he yearned for 
"a season of Elysean repose after November." Probably he had thrown 
himself into the campaign to compensate for his loneliness, his isola­
tion from his family. In recent years he had seen little of his 
Alexandria in-laws, although he visited Alexandria frequently on 
business. His cousin David was far removed in Illinois and wrote less 
than once a year. His only sister Jane had. married an English 
missionary, the Reverend Edward Syle, and had journeyed to China 
several years before he left Alexandria. In Baltimore he was close 
to George Milligan and George Turnbull, but his circle was constricted
2Baltimore Clipper, 19 August, 14 September 1852, HWD to SFDP, c.
23 August 1852, WMss 9-6573; HWD to SFDP, 29 August 1852, WMss 9-6438;
SFDP to SMDP, 25 September 1852, WMss 9-1330; HWD to SFDP, 5 October
1852, WMss 9-6488; SMDP to HWD, 7 October 1852, WMss 9-22013.




In the midst of the Whig national convention in June, Davis was 
informed that a young relative had arrived in New York. Hoping to see 
the "nomination game played out," he remained in Baltimore instead of 
rushing to New York to claim his nephew Henry Winter Syle, eldest son 
of his sister Jane in China. After he finally retrieved his nephew, 
he described his four-year-old namesake as "a sort of savage [who] runs 
and hides himself from every new person," including his "Uncle Davis." 
Davis seems never to have been close to his nephew who lived with him 
during school vacations. Young Syle came to worship his uncle— but 
deafness, which struck him after a severe bout with scarlet fever in 
1853, was a barrier never penetrated. Closely following the "little 
Chinaman" came his mother. For months Davis consoled himself with 
Jane's company. On Christmas Day, 1853, he wrote Captain Du Pont:
Jane "is now with me and today we took together our first Christmas 
dinner for nine long years— and inspite of our self the question will 
recur when the next will be."28
The visit by his sister and his nephew was all too brief for 
Davis and soon his black moods of loneliness returned. Again he 
plunged himself into his law practice. Although he specialized in 
suits before the United States Supreme Court and the Maryland Court 
of Appeals, he maintained a respectable Baltimore practice in addition
27HWD to SFDP, 20 October 1852, WMss 9-6503; Hayden, Virginia 
Genealogies, 166; HWD to SFDP, 6 November 1853, WMss 9-6874.
28HWD to SFDP, 25 January 1852, WMss 9-25815, 10 June 1852, 
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to handling some of the Cazenove's affairs in Alexandria. His main 
diversion from law remained politics.29
As the election of 1852 destroyed the Whig party in Maryland new 
alliances formed on new issues sprang up in the wards of Baltimore.
Since bloc voting by foreigners was believed to have defeated Scott, 
the main platform of the new organization was opposition to foreign 
influences in American politics. The rising rate of crime in the cities 
was also attributed to the influx of "foreign criminals." But unlike 
the wave of nativism which gripped the country following the Whig 
defeat of 1844, the anti-Catholicism and nativism of the 1850s emerged 
simultaneously with a hostility to politicians and impatience with the 
established parties. In Maryland a plethora of splinter parties arose 
to replace the Whig party well before the national Whig party was 
destroyed by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854.30
Anti-Catholic and nativistic issues dominated the gubernatorial 
and congressional elections of 1853. The first was the fate of the 
public school system. A state legislator, Martin J. Kerney, reported
29HWD to James L. Orr, 13 January 1853, Orr-Patterson Mss,
Southern Historical Collection.
30George Vickers to John M. Clayton, 18 January 1853, Clayton Mss, 
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that it was a revolt against the party system, the average citizens' 
disgust with "court house cliques" and "wirepullers" which was the 
impetus for the rise of the Know Nothing party in Forging a Majority:
The Formation of the Republican Party in Pittsburg, 1848-1860 (New
Haven, 1969), 9.
a bill denouncing the public schools as inadequate and providing public 
funds for private schools. Shortly thereafter the Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Baltimore requested the City Council for a prorata 
distribution of the school taxes to the school of the parent's choice.
The public reacted vehemently to this supposed threat to their children's 
schooling. "We are willing to be taxed for the support of the public 
schools, where all classes of society may send their children to be 
educated," protested the editorial writer of the Baltimore Clipper,
"but will not consent to pay for sectarian schools of any denomination." 
In March 1853 a "Mass Meeting of Mechanics" was held to protest this 
proposed impairment of the public schoolhouse. At that meeting promin­
ent Protestant clergymen spoke. Dr. Johns denounced the attempt to 
secularize the schools. A Baptist minister castigated the Catholic 
Church for its opposition to public schools saying "Wherever the 
Catholic religion prevails liberty is not known." A leading Methodist 
denounced the Catholic Church as an enemy of education: "It is
Jesuitism which imprisoned Copernicus and killed Columbus. It puts 
fetters on the intellect. They denounce Milton and Cowper, and condemn 
Locke on Human Understanding." He pleaded with his follow citizens to 
maintain their local institutions against "the designs of a foreign 
Priesthood."^1
The decisive issue in the 1853 elections became the influence of 
German-speaking voters. During the campaign the German Organization of 
Baltimore sent a questionnaire to the congressional candidates asking
3Baltimore Clipper, 26, 29 March, 12 April, 18 May 1853; 
Baltimore Sun, 30 March 1853.
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if they would support the aims of that organization, chiefly the 
appointment of German-speaking justices of the peace and teachers in 
German areas of the city and if they would endorse two German immigrants 
for the state legislature. Immediately nativist emotions flared up.
Five thousand men turned out for a public rally called by the United 
Sons of America, Maryland Camp, No. 1. Carrying banners reading "The 
Public Schools As They Are," "Americans Can Do Their Own Voting," "We 
Want No Foreign Organizations," and "Young Americans Assert Your 
Rights," they heard speeches calling for the organization of an American 
party which would revise the naturalization laws. Henry L. Smith of 
Philadelphia, an American party organizer, appealed to Whigs and 
Democrats alike to "rally under the banner of the American party" and 
cease the "pandering" of both parties to "foreigners."32
While nativist feeling was still high, the Democratic and Whig 
parties met to nominate candidates for state offices. Specualtion 
regarding the Whig gubernatorial nominee centered on Baltimore Mayor 
John H. T. Jerome, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad President Thomas Swann, 
General John G. Chapman, Congressman Richard Bowie and Henry Davis. 
Captain Du Pont advised Davis not to seek the nomination. "The 
confusion of parties just now makes it a very unpropitious moment,"
Du Pont warned, "and I think in Maryland the old cliques are not 
sufficiently broken up for the Whigs to bring forward new and shiny 
men." Davis initially discounted talk of his candidacy. But in August 
while on vacation in Saratoga, New York, "the matter was again brought
32Baltimore Clipper, 6, 16 July, 19 August 1853; Baltimore Sun, 
19 August 1853.
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to ray attention and on getting home I found myself full up before the 
people— with a pretty fair chance for the nomination." Inflated by 
public notice, he boasted that he had "a better chance of success than 
any of the others spoken of." Having decided to accept the nomination 
if tendered, he discovered that the new Maryland constitution required 
a five-year residency. "My fourth is just ending!" he lamented. "So
1 have a note for the Convention requesting to be let alone. That’s 
nice is it not?" At the Whig convention, Bowie was nominated over 
Swann in a sharp division of the slave and free counties. But a full 
Whig slate was not filed. The party instead allowed its candidates for 
the state legislature to run either as independents or on the Maine 
Law or temperance ticket.33
Early in the 1850s this temperance movement achieved all the 
force of a revival. Temperance enthusiasts, "the cold water army," 
succeeded in passing the first prohibition statute in Maine. Attempts 
to spread prohibition generally went under the heading of "Maine Law" 
movements. In Baltimore the Maine Law movement was joined by the 
United Sons of America, which was seeking to preserve the public school 
system. The Maine Law movement was in essence a nativistic movement 
as it objected to beer— a symbol of cultural conflict. The Germans 
had introduced lager beer in the United States and in so doing had 
removed one of the limiting factors of the use of alcohol— the price. 
With cheap beer, "grog shops" sprang up all over the city "like the
3Baltimore Clipper, 12 August, 7 September 1853; HWD to SFDP,
9 July 1853, WMss 9-6759; HWD to SFDP, 28 August 1853, WMss 9-6820;
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frogs of Egypt." The United Sons of America sent questionnaires to all 
candidates asking if they were in favor of the Kearney School Bill.
When the Democrats refused to answer the questionnaire, the U.S.A. 
endorsed the Maine Law Ticket and the anti-Catholic and anti-German 
forces were joined.34
The results of the election of 1853 graphically illustrate the 
confusion of party politics in Maryland. Despite extensive campaigning 
by the Whig candidates aided by Davis and others, the Democrats swept 
the state offices. But in Baltimore where the Democratic gubernatorial 
candidate rolled up better than a three-thousand vote margin over the 
Whig, the Maine Law legislative ticket beat the Democrats with an 
average majority of over one thousand.35
Davis pretended to be indifferent to the disaster which struck 
the Whig party. In fact, he shrank from political involvement. He 
returned to his "old habits of work, yawning, heels high on the mantle 
in proportion as the spirits sink low in the heart— a good hermit—  
who don't keep Lent." Disenchanted with his law practice, lonely, 
bored and confused by the upheaval of politics, Davis decided to travel 
for distraction. By the end of May he had completed his unfinished 
legal matters and turned the remainder over to his friends. Soliciting 
letters of introduction from the Du Ponts and others, he left Baltimore
3l|Baltimore Clipper, 1, 5 November 1853; Baltimore Sun, 2 
November 1853.
3Baltimore Sun, 3 November 1853; Baltimore Clipper, 28 October, 
7, 8 November 1853.
for New York on May 25, 1854. Within days he boarded an oceanic' steamer 
bound for Europe.36
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Chapter 4
EUROPE GAVE ME NEW VIEWS
Describing his voyage to a friend, Davis wrote from Europe, "I 
kept my legs, for the sea was as smooth as glass with the exception of 
one day .... But alas! for my head, it swam as long and as well as 
the vessel— and sympathized with every pitch." He declared seasickness 
to be "of the head and not the stomach" for his head was "sick and 
reeling all the while— my stomach was very little affected and only 
occasionally." The entire voyage of two weeks was spent "lying on my 
back on deck wrapped in my shawl and overcoat laughing at the ridiculous 
figure I cut, playing baby on board, and living on brandy and ship 
biscuit." Feeling better one evening, he visited the dinner table 
only to find that "boned turkey on a voyage ten days out, is not 
boned turkey a la Baltimore supper." Lamenting to Captain Du Pont that 
"I have not fallen in love with the sea," he announced that "I rather 
think my voyage home will be my last for some time."1
His spirits rose remarkably after the captain announced landfall. 
"Surely I thought the first glimpse of old Ireland was the prettiest 
land I ever did see," he wrote, "and no Paddy returning from exile to 
poverty could have been more gratuitiously partiotic with delight."
The ship landed at Liverpool which he described as "about the age of
1mD to SFDP, 9 July 1854, WMss 9-7053.
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Annapolis— the same bricks— window sashes— pitch of stories, and the 
like," but destitute "of the aristocratic dignity which appertains to 
the deserted mansions of the Maryland aristocracy." His drive around 
Liverpool, "John Bull's second city," convinced him of the superiority 
of American architecture. "The docks are noble and stupendous works," 
he conceded, but "they and William Huskisson seem all Liverpool can 
produce."
Having seen enough of England for the present, he took a train 
from Liverpool to London to Dover, and a boat to Calais, France. "I 
must do the English justice," he reflected upon leaving England, "to 
say I had more bows, met more politeness, heard more 'thank yous' for 
showing tickets and got more 'please sirs' for getting out of peoples 
way in a day, than I had heard or received for the current year" in 
America. Greatly impressed by the "extreme urbanity and deferential 
courtesy" of England, he vowed to visit it on his return.
As he was predisposed to find fault with commercial Liverpool, 
so he was predisposed to fall in love with Paris. "At first it looked 
just like the pictures of it— as everything with a ruff looks like 
Raleigh or Queen Elizabeth." On his first afternoon in Paris he 
strolled into the central avenue of the garden of the Tuilleries, saw 
the "barbaric magnificence" of the Palace of the Bourbons, and roamed 
up the Champs Elysees to the Arc de l'Etoile. It all appeared to him 
to be copied straight out of the Arabian Nights— the gayly decorated 
carriages and the laughing crowd seemed "to live with double life."
His first favorable impression did not last, perhaps because 
homesickness set in. Indeed, the city soon began to oppress him. The 
buildings took on "a physiognomy of their own— and then they all melted
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into one broken and indistinguishable mass of yellowish whitish 
limestone." All the colonnades, the portals, and the gloomy courts 
appeared new for awhile, "then became familiar— and now is tiresome." 
He came to feel as if he had lived there for half a life. "Even the 
garden of the Tuilleries and the Camps Elysees have lost their magic 
splendor."
Depressed by Paris, Davis took the train to the Palace of 
Versailles, but that was no relief. The galleries of paintings he 
described as "miles of length and square acres of canvass oiled and 
colored— for the most part bad battles represented by worse paintings." 
He thought the busts of Napoleon were exquisite but that "his features 
[were] a little idealized— showing the first step by which in the 
process of time his face will be a myth and not a reality." After 
strolling "through the tiresome rows of tortured trees" to visit the 
beautiful villas surrounding the Palace, he pronounced the Lesser 
Trianon as "not so splendid as many a house in New York."
After watching a military parade in Paris, Davis decided the 
French people were unimpressive looking. "I am convinced the effects 
of Napoleon's wars are visible in the manifestly diminished stature of 
the present generation," he wrote. Davis, six feet tall, claimed he 
could look over the heads of all the soldiers and "but for their 
thickset figures and swarty visages I should suppose them youths."2
In Paris Davis met a number of Americans, and he arranged with 
two of them to tour the continent. One was an acquaintance of his 
from the University of Virginia, John Reuben Thompson, a personable
2Ibid.
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young Richmond lawyer who had given up the law to edit the Southern 
Literary Messenger. The other, Henry S. Randall, younger than Davis 
and Thompson, was a proper Philadelphian who spoke nothing but English 
and was thus dependent on Davis' meager French and broken German to 
obtain the necessities of life. Davis also became acquainted with a 
group of Virginians who were on the staff of former Senator James Mason, 
the United States Minister, and shortly before he departed from France, 
he was invited to dine with Mason. Davis described the affair as being 
completely Virginian, "had a Virginia ham handed round— Virginia 
Madeira to drink— Va confab for talk and all very homish except that
there were no vegetables on the table." His host was a "fine hearty good
humored Va Gentleman" who had scandalized Paris "by his gothic ignorance 
of the use of the fork." Despite the company of the amiable Virginians, 
Davis continued to feel the old pangs of loneliness. From Paris he 
wrote Captain Du Pont that he regretted traveling to Europe alone.
"If I had known as much as I do now I should have thought twice before
leaping." Realistically he added that his life was "a series of hasty 
acts and leisurely repentance and so it will be to the end."3
One bright afternoon in mid-July Davis, Thompson, and Randall 
took the train from Paris to Brussels. "It is a sort of mild Paris," 
Thompson wrote. After an excursion to Waterloo, Davis and Thompson 
visited the Cathedral of St. Gudale, a church memorable for its stained
3Ibid.; John Reuben Thompson to John Pendleton Kennedy, 16 
August 1853, Thompson to E. A. Duychinck, 13 March 1855, Thompson Mss, 
University of Virginia; Frank L. Mott, A History of American Magazines, 
1741-1850 (New York, 1930), 347-352.
72
glass windows and oak carvings. **
It happened that the Sunday they visited the cathedral was one 
designated to celebrate an historical event. As tradition had it, four 
hundred years before unbelieving Jews had entered the Cathedral at night 
and stolen the consecrated wafers which signified the bodily presence 
of Jesus Christ. Carrying them to the synagogue,they had stabbed them 
with knives, whereupon great drops of blood had poured from the wafers 
and the Israelites were struck dead by divine wrath. "I happened there 
on that day," Davis recounted, "and went to witness the ceremony— in 
the midst of Brussels and in the middle of the 19th century." The mass 
was conducted "with great formality— candles flashing by the hundreds—  
troops of priests." It all struck Davis as a "Diogenean search for 
religion by candle light in day time." He scoffed at the Catholics for 
the procession, the Mass, and the granting of indulgences. "Now these 
thousands were not all fools nor all hypocrites— nor half one, one half 
the other," he reasoned. "Nor did they believe in any sense as a fact 
this lying folly." He finally decided that the people participated in 
this "senseless" ceremony because they equated tradition and faith; they 
feared discarding old traditions for fear of losing the faith. Less 
generous, Thompson pronounced the celebration as merely one aspect "of 
the charlatranry of Romanism."
From Brussels the three Americans traveled by railroad to Antwerp. 
The four-hundred-foot-tall spire of the Cathedral of Antwerp overwhelmed 
Davis. The idea that a comparatively insignificant city in the middle
'♦J. R. Thompson, "Editorial Letters from Europe," Southern 
Literary Messenger, 20 (November, 1854), 699.
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of the fourteenth century could build such a structure made him "more 
Impressed with the absolute power with which the religious Idea had 
seized the minds of the men of that day— where it could enable priests 
to cover the land with structures that now amid the wealth of the 19th 
century they find it difficult even to keep in repair."
After three days in fourteenth century Antwerp, Davis and his 
companions boarded a Dutch steamer to Rotterdam, and then a short train 
ride brought them to the Hague. Upon arriving in the capital of Holland, 
they took a carriage to the main hotel. But the King of Portugal and 
his young bride were staying there and taking up all possible accomo­
dations. Finally talking the proprietor out of his own room, the 
Americans settled down for a rest. "I fear I am a very phlegmatic 
person in the matter of royalty," Davis noted. "All the house is agog 
and in a tremor except myself and Thompson— whose republican nerves 
are proof against any such excitements." After talking with local 
inhabitants, Davis concluded that "royalty in Europe is spoken of and 
looked on as a passing thing— veneration is gone for it— and men treat 
it as the priests do the religious ceremonies of antiquated supersti­
tions— as things to be preserved because standing and closely interwoven 
with what they value rather than for any faith in them."5
From the Hague, Davis and his friends took a Dutch steamer to 
Prussia, arriving in Dusseldorf after eleven hot, weary hours on board 
ship. From there they took a train to Bonn, the beginning of the 
picturesque part of the Rhine "where gentlemen begin to quote Byron."
5Ibid., 700-706; HWD to SFDP, 17 July 1854, WMss 9-25920.
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On their way to Bonn they stopped to see the Cathedral of Cologne and 
encountered another religious procession with "Priests, the vestal 
maidens, the host, the children, the swinging censers, the gaping crowd—  
the scene of Brussels on a smaller scale." Outside the cathedral they 
found a section of the city "looking nothing in the world so much as 
Bvmyon's description of Vanity Fair— the cards, the gambling wheels, the 
stalls with Saints, and crucifixes."6
Boarding another uncomfortable steamer, the Americans traveled to 
Biberich, Wiesbaden, and then to Strassburg. To visit Strassburg they 
needed to re-enter French territory, but they had failed to bring their 
passports. "We were inoffensive American citizens who had no wish 
whatever to disturb the tranquillity of the French empire," Thompson 
wrote, "but merely desired to see Strassburg Cathedral and eat a 
Strassburg pie." Davis, who spoke French, attempted to negotiate with 
the French police. "I am quite sure that we should have met with little 
difficulty on account of the passports had it not been for a hat which
D  had purchased in Wiesbaden— a sort of burnt-ombre colored
sombrero," Thompson recalled. "It was a most preposterous, inflamatory,
disorganizing hat ... and it fully warranted a gendarme in taking D---
for a Thug, a filibusterer or Signor Mazzini."7
From Strassburg they moved on to Berlin which Davis described as 
a "place existing without reason— put where it is by man's device— and 
like a flower in a pot kept alive by artificial watering." An incident
6HWD to SFDP, 6 August 1854, WMss 9-7074.
7Thompson, "Notes of European Travel," Southern Literary Messenger, 
21 (May, 1855), 309-310.
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in Berlin soured the American entourage on Prussian militarism. Davis, 
"usually the most careful and trustworthy of men," lost their baggage 
tickets, Thompson recalled. In vain Davis searched his pockets. Al­
though the trunks bore the initials of each traveler and "Pa.," "Va.," 
and "Md." designating their states, the Berlin officials would not let
them have the baggage. "It was wonderful how strong D  came out in
this emergency," Thompson noted. "There are occasions when the sterling 
qualities of men are instantly developed and this was one of them." 
Suddenly Davis, "by nature an orator as Brutus was, seemed endowed with 
an almost Pentecostal affluence of German" which he used to charm the 
officials out of the baggage. "I left Berlin heartily tired of it," 
Davis reported.8
A twenty-five hour train ride brought them to Vienna. There 
customs officials rudely dismantled Thompson's luggage and seized a 
flask of cologne. Throughout their stay they were conscious of 
official surveillance. Davis charged that they were "dogged all 
through the country," and that everywhere they went, "everyone like 
negro slaves were obliged to show his pass." He and Thompson devised 
a law of nature declaring that there was an exact ratio between the 
degree of despotic rule and difficulties with passports. Tyrannical 
Austria and Prussia were impossible, despotic France was difficult, and 
only freedom-loving England was like America.
Davis' months in Europe had begun to give him a new perspective
8HWD to SFDP, 6 August 1854, WMss 9-7074; Thompson, "Notes of 
European Travel," SLM, 21 (June, 1855), 341; J. R. Thompson to mother, 
13 August 1854, Thompson Mss.
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on American society. The low and poverty-stricken condition of Europe 
he ascribed to the Roman Catholic Church. "Every where the Catholicism 
of the country meets the eye," he noted. "Crosses decorate every house—  
paintings or images of the origin or crucifixion are on every building 
... crosses by the roads, in the fields, on the hills are studeously 
brought before you." Poverty was widespread and "the proudest buildings 
are the vast monasteries which crown the loftiest hills surrounded by 
princely domains." The grandeur of the religious buildings only
Qimpressed him with "the power of the priesthood."
Leaving Austria, the trio joumed to Lindan, Switzerland, on the 
shore of Lake Constance. Davis hated to leave Italy so soon without 
visiting Milan and Venice, but he had resolved to see England thoroughly 
and decided to leave Italy for some future visit. Bidding farwell to 
Thompson and Randall, he "flew" to Paris on one of the best railroads 
in Europe. After a week there, he hurried to London to join his old 
friend Turnbull. Together they visited the countryside, toured castles 
and historical sites, and made a special visit to Westminister Abbey to 
see a Scotch National Church service. Disturbed by "the intrusion of 
music into the prayers" of the Presbyterian service, Davis became 
convinced "it is nothing more nor less than a piece of Romish alliance 
between sentiment and music to furnish a substitute for Religion." Even 
in England, he mourned, religion had fallen prey to Catholic influences. 
After a final tour of English castles and moors, he sailed for home on
9J. R. Thompson, "Notes of European Travel," SLM, 21 (September, 
1855), 546; HWD to SFDP, 22 August 1854, WMss 9-7088.
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the fourth of October.10
On the long voyage home, Davis reflected upon his grand tour of 
Europe and his future prospects. Although interested in historic places, 
Davis never lost sight of the everyday life of the people of France, 
Prussia, Austria, and Italy. Along with the castles, he saw the slums, 
the poor educational and medical facilities, and the poor sanitation.
He saw the rich monasteries side by side with dilapidated farmhouses.
He blamed the widespread poverty and ignorance on "the opium of the 
people"— the Roman Catholic Church. Catholicism with its "aristocracy 
in religion," its absolute dogmas, and "its terrible anathemas" imposed 
restraints on the individual's intellect and industry. In America 
Protestantism fostered democratic institutions and lessened the distance 
between the rich and the poor; in Europe, Catholicism encouraged 
despotism and the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few 
individuals.
While returning to America, Davis also pondered his political 
future. In London he had received news from Captain Du Pont concerning 
the rise of the Know-Nothing organization. The new party was spreading 
everywhere, the Captain noted, but added "there is a feeling, however, 
which indicates more a determination to change all men now in public 
life than to settle down on any new principles or organizations." The 
Know-Nothings were strong in Baltimore, Du Pont advised, and he predic­
ted that incumbent Baltimore Congressman Henry May, a Democrat, "cannot 
be returned as the Know Nothings would go against him." Davis knew he 
would have to take a side upon his return. But the question remained,
10HWD to SFDP, 11 September 1854, WMss 9-1529.
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"What shall it be?"11
On arriving in Baltimore he was immediately caught up in legal 
business. With suits pending before the highest courts of Maryland and 
Virginia and appeal cases not yet decided before the United States 
Supreme Court, Davis reported, "I have been on the go all the time."
His practice became so involved that he rarely had time for politics.
In the December 1854 term of the United States Supreme Court he achieved 
his greatest legal victory— a suit arising out of the Mexican War. By 
a five to four vote, the Supreme Court reversed a Federal District Court 
decision handed down by Chief Justice Taney. "This is a great triumph," 
Davis crowed, "for it is the first time the old chief has even been 
reversed."12
As involved as he was in the practice of law, Davis yearned for 
more information about politics, particularly the breaking up of the 
old political parties "which I have long looked for and heartily rejoice 
in." After a few weekends with Captain Du Pont and several discussions 
at the Friday Club he felt better informed. He was impressed with the 
American or Know-Nothing party's victories throughout the nation in the 
fall of 1854. They carried the Massachusetts and Delaware elections, 
supported Whigs to beat the Democrats in Pennsylvania and aided the Whig 
and Republican fusion ticket to victory in Ohio and Indiana. In October
1!Ibid.; SFDP to HWD, 7 August 1854, WMss 9-1529.
12HWD to SFDP, 28 October 1854, WMss 9-7130; HWD to SFDP, 3 
November 1854, WMss 9-7138; HWD to SFDP, 14 November 1854, WMss 9-7144; 
HWD to Wm. Morrison, 25 December 1854, Aldine Collection, MdHS; HWD to 
SFDP, 18 February 1855, WMss 9-7253. See also McBlair v. Gibbs et al. 
(17 Howard 274), Williams v. Gibbs et al. (17 Howard 239), and Godding 
v. Gibbs et al. (17 Howard 274).
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1854, shortly before Davis' return to Baltimore, the Know-Nothings 
elected Samuel Hinks, a former Democrat, as mayor by a large margin and 
carried fourteen of twenty seats in the First Branch of the City Council 
and eight of ten seats in the Second Branch. The "dark lantern crusade" 
had clearly swept the country. "For my self I am free to act with any 
body for any object I approve," Davis declared. "Europe has fixed me in 
some notions and greatly strengthened others and given me new views and 
I am ready to set on them!"13
Although generally pleased with the new party, he strenuously 
opposed the organization's secrecy and its rabid proscription of 
Catholics. He applauded the February 1855 resolutions of the New York 
Council of the American party which renounced secrecy. "At last they 
are beginning to clear up their unattractive feelings in the light of 
reason," Davis wrote Du Pont, "and to state their purposes and objectives 
in a prudent, moderate and defensible shape." He hoped that the Ameri­
can party in Baltimore and Maryland would "adopt those or analogous 
resolutions." If the local organization abandoned secrecy, he vowed he 
would join them, but until then he was "bidding" his time.14
13HWD to SFDP, c. October 1854, WMss 9-7144; Baltimore Sun, 12 
October 1854. The exact year in which the Know-Nothing party was 
organized in Maryland is not certain. Sister Mary McConville in 
Political Nativism in the State of Maryland, 1830-1860 (Washington, 
1928), pp. 64-65 cites authorities giving varying dates from 1851 to 
1854; Lawrence F. Schmeckebier, History of the Know Nothing Party in 
Maryland (Baltimore, 1899), p. 13, concludes that the party was first 
formed in October 1852; the best analysis of the Know Nothing party is 
Jean H. H. Baker's "Dark Lantern Crusade— An Analysis of the Know 
Nothing Party in Maryland," (Johns Hopkins University: M.A. thesis,
1965).
14Council No. XII, New York City, "Principles and Objects of the 
American Party," (New York, 1855); HWD to SFDP, c. 1 March 1855,
The June 1855 national convention of the American party marked the 
apex of the nativistic movement in the 1850s. Convening in Philadelphia, 
representatives from thirty-one states forged a platform abandoning 
secrecy, softening their denunciation of Catholicism, but splintering 
over slavery. Nearly all the delegates agreed that the naturalization 
laws should be amended to require a twenty-one year period before a 
naturalized citizen could vote. Many, though not a majority, favored 
the admission of American Catholics into the party. The most heated 
argument revolved around the restoration of the Missouri Compromise. 
"North Americans" favored the repeal of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, while 
"South Americans" adhered to the status quo and resolved not to agitate 
the sectional issue. The majority platform was adopted in a strictly 
sectional vote— only New York and California delegates voted with the 
southern and border states. Although the delegates resolved to meet 
in February 1856 to nominate a presidential candidate, the controversy 
over slavery virtually killed the organization as a national party at 
the moment of its birth. One disappointed Know Nothing lamented that 
such "a pitiful convention never assembled to perform such important 
duties. It is full of fools and demagogues."15
Reaction to the Philadelphia platform was mixed. Many condemned 
it as "outright bigotry" while another declared it to be "a second
WMss 9-7311. Former President Millard Fillmore, who endorsed the 
party's objectives, was one of many who would not join because of the 
party's secrecy, see Fillmore to Alexander H. H. Stuart, 15 January 1855, 
A. H. H. Stuart Mss, University of Virginia.
15New York Tribune, 13, 14, 15 June 1855; Baltimore Clipper, 14,
15, 16 June 1855; A. T. Burnley to J. J. Crittenden, 12 June 1855, 
Crittenden Mss, LC.
81
Declaration of Independence." Davis was pleased with the platform but 
felt it was "pitiably spoiled by a bad statement," the eighth section. 
That article was intended to condemn the Roman Church for interferring 
in politics. But the wording of the section did not distinguish between 
condemning Catholics for holding their religious beliefs and condemning 
religious sects from influencing political affairs. "A simple change 
of expression would have saved the necessity of any explanation," Davis 
asserted, and "converted a source of weakness into one of strength."16
To remove the charge of religious bigotry against the Philadelphia 
platform, "to defend it from its friends," Davis wrote another "Hampden" 
letter for publication in the local newspapers. Claiming that "the 
obscurity of its language and the inversion of the two clauses" created 
a misunderstanding, Davis declared that the article's real intention was 
to maintain the separation of politics and religion and not to condemn 
the Catholic faith as a religious belief. Catholics had "notoriously, 
palpably, and reiteratedly violated" that principle by active political 
efforts in recent elections— the presidential election of 1852, the 
Maryland gubernatorial election of 1853, and the mayoralty contest of 
1854. "Every Whig Catholic has joined or voted with the Democrats," he 
charged. "They are now openly and everywhere a political sect." The 
American party only sought to preserve the republican principle of the 
separation of church and state.17
16HWD to SFDP, 20 June 1855, WMss 9-7396; Alexander Boteler to 
wife, 12 June 1855, Boteler Mss, Duke University; Baltimore American, 
19 June 1855.
17"The Religious Test of the American Platform by HAMPDEN," 
Baltimore American, 20 June 1855.
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In March, Davis had become aware that many in the American party 
in Baltimore considered him an ideal candidate for the congressional 
election in the fall. "I am very generally spoken of," Davis confided 
to Du Pont, as the opponent of "one William C. Preston— a low rascally 
lawyer— skilled in the criminal court— smart but utterly unprincipled." 
He considered the possibility of running for Congress. Captain Du Pont 
tried to discourage him by pointing out some of "the shoals and rocks 
and what was generally said." In spite of the captain's warnings, Davis 
had "surveyed the ground swell" and had determined "to take the leap."18
To clarify the misunderstood position of the American party,
Davis published an unsigned pamphlet entitled "The Origin, Principles 
and Purposes of the American Party." For the third time in the country's 
history, Davis argued, political parties had dissolved. In place of the 
old issues:— the Bank of the United States, the tariff, and internal 
improvements came new issues arising out of the Mexican War. But the 
existing parties had "compromised, disguised and patched up" real 
differences for the purpose of winning. "The voice of the people has
not been expressed directly on any great public measure in either house
of Congress for ten years," he declared. Politicians had maintained
the old parties and themselves in office by "bribery, the abuse of
patronage, the pandering to factious organizations, and the pampering 
of foreing influence."19
The first principle of the American party was to return the
18HWD to SFDP, c. 1 March 1855, WMss 9-7311; SFDP to HWD, 8 July 
1855, WMss 9-1623.
19[Henry Winter Davis], "The Origins, Principles and Purposes of 
the American Party," (n.p., 1855), 7-10.
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government to the people by removing all corrupting influences— bloc 
voting by foreigners, bloc voting by Roman Catholics, and presidential 
usurpations of power. To accomplish this goal, the American party 
proposed to exclude the newly arrived immigrant from voting. As the 
Negro, the Indian, and the Chinese were excluded from the franchise, 
so should the European immigrant until "Americanized." "It is folly," 
Davis claimed, "to apply laws made in 1802 for 10,000 emigrants in the 
year to a time when they have swollen to 500,000 in each year. Their 
character has changed as much as their numbers." For the new immigrants 
"remain a distinct class, voting apart, living apart, forming foreign 
associations, political, social and military, and demanding from 
political employers their share of political patronage." On the eve 
of every election they crowded the courts with naturalization petitions 
in order to "control American election the following day."2®
Davis also argued that the state must be neutral in matters of 
religion. It should not interfere with any man's creed and it should be 
free from pressure by religious sects. For fifty years "the Baptist has 
been free to dip in the infallible water, and the Papist to confide in 
the Infallible Pope, the disciples of Calvin to preach the infallible 
decrees, and the disciples of Voltaire to mock at the fallibility of all 
the infallibles." But within the last ten years this principle had been 
gravely violated. The Mormons had established a church that usurped the 
authority of the state. Roman Catholics had sought to remove the Bible 
from the public schools, to divide the public school fund for sectarian 
schools, to concentrate church property under the control of the bishops
20Ibid., 11, 15, 16, 20, 25.
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instead of laymen, and to influence state and national elections. It 
was the purpose of the new party to oppose the influence of religious 
organizations in politics in order to preserve religious freedom for 
all.'21
The American party, he declared, would not tolerate any agitation 
of the subject of slavery in national politics for slavery was a "local 
issue." As to slavery in the territories, he declared that "each 
territory should be left free to decide that question by the first 
constitution it adopts as a state." Until that time the Federal 
government should ignore the territories and neither "encourage or 
discourage, extend or restrict slavery." The Kansas-Nebraska Act 
should not be repealed "for our policy is peace; and to open that 
question renews the terrible conflict."22
Finally, he declared that the people must regain control of the 
government. At present the President dominated the government to far 
too great a degree. He was only "the common executive head," and should 
have no influence on the legislative process. Davis railed against the 
perversion of the presidential veto and against the use of patronage.
He suggested that Congress should deprive the President of the "absolute 
power of removal, by fixing a more permanent tenure of office than his 
will or party victory." The veto should be used only to protect the 
country from hasty action— as a form of injunction. A Congress freed 





The appearance of the pamphlet established Davis as a spokesman 
of the American party and as a likely candidate for Congress on its 
ticket. While not openly announced as a candidate, Davis was quietly 
enlisting support in the lodges for the congressional nomination. He 
spoke at several American party rallies during the summer. His major 
opponent for the nomination was Anthony Kennedy, younger brother of 
novelist and statesman John Pendleton Kennedy. The younger Kennedy had 
joined the party in its earliest stage and had been one of the few 
leading men to be publicly associated with the clandestine movement.21*
Davis was out of town on business when the congressional nomina­
ting convention met on September 3. Shortly before the meeting, rumors 
spread around Baltimore regarding Davis' personal conduct. "The father 
of lies let loose a special brood of his children for the occasion," 
Davis later joked, "assailing my personal character by the grossest and 
most disgusting charges." One of the rumors, he noted, "was only the 
innocent peccadillo of having seduced a young woamn of most respectable 
family— then spirited her out of town .... The perpetuation was named 
Davis— and some scoundrel suggested my name as the first one. So Winter 
Davis it was." In addition there were stories of Davis being an 
abolitionist, a freesoiler, and an advocate of "Kossuthism." The 
stories spread all over town before Hugh Lennox Bond, James A.
Partridge, and R. Stockett Matthews, Davis' personal friends, heard the
23Ibid., 41-43, 45.
21*Baltimore Clipper, 19 June, 1 September 1855; SFDP to HWD, 12 
August 1855, WMss 9-1639.
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stories, tracked down the source, and secured a retraction.25
The congressional nominating convention consisted of eighty-four 
delegates, seven each from the twelve wards which composed the fourth 
congressional district, the north, south, and west sections of Baltimore 
City. They met at Armitage Hall and nominated three candidates:
Anthony Kennedy, Henry Winter Davis, and Z. Collins Lee. On the first 
ballot Davis received forty-three votes, one more than necessary for the 
nomination. "The news of the result of the nomination met me in N. York 
before I knew of the meeting of the convention," Davis explained to Du 
Pont, "and no one was more surprised than I was."26
In a letter published September 11 Davis accepted the nomination 
and outlined his platform— the exclusion of illegitimate influences from 
politics and silence on the subject of slavery. Three days later he 
delivered his acceptance address before an enthusiastic crowd. His 
speech was typical of all those he delivered during the following 
campaign. He began by denouncing President Pierce as merely "an 
arbitrator between greedy and clamorous factions" for the spoils of 
office. He charged the Democrats with lighting "the fires of civil and 
sectional discord." His position in Congress would be "non-intervention 
on either side with the Slavery agitation." Peace between North and 
South was more important to Maryland than any other state, he warned, 
"for her soil must be the Flanders of America, if civil war breaks out."
He blamed the corruption of recent elections on the "new
25HWD to SFDP, c. 6 September 1855, WMss 9-7530.
26Baltimore Clipper, 4 September 1855; HWD to SFDP, c. 6 September 
1855, WMss 9-7530; J. P. Kennedy Journal, 10 September 1855, Kennedy 
Mss, Peabody Institute.
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immigration." In place of quiet, hardworking European refugees, "red 
republicans had been substituted, ignorant of our laws and usages— with 
wild European notions of liberty, which are licentiousness." Not only 
did they interfere with the election process, but "they are crowding our 
cities and competing, in every department, with our mechanics and 
operatives— giving more labor than the capital of the country demanded, 
and lowering the compensation." The newspaper reported that he 
captivated his audience and that "his speech was frequently interrupted 
by thunders of applause." Davis modestly reported that he had "bored 
them and they took it quite uncomplainingly for two hours or more."27
He estimated his chances of election as "pretty fair," but he 
feared it "will be a furious canvass and missies will be hailed on me 
like bombs on Sebastapol." The first missle was an anonymous pamphlet 
entitled "Read and Judge for Yourself: A Review of the Pamphlet of
Henry Winter Davis." It charged Davis with advocating the social and 
political disfranchisement of Catholics, and the Know Nothing party with 
encouraging "bloodshed, disorder and a disregard for everything sacred." 
A second entitled "Mr. H. Winter Davis and Freesoilism: His Hampden
Letters, Ormuzd and Ahriman in the Nineteenth Century, Speeches, 
Conversations, etc." appeared shortly after the first. This pamphlet 
labeled every Know-Nothing Council north of Maryland as advocates of 
free soilism and as agents dedicated to the destruction of Southern 
rights. By quoting Davis' book out of context and by exposing his 
youthful 1849 Hampden letters, the author concluded that Freesoiler was
27Baltimore American Democrat, 14, 15 September 1855; Baltimore 
Sun, 12 September 1855; Cecil Whig, 15 September 1855; HWD to SFDP, c.
13 September 1855, WMss 9-7259.
"a soft term to apply to Mr. Davis, but that 'Abolitionist' would be 
more appropriate, because more just." A third missle, authored by 
Henry May, incumbent Democrat congressman running for re-election, was 
titled "Portrait of Henry Winter Davis, Esq. by His Own Hand. His 
Political Inconsistencies Daguerreotyped in Colors Warranted Not to 
Fade, as His Principles Have Always Done, Under the Corroding Touch of 
Times." May cleverly assailed Davis for supporting Kossuth but 
opposing immigrants; for advocating intervention in European wars in 
Ormuzd and Ahriman but advocating "as little political connection as 
possible" with Europe in "Origin, Principles, and Purpose"; for sup­
porting Winfield Scott (an advocate of speedy naturalization) in 1852 
and for proposing a probation period for naturalized citizens in 1855; 
for upholding the power of Congress to legislate against slavery in the 
territories in his Hampden letters, and for reportedly denying Congress' 
power in a speech in September 1855; for opposing the establishment of 
a free school system in Alexandria in 1849 and opposing the Kearney 
School bill in 1855. Davis denied May's charges.
Henry May challenged Davis to a series of debates. Davis accepted 
with relish; as the abler debater and lesser known of the two, he leaped 
at the chance. After consultation with his advisers, May backed out of 
the debates, claiming to be ill. This retreat gave the Davis campaign 
a boost. "Our canvass goes on well so far," he then reported, "our 
enemies bitter and rancorous and active and vigilant and scared into 
fighting. We are at work and cool and pretty confident." Eschewing the 
old Whig habit of merely writing letters stating positions and letting 
others do the speaking, Davis took to the stump. Nightly meetings in 
different wards featured processions, banners, music, fireworks, and
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the traditional stump speeches. As the Democrats organized political 
clubs out of the volunteer fire companies in the Baltimore wards, so the 
Americans organized young men's political clubs, often with bizarre 
names, from the Know-Nothing Lodges. The Rip Raps of the 12th ward, the 
Jefferson Club from Old Town, the Plug Uglies of the 18th ward, the 
Guards of Liberty from the 12th and 20th wards were the most popular. 
Feeling secure of victory in his home district, Davis traveled the state 
campaigning for the American nominees for Comptroller and Lottery 
Commissioner as well as other congressional candidates.28
The first test of the American party's strength came in the 
election for the city council on October 10. The Democrats carried the 
majority of seats in the First Branch and almost swept the Second. "We 
did not expect with any sort of confidence to obtain a popular majority 
in the elections for councilmen," Davis explained. "We did not expect 
to get out our full vote." The Americans had spent less than five 
hundred dollars in the campaign, while the Democrats spent thousands.
But even though "heaven and earth, money and lies" were used by the 
Democrats, they had not increased their total vote over the last 
election. In the congressional election, he calculated a victory by over 
one thousand votes. "Of course this is only calculation," he noted,
"but we are quite sure of the result."29
Toward the end of the campaign both parties resorted to unfair
28HWD to SFDP, 22 September 1855, WMss 9-7518; Baltimore American,
28 September, 5 October 1855; Baltimore Sun, 26 September 1855; HWD to
SFDP, c. 30 September 1855, WMss 9-7528.
29SFDP to HWD, 12 October 1855, WMss 9-1655; HWD to SFDP, c. 14
October 1855, WMss 9-7568.
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tactics. The pro-Davis Baltimore Clipper charged that if workingmen 
voted for the Democratic party, a party "which invites a foreign 
competitor to your workbench, you vote yourself out of employment." The 
pro-May Baltimore Sun countered with doggerel rhymes taunting "St. 
Winter" as the "friend of Kossuth," and charges that if Davis were 
elected poor children would be compelled to go to school with Negroes. 
Davis was even attacked for wearing "his aristocratic and foreign 
mustache, so recently imported by him from Parisian circles."30
Election day, November 7, 1855, was a pleasant, sunny autumn day. 
Aged John Pendleton Kennedy recorded in his diary that there was "great 
interest manifested on both sides. Great determination on the part of 
the Americans to resist bullying" by the Democratic clubs. The whole 
town was armed, as in past elections. But it was "a peaceful day" and 
everything went quietly. Police arrested several Germans and Irish 
trying to vote with other men's naturalization papers, but otherwise the 
contest was orderly— except for the shooting of Petty Naff, a local 
Irish ward heeler.31
At midnight Davis wired Du Pont announcing his victory. The next 
day he explained the election in detail. "It has been far the most 
desperate battle waged in Maryland for thirty years and none has been
30Baltimore Clipper, 26 October 1855; Baltimore Sun, 12, 16 29 
October, 1, 2 November 1855; Baltimore Argus, 31 October 1855; Baltimore 
American Democrat, 5 November 1855. During the campaign Davis had 
sought to support his argument that Catholics had interfered in 
American presidential elections by writing former Secretary of State 
John M. Clayton regarding nine Catholic bishops who had bargained with 
Henry Clay, see HWD to John M. Clayton, c. 1855, Clayton Mss, LC.
31J. P. Kennedy Journal, 7 November 1855, Kennedy Mss, Peabody 
Institute; Baltimore Sun, 8 November 1855; Baltimore Clipper, 9 
November 1855.
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crowned by so overwhelming a victory," he bragged. "Our whole ticket is
carried in the city— all our state officers are elected." As the
Americans had carried the state legislature, they were assured of 
electing a United States Senator. "But my election is the greatest
miracle of them all and gives our friends more delight and our foes more
chagrin than all else combined." He charged that the Pierce adminis­
tration had spent between forty and fifty thousand dollars in his 
district to aid May. "The Catholics poured out money like water. Every 
man who could be bribed was bribed," he claimed. "The Irish were armed 
to the teeth,"32
It was the largest turnout in Baltimore's history. Over fifteen 
thousand men voted in Davis' district, over one thousand more than the 
turnout in the mayoralty election of 1854, the previous high. The 
largest increases were in the outlying wards, the 18th, 19th, and 20th. 
The corrected totals were 7,988 to 7,493, a margin of 495 for Davis.
The election attracted men who had never voted before— men too apathetic 
to vote Whig or Democrat now were involved in a crusade, the Dark 
Lantern Crusade.33
Overjoyed by his first political victory, Davis wrote that he was 
"nearly pulled to pieces by the enthusiastic greeting of our men every­
where." Within a week he was off to Washington to find lodgings. His 
thoughts turned to the upcoming session of Congress only weeks away.
32HWD to SFDP, 8 November 1855, WMss 9-7579; HWD to SFDP, c. 10
November 1855, WMss 9-7605.
33Baltimore Clipper, 8, 9, 10 November 1855.
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"There will be a lively time in choosing a Speaker," he predicted to 
Du Pont, and "the result is inscrutable."34
34HWD to SFDP, 25 November 1855, WMss 9-7594.
Chapter 5
AIKEN PAINS
The first session of the Thirty-Fourth Congress, Davis' freshman 
term, began at noon on December 3, 1855. Immediately the House of 
Representatives became embroiled in a controversy over the election of 
a Speaker. One congressman noted that there were "thirty modest men 
who think the country needs their service in the Speaker's chair. To 
get rid of this swarm of patriots will take time." The task of choosing 
a presiding officer was complicated by the fact that no party had a 
clear majority. Moreover, those opposed to the Pierce administration—  
Republicans, Freesoilers, Whigs, and Americans— were seriously divided. 
When the voting began, those opposed to slavery divided between short, 
nervous Lewis D. Campbell, an Ohio Whig-Free Soiler, and tall, sturdy 
Nathaniel P. Banks of Massachusetts, a former Democrat who had left the 
party to join the anti-slavery faction of the American party. The 
Democrats nominated William A. Richardson of Illinois, Senator Stephen 
A. Douglas' alter ego and an ardent supporter of the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
in the previous Congress. Davis and the Americans from the border states 
supported a fourth candidate, Humphrey Marshall of Louisville, who was 
a vowed opponent of sectional agitation. On the first four ballots no 
candidate received a majority vote.1
1Timothy C. Day to uncle, 6 December 1855, in Fred H. Harrington, 
"The First Northern Victory," Journal of Southern History, 5 (May,
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As the session progressed several caucuses were held to attempt 
to arrive at a majority. The antislavery forces, led by Republicans 
Anson Burlingame, Schuyler Colfax, and Israel and Elihu Washburne 
withdrew Campbell and united on Banks in an effort to attract the entire 
American vote. The Democrats, hoping to divide the Americans by 
pressing the slavery issue, continued to back Richardson, but let it be 
known that another candidate might be substituted. Both strategies 
depended for success upon the American party. But the Americans, hoping 
to avoid sectional strife, kept their candidate in the field with the 
deciding thirty votes behind him. Later the Americans proposed a 
counter-strategy. They withdrew Marshall and substituted Henry M. 
Fuller, a Free-Soil American from Pennsylvania, but neither the 
Republicans nor the Democrats would join them. "The hostility to the 
Americans is utterly undescribable,11 Davis reported. "We are treated as 
a sort of wolf-head to be smitten of all men. Anything is better than 
the Americans."2
Day after dreary day the contest wore on with innumerable caucuses 
and speeches. The administration and the press cried for an election. 
The Baltimore press urged Davis to aid a speedy organization, but not to 
ally with the Republicans. The American caucus of the Maryland 
legislature congratulated the Maryland Congressmen for protecting the 
House from being organized on a "sectional basis," that is, by the
1939), 189; Harrington's article is an excellent summary of this vital 
contest but seriously neglects the American party's influence; Horace 
Greeley to Schuyler Colfax, 13 November 1855, Greeley-Colfax Mss, New 
York Public Library; Congressional Globe, 34th Congress, 1st Session, 
p. 3, hereinafter cited as CG 34th-lst-3.
2HWD to SFDP, 12 January 1856, WMss 9-7684.
95
Republicans.3
Before the House adjourned for Christmas, it almost succeeded in 
adopting a plurality resolution which would have given the election to 
Banks. "We shall elect Banks in the end," Colfax confidently asserted, 
"in one way or other." Davis was not so sure. The Democrats and the 
Americans could block the adoption of a plurality resolution, and that 
would stop Banks. But he was less confident about electing a compromise 
candidate. "There is no light," he reported,"— our fog bell is still 
ringing." He could not understand why the Republicans and certainly the 
North Americans would not desert Banks in favor of Fuller. "The 
pertinacity of the Banks men is utterly without precedent," he complain­
ed. On the other side the Democrats would not consider an alliance with 
the Americans: "The Locofocos are holding themselves quiet and clean
from all questionable associations with a view to the Presidency."4
"Behold our life," Davis moaned. "Vote Vote Vote and then a gush 
of very poor thick-blue and half-sour stump oratory— and then vote and 
vote." On January 12, after over one hundred votes, the Americans 
arranged for the three candidates— Banks, Richardson, and Fuller— to 
define their political views to the House. The object was to attract 
Banks' supporters to Fuller, but it succeeded only in confusing the
Baltimore Clipper, 10, 25 December 1855; Baltimore American,
14 December 1855; American Organ, 7 January 1856.
4Schuyler Colfax to Wheeler, 23, 26 December 1855, Colfax Mss, LC; 
Israel Washburne to J. L. Stevens, 25 December 1855, Israel Washburne 
Mss, LC; Howell Cobb to wife, 23 December 1855, in U. B. Phillips (ed.), 
The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell 
Cobb (Washington, 1913), 356; HWD to SFDP, 4 January 1856, WMss 9-7667.
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already chaotic situation. Banks dodged questions about the equality 
of the races which disappointed many of his supporters; Richardson 
hedged on his answers regarding the power of Congress to legislate for 
the territories and the constitutionality of the Wilmot Proviso. Davis 
described this Congressional "catechism" as "a sick day." He felt that 
Fuller "was greatly the most explicit, manly, direct and sensible.
Banks next and Richardson last, and last on all points." He concluded 
that the debate succeeded in "uncovering the trick which pushed off 
Richardson as a specially sound and safe man for the South." Now with 
Richardson discredited, he thought, "the locos will find great diffi­
culty in justifying their allowing Banks to be elected when they could 
have elected Fuller."5
As the contest entered the seventh week, Davis wrote that plans 
were being made to get the Americans "of all quarters together and to 
select a candidate irrespective of the negro question." After another 
American party caucus, party spokesmen offered to withdraw Henry Fuller 
in return for any organization based upon broad national principles—  
but both the Republicans and Democrats declined. As every compromise 
offer of the American party was rejected, Davis thought the plurality 
rule came closer to adoption and "in that event Banks will be elected." 
He did not personally object to Banks, only to his abolitionist reputa­
tion and his Republican support. "In my view he is a safer man for the 
country than Richardson or any extreme Locofoco," Davis concluded.6
5CG 34th-Ist-222-228; HWD to SFDP, 13 January 1856, WMss 9-7684.
6HWD to SFDP, 13 January 1856, WMss 9-7684; CG 34th-lst-282, 294. 
Baltimore Clipper, 24 January 1856.
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"The present struggle bums along like a slow match smoking and 
smouldering but with little flame," reported a former Congressman. 
However, members were beginning to show signs of strain. Albert Rust, 
a burly first-term Arkansas Democrat, accosted Horace Greeley outside 
the House Chamber and struck him. On the floor of the House order was 
difficult to maintain. "Mr. Cullen of Delaware, Mr. Bowie of Maryland, 
and Campbell of Kentucky have been very drunk and others a little drunk," 
reported freshman Congressman Justin Morrill. "We have kept good- 
natured, silly and noisy," he added. But soon Davis reported that "I 
am patient and everybody is cool."7
On February 1, after nine weeks of the contest, the Democrats 
surprisingly joined the Republicans to pass a plurality resolution. The 
Democrats gambled that their new candidate, silver-headed, bewhiskered 
little William Aiken of South Carolina would be elected by a coalition 
of the Democrats and the Americans. "He is personally the most popular 
man in the house, universally liked by everybody," Howell Cobb wrote 
his wife. "He is a democrat and as national as a South Carolinian ever 
gets to be. He was not in our caucus, though approving our platform, 
and for that reason the National Know Nothings have agreed to vote for 
him." At a White House reception after the announcement of Aiken's 
candidacy, President Pierce greeted Aiken as "Mr. Speaker."8
Under the plurality resolution, the House agreed to four more
7Robert C. Winthrop to Howell Cobb, 5 January 1856, in Phillips 
(ed.), Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 357; Justin Morrill 
to wife, 10 January 1856, Morrill Mss, LC; HWD to SFDP, 4 January 1856, 
WMss 9-7667.
8CG 34th-lst-335; Cobb to wife, 2 February 1856, in Phillips (ed.) 
Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 358.
votes— the fourth vote being final. On the 130th ballot, the first 
under the plurality resolution, Banks received 102 and Aiken 93. But 
Davis and thirteen other Americans supported Fuller and so Banks was 
short of a majority. The excitement grew more and more intense on the 
next two ballots, but with the same results. Before the 133rd ballot, 
in which the plurality rule would be invoked, tremendous pressure was 
brought on the fourteen who had stuck with Fuller to join the Democracy 
and elect Aiken. Davis and five others refused to join the Democrats 
thus allowing Banks to win, 103 to 100. Wild applause greeted Banks' 
election. The Republicans were exhilerated by the victory, the 
Democrats were bitter.9
In Maryland there was an immediate reaction to Davis' final vote. 
The Baltimore American condemned him for not joining the rest of the 
Maryland delegation in supporting Aiken: "To use the mildest phrase,"
they wrote, "it was certainly a great mistake— and in politics as well 
as diplomacy a blunder is often worse than a crime." The editor of the 
American Democrat, which had supported Davis for election, disapproved 
of Davis' vote and applauded Aiken.10
Davis' friends were concerned about hostile reaction to his course 
"I fear our friend Mr. Davis has ruined himself politically by his vote, 
Captain Du Pont wrote to his wife, "but he acted consciously and knew 
the sacrifice." In Washington, Du Pont reported, Davis' name was
9CG 34th-lst-335; Harrington, "The First Northern Victory," 202- 
203; Thurlow Weed to N. P. Banks, 3 February 1856, Banks Mss, LC.
10Baltimore American, 4, 16 February 1856; Baltimore Clipper, 7 
February 1856; Baltimore American Democrat, 13, 15 December 1856; Cecil 
Whig, 23 February 1856.
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mentioned everywhere and often he had to leave a conversation when 
politicians condemned him. But eccentric Hugh Lennox Bond, a Baltimore 
attorney and a strong backer of Davis', wrote him that "if I had been 
in your place I should have voted as you did." The Democrats deserved 
the loss for so viciously insulting the Americans and spurning their 
compromise officers. "When folks understand the position and Banks 
turns out not to have hoofs, horns or tails," Bond assured him, "when 
they find out he permits white men to have white wives and is not 
generally Monstrum horrendum" they will cease to think of "your vote 
and you will be freed from your 'Aiken pains'."11
The political repercussions of Davis' vote against Aiken were 
immediate. The Maryland legislature, in which the American party held 
a majority, was then deliberating on a successor to United States 
Senator Thomas G. Pratt. Davis' commanding position in the fledgling 
party, secured by his campaigning all over the state that fall, made 
him a logical candidate despite the fact that he had barely warmed his 
House seat. The Cecil Whig, a Know Nothing paper, came out for Davis 
for Senator at the end of December 1855. Several newspapers considered 
him among the best qualified aspirants.12
11SFDP to SMDP, 3 December 1855, WMss 9-1679; SFDP to SMDP, 10 
December 1855, WMss 9-1684; SFDP to SMDP, 4 February 1856, WMss 9-1723; 
H. L. Bond to HWD, 4 February 1856, Bond-McCulloch Mss, MdHS; SFDP to 
SMDP, 5 February 1856, WMss 9-1724. Political disaster struck the other 
five Americans who stuck with Fuller on the last ballot: Elisha Cullen
of Delaware, William Millward of Pennsylvania, and Jacob Broom of 
Pennsylvania were defeated for re-election; Thomas R. Whitney of New 
York did not even get renominated; Ezra Clark of Connecticut soon bolted 
the party, joined the Republicans, was elected to the Thirty-Fifth 
Congress and then was defeated for re-election.
12Cecil Whig, 29 December 1855; Baltimore Clipper, 26 November,
18 December 1855.
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The election of a Senator was delayed for over a month while the 
legislature dealt with an assault made upon the American party by 
Democratic Governor T. Watkins Ligon. In his annual message, the 
Governor denounced "secret societies" in Maryland as "a tide of evil 
flowing upon us." He accused the party of stirring "the most ungovern­
able passions and prejudices of the human heart." The American-con­
trolled legislature responded to the Governor's charges by appointing 
a committee to investigate "secret societies" with Anthony Kennedy as 
its chairman. Democrats planned to take full advantage of this 
investigative hearing to expose the Know Nothings' pre-1855 secrecy, 
ritual, oaths, and religious extremism.13
Davis shrewdly realized the danger posed by the investigation.
In a letter to Anthong Kennedy he outlined a strategy to turn the 
hearings to the party's advantage. "I think it of the utmost moment 
that no examination in fact [be held], and the question is how to 
avoid it without losing your advantage." In Davis' view it was 
suicidal to allow the Democrats to call witnesses to explain the 
American party's platform. "Even if you choose them yet no one can 
answer for the consequences of cross examination," he advised. Fearing 
misrepresentation of the party philosophy "by men as witnesses whom you 
would never allow to go on the hustings," he suggested a solution.
The Americans should wait for the Governor's reply to the request
13"Message of the Governor," Maryland House Documents— 1856, 
Document A, 28-32; Baltimore Sun, 5 January 1856; Baltimore Clipper,
10 January 1856.
llfHWD to Anthony Kennedy, c. January 1856, Christopher Hughes Mss, 
William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.
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for specific charges, he suggested. Then, "if he point his charge at 
the American Party— you are the representatives of that party sent by 
the people of Maryland" and "can repel every insinuation and have a 
glorious opportunity of spreading our opinions on record and retaliating 
the Gov.’s imputations." If the Governor made his charges against the 
local lodges instead of the state party, "you reply that those Lodges 
are the form of organization of the American Party in each locality—  
differing in nothing from its principles, having no secret principles, 
not using any oath." Therefore the legislators could speak for them 
since "two thirds of the Legislature belong to them." If the Governor 
dealt only in general terms, Davis suggested that the legislature 
"butt the Gov. for attempting to alarm the public mind by vague and 
unfounded rumors." Although the legislature should always be willing 
to investigate a specific danger existing in the state, the Governor 
had "called out wolf wolf without any fact on which to base his cry."
Now he should be shown that the legislature "will not degrade the people 
of Maryland by instituting a general search warrant into their opinions 
on the vague charge of conspiracy." He urged Kennedy to follow his plan, 
but asked that the authorship of the plan be kept secret.15
Governor Ligon replied to the committee's request for specific 
charges on January 23. He declined to name either the American party 
or the Know Nothings lodges but instead made vague charges of religious 
intolerance and persecution. Kennedy scheduled hearings for the 
following week. The Democratic committeemen presented a list of names 
of witnesses they wished called that included nine Baltimore Know
15Ibid.
102
Nothings who had left the party and were now ready to "expose" it. 
Following Davis' plan, Kennedy secured the defeat of the motion to call 
any witnesses saying, "The Committee are themselves the witnesses for 
the American Party ... and can speak authoritatively." The proposed 
investigation thus became a lengthy explanation of the party's position 
on immigration, the separation of church and state, and the influence 
of foreign bloc voting on democracy. Its majority report "butted" the 
governor's message as "an unfortunate exhibition of ill-timed and 
undeserved discourtesy."16
Kennedy's handling of the investigation increased his prominence 
in the party and was contrasted favorably with Davis' vote against 
Aiken for Speaker. Newspapers switched their support from Davis to 
Kennedy. Four days after Eanks was elected Speaker, the American 
caucus met in Annapolis. Davis' lieutenants were active in the caucus 
trying to retain support for him. On the first ballot Anthony Kennedy 
led with 14 votes, Congressman J. Dixon Roman was second with 13, 
state senator Coleman Yellot and Davis had 10 each, and 11 votes were 
scattered. On the second ballot Davis moved ahead to lead with 19 to 
Roman's 15, Kennedy's 14, and Yellot's 11. But then a secret caucus 
halted a Davis boom. On the third ballot Davis lost eight votes and 
after the fourth ballot his supporters withdrew his name from the 
contest. Anthony Kennedy was finally elected on the ninth ballot.
Davis' chief supporter in the legislature, Baltimore attorney James
16T. Watkins Ligon to A. Kennedy, 23 January 1856, Governor's 
Letterbook, Maryland Hall of Records; Maryland House Documents— 1856. 
"Report of the Majority of the Committee on Secret Societies," 8; 
"Journal of the Select Committee on Secret Societies," 71-74; Baltimore 
Sun, 29 January 1856.
103
A. Partridge, wrote him that the moment his vote on the Speakership 
became known "a dozen aspirants started forth, and this added to the 
virulence with which he was assailed" lost him the Senate seat.17
After visiting Davis, Captain Du Pont wrote his wife that Davis 
thought his district was reconciled to his vote, but "there seems no 
question however that it lost him the Senatorship." Du Pont, 
politically shrewd, was less concerned over the loss of the Senate 
election than "oppressed at the idea that [Davis] should have separated 
himself from that sympathy and support in his State and Section of the 
Country." He hope that the controversy would all "blow over yet," but 
noted that "this slavery question is the touchstone of everything South." 
The Captain feared that the loss of the election had been a blow to the 
proud, self-confident Davis. "He bears himself like a man under it,"
Du Pont concluded, but "what the effect be to him to appear this way,
I know not."18
If Davis' vote on the Speakership lost him a Senate seat, it 
gained him a ranking position on the House's most prestigious committee. 
Speaker Banks, perhaps in gratitude for Davis' neutrality in the contest 
and perhaps in recognition of his ability, appointed him to the Commit­
tee on Ways and Means. With the Speakership contest and the Senate 
election behind him, Davis now occupied himself with his legislative 
duties and his law practice. He rented two rooms, "not large but better
17J. P. Kennedy to George S. Bryan, 3 December 1855, Kennedy to 
Solomon G. Haven, 29 January 1856, Kennedy Journal, 6 December 1855, 4,
15 February 1856, Kennedy Mss, Peabody Institute; Baltimore Sun, 8, 14 
February 1856; Baltimore Clipper, 9, 11 February 1856; Maryland House 
Journal— 1856, 328.
18SFDP to SMDP, 14 February 1856, WMss 9-1731.
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than any others I saw," on 15th Street, one block from the White House 
and across the street from the Treasury Department. "I shall have 
breakfast there or sent from Gautiers— and dine at Gautiers or elsewhere 
as my convenience may require," he wrote, but "I cannot endure a 
boarding house." As a freshman member of a third party, he did not have 
to deal with the many requests made of more influential members. How­
ever, with his district only a short train ride from Washington, he was 
within easy reach of constituents seeking favors.19
During the early months of the session, Davis, as befitted a new 
member, rarely spoke on hte floor of the House. During the entire 
speakership contest he never engaged in the sometimes heated debate. 
Throughout the first months he was engaged in committee preparing the 
appropriations bills to be passed that session. Desiring to please his 
constituents, Davis offered two local bills early in the session: one
to improve the Baltimore harbor and one to clear the Susquehanna River 
in northern Maryland.20
Anxious to make a name in Congress, Davis delayed his maiden 
speech until a major issue emerged. He found the opportunity in a 
contested election from the Kansas Territory. In the territory strife 
between supporters and opponents of slavery verged on civil war. A 
recent election to choose a delegate to Congress had resulted in both 
candidates claiming victory— John W. Whitfield, the "regularly elected" 
representative, and Andrew H. Reeder, the Free-State settlers1 candidate. 
Both men presented themselves to the House, and this gave that body a
19CG 34th-lst-411; HWD to SFDP, 25 November 1855, WMss 9-7594.
20CG 34th-lst-533.
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pretext to intervene in the affairs of the territory, an opportunity 
previously denied to it because administration of the territories was 
vested in the President. Particularly eager to intervene were the 
Republicans and antislavery forces. Consequently the Committee on 
Elections asked for authority to investigate the election and to send 
a sub-committee to Kansas, a move that was strenuously opposed by 
Southerners.
Davis obtained the floor on March 12 and spoke against the 
investigation. He began by questioning the purpose of such an
investigation. "They do not propose, sir, to impeach Governor Reader
for improper administration of the office of Governor." If that were 
the purpose, he would vote with them. "They do not propose to lay the 
foundation for an impeachment of the President of the United States for 
failure to execute the laws and to see that justice was administered in 
that Territory. If that were the question, my vote should be for the
investigation." He was always ready, he said, to "investigate
grievances alleged by either the North or by the South," but the 
proposed investigation was but "a wind cloud-boisterous, disturbing, 
casting dust in men's eyes, but not charged with any lightening."
If the House wished an investigation into the situation in Kansas which 
would hold persons "high or low to responsibility for malfeasance, I 
should be in favor of such investigation." But to use a contested 
election case as a vehicle to examine the chaos in Kansas was a 
corruption of the election laws. When he concluded, both sides of the 
House rose, and many members, both Republicans and Democrats, crowded 
to shake hands with him. However, his hour-long speech failed to 
accomplish its purpose, a week later the House voted 101 to 93 to
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establish such a committee.21
His first speech in Congress attracted great attention. James 
G. Blaine, youthful reporter of the Kennebec Journal in Augusta, Maine, 
wrote after the speech that "Davis is the most eloquent and promising 
member of his party in the House." The Philadelphia Inquirer reported 
that when Davis was speaking House members "dropped their pens and 
papers, hushed their conversations and crowded around the speaker .... 
Mr. Davis, who has, for some time, been called the Henry Clay of 
Maryland, is one of the most promising men in the Thirty-Fourth 
Congress.1122
His maiden effort a success, Davis next sought an opportunity to 
speak on one of the major planks of the American platform— naturaliza­
tion. His chance came when Humphrey Marshall of Kentucky introduced 
a bill requiring all citizens of the District of Columbia to live in 
the city "as citizens" for one year before they could vote. This bill 
would help stop corruption in elections in Washington, Davis alleged. 
Foreigners crowd the courthouses on the day before an election to take 
out naturalization papers and then vote the next day turning the balance 
against longtime citizens. These new voters can't speak the language, 
don't appreciate the problems of the city, and "in nine out of ten 
cases do not pay their own naturalization fees." They are "marched and 
dragged along before the tribunals of the United States" by unscrupulous
21John Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate, 
and Cabinet, I, 114; CG 34th-lst-Appendix-227-229.
22Kennebec (Maine) Journal, 17 March 1856; James G. Blaine, Twenty 
Years in Congress (Norwich, Conn., 1884), I, 122; Philadelphia Inquirer, 
15 March 1856; SFDP to James S. Biddle, 17 March 1856, WMss 9-1752; 
Baltimore Clipper, 19 March 1856.
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politicians who pay the fees, hold the naturalization papers, and only 
allow them to have their papers when "they are marched up in files to 
the polls upon the day of election." After a hard fight in which Davis 
showed skill as a parliamentarian, a compromise election bill for 
Washington was passed. Davis termed it "another illustration of the 
American power in the House."23
As the presidential election of 1856 approached, debate over 
Kansas and slavery became more frequent and bitter. During a discus­
sion of a routine appropriations bill, abolutionist Joshua Giddings 
rebuked the House Ways and Means Committee for including "obnoxious" 
funds for the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law. Boldly Davis 
rose to reply to the dean of the House. Conceding that the Fugitive 
Slave Law was "obnoxious in the northern country," he nevertheless 
condemned the "crazy and maniac idea that laws are nothing after they 
are enacted." When Giddings commented that he, like Thomas Jefferson, 
would refuse to execute an unconstitutional law, Davis replied, "I 
have never thought that Jefferson was the safest guide in construing 
the Constitution." Higher-law in Jefferson's day, he added, was 
"modified and limited, and not to the extent to which it has now gone, 
because that doctrine, like other noxious weeds, grows from year to 
year."21*
The sectional animosity always latent in the Thirty-Fourth 
Congress erupted when Representative Preston Brooks of South Carolina




brutally assaulted Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts on the floor 
of the Senate. The House appointed an Investigating committee to 
consider expelling Brooks. "The excitement here is intense," reported 
Congressman Justin Morrill, "scenes of great turbulence are expected." 
All business stopped in the House for weeks while each side attacked 
and defended Brooks' action. In mid-July the House finally brought 
itself to vote on a motion to expel Brooks. Going along with his party, 
Davis voted against expulsion. The motion was carried by a vote of 121 
to 95, but as it lacked the requisite of two-thirds vote, Brooks was 
not expelled.25
The furor over "Bleeding Sumner" did not abate before "Bleeding 
Kansas" became the issue. Freshman representative John Sherman, recent­
ly returned from Kansas as part of the congressional investigating 
committee, introduced a proviso to the army appropriation bill to 
exclude the use of the army in enforcing the laws of the proslavery 
legislature at Shawnee Mission and to disarm the militia of the pro­
slavery territorial government. The militia, acting with the approval 
of the legislature, had invaded the town of Lawrence, destroyed numerous 
buildings, and arrested scores of Free-State men on "high treason."
Day after day the debate continued on the proviso, the Republicans 
defending, the Democrats attacking, and the Americans remaining silent. 
In vain Davis protested the inclusion of the proviso to a needed 
appropriation bill. He agreed that the atrocities in Kansas ought to
25See David Donald, Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War 
(New York, 1860), 288-311, for a brilliant analysis of "Bleeding Sumner" 
upon the Congress and the country; Justin Morrill to wife, 25 May, 1 
June 1856, Morrill Mss, LC; CG 34th-lst-1628.
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be stopped, but declared the proviso was no solution. He consistently 
voted against it and urged the House to accept the Senate version of the 
appropriation bill which did not contain the amendment. As Congress 
adjourned without resolving the dispute over the proviso and without 
passing an army appropriation bill, President Pierce called it back into 
special session for that purpose.26
During the special session Davis voted for the bill with the 
proviso as a parliamentary maneuver. The following day he voted to 
strike it out. But his one vote for the proviso caused considerable 
uproar in Baltimore. Both Democratic and American newspapers berated 
him as a disunionist, an abolitionist, and a "black Republican." 
Throughout the presidential campaign he was called on to explain his 
vote on that occasion.27
When the special session of Congress adjourned, the presidential 
campaign summoned the efforts of politicians. In February the American 
party met in Philadelphia and nominated former President Millard 
Fillmore for president with Andrew Jackson Donelson, Old Hickory's 
nephew, as his running mate. After the nomination of Fillmore and 
Donelson, delegates from four New England states, Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Illinois withdrew from the convention to 
protest the party's noncommittal stand on slavery expansion. In early 
June the Democracy assembled in Cincinnati, and after a long contest
26Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years, I, 131; 34th-lst-
2091-92; HWD to SFDP, 17 August 1856, WMss 9-8000.
2Baltimore Clipper, 22, 27, 30 August, 2 September 1856;
Baltimore Sun, 29 August 1856, Cecil Whig, 6 September 1856; Baltimore 
Patriot, 9 September 1856.
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nominated the most "available candidate," sixty-five year-old James 
Buchanan. Two weeks later the rump or North American convention 
assembled in New York and nominated House Speaker Nathaniel F. Banks 
for President, however, Banks withdrew when the Republicans assembled 
in Philadelphia and nominated John C. Fremont, "the Pathfinder."28
The American party entered the contest with high hopes of victory. 
Buoyed by their phenomenal success in 1854 and 1855, they had reason to 
hope for victory in 1856. The division of the party dimmed Fillmore's 
chances for outright victory, but many Americans thought they might be 
able to win if the election were thrown into the House of Representa­
tives. If they could carry New York, Fillmore's home state, California, 
Louisiana, and the three border states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and 
Maryland they might accomplish their purpose. Based on past elections, 
the chances of carrying California and Louisiana seemed good and the 
other might also be won if they could enlist the old Whig vote.29
Davis seemed confident that Fillmore could carry Maryland. While 
in Congress he made a major campaign speech directed as much to his own 
state as to the members. His "Plea for the Country Against the Sections" 
speech was the model from which he patterned his later campaign speeches. 
The Democratic party was dead in the North, he argued, killed by its 
aggressive policy of slavery expansion. The Republican party was a
28Baltimore Clipper, 18 January, 2, 22 February 1856; New York 
Herald, 19-26 February 1856; Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, II, 466-69;
W. G. Brownlow to John Bell, 15 January 1856, Bell Mss, LC.
29Baltimore Clipper, 2 February 1856; HWD to David Davis, 21 
February 1856, David Davis Mss, CHS; Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, II, 
494-95; Arthur C. Cole, The Whig Party in the South (Washington, D.C., 
1914), 322-26; James Buchanan to Howell Cobb, 22 July 1856, in Phillips 
(ed.), Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 377.
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purely sectional party incapable of governing effectively. That left 
only the Americans. While the other parties cried "No Compromise" and 
dedicated themselves to the conquests of each other, Fillmore and the 
American party proposed "a moderate and middle position." Beware the 
extremes, he pleaded. "Deliver us not over into the hands of the 
Abolitionists." Many Southern extremists secretly wanted the election 
of Fremont in order to cause the dissolution of the Union. But disunion 
"would be an act of suicide"; it would be no peaceful separation "but 
a sharp and jagged chasm, rending the hearts of great commonwealths, 
lacerated and smeared with fraternal blood." The election of Fillmore,
the "Pacificator" was demanded by the times. "No law can quiet Kansas
unless a soothing administration soften the exacerbated feelings of the 
people." Davis called his countrymen to Fillmore "in the name of the 
Union he saved." His speech carried the condescending air of a wise 
man instructing errant children, but its emotional impact, his rapid- 
fire delivery, and his captivating voice made it a success whenever he 
delivered it.30
To win the campaign in Virginia was Davis' immediate concern. 
Vespasian Ellis, editor of the American Organ in Washington, printed 
copies of his "A Plea for the Country Against the Sections" speech
and Davis distributed them throughout the old Whig areas of Virginia.
He planned rallies in Alexandria, Richmond, and Charlestown and enlisted 
old Whigs to come and speak. "There is much as to induce a stormy 
hope of carrying the state," he wrote Colonel Dick Thompson urging the 
Hoosier to come to Virginia to speak. The enthusiasm that Davis saw
30Davis, Speeches and Addresses, 40-62.
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in Virginia for Fillmore made him think that "the end of Locofocos" 
party was "at hand."31
In July, Davis spoke at a rally at New Brunswick, New Jersey. 
Defending Fillmore as the best hope for the Union, he denounced Buchanan 
as having been "all things to all men, and nothing long," and Fremont 
as "first at every feast, but last at every fight." Both Buchanan and 
Fremont, he alleged, were nominated principally because they were 
incapable and could be used as tools by the powers behind the throne. 
Both candidates represented sectional interests. The sole remedy was 
to rebuke sectionalism on either side and choose the conservative man—  
Fillmore. Davis' speech was so well received by the audience that he 
was invited back to New Jersey in September to speak at Newark.32
The tiny state of Delaware was the domain of Senator John M. 
Clayton, former Secretary of State under Taylor. A proud man, Clayton 
was asked to resign when Fillmore ascended to the presidency and would 
not openly support Fillmore in 1856. Davis, through Captain Du Pont, 
came to know and to respect Clayton. There were few men in Davis' life 
that he could admire without reservation, but Clayton was one. On 
several occasions Davis visited the Senator at his home in Delaware to 
urge him to support the American slate. Also on those trips, in 
addition to speaking at rallies in Wilmington and New Castle, he took 
time off to relax at the Du Pont's luxurious home, Louviers. That
31HWD to Richard W. Thompson, 21 August 1856, Thompson Mss, 
Rutherford B. Hayes Library; Richmond Whig, 26, 28 August, 23 September 
1856; Baltimore American, 11 September 1856; Charlestown Free Press,
30 October, 6 November 1856.
32Baltimore Clipper, 18 July 1856; HWD to SFDP, 1 September 1856, 
WMss 9-8014.
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estate constantly brought back memories of Connie and the weekends they 
spent with the Du Ponts. Davis enjoyed his stolen vacations during the 
summer and fall of 1856, for the campaign in Maryland soon became a 
free-for-all. 33
The presidential campaign of 1856 in Maryland was one of the most 
fiercely contested elections in the United States. There the Democrats 
and Americans were evenly divided with the old Whigs holding the balance. 
Throughout the summer Howell Cobb of Georgia, one of Buchanan's most 
trusted advisors, enlisted former Whigs to support Buchanan. In late 
July and early August Whig Senators James A. Pearce and Thomas Pratt 
defected to the Democracy and were followed by Maryland's senior 
statesman, Reverdy Johnson. The Americans countered by secretly 
organizing and financing a Whig convention in Baltimore. That meeting, 
led by old Whigs J. Hanson Thomas, Mexican War hero General John R.
Kenly, and Baltimore American editor C. C. Fulton, denounced the 
defection of Maryland's Senators and endorsed the nomination of Fillmore 
and Donelson. 314
Winter Davis knew that the campaign in Maryland would not be won 
by endorsements of senior politicians, but by a well-organized campaign
33SFDP to SMDP, 29 February 1856, WMss 9-1739; HWD to SFDP, 9 
September 1856.
3I*James Buchanan to John C. Breckenridge, 20 June 1856, Breck- 
enridge Marshall Mss, Filson Club; Cobb to Buchanan, 4 August 1856 in 
Phillips, (ed.), Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 379;
James A. Pearce to James Buchanan, 16 July 1856, Buchanan Mss, HSP; 
Reverdy Johnson to James Buchanan, 17 July 1856, Buchanan Mss, HSP,
Thomas G. Pratt to Editor, National Intelligencer, 30 July 1856; James 
A. Pearce to Editor, Baltimore American, 4 August 1856; Baltimore 
Clipper, 23 June 1856; Baltimore Sun, 11 July, 19 September 1856;
Wm. Pinkney Ewing to Francis P. Blair, Sr., 29 September 1856, Blair- 
Lee Mss, Princeton.
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that reached the entire state. He supported the decision of the State 
Central Committee which planned an exhausting schedule of rallies 
beginning in western Maryland, extending to southern Maryland, and 
ending on the Eastern shore. Davis spoke at most of the twenty-five 
state rallies and dominated the campaign in Baltimore, sometimes 
speaking at two ward rallies in one night.35
At a meeting in Baltimore's China Hall, Davis opened the campaign 
in Maryland with a fiery speech. "The room was crowded almost to 
suffocation," reported the Baltimore Clipper, "and hundreds were com­
pelled to leave on account of not being able to press themselves 
within the door way." Riot and bloodshed had spread over the terri­
tories, Davis stated, and it was necessary for all to lend their efforts 
to check its fearful march before it resulted in civil war. Over and 
over he stressed that the only decision to make before voting was to 
measure what each candidate would do for the good of the Union.
Fillmore, the "Pacificator," had saved the Union in 1850 and would do 
so again. One reporter covering the speech was amazed at Davis' "ease, 
grace and eloquence," and the "clearness and cogency" with which he 
expressed his views. Like others, the reporter concluded that Davis 
promised "to become, in a very short time, one of the great men of the 
nation."36
As the campaign neared its close, estimates of its results varied 
sharply. Fillmore still had hopes that the election would be thrown
35Baltimore Clipper, 17 September 1856.
36Roy F. Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (New York, 
1948), 56; Baltimore Clipper, 9, 11 September 1856.
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into the House of Representatives. Vespasian Ellis, party strategist, 
felt as late as October that New York, Tennessee, Kentucky, Florida, 
Louisiana, and California were "safe" for Fillmore with others a 
possibility. Democratic leaders predicted that Buchanan might carry 
all but three states, while a Republican newspaper asserted that 
Fillmore would not carry a single state.37
In Maryland, knowledgeable politicians made no bold predictions. 
Democrat Robert McLane wrote Buchanan that "on the Eastern Shore, there 
will not be a majority of more than two or three hundred votes either 
way, and on the Western Shore, outside of Baltimore, I look for about 
the same state of vote." Thus the election hinged on Baltimore and the 
mysterious Whig vote, he felt. The majority of the Whigs would go for 
Fillmore, but Senators Pratt and Pearce were making last minute efforts 
in Baltimore to change the tide. Also worried about the Whig vote was 
Davis. Although most of Maryland's Whigs had approved of Fillmore while 
he was President, now most "like Peter begin to curse and to swear that 
they do not even know Fillmore." As the campaign closed, he consoled 
himself that he had done all he could for "peace and moderation" and 
would "leave the result to God and the people, his instruments."38
Election day was marred by disgraceful rioting in Baltimore. 
Policemen battled the political clubs in several wards, five Americans
37Millard Fillmore to J. P. Kennedy, 25 October 1856, Kennedy Mss, 
Peabody Institute; Vespasian Ellis to J. Scott Harrison, 3 September 
1856, John Scott Harrison Mss, LC; Vespasian Ellis to Alexander H. H. 
Stuart, 1 October 1856, Stuart Mss, University of Virginia.
38Robert McLane to James Buchanan, 1 November 1856, Buchanan 
Mss, HSP; HWD to SFDP, 29 October 1856, WMss 9-8058.
and one Irish ward heeler were murdered, and a general riot broke out 
in the 6th and 7th wards when the militant Irish Club of the 8th ward
invaded the polls. Nationwide it was a peaceful contest. Buchanan
carried the entire South, his home state of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
Indiana, Illinois, and California, and was the victor by a narrow 
margin*”
"However it may have you elsewhere— and it seems bad enough," 
Davis wrote Du Pont the day after the election, "you will join me in
rejoicing that Md. stands firmly; and especially that Balto gives
7.000 [majority] for Fillmore; and more especially that 6,000 of the
7.000 majority are in my heretical and ostracized district." He 
considered that "rather a good endorsement on change" in the political 
life of Baltimore and Maryland. Indeed, Maryland was the only state 
Fillmore carried.1*0
39Baltimore Clipper, 5, 6 November 1856; Baltimore Sun, 5 
November 1856.
**°HWD to SFDP, 5 November 1856, WMss 9-8064.
Chapter 6
HOLD THE TONGUE ON THE NEGRO QUESTION
"Women are the good beings whom ignorantly we worship and confide 
in during our simple childhood," Henry Winter Davis once specualted,
"and who only lift the veil when maturer reason can appreciate the 
necessity, yet not cease to adore the source, of our happiness when 
found to be so much nearer and so much more real than we supposed."
There had been many women in Davis* life, but death and circumstances 
had separated all of them from him. His mother became mentally unstable 
when he was a boy and she died shortly thereafter. His aunt Elizabeth, 
who raised him and supported him through law school, was now in ill- 
health and lived a secluded life in Jefferson County, Virginia. His 
sister Jane had married a missionary and lived half way around the 
world in China. Six years had passed since Constance had died.
For five years after Connie's death, Davis remained virtually 
unattentive to women. The move to Baltimore, travel in Europe, his 
total engagement in law and politics, and time removed much of his 
sorrow. Eventually the painfulness of living alone dictated a change. 
The alteration was apparent in the summer of 1855. While vacationing 
at the Cape May, New Jersey, seashore, he was seen in the company of not 
one but several ladies. Mrs. Du Pont was scandalized. The gossipy old 
recluse had heard rumors that Davis was secretly engaged to several 
different women. She dismissed the tales as unfounded but noted that
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"one report however was more repeated and dwelt on than the rest, and 
reached me thru three or four persons." She gave it little credence 
"because the lady in question, a widow, was described as a very gay, 
dressy, fashionable woman, to use the vulgar phrase a 'fast woman'."
She knew "such a description would never be that of any one he could 
love."1
Davis' attentions to the widow Brown were probably only a cover 
for the real affair that he wished to keep secret. In August 1855, 
while engrossed in his first congressional contest, he visited New York 
with a party of Baltimore socialites, among them a Miss Nancy Morris. 
Shortly after his election to the House, he became secretly engaged to 
her and kept the secret for almost a year. In September of 1856 he 
finally disclosed to the Du Ponts that he was to be married within a 
month. But death of a relative of Nancy's postponed the occasion.2
In preparation for his marriage, Davis sought a larger home than 
the law office and "box" he rented in Baltimore. He purchased a house 
with a downstairs wing for his office, across the street from his 
former residence on Baltimore's fashionable St. Paul's Street, lawyers' 
row. The house was fairly large and well organized; a large brick 
building, it had an air of elegance as befitted the city's congressman. 
Aside from the kitchen and servants’ quarters, it consisted of nine 
rooms. Davis' office, with large bay windows facing the street, 
occupied most of the first floor and became a frequent gathering place
1HWD to SMDP, 24 December 1854, WMss 9-25940; SMDP to Jane Syle, 
8 January 1857, WMss 9-22426.
2SMDP to Clementia Smith, 23 January 1857, WMss 9-22427.
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for politicians in the city. Refurnishing the old residence was an 
immense task. He plunged into "the great bother of papering, painting, 
leading, etc., etc., etc., so as to be done with in once and for all." 
The "piles of dust, literary and other" were soon removed and his "piles 
of books waiting translation" were eventually installed in his new 
office so that by the end of June 1856, he formally moved his law 
practice there. With Nancy's help, he furnished his new residence.
Thfe total cost for house and furnishing was estimated at $35,000, a 
small fortune in those days.3
"My affair is to be closed some time between this and the 15th 
January," he informed the Captain at the end of December. Unfortunately 
his plans were again delayed. Finally on January 27, 1857, at nine 
o'clock in the evening, Henry Winter Davis and Nancy Hollingsworth 
Morris were married at St. Paul's Episcopal Church by old Dr. William 
E. Wyatt. "The bride does not look Young," Du Pont reported to his 
wife, "but she is pleasing .... A true lady in her manner and expres­
sion, but not at all handsome." Even by the standards of the day,
Nancy Morris was a homely creature, but she was educated, intelligent, 
and the daughter of one of the wealthiest and most influential men in 
Baltimore, John Boucher Morris, old-line Whig and president of the 
Merchants Bank of Baltimore. Although five years older, Davis looked 
younger than his bride. At thirty-nine years old, he was a boyish, 
handsome man. His sturdy six-foot frame, his broad, massive forehead,
3HWD to SFDP, 14 June 1856, WMss 9-7923; Baltimore Clipper,
30 June 1856; SFDP to SMDP, 30 November 1856, WMss 9-1833; SFDP to 
SMDP, 1 December 1856, WMss 9-1834; 1860 Census Population Schedule 
Mss, Maryland, City of Baltimore, Ward 10.
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with its full mass of auburn brown hair betrayed few signs of his age. 
The select party of one hundred and fifty guests included most of the 
city's dignitaries, as well as his first wife's mother, sister, and 
cousins. "The supper was very handsome and hot," Du Pont related,
"with nice things which these Baltimore people go for— Mr. Morris was 
especially civil to me— all were home by 12 o'clock."1'
The following day, the newlyweds were on their way to Washington, 
D.C., for Congress was then in session. When Captain Du Pont met them 
at the train station, he thought "the Bride appeared younger" than the 
night before. With Du Pont and Elizabeth Glenn, Nancy's closest friend, 
the couple visited the Capitol where Davis took care of routine business, 
and then they roamed the avenues of Washington. After a full day in her 
company, the Captain judged Nancy to have "a quick mind," to be "re­
fined," and "far from being a shy woman, she is very sociable— and seems 
with perfect taste." Du Pont was embarrassed that they received no 
callers upon arriving in the city. "Davis ... begins to regret, I can 
see, his not having paid more attention to his social duties about 
visiting." When they returned from dinner, Du Pont noted many calling 
cards in their basket at the hotel and was relieved that they had not 
been snubbed. A few days later their brief honeymoon was ended. Nancy 
settled into their new home in Baltimore and Davis turned his attentions 
to Congress, commuting to Washington four days a week.5
The Third Session of the Thirty-Fourth Congress convened on the
^HWD to SFDP, 30 December 1856, WMss 9-8104; HWD to SFDP, 21 
January 1857, WMss 9-25991; SFDP to SMDP, 28 January 1857, WMss 9-1851; 
J. P. Kennedy Journal, 28 January 1857, Kennedy Mss, Peabody Institute.
5SFDP to SMDP, 31 January 1857, WMss 9-1853.
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first day of December 1856. President Pierce’s final message 
interpreted Buchanan's election as a vindication of his four years in 
office. This provoked extremists of both the Republican and Democratic 
parties into a lengthy debate. In the House, business was delayed while 
numerous speeches consumed the daily meetings. Davis took the first 
possible opportunity to join in the chorus berating Pierce.6
In a speech entitled "The Teachings of the Late Election," he 
labeled the President's message "the most ungracious sarcasm ever flung 
by a President on the people who lifted him above his fellows." It was 
"an evil example" he said for the President to have "departed, in the 
language of his message, from the severe courtesy, the respectul reserve, 
[and] the passionless dignity observed by his predecessors" and to have 
"poured out the bitterness of his heart" on the judgment of the American 
voters. Contrary to Pierce's claim that Buchanan's election was an 
endorsement of his rule, Davis declared that as only a minority elected 
Buchanan, that only a minority were in favor of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, 
and that only a minority approved of Pierce's administration.7
In language reminiscent of his fall campaign speeches, Davis 
pronounced the Democratic party to be at an end. "The death-wound, I 
rather think, has been dealt to that party which insolently boasted 
itself a perpetual plague to the republic." Divided on every question 
of domestic policy, the Democrats had long boasted that on the slavery 
question, the "shibboleth of their faith," they were united. But now, 
over the Kansas-Nebraska Act, they had divided: "It can not be pushed
6CG 34th-3rd-16, 26, 27.
7CG 34th-3rd-Appendix-122-126.
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aside as a mere diversity of opinion on the Kansas-Nebraska Act, 
because it is carried back to the very foundation of the Constitution." 
That act, passed by a Democratic Congress, was "an electioneering 
maneuver," which protected "neither a Territory, nor a state, nor a 
constitutional principle, nor peace." It was designed to elect a 
minority president and it had been successful. But in the process, he 
declared, it destroyed the Democratic party.
Davis predicted that the first morning reception of Buchanan's 
administration would be a ludicrous scene. Buchanan, "a quiet, simple, 
fair-spoken gentleman, versed in the bypaths and indirect crooked ways 
whereby he met his crown," would see how uneasy the crown set upon his 
head. For that morning, Southern Democrats would come and congratulate 
him for preserving the Union, and others, disunionists, would congrat­
ulate him for defeating Fillmore, "whose quiet administration might have 
postponed the inevitable"— "civil war." Southerners would celebrate 
the triumph over the North, while Yankees would only whisper "Buchanan, 
Breckenridge, and Free Kansas." The Democracy was divided into two 
wings and had little left in common outside its name. And the great 
lesson taught by the election was that sectional parties were condemned 
by the majority of the country "as common disturbers of the public 
peace."
In marked contrast to the section Democratic and Republican 
parties stood the national American party, "thinned by desertions, but 
still unshaken." Had the Northern Americans showed moderation and 
held to "the great American principle of silence on the negro question," 
he said, the Americans and Fillmore would have won. He appealed to the 
North Americans to return to their party; only a strong American party
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could settle the sectional discord. "This is the great mission of the 
American party," he claimed. Halt the sectional agitation, he cried, 
or the country will find itself "in the midst of an agitation compared 
to which that of Kansas was a summer's sea; whose instruments will be, 
not words, but the sword." Although his speech was well received 
throughout the country, it did little to rally support for the sagging 
American party of sectional peace.8
In mid-January Davis was appointed by Speaker Banks as chairman 
of a five-man investigating committee to look into charges of bribery 
and malfeasance brought against four members of the House by the press. 
For weeks Davis conducted hearings to gather evidence against 
Representatives William A. Gilbert, Orasmus B. Matteson, and Francis 
S. Edwards of New York and William W. Welch of Connecticut, who were 
charged with accepting bribes in return for their vote on an Iowa land 
bill. In addition, Gilbert was accused of receiving kickbacks amounting 
to several thousand dollars on the publication of a House land document. 
The Davis committee hearings drew large crowds excited by the scandalous 
testimony. After the committee elicited all the pertinent facts it 
prepared its report which Davis attempted to present to the House on 
February 19. Many Republicans tried to block even a reading of the 
report on the four Republican Congressmen, but after skillful maneuvering 
Davis succeeded in reading the report and making a short speech. "Davis 
has again loomed up in the House in the largest proportions," Du Pont 
commented to his wife. He made a "short off hand speech of the most 
telling effect they say— so much at a certain part of it there was a
8Ibid.
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loud utterance of 'Good, Good1." His comments won the House's approval. 
"The silence it is said was breathless," Du Pont concluded.9
When the committee's report was considered for debate six days 
later, many members urged the dismissal of the case as beyond the 
authority of Congress. Davis rose to defend his report and the 
recommendations for the expulsion of Congressman Gilbert and the 
censure of Matteson for complicity with Gilbert. The investigation, 
he said, was without precedent in England, France, or even the United 
States. It was the first time a parliamentary body had ever exposed 
corruption among its own members. To investigate but not punish, he 
declared, was to "give immunity to the guilty, and to perpetuate 
corruption. It is to make the House the accessaries after the fact."
He invoked the House to either acquit or condemn upon the evidence 
presented, but not to dismiss. The accused were all members of the 
majority party and thus "to punish them will be seen as a sorrowful act 
of high justice" and not as an act of revenge against the minority. The 
motion to dismiss the charges and the substitute resolutions were voted 
down, but before a direct vote of expulsion could be taken Congressman 
Gilbert resigned his seat. Davis' motion to censure Congressman 
Matteson was adopted by an overwhelming vote of 145 to 17. The appal­
ling display of bribery and corruption he exposed brought him national 
prominence.
Newspapers throughout the country commended the Davis investigat­
ing committee and the vote by the House, but none were more enthusiastic
9Baltimore American, 12 January, 20 February 1857; CG 34th-3rd- 
406, 760-773; SFDP to SMDP, 21 February 1857, WMss 9-1866.
than the Baltimore press which hailed him as "the incorruptible Davis." 
One newspaper commented that his "independent course" as chairman of the 
investigating committee was characteristic of his entire efforts in the 
Thirty-Fourth Congress. From the start Davis had supported efforts to 
avoid sectional discord by supporting an independent candidate for 
Speaker. He had opposed the establishment of the Kansas investigating 
committee as "more heated air." Moderation governed his votes on the 
Brooks-Sumner affair as well as the controversial Kansas Proviso to the 
Army Appropriation bill. For Baltimore he had secured the passage of 
a harbor bill, and had engineered its passage over President Pierce's 
veto. He had also helped secure $300,000 for a new post office building 
and $200,000 for a federal court house for Baltimore. He won a minor 
victory by the passage of the Washington, D.C., Election Act. His most 
significant achievement in that Congress was to force Congress to 
discipline its corrupt members. That investigation did much to bolster 
his shaky political prospects and relieve many of his "Aiken Pains."10
Congress adjourned sine die on March 4, 1857, the day of James 
Buchanan's inaugural, and the following Sunday the Davises invited 
friends to their Baltimore home to join them in celebrating the end 
of his first term in Congress. Du Pont reported that "D. himself is 
suffering from a headache and the exhaustion of the last week of 
Congress has not yet passed off." Characteristically Davis brooded 
over affairs in Congress while the others made lively conversation. A
10Baltimore Clipper, 24 February 1857; CG 34th-3rd-905; New 
York Herald, 25 February 1857; Baltimore American, 3 March 1857; 
New York Tribune, 6 March 1857; Dr. Henry to David Davis, 10 March 
1857, David Davis Mss, CHS.
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friend tried to break him away from his thoughts with the admonition, 
"Davis, you seem as if you were still on that investigation committee."11
During the spring of 1857 Davis and his expectant wife Nancy 
remained in Baltimore except for his frequent trips to Washington on 
legal business and her occasional visits with her relatives in the 
nearby Maryland countryside. Together they visited the Du Ponts at 
Louviers. Returning to his law practice, Davis told the captain, "every 
time I catch a sniff of fresh air untainted by legal dust I think of the 
Brandywine and envy you in Happy Valley." Du Pont reported that the new 
husband was "well and buoyant as ever— very happy in his second 
marriage evidently; though I was one that believed that Connie Gardner 
could not be replaced to him." Except that he still felt Davis "looks 
younger than his wife, which he is not by a proper number of years,"
Nancy seemed a perfect wife. "She is a very quiet, refined person, 
with a strong vein of wit kept in proper subjection."12
Involved in his law practice, his family and friends, Davis was 
politically inactive during the spring and summer of 1857. Although he 
did not attend the American national convention in Louisville, he was 
appointed to its thirteen-member National Central Committee. Without 
his authorization, his name was presented at his party's city convention 
in June as a candidate for the at-large delegate to the state convention, 
but he was not elected. His indifference to politics, however, was of 
short duration. Having experienced no serious reverse in the previous
11SFDP to SMDP, 8 March 1857, WMss 9-1875.
12HWD to SFDP, 2 April 1857, WMss 9-8243; SFDP to Edward Syle,
9 November 1857, WMss 9-1934.
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Congress and harboring great political ambition, Davis probably never 
considered retiring after one term in the House. In July he was informed 
by "divers good sources" that his close friend in the Friday Club,
Severn Teackle Wallis, a former Whig recently defected to the Democracy, 
was being urged to run against him, "with the distinct promise that 
failure will be rewarded by the Spanish or other mission of dignity." 
Davis regarded that as "good pay" for a "licking," but thought "Wallis 
has too much stomach for the stripes." When Wallis declined to run,
Davis began to doubt that he would have even a "pro forma opposition.1,13
In the state American prospects looked particularly good. "We 
shall gain the Governor and one congressman more than last time," Davis 
predicted. He was certain that "the opposition is broken to pieces.
The Locofocos can't even nominate a Governor." He was surprised when 
the Democrats named Colonel John C. Groome to oppose Thomas Holliday 
Hicks, a crusty old Eastern Shore farmer lately affiliated with the 
Americans. Davis considered Groome no competition for Hicks.11*
Outside of Maryland, the American party's prospects were not 
encouraging. Davis was sorely disappointed with the recently adopted 
American platform— it was not specific enough on naturalization and 
not vague enough on slavery. When the southern states, particularly 
Kentucky, failed to swing back into the American column in summer 
elections, he began "to despond of any speedy turn of the tide." He
1 Baltimore Sun, 4, 18 June 1857; Baltimore Clipper, 13, 18 June 
1857; Easton Gazette, 11 July 1857; HWD to SFDP, 15 July 1857, WMss 
9-8592.
^Baltimore Clipper, 24 July 1857, for details of the American 
state convention; Baltimore Sun, 31 July 1857, for the Democratic 
state convention.
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feared that "the great dissatisfaction with Buchanan in the South 
will ... expire for want of vigorous nourishing." The permanent 
secession of the North Americans from the party was even more disas­
trous for the party's future. "Oh if our friends of the North had 
only been wise," he lamented to a New Jersey friend. If they had 
simply united "all who were Americans on the American issue" and "held 
the tongue on the negro issue— then the Union would now be as Maryland 
is." Still he had hopes for rallying the party and bringing "our 
people at the north back again," but it could only be on the principle 
of "silence and abstinence from agitation." The North and the South 
would never agree on the morality of slavery, "but the Locofocos agreed 
to keep silence between themselves on the subject and why cannot we 
imitate their wisdom." All that was needed in place of "the trash of 
the 12th Section" of the 1856 American platform, "which ruined us," was 
"a simple declaration of the right of the citizens of a territory to 
form their own institutions when they form their Constitution— only let 
us draw the line excluding squatter sovereignty." Such a statement 
should be the American platform for the next presidential contest and 
the basis for actions of the Americans in Congress.15
On August 12 a specially elected American congressional convention 
met at the Temperance Temple in Baltimore to nominate a candidate for 
Congress. Present were sixty delegates, five each from the twelve 
wards that composed the Fourth Congressional District. After haggling 
over resolutions endorsing Davis for his "character and principles as
15HWD to James Bishop, c. 1 August 1857, Davis Bishop Mss, 
Rutgers University.
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a Southern man," for his "refusing to unite with the black Republicans 
of the North or with the ultra locofocos of the South," and for his 
vote on the Army Appropriation bill, the resolutions were tabled, and 
Davis was unanimously nominated.16
Davis’ acceptance speech was actually a keynote address for his 
party's state campaign rather than a stump speech for his own candidacy. 
He attacked Colonel John C. Groome, a former Whig, as an "independent 
stooge" being used by the Democrats. After detailing the accomplish­
ments of the American-dominated state legislature, he seized on an 
economic issue— the growing unemployment in Baltimore and the rising 
cost of living throughout the state. He noted that the Democratic 
administration in Washington had not spent the funds he secured from 
Congress for a new post office and courthouse, thus depriving Baltimore 
workmen of needed jobs. He closed with a sweeping indictment of 
President Buchanan and his position on "free Kansas."17
Economics and Kansas became the two issues of the 1857 campaign. 
Late in September, while the campaign was still young, the financial 
crisis that previously struck New York reached Baltimore. Stocks fell 
to extremely low levels, commodity prices dipped, and bankruptcies were 
frequent. Banks in Baltimore held an emergency meeting after which the 
city's leading financier, Johns Hopkins, announced the suspension of 
specie payment in the city. At campaign rallies throughout the state
16Baltimore American, 13 August 1857; Baltimore Sun, 13 August
1857.
17Ibid.; see the Baltimore Clipper, 13 August 1857, for the best 
report of the speech.
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Davis emphasized the tax cut passed by the American-controlled 
legislature, the establishment of a ratio license system which aided 
smaller businesses, the Baltimore harbor improvement bill which made 
it possible for the port to receive the largest draft vessels, and the 
unwillingness of Buchanan's administration to spend the one-half million 
dollars appropriated for construction of federal offices in Baltimore. 
Editorials in American party papers blasted "the ruinous effects of 
Democratic measures," and the influx of foreign workmen who undercut 
American workers. Editorials also attacked the low Democratic tariff 
which was said to be the cause of the depression. "So long as 
Democratic legislation gives foreigners access to our market almost 
free of taxation," claimed one editorial writer, "the country must 
occasionally be drained of its specie."18
In other speeches Davis riddled Buchanan's Kansas policy as a 
"political trick— teaching one thing to the North, and another to the 
South." The entire administration he called a "conglomerate mass of 
deception calculated only to mislead the country." Buchanan was 
pledged to make Kansas a slave state, but all the while the President 
was using the army to protect the Free soil settlers so that Kansas 
would remain free. Buchanan's whole policy was misrepresentation in 
order to keep both factions mollified. But soon, Davis cried, the 
President's real course "would come out."18
Determined to win a smashing victory, Davis made an all-out
1 Baltimore American, 28 September 1857; Baltimore Clipper, 28 
September 1857; Baltimore Sun, 30 September 1857.
1Baltimore Clipper, 22, 29 October 1857.
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effort to reach as many of the voters as possible. Tirelessly he 
traveled the state speaking at rallies and lodge meetings. His fear­
lessness in campaigning is shown in an anecdote told of a speech he 
made in a predominant Democratic ward. A local fire company had sworn 
to mob him if he spoke at the Cross Street Market Hall. On the evening 
of the scheduled speech, Davis arrived in an open carriage, wearing a 
full dress suit, white gloves and a silk hat. Stepping down from the 
carriage, he walked slowly, took off his gloves, placed them in his 
hat, and began the speech. The crowd, half American and half Democratic, 
were awed by his magnifient speech and listened intently. After he 
finished the hour-long speech, he bowed to the applause and freely 
walked out of the hall with no attempt made to stop him. After the 
speech one man was heard to say: "That's the man for my vote. He as
good as said, 'damn you, I don't care for you— put that in your pipe 
and smoke it'."20
The Democrats did not name a candidate to run against Davis until 
three weeks before the election. He was a former Whig, Henry P. Brooks, 
a relative of the famous cane-carrying South Carolinian, Preston S. 
Brooks. After their overwhelming defeat in the October city council 
elections, the Democrats had no hope of victory. Rather, Brooks was 
induced to run against Davis in the hope that excessive frauds at the 
polling places would enable the Democratic Congress to void the election. 
A week before the election, Governor T. Watkins Ligon wrote Mayor 
Thomas Swann asking what steps he had planned to ensure safety at the 
polls in Baltimore. Swann indignantly replied that the regular force
20Steiner, Life of Henry Winter Davis, 114.
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plus extra police would maintain order. Not satisfied with the Mayor's 
plan, the Governor instructed the commander of the state's militia 
to have his entire troops ready to occupy Baltimore. Davis urged Swann 
to stand up to the Governor and not allow martial law to be proclaimed 
as President Buchanan had recently done in Washington, D.C. "I advised 
him to yield nothing to the Governor," Davis reported, "but let him 
call his military into the streets of Baltimore if he dared."21
On election day, the Governor recoiled from calling out the 
militia. Although the police were vigilant, fights broke out between 
the American political clubs, the Rip Raps, the Blood Tubs, and the Plug 
Unglies, and the fire companies on the city's east side. But on the 
city's west side, Davis' district, the police maintained substantial 
order. Several were arrested for fighting in the 8th and 9th wards, 
and an intruder from Washington was shot to death for interfering at 
the polls in the 12th ward. Although the city's Democratic newspaper, 
the Baltimore Sun, complained of brutal violence in Davis' district 
and the inability of any naturalized citizen to vote, the turnout in 
the Fourth District was normal for a non-presidential year. Over 
fourteen thousand votes were cast, of which Davis received 10,528 and 
Brooks only 3,999.22
A jubilant Davis wrote Mrs. Du Pont after the election results 
were known. "I think the Captain would enjoy the military aspect it
2Baltimore Sun, 16, 29, 30 October 1857; Baltimore Clipper, 24 
October 1857; T. W. Ligon to Swann, 27 October 1857, Swann to Ligon,
28 October 1857, Executive Letterbook, Governors Mss, Maryland Hall of 
Records; CG 38th-lst-2190.
22Baltimore Sun, 5 , 6  November 1857; Baltimore Clipper, 6 November
1857.
at one time assumed and especially our backing out the Governor's 
soldiers and all then beating them 10,000 in the State," he chanted.
He labeled the Governor's actions "a bold attempt to overcome the 
freedom of elections here as the President did in Washington." In 
Washington, twelve unarmed citizens had been gunned down by marines 
without warning, but the Democrats realized that in Baltimore the 
shooting would not all be on one side. "For three days however we 
were on the brink of civil war," he noted, "and the whole of last 
Sunday (the 1st) I was engaged in the negotiations to bring the Governor 
to his senses." In Davis' opinion it was a fair election and a victory 
hard-earned. He considered his overwhelming victory as vindication of 
his course in Congress by his constituents and proof positive that his 
"Aiken pains" were gone. But perhaps more satisfying than his re- 
election was the birth of his first child, Anna Hollingsworth Davis, 
born only four days after the election.23
23HWD to SMDP, 9 November 1857, WMss 9-26125; SMDP to SFDP, 22 
November 1857, WMss 9-22525; T. Swann to Salmon P. Chase, 15 November 
1857, Chase Mss, HSP.
Chapter 7
THE PREVENTION OF EVIL
The tiresome campaign for re-election and the birth of his first 
child, Anne, left Davis "worried to death" and "getting quite grey."
But after the votes were counted and after the doctor pronounced mother 
and daughter as doing fine, Davis was off to Alexandria on legal 
business. Little in the practice of law interested him except thorny 
constitutional issues and cases that seemed impossible to win. In 
Alexandria Davis took on a client who was presumed guilty even by his 
family. An old friend was accused of arson— burning down his warehouse 
to collect the insurance. At the trial, Davis masterfully reconstructed 
the events of the evening of the fire and then presented a surprise 
witness who established an ironclad alibi for his client. After winning 
that case, Davis hurried back to Baltimore to defend a man indicted for 
murder. Although the man admitted his guilt to Davis, Davis won the 
jury with his summation and the accused escaped with a verdict of 
manslaughter. But the law was only a diversion and within a month 
Davis was commuting daily to Washington for the Thirty-Fifth Congress.1
While the Congress assembled, Davis' former classmate at the 
University of Virginia, James L. Orr, a large, powerfully built man,
1SMDP to SFDP, 22 November 1857, WMss 9-22525; SMDP to SFDP,




with a frank, ruddy face and a loud, booming voice was elected Speaker. 
The following day President Buchanan's message was read. It included a 
recommendation for a Pacific railroad, a condemnation of filibustering 
in South America, and a Kansas policy suggested by his Cabinet,
principally by Howell Cobb, Secretary of the Treasury. Defending the
Lecompton constitution, Buchanan urged the voters of Kansas to ratify 
it in the plebicite to be held on December 21.2
The first issue to arise in the House, however, was not the
railroad or Kansas, but the administration's efforts to save the economy 
in the aftermath of the Panic of 1857. While most Republicans and 
Americans— reflecting their old Whig origins— blamed the depression on 
the Walker Tariff of 1846 and the more recent tariff reduction passed 
in 1857, Buchanan— an old Jacksonian— saw the evil in the 1400 state 
banks. To remedy the shortage of funds in the Treasury, the President 
and Secretary Cobb proposed the issuance of twenty million dollars of 
treasury notes. A bill to that effect was introduced in the House by 
J. Glancy Jones of Pennsylvania, a close personal friend of Buchanan's 
and newly appointed Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means. It met 
immediate and bitter opposition from Davis.3
Davis had a low opinion of Jones' financial knowledge. As an 
example of the chairman's ignorance Davis related that when Jones 
claimed the notes were to be issued at par "Jones maintained that par 
meant whatever any bidder might give for them!!! The dems have added
2CG 35th-lst-2; Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln (New York, 
1950), I, 248.
3Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth 
Century (Boston, 1903), II, 83-109.
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to their numbers" in the House, Davis noted, "but not to their 
intellectual strength either North or South."1*
Davis' primary objection to the President's plan was that it 
contained a "bankrupt bill" which would allow the government to close 
state banks which suspended specie payments. Temporary specie suspen­
sion such as that effected in Baltimore, Davis said, was merely . 
"following the best precedents of the greatest financial minds of this 
country and England." By suspending specie payment for three months, 
he claimed, permanent defaults were prevented and economic disaster was 
avoided. Furthermore, Davis felt the introduction of treasury notes 
would merely inflate the currency now in existence. "In one breath, 
the honorable gentleman at the head of the Treasury Department talks 
about the danger of an inflated currency," Davis noted, and "in the very 
same breath desires to throw on the country $20,000,000 excess."
Davis also objected to the Treasury note scheme from fundamental 
principles. The panic and depression which followed were not a mere 
temporary disorder in the country. "I apprehend that it has affected 
the business of the country to its very foundations." Thus the situ­
ation demanded permanent reform instead of a temporary scheme. He 
urged the reestablishment of the sub-treasury system and the institu­
tion of a federal banking system with a federal currency. In addition, 
he called for an upward revision of the tariff, which he said would 
decrease the speculative tendency in the country. When he closed his 
speech, Davis felt "the Administration was rather staggered by the 
Opposition fire." Yet when the treasury note bill was put to a vote it
‘♦HWD to SFDP, c. 20 December 1857, WMss 9-8706.
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passed, 118-86. The opposition's fire was not strong enough.5
While discussing the Tariff of 1857, Davis aroused the press of 
the country to anger. A newspaper article charged that unnamed members 
had accepted bribes to influence the passage of that tariff. When an 
investigation similar to the one which he conducted in the previous 
Congress was proposed, Davis spoke in favor of such an inquiry. But 
at the end of his address he mentioned that one newspaper article was 
insufficient to bring about an investigation, for "there is no man who 
hold the comments of the political press of the country in more utter 
contempt than I do." Newspapers throughout the country reacted strongly 
to his speech, the Democratic newspapers coming down on him "tooth and 
claw," he thought. Even the Baltimore American, a Know-Nothing paper, 
accused him of slander and "an unfortunate proclivity for doing and 
saying unnecessary things that have on more than one occasion pained 
his friends." Although admitting his ability and integrity, the 
American decried his lack "of sound practical judgment" and his inabil­
ity "to know when he has exactly said or done enough."6
A week after his attack on the press, the University of Virginia 
withdrew an invitation that had been extended to him to address the 
student body of his alma mater. The Jefferson Society, a co-sponsor of 
the speech, held a meeting to condemn Davis. Commenting on the incident, 
the New York Times called Davis "perhaps one of the best abused men of 
the day." But the insults of the press and the University of Virginia
5CG 35th-1st-109-111, 154.
6Ibid., 306; SMDP to SFDP, 23 January 1858, WMss 9-22549;
Baltimore American, 19 January 1858.
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only made him more impudent. In a letter to Mrs. Du Pont he claimed 
his attack on the press had "told— or they would not have set up such 
a howl of rage." The abusive editorials inclined him "to fling another 
stone in the same nest," but Nancy disuaded him, saying he had become a 
"nuisance in the papers."7
Davis spoke on almost every issue that arose in the House during 
the Thirty-Fifth Congress— the Pacific railroad, the tariff, and the 
admission of Kansas under the Lecompton constitution. No longer a 
freshman Congressman, he began to assume the pose of the leader of the 
"Opposition" in the House, the uneasy alliance of those opposed to the 
adminis tration.
Davis supported the establishment of a Pacific railroad. To 
Southern Democrats who attacked the constitutionality of Congress to 
build a transcontinental railroad, Davis replied that the authority 
was "where Mr. Jefferson found authority to commence the national road; 
where Mr. Monroe, Mr. John Quincy Adams, and General Jackson found 
authority to continue it." That authority was in the clauses of the 
Constitution which authorized Congress to provide for the common defense 
and to regulate commerce among the states. In order to adequately 
protect its Pacific coast the United States had to have a railroad that 
could speedily transport troops there.8
The most controversial issue of the Thirty-Fifth Congress was the 
admission of Kansas under the Lecompton constitution. A constitutional
7New York Times, 30 January 1858; HWD to SMDP, 10 February 1858,
WMss 9-26154; SMDP to Edward Syle, 10 February 1858, WMss 9-22555.
8CG 35th-lst-352.
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convention representing less than one quarter of the territory's 
population met at Lecompton and framed a constitution. Davis considered 
it grossly unfair. Only the slave clauses of the constitution were 
submitted to the people for ratification; if they were approved, Kansas 
would come into the Union as a slave state; but if they were rejected, 
slaves already in Kansas would remain in slavery. Buchanan supported 
the Lecompton constitution on orders of the "fire-eaters," Davis wrote, 
but there were more than enough anti-Lecompton Democrats in the House 
to defeat the Southern locofocos. "tty vote will certainly be on that 
side in spite of all consequences," he confided, "so that there is, I 
think, final breakdown of the Administration, and dissolution of the 
Locofocos at the threshhold of the Administration." The final destruc­
tion of the Democratic party was "righteous retribution for the Kansas 
inequities." During the early weeks of the session he claimed he was 
"trying to beat common sense into the heads of the South Americans! and 
if I can the opposition will be united and the masters of the country."9
The administration decided to make the admission of Kansas with 
the Lecompton constitution the test of party orthodoxy. This led to 
the most violent contest ever held in the House. "The pot is boiling 
and there are as many ingredients in it as ever the witches put in 
their caldron," wrote one Congressman. As the debates lengthened, 
tempers shortened. Pennsylvania Republican Galshua Grow while making 
a speech late one night happened to wander over to the Democratic side 
of the House. South Carolina Democrat Lawrence Keitt, wearied by the
9HWD to SFDP, c. 20 February 1857, WMss 9-8706; Nevins, Emergence 
of Lincoln, I, 261-262.
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lateness of the hour— it was 2 A.M.--and perhaps under the influence of 
stimulants intended to keep him awake, yelled to Grow, "Go back to your 
side of the House you Black Republican puppy!" Grow defiantly replied 
with some comment that ended in "nigger drivers." A scuffle ensued in 
which Grow knocked Keitt down. A general melee then broke out between 
members on both sides. "Had it continued one minute longer," Congress­
man Dawes recounted, "It would have involved the whole house." During 
the scuffle, Washbume of Illinois knocked off Mississippian Barksdale's 
wig and in the commotion he put it back on with the wrong side out. 
Laughter halted the fighting and order was restored. At 6:30 in the 
morning the House adjourned till Monday when it agreed to take a vote 
on the Lecompton question.10
When the House reconvened, many of the members were armed with 
pistols, knives, or canes. On the question to refer the President's 
message to a select committee instead of to Alexander H. Stephen's 
Committee on Territories, the opposition succeeded, 114 to 113. But the 
"opposition" was not as strong as Davis had hoped— it was composed of 
all 91 Republicans, 22 Douglas Democrats, but only one American, Davis. 
The Democratic press immediately assailed Davis' alliance with the 
opposition. The Washington Star went so far as to claim that by his 
vote Davis had driven millions of dollars of trade from Baltimore. But 
Davis was resolute. "I am in for the war," he declared, "I may fall but 
I will not retreat."11
10Henry L. Dawes to wife, 3 January, 6 February 1858, Dawes Mss,
LC; Nevins, Emergence of Lincoln, I, 288; Roy F. Nichols, The Disruption
of American Democracy (New York, 1948), 165.
11Dawes to wife, 8 February 1858, Dawes Mss, LC; Washington Star,
24 February 1858; OG 35th-lst-622.
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On March 30, Davis obtained the floor of the House to speak 
"Against the Lecompton Frauds," as his speech was entitled. He 
ridiculed Buchanan for claiming to be the "godfather of popular 
sovereignty" while opposing a popular vote on the entire Lecompton 
constitution. He said he opposed that "piece of parchment" but not 
because it contained slavery as his critics alleged. If slavery were 
included "by the will of the people, it ought not to weigh with the 
weight of the dust in the balance upon the question." It was not 
slavery, but the legality of the convention which led him to oppose the 
constitution. The call for the convention was "the first blunder— to 
be followed up consecutively and logically by other blunders in law, 
in policy as well as in morals." Not only was the constitution adopted 
by illegal methods, but also the territory's population was too small. 
Instead of the requisite 90,000 inhabitants, Kansas had barely 25,000 
persons. In concluding his lengthy speech, Davis labeled the President's 
Kansas policy "high treason against the right of the people to govern 
themselves." To force the Lecompton constitution on the people would 
result in "civil war in Kansas." Give the people the opportunity to 
express their will on the document, he urged, and allow them to come in 
"at the proper time, with a proper population."12
On April Fool's Day the House voted on a substitute for the 
Lecompton bill submitted by anti-Lecompton Democrat William Montgomery 
of Pennsylvania. Montgomery's amendment, similar to one introduced by 
Senator John J. Crittenden and defeated in the Senate, proposed to have
12HWD to SMDP, 2 March 1858, WMss 9-26158; Davis, Speeches and 
Addresses, 83-86, 97-102.
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the constitution resubmitted to the people of Kansas. "We had a very 
exciting time," Congressman Dawes reported, "not a noisy but a deep 
silent excitement— an intensity of feeling which forbid noise." The 
gallaries were filled to capacity and for the first time that anyone 
could remember all members were present, including one infirm Democrat 
who had to be carried in on a stretcher. On the final vote, the 
Montgomery substitute was passed, 122 to 120. The opposition had 
finally united with 92 Republicans, 22 Douglas Democrats and 6 Americans, 
including Davis.*3
When the Senate rejected House version, the bill went to a 
conference committee. There the administration coupled the Lecompton 
constitution with an appropriation of a large grant of public land.
Thus, if the voters of Kansas rejected the constitution they would not 
only lose the land but they would be forced to wait until Kansas’ 
population reached 90,000 before it could apply again. This "bribed 
compromise" was submitted to the House on April 23. Davis reported that 
"the contest still hangs with nicely balanced scale, so close that no 
one can be certain of either result." Davis rallied the Americans to 
oppose the conference report, but the opposition broke down when 
thirteen anti-Lecompton Democrats, "who in the wilderness of opposition 
longed for the fleshpots of Egypt," succumbed to pressures by the 
administration. The House adopted the conference report, 112 to 103, 
and the Senate also accepted it. The Buchanan administration claimed
13Nichols, Disruption of American Democracy, 169-181; CG 35th-lst- 
1437; Baltimore American, 2 April 1858, New York Tribune, 2 April 1858; 
Dawes to wife, 2 April 1858, Dawes Mss, LC.
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a victory.
The opposition claimed a victory also. Davis wrote that after 
the administration was "beaten by Mr. Crittenden's amendment, they set 
to work to parody it, change its name ... and finally got some northern 
sneaks to join them in passing it." In Davis' view it was "our victory 
and their ruin. It yields everything we insisted on, and they have been 
compelled to adopt and pass it." But the real victory, Davis thought, 
was the union of the opposition. "The Northern men have behaved as 
wisely this Cong as they did foolishly last Cong," he reported. "They 
were induced to unite on Mr. Crittenden's proposition and to adhere to 
it— to hold their tongues and say nothing imprudent." And when the six 
Americans united with the Republicans and anti-Lecompton Democrats, they 
"took the first and most difficult step towards uniting the northern and 
southern wings of the opposition." He now thought the possibility of 
making "common cause" with them was good. "If I could have gotten them 
to do so two years ago Fillmore or John M. Lane would now be Prest. It 
looks well for the future."15
With Lecompton disposed of, relatively minor subjects occupied the 
rest of the session. The opposition united to pass the Morrill Land 
Grant College Act only to have the President veto it. Davis and the 
Americans protested the admission of Minnesota because its constitution 
conferred suffrage on unnaturalized foreigners. The Americans led by
ll*HWD to SMDP, 21 April 1858, WMss 9-26171; HWD to SMDP, 30 April 
1858, WMss 9-26177; New York Tribune, 24 April 1858; CG 35th-1st-1906.
15HWD to SFDP, 2 May 1858, WMss 9-8888; New York Tribune, 10,
17 April 1858.
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Davis also attempted to get Congress to pass a residency requirement 
for voting in Washington, D.C., elections.16
The greatest source of distraction to Davis during the first 
session of Congress was the fact that his seat was being contested by 
Henry P. Brooks. Brooks' object in challenging the seat was not to have 
himself declared the victor as was usual in contested election cases, 
but instead to have the election vacated on grounds the result had been 
obtained by fraud. Brooks charged that large numbers of persons had 
been excluded and large numbers had voted illegally. The most sensa­
tional of the charges, one which amused Mrs. Du Pont, was "that a great 
many ladies went to the Polls, dressed in men’s clothes, and voted."17
On February 12, in the midst of the debates over Kansas, the 
Elections Committee reported the Davis-Brooks election case in Davis1 
favor. Several members used the time allotted for debate to attack 
Davis and the Know Nothings. Most bitter of the hostile speakers was 
balding, anemic Thomas F. Bowie of Maryland. While insinuating that 
Davis was responsible for the violence in Baltimore's elections, Bowie 
said that Davis had a "flimsy-flamsy, namby-pamby" mind. When the 
Speaker called Bowie to order for such a personal remark, Bowie replied 
that if Davis has a "crooked mind, if it does not go in the straight 
direction, it is not my fault, nor is my remark personal." Bowie called 
the American party of Maryland "a bloody party, won by the siren songs
16CG 35th-lst-1742, 1978, 2356-2358, 2361, 2386; HWD to Israel 
Washbume, 20 May 1848, Israel Washburne Mss, LC; HWD to SFDP, 2 May
1858, WMss 9-8888.
17HWD to SFDP, c. 20 December 1857, WMss 9-8706; SMDP to SFDP,
29 December 1858, WMss 9-22534.
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of the sitting members." Despite the railing of the Democrats, the 
contested election case was dismissed by a vote of 110 to 86. Davis 
had been uncertain about how his case would go. "Nobody can tell what 
will be done," he had said, "but of course I should go back [to Congress] 
in two weeks with a greater majority" if he lost. He thought that the 
vote to dismiss the case revealed a strong "opposition" and proved that 
there was no "disciplined Locofoco majority."1®
By the time Congress adjourned in the middle of June, Davis was 
completely disgusted with Buchanan's and the Democrats' rule. "In one 
year," he complained, "this Adm. has done more vile things than any for 
thirty years." Davis spent the summer and the fall primarily engaged 
in his legal practice. The Davises spent most of their time in 
Baltimore for Nancy was expecting her second child and little Annie 
was too young to travel.
For months Davis pondered ways "to obliterate the foolish division 
which in 1856 entailed defeat of the majority of the people." In the 
last presidential election he had hoped for a union of "the great body 
of the people not democrats" but was disappointed when "the fury of 
the hour blinded them and they went fighting each other in 1856 instead 
of uniting." Convinced that the events of that election and the last 
session of Congress had "opened their eyes," he met with leaders from 
numerous states in Washington with a view to uniting the opposition in 
the 1860 election. With hope he noted that "the Republicans are for­
saking their objectionable views and the Americans are ceasing to be
1 Baltimore American, 13, 17 18 February 1858; CG 35th-lst-
725,727, 729, 733, 745, 746; Baltimore Clipper, 20 February 1858.
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exclusive and narrow minded."19
By the opening of the second session of the Thirty-Fifth Congress, 
the opposition was "in high glee." Victories in Pennsylvania, Indiana, 
Ohio, Massachusets, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan had guaranteed 
that the House of Representatives in the Thirty-Sixth Congress would be 
controlled by the opposition. Davis delighted to know that the 
President would be reduced "to impotence in his own house in his second 
year." And following the opposition's organizing of the House in 1860, 
"there is every prospect of a union of the whole opposition on such a 
man as Bell or Corwin in I860."20
Arriving in Washington for the term which began on December 6,
1858, Davis wrote Captain Du Pont that he looked "for nothing good" in 
that session, "only the prevention of evil— till next Congress." With 
the Lecompton question settled, most of the business of the session 
would be concerned with economic matters: the transcontinental railroad
bill, a homestead bill, various internal improvements, and a revision 
of the tariff. The railroad bill was doomed to defeat because the 
location of the eastern terminus could not be agreed upon. In the House, 
the Republicans, backed by western Democrats, passed a homestead act 
only to have it killed by Vice President Breckinridge's deciding vote in 
the Senate. One of the major goals of the Buchanan administration was 
to reduce the federal budget from $81 million to $41 million. In a 
speech on the floor of Congress in February, Davis protested what he
19HWD to SFDP, 2 May 1858, WMss 9-8888; HWD to SMDP, 17 September
1858, WMss 9-26210.
20HWD to SFDP, 6 December 1858, WMss 9-9104.
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felt was harmful economy. Cut extravagance in the Quartermaster's 
department, end theft in the Navy Yards, suspend the allocation of 
miscellaneous funds in all departments, he urged, but do not stop 
clearing the rivers, the erection of forticiations, or the construction 
of lighthouses. "Democratic economy," he charged, was "a war on all 
that is useful in government expenditures." But his objection had 
little effect.21
Pressure for an increase in the tariff came from several sources. 
Ironworkers of Pennsylvania and Maryland were particularly hard hit by 
the depression of 1857. The cost of producing iron rails had gone up 
to $45 a ton while England could export the same product, pay the 
tariff, and still sell it cheaper. Furthermore, a shortage in the 
Treasury forced the President to recommend specific or item raises of 
the tariff. A subcommittee of the House Ways and Means committee 
headed by Justin Morrill, hard-headed Yankee businessman, William A. 
Howard of Michigan, and Davis authored a new tariff bill. But inspite 
of backing from the "House tariff bloc," the Morrill Tariff was defeated. 
It was just one of numerous measures, Davis wrote, that would need to 
wait "till next Congress." The second session of the Thirty-Fifth 
Congress which adjourned in March 1859 was unusually barren of action.
As the Baltimore American commented, only "a negative sort of praise may 
indeed be claimed for what had not been done."22
21Ibid.; CG 35th-2nd-1470; Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years, 
I, 154; Nichols, Disruption of American Democracy, 226-245.
22Nichols, Disruption of American Democracy, 237; HWD to Justin 
Morrill, 20 August 1859, Morrill Mss, LC; Baltimore American, 4 March
1859.
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Davis was particularly anxious for the session to close. In 
January, almost on his second wedding anniversary, his second daughter, 
Lydia, was born prematurely. Within days the baby died. "There is 
little cause for mourning," Davis stoically confided to Mrs. Du Pont. 
"There was no prospect that the little one could ever be well or enjoy 
life and surely that was the time to leave life before the bitterness 
was tasted." He rejoiced that "a merciful providence spared it till 
Nancy was well enough to meet the loss without danger; and now she is 
quite well though still weak."23
When summer arrived, Nancy was still not fully recovered. 
Consequently, Davis planned a vacation at Cape May, New Jersey, for 
most of July. The salt water and fresh air were beneficial to them 
both. Rising at 4 A.M., they swam in the breakers before breakfast and 
the morning nap. Horseback riding around the cape or rolling duck pins 
preceded the noon swim and a lunch of mint julips and raw oysters. 
Following an afternoon nap, the guests at the hotels were served 
magificent dinners after which they joined the grand promenade on the 
beach. They day was concluded with a dance at one of the hotels. Nancy 
and Winter vacationed for a month before his law practice called him 
back to Baltimore. When they returned, they found that their one and 
one-half year old daughter had been critically ill, but soon fully 
recovered. With his family's health restored, politics once again 
claimed Davis' attention.24
23HWD to SMDP, 28 January 1859, WMss 9-26247.
21tHWD to SFDP, c. June 1859, WMss 9-9607; HWD to SFDP, 26 July
1859, WMss 9-9462.
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Sometime that summer Davis decided to seek a third term in the 
House. "In Md. we are pretty safe," he estimated, but "there is a sharp 
underground contest against me organized with considerable skill." That 
was a revival of the old Whig party. Upper class businessmen and 
professional men like John Pendleton Kennedy had been distrustful of 
the workingclass and middle-class Know-Nothing movement from its 
beginning and had refused to join it. A few of the old line Whigs 
joined the Democracy, but the mass remained unattached. In the spring 
of 1859, a well financed group approached Kennedy about running against 
Davis. But the plan collapsed when Kennedy refused. "I am too much 
turned towards philosophic life for that," the always ambitious aristo­
crat confided to his diary.25
The second major challenge to Davis' re-election came from within 
his own party. "A small and active and desperate squad are struggling 
to prevent my nomination," he wrote his friend Justin Morrill. He did 
not consider the threat to be very great, but professed he would be 
satisfied with either result as Nancy opposed him returning to Congress. 
"There is no numerical strength in the opposition to me," Davis 
reported, "but a few desperados in our great cities may always occasion 
great trouble by stacking ward meetings, throwing in three or four votes 
at once ...." The real danger, he feared, was the over confidence of 
his supporters.26
25J. P. Kennedy Journal, 7 April 1859, Kennedy Mss; HWD to SFDP,
10 August 1859, WMss 9-9476.
26HWD to Morrill, 20 August 1859, Morrill Mss, LC; HWD to SFDP, 
c. 20 August 1859, WMss 9-9495; SMDP to Edward Syle, 27 August 1859,
WMss 9-22714.
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On August 23, 1859, ward meetings were held throughout the city 
to choose delegates for a nominating convention that would meet on the 
following evening. As the results of the ward meetings became known, 
it appeared that Davis’ supporters had captured the convention. But 
when the convention assembled the following evening a great many more 
delegates appeared. To accomodate the larger crowd the meeting was 
adjourned to the New Assembly Rooms, a larger meeting hall. Great 
disorder prevailed as the meeting was called to order by a temporary 
chairman. An unruly crowd outside, demanding admittance to the crowded 
room, finally broke the doors down and a general free-for-all ensued. 
The city marshall and a large body of policemen were called to restore 
order. After several arrests were made, the meeting adjourned to meet 
again the next night.27
At a conference that night Davis discovered what had occurred. 
State legislator Coleman Yellott, a formidable rival, had organized a 
secret movement to deprive him of the nomination. Yellott's supporters 
had packed normally safe Davis wards capturing a sizeable number of the 
delegates. The nomination was thus in doubt. When the convention 
reassembled, the chairman instructed the doorkeeper to allow only 
delegates into the room. Competing delegations from the 18th and 19th 
wards were referred to the credentials committee. Unable or unwilling 
to make a determination between the Davis and Yellott delegations from 
those districts, the convention referred contested cases to the voters 
in the wards. A special election was called for the following Monday
2Baltimore Clipper, 24, 25 August 1859.
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afternoon.28
Davis' supporters turned out in great numbers at the ward elections, 
and his slate was easily elected. In the 18th ward there was a large 
vote with no disruption, but in the 19th there were frequent brawls and 
the police made numerous arrests. When the convention reassembled with 
the certified delegates from the two wards present, Davis was nominated 
by a vote of 35 to 15 with 10 abstaining.
Davis was pleased by the nomination. "The scuffle with the cut 
throats ended in their utter confusion," Davis announced. Yellott 
"turned out to have no strength among the people at all and could not 
throw 300 votes in the district." The fifteen delegates he did receive 
Davis attributed to fraudulent means— "throwing in hands full of votes 
at three or four wards." As Yellott's "scoudrels" could not control the 
convention, they tried "to bully it into nominating Yellott" and then 
they "tried to break it up— tried to deprive my majority of their seats, 
&c." Davis reported. "The result is important since it is the first 
time any such men have attempted to control us as they always controlled 
the democrats."29
The final, most dangerous, challenge to Davis' re-election was the 
appearance of a strong "reform" movement in Baltimore. As the Democratic 
party in Baltimore was too weak to elect anyone under its own banner, it 
enlisted "the mercantile gentry" to join in a movement to restore law 
and order to the city. Since the 1830s, Baltimore had been known as
2Baltimore Clipper, 26 August 1859; Baltimore American, 26 
August 1859.
29Baltlmore Clipper, 29, 30, 31 August; Baltimore American, 30 
August 1859; HWD to SFDP, c. 1 September 1859, WMss 9-9540.
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"Mob Town" in the national press. In an era of urban violence, 
Baltimore led Philadelphia, Boston, and New York in the number and 
intensity of its riots. And though the American party had done far 
more to arrest violence and crime in Baltimore than its Democratic 
predecessors— for example, it hired full-time uniformed policemen to 
replace the part-time watchmen— the rate of crime rose.30
While the reform movement was gaining strength, Davis was losing 
supporters by his characteristic inability to know when he had said 
enough. On Monday, September 5, a large crowd gathered at the Maryland 
institute to hear Davis' acceptance speech. For over two hours the 
enthusiastic crowd listened to Davis chastise Buchanan's administration 
for shooting down voters in Washington, D. C., for persecuting the 
Mormons in Utah, for illegally declaring war on Peru, for invading 
Mexico's Sonora and Chihuahua provinces, and for trying to force the 
Lecompton constitution on the people of Kansas. But having won his 
audience on all the essential points, he ventured into risky territory. 
He called for an alliance between Maryland and the "Northern Oppo-
30HWD to Morrill, 14 September 1859, Morrill Mss, LC. For a survey 
of violence in antebellum America see Richard M. Brown, "Historical 
Patterns of Violence in America," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert 
Gurr (eds.), Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspec­
tives (Washington, 1969), I, 40-41. As early as 1840 Baltimore was 
labeled "Mob Town," see Smith, "Whig Party in Maryland," 47. For Mayor 
Swann's contribution to municipal reform see Joanna H. Spiro, "The Mayor 
and the Municipality— Thomas Swann and Baltimore, 1856-1860," (Loyola 
College, Baltimore: M.A., 1964) and Nancy Anne Miller, "Thomas Swann:
Political Acrobat and Entrepreneur," (Virginia Polytechnic Institute: 
M.A., 1969). For information regarding the influence of volunteer 
firemen's units in politics see Andrew H. Neilly, "The Violent Volun­
teers: A History of the Volunteer Fire Department of Philadelphia,
1736-1871," (University of Pennsylvania: Ph.D., 1959).
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sition." Maryland, he said, needed their votes for the protection and
development of industry, for a higher tariff for coal, iron, and copper, 
for higher appropriations for improvements to the Baltimore port, and 
for a central route for the transcontinental railroad. Only the
Northern opposition would vote with Maryland on these issues, he
claimed. "Maryland is with the Opposition," he concluded, "and no
combination can delude or over awe her."31
Although most Marylanders supported the economic program Davis 
outlined, they were opposed to any alliance with "the Black Republicans 
and abolitionists." The Democratic newspapers castigated Davis as 
fostering "abolitionism" and the amalgamation of the races, while the 
Know-Nothing papers denied that the "Grand Opposition" was a party 
principle. "It is merely one man's opinion" stated the Baltimore 
Clipper.32
While Davis was losing support through his advocacy of an alliance 
of the opposition, the reform leaders were gaining converts, among them 
Davis' close friends, former Whig George William Brown and former Know- 
Nothing Mayor Charles D. Hinks, both now in league with the Democratic 
party. In the city council elections, the reformers carried six out of 
twelve wards much to Davis' surprise.
Despite the growing reform movement, Davis felt he was in no
31Baltimore Clipper, 6, 15 September 1859.
32Easton Gazette, 17 September 1859; SMDP to Jane Syle, 28 
October 1859, WMss 9-22738.
3Baltimore American, 27 August 1859; Baltimore Clipper, 9 
September 1859; J. P. Kennedy Journal, 13 September 1859, Kennedy to 
Robert C. Winthrop, 19 September 1859, Kennedy Mss; Frederick Brune to 
wife, 13 October, Brune-Randall Mss, MdHS.
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danger. "We are getting on well with our Canvass," he reported, "and 
the reformers are dwindling daily— as their Locofoco claws peep out."
He explained to Justin Morrill that "the town meeting and the reform 
association are Locofoco tricks to entrap some timorous and weak 
brethern," but even without "all who are fools enough to go and vote 
with them" the Americans had enough strength to carry the city.34
In late October, just three weeks before the election, the reform 
movement finally nominated a candidate against Davis. He was William 
Gilpin Harrison, a fifty-seven year-old former president of the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and a leading merchant in the sugar and 
molasses trade. John Pendleton Kennedy and George William Brown had 
been asked to run but had declined. So Harrison was finally persuaded 
after his mother released him from a promise he made never to engage 
in politics.35
The reform movement received unexpected help when word was 
received in Baltimore of John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry. Every­
thing that was ever said about the "Black Abolitionists" now seemed 
true. Rumors again were started that Davis was an abolitionist and 
would defend John Brown.
To counteract the sudden impetus of the reformers, the Americans 
held a mass meeting on Federal Hill. All the political clubs were 
present with their political paraphernalia, drums, rockets, cannon, 
and huge signs called transparencies. In the preceding city council
3ltHWD to SFDP, 26 September 1859, WMss 9-9531; HWD to Morrill,
14 September 1859, Morrill Mss, LC.
35Brune to wife, 15, 18 October 1859, Brune-Randall Mss, MdHS; 
Ames, "Genealogies in Dorchester," 380-381.
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election the shoemaker's awl had been used as a weapon by both sides 
at many of the polls resulting in numerous injuries. Banners above 
the speaker's stand provided by one of the young men's political clubs, 
the Plug Uglies, read "The Awl is Useful in the Hands of an Artist," 
"Come Up and Vote: There is Room for Awl," "The Third Ward is Awl
Right," and equally ominous, "Reform Ticket and Reform Man, If you can 
vote, I'll be Damned." Above the speaker's platform hung a gigantic 
awl provided by another political club.
When Davis spoke that evening on the decorated platform, his 
speech was interpreted by the Democratic and independent presses as an 
endorsement of violence and illegal electioneering. Claiming that Davis 
belittled the violence that had previously occured at elections as "a 
little fighting, and a few black eyes," the Baltimore American denounced 
his speech as "an apology for all the fraud, violence and dishonesty 
which characterized the municipal election."3®
Equally disturbed by Davis' speech were his friends in the Friday 
Club. They met in a special session to revoke his membership. "I fear 
Mrs. Davis is married to an unprincipled if brilliant demagogue," one 
wrote. The majority considered that after the speech they could never 
meet on social terms with Davis again, and decided on a letter request­
ing an explanation for his action. Davis denied the things the news­
papers attributed to him. The extract of his speech and the general 
report of it he pronounced as "a garbled, false, and I believe, 
malicious perversion of the language used by me on that occasion. He
36Baltimore Clipper, 18 October 1859; Baltimore Sun, 19, 20, 22
October 1859; Baltimore American, 22 October 1859.
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said he had mentioned the newspapers' exaggeration of "isolated 
instances of wholly unjustifiable violence" but that he strongly 
disapproved of all illegal conduct. Despite Davis' explanation, he 
was asked to resign from the Friday Club. S'7
Election day was marked by bloody conflict. In the fourteenth 
ward a leading member of the Rip Raps was gunned down by an Irish mob, 
while in the 15th two brothers who were Democrats, were shot by a group 
of Know-Nothings. "We have carried the city," Davis wrote Du Pont,
"amid considerable excitement and trouble." He had been overwhelmingly 
re-elected by a vote of 10,068 to Harrison's 2,807. He claimed that the 
violence was "chiefly occasioned by the incendiary and violent appeals 
of our opponents— followed up by a fair share of violence on their part." 
He noted that "one man on our side and one on their side fell victim to 
this bad blood they had excited." Expecting the Democratic newspapers 
to "howl and overflow with exaggerated detail," he prepared a detailed 
account of the election.38
A week later he announced that "the howl is dying away before the 
facts which are being day by day developed." The coroner's report of 
the death of the Democratic brother demonstrated that both brothers had 
pulled their weapons first on the Know-Nothings and that the dead 
brother had shot a young boy. Davis was certain that the facts would 
be "very undigestable for the peaceful reformers who marshalled them­
selves at the polls with pistol and bowie knife ready for— voting, of
37Brune to wife, 19 October 1859, Brune-Randall Mss, MdHS; HWD
to Editor, Baltimore American, 24 October 1859; HWD to Editor, Baltimore 
Patriot, 23 October 1859.
38HWD to SFDP, 3 November 1859, WMss 9-9570.
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course!" The newspaper accounts were like "rattle snakes who infused 
all the venom into the contest, and have had the horror of leading the 
democrats as they led the Whigs to utter defeat, and still shake their 
rattles after their fangs have been knocked out by the elections."39
Although Davis had won, his party had suffered badly. It lost its 
control of the Maryland legislature and hence would be unable to choose 
the next United States Senator. "I would cheerfully have been beaten to 
secure the legislature and a Senator from the Eastern Shore," Davis 
wrote. He believed that if he had had ten more days "to drive home the 
Harper's Ferry tragedy on their agitating and aggressive policy" the 
American legislative ticket would have won.1*0
Shortly after the election Davis submitted his resignation to the 
Friday Club. "The beaten gentry," he complained, "are carrying their 
bitterness into all the relations of life. The fools suppose that they 
can effect my by such an effort." The social ostracism effected Nancy, 
however, and at her urging Davis rented a home in Washington for the 
coming session of Congress. By the end of the month they moved to their 
new home where Davis occupied himself with plans for an opposition 
candidate for Speaker of the House.1*1
39HWD to SFDP, 11 November 1859, WMss 9-9577; Baltimore American,
7 November 1859; Baltimore Sun, 2, 3, 4 November 1859; see also Maryland 
House Documents— 1860, Document U, "Baltimore City Contested Election," 
for detailed testimony on violence on both sides.
1*°HWD to SFDP, 11 November 1859, WMss 9-9577.
1*1Ibid.; Friday Club Minutebook, 18 November 1859, HdHS.
Chapter 8
NO DEMOCRAT SHALL BE SPEAKER
By Tuesday, January 31, 1860, the House of Representatives had 
been in session for eight exhausting weeks, but it had not yet been 
able to elect a Speaker. Without a Speaker, the House could not 
commence business and could not deal with the numerous appropriation 
bills on which the operations of government waited. On that day, 
however, it seemed that the impasse might be broken. A compromise 
candidate, ex-Governor William Pennington, a Republican from New 
Jersey, had pulled within two votes of election. An estimated twenty 
to thirty thousand spectators mobbed the Capitol trying to gain admis­
sion to witness the election. "The galleries were more densely crowded 
than at any former period in the session," a reporter wrote. An hour 
before the session began all available seats were taken. "Crowds were 
wedged in the various doorways, while the lobbies were alike uncom­
fortable with persons ofboth sexes."1
Three Congressmen wavered between rival candidates, and the 
combination of two of these three could elect a Speaker. For eight 
ballots, Winter Davis, the most prominent of the three, supported the 
candidacy of the American-Democratic coalition nominee, William N. H. 
Smith of North Carolina, against the Republican candidates. On the
1New York Times, 12 December 1859, 31 January 1860.
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forty-third ballot, however, the Democrats broke the coalition and
r
switched their support from Smith to John A. McClemand, an Illinois 
Democrat, and Smith lost any chance of election.2
As the forty-third ballot progressed, numerous explanations were 
given as members were called to vote. "It was not until the name of 
Henry Winter Davis was called," wrote one reporter, "that every ear was 
strained to catch the response." At the rear of the hall pacing back 
and forth when his name was called, Davis stopped short, turned, and 
spoke. "His voice fell like a falling star upon the House and galleries 
as he answered 'Pennington1. Such a burst of applause, mingled with 
hisses, has never before deafened the hall." Congressman John T.
Nixon added that "the showers of applause and hisses indicated the 
impression that the contest was over."3 Now only one vote short, 
Pennington had assurance from George Briggs, an American from New York, 
that he would change his vote if it would mean an election. On the 
next ballot, Davis and Briggs both cast their votes for Pennington, and 
the Republican was elected.1*
Pennington's election brought to a close two months of conflict 
that threatened a division of the Union. It also gave the Republican 
party momentum for the upcoming presidential campaign. Pennington was 
the first Republican elected to a national position, and his office 
allowed the Republicans to organize the House. Controlling the House,
2CG 36th-lst-634; New York Times, 1 February 1860.
3John T. Nixon, "The Circumstances Attending the Election of 
William Pennington as Speaker of the Thirty-Sixth Congress," New Jersey 
Historical Society Proceedings, II (2nd Series, 1872), 219.
‘'Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years, I, 169; CG 36th-lst-2.
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the opposition could continue to Investigate charges of fraud In 
Buchanan's administration, secure the passage of a protective tariff, 
and decide all contested seats— which might determine the Presidency if 
the upcoming presidential election ended up in the House.
Pennington's election was also the first step in Henry Winter 
Davis' plan to elect an "opposition candidate" to the presidency in
1860. Since the election of 1856 when the Democracy triumphed over a 
divided opposition, Davis had sought the creation of an "opposition party" 
as the best way to defeat the hated Locofocos. When Congress rejected 
Buchanan's Lecompton constitution in 1858, Davis began to think there 
was a real possibility for a union of Republicans, Americans, and 
Anti-Lecompton Democrats. "There is every prospect of a union of the 
whole opposition on such men as Bell or Corwin in 1860," he wrote in 
December 1858. In February 1859 he proposed to Governor Thomas H.
Hicks of Maryland that the Americans should cooperate with the Repub­
licans in Congress in return for their support of Edward Bates of 
Missouri or some other suitable candidate for President. To achieve 
that goal he urged the Maryland American state council in April of 1859 
to formally invite a union of the "opposition" in I860.5
In an attempt to gain national attention for his plan of fusion, 
Davis wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Tribune in which 
he argued for an "opposition candidate" for President. The Republican 
party could rally others opposed to the Democracy if they would just 
soften their demand for a law to prevent the extension of slavery, Davis
5HWD to SFDP, 6 December 1858, WMss 9-9104; HWD to T. H. Hicks, 
February 1859 in George P. Radcliffe, Governor Thomas H. Hicks and the 
Civil War (Baltimore, 1901), 520; Baltimore Clipper. 7 April 1859.
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argued. By law, all the territories are free. "No act establishing 
slavery has been passed for any territory," he wrote, "and the act of 
the New Mexico legislature was in conflict of the Mexican treaty and 
therefore void." To pass a law to restrict the extension of slavery, 
he noted, would require the Republicans to capture all three branches 
of government— the Congress, the Presidency, and the Supreme Court. No 
anti-slavery extension law could pass if the Democrats controlled even 
one branch of the government. "We say the President alone is sufficient" 
to reverse Democratic policy, Davis wrote. If the "opposition" con­
trolled the presidency, they would control appointments to the Supreme 
Court "and between now and the end of the next term a majority of those 
judges now on the bench must, in the course of nature, be substituted 
by others." With opposition judges on the Supreme Court, the Dred 
Scott decision, "that ridiculous farago of bad history, worse law, and 
Democratic partisanship" would be reversed and thus no anti-slavery 
extension law would be necessary. With an opposition party President, 
the veto could be used to protect the territories from passage of a 
congressional slave code or the repeal of the prohibition against 
slave-trading. Thus, Davis reasoned, a platform calling for the 
restriction of slavery in the territories was not necessary to accom­
plish the purposes which moderate men wanted. The only thing the 
oppositions needed was the presidency.6
American party victories in congressional elections in North 
Carolina and Tennessee convinced Davis that the time was ripe for the 
formation of an opposition party. If the opposition could unite early
6Davis, Speeches and Addresses, 121.
162
on a candidate such as John Bell of Tennessee or Edward Bates of 
Missouri, he felt they could capture the border states and most of the 
North. "In my judgment," he wrote Congressman Justin Morrill in the 
summer of 1859, "the opposition are fools if they do not take the latter 
[Bates]; it will give us the Govt, for 12 years at least; and in the 
next six years every seat on the Supreme Court Bench will be vacated by 
the hand of time."7
The first step toward securing an opposition victory in the 
presidential election of 1860 was the election of an opposition 
candidate as Speaker of the House. Davis' plan was to get the Pennsyl­
vania People's party to invite the South Americans to join with the 
Northern opposition (Republicans and Anti-Lecompton Democrats) in a 
caucus. The opposition would then "agree on some man not absolutely 
offensive to either branch for Speaker." In his opinion a northern 
man was preferable for Speaker "in view of the great preponderance of 
northern members and of the fact that we ought to induce them to take 
Bates or Bell or Stanley or some other Southern man for President."
Davis considered the ideal combination to be Sherman for Speaker and 
Bates for President, but he noted that "all is open for conference and 
remons trance."8
On the eve of the meeting of Congress, Davis had despaired of 
effecting his plan. The Pennsylvania delegation failed to make the 
necessary arrangements for an opposition coalition. "There was a lack
7HWD to Justin Morrill, 20 August 1859, Morrill Mss, LC.
8HWD to Alexander R. Boteler, 9 November 1859, Gratz Mss, HSP.
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of conciliation at the beginning among my friends and lack of tact among 
the northern people," Davis explained. But he gained hope when the 
Republicans decided not to nominate a candidate in caucus, but to rally 
behind the Republican who polled the most votes on the first ballot for 
Speaker. On that first ballot, young, handsome, bearded John Sherman, 
an Ohio Republican and Davis' favorite, led burly Galusha A. Grow, a 
Republican from Pennsylvania, and thereby became the Republican nominee. 
Davis was delighted with the Republicans choice of Sherman and hoped 
that the opposition might be rallied to support him.9
Southern Democrats suspected Davis' fusion plans and set out to 
dismantle it. Treasury Secretary Howell Cobb, himself a former House 
Speaker, warned Alexander Stephens before the session began of "Winter 
Davis ... and other Southern oppositionists who are supposed to be quite 
ready for a bargain." To prevent the Southetn opposition from uniting 
with the Northern opposition, the Democrats purposely and skillfully 
agitated sectional feelings.19
After the first ballot for Speaker was tallied, Missouri Democrat 
John B. Clark presented a resolution which stated that no member who had 
"endorsed and recommended" Hinton R. Helper's book, The Impending Crisis 
of the South— How to Meet It or the compendium from it, was fit to be 
Speaker of this House." Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania opposed the 
resolution on the grounds that no motion was in order until the Speaker 
was elected, but the clerk chose not to rule on Steven's objection and
9HWD to SFDP, 28 November 1859, WMss 9-9594.
19Cobb to Stephens, 14 November 1859, In Phillips (ed.), 
Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, II, 449; Radcliffe,
Hicks and the Civil War, 18.
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submitted it to the House for a decision. This opened up a debate which 
was to continue for eight weeks and was only interrupted for occasional 
balloting.11
The controversy over Helper's book arose because in March 1859, 
John Sherman, Thaddeus Stevens, and other leading Republicans had 
signed a certificate endorsing the publication of a summary of Helper's 
work for circulation throughout the country. Many Southerners 
considered the book insurrectionary. Helper had appealed to the poor 
whites of the South to support the abolition of slavery. He argued that 
the death of slavery would improve the economy of the South by helping 
manufacturing interests and commerce. Industry would greatly increase 
the value of poor farmer's land and provide new jobs. Helper's reason- 
ing, supported by a mass of statistics, was impressive and frightening 
to the slaveholding South.12
On the second day of the session, the Helper book was discussed 
again. Clark read his resolution and extracts from The Impending Crisis 
compendium. He charged that anyone who had signed the endorsement was 
"advising rebellion and treason; advising steps that will result in 
insurrection." John S. Millson of Virginia went even farther when he 
added that "one who consciously lent his name and influence to the pro­
pagation of such writing is not only not fit to be Speaker, but is not
^Nixon, "Election of Pennington," 209; CG 36th-lst-3.
12Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years, I, 170-171. The most 
complete account of John Sherman's attempt to secure the Speakership 
is Ollinger Crenshaw's "The Speakership Contest of 1859-1860: John
Sherman's Election a Cause of Disruption?," Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, 29 (December, 1942), 323-338.
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fit to live."13
Although Sherman explained that he had never read Helper's book 
or the compendium, and that he did not even recall signing the endorse­
ment of it, extreme Southerners continued to berate him and the Repub­
lican party. Lawrence M. Keitt of South Carolina, L. Q. C. Lamar of 
Mississippi, and Roger A. Pryor of Virginia charged that the Republicans 
who signed the endorsement were responsible for John Brown's raid on 
Harper's Ferry. Martin J. Crawford of Georgia said the South would 
"never submit to the inauguration of a black Republican President." The 
depth of Southern indignation was voiced by Jabez L. M. Curry of 
Alabama when he declared to the House that if "Wm. H. Seward or Salmon 
P. Chase, or any such representative of the Republican Party was elected 
upon a sectional platform, [that it] ought to be resisted to the 
disruption of every tie that binds this confederacy together."14
The attack on Sherman ended any hope that the South Americans 
could be brought to support a Republican for Speaker, Davis predicted. 
There was still a chance for the election of an opposition Speaker,
Davis thought, but only if the plurality rule was adopted. He vowed 
that if his vote would decide the contest "I have resolved to cast it 
for Mr. Sherman and face the storm. No Democrat shall go into the 
Speakers chair if my vote can prevent it." He regarded Sherman as "the 
best man in the House for the place. He will organize the Committees on 
the basis of recognizing all the opposition whether they voted for him
13Nixon, "Election of Pennington," 210; CG 36th-lst-95.
ll*New York Times, 10 December 1859; New York Tribune, 12 April
1860; also see Clement Eaton, The Freedom-of-Thought Struggle in the
Old South (New York, 1964), 139-142.
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or not." With the opposition in control of the committees, they could 
"stifle the negro agitation" and "turn the whole activity of the session 
on exposure of the administration." Until such time as his vote would 
be needed, he resolved to "shut my mouth and spend the day lying on 
the sofas possessing my soul in peace and saving my ears from the negro 
ding dong."15
The balloting for Speaker began rather slowly. There were but 
four votes in the first ten days. After the first ballot the voting 
changed very little. Day after day Sherman polled almost all of the 
109 Republican votes, Thomas S. Bocock of Virginia received all 88 
administration Democratic votes, the 26 Americans including Davis 
supported John A. Gilmer of North Carolina, and the anit-Lecompton 
Democrats divided their thirteen votes between several candidates.16
"We still hang," Davis wrote the Du Ponts on Christmas Day, "but 
the temper is getting rather better indoors as it seems to be getting 
worse out of doors." On the twenty-first ballot, the last before the 
Christmas recess, all coalitions except for the Republicans dissolved. 
Talk got angrier and angrier. Discussions of secession became common­
place as Southern fire-eaters decried Sherman's election as "an open 
declaration of war upon the institutions of the South." Davis dis­
counted talk of civil war. The steadiness of Virginia and North 
Carolina would prevent a collision. But if it had to come Davis 
wished it to come before Winfield Scott died, he said, for "that old
15HWD to SFDP, 27 December 1859, WMss 9-9629; HWD to SFDP, 20 
December 1859, WMss 9-9625.
16New York Times, 2 February 1860, for a complete summary of the 
balloting.
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fool" President would not have enough sense to replace him with 
Robert E. Lee. "My own impression," Davis confided to Du Pont, "is 
that the chief obstacle to the [secession] attempt is that no one has 
yet made up his mind to put his neck in John Brown's halter if enough 
do not follow."17
When Congress re-assembled after Christmas, Republicans intro­
duced a motion to elect a Speaker by plurality vote. Specualtion was 
widespread as to which party would have the advantage in a plurality 
election. One newspaper reporter thought "the Republicans may be able 
to cast their whole vote, 113. The Democrats by a union of the 
Southern opposition, can reach 110." He concluded that "there would 
still be left a balance of power sufficient to determine the result in 
favor of either party." The political uncertainty of this pivotal group, 
which included Winter Davis, kept both parties from agreeing to a 
plurality vote as in the deadlocked speakership contest in 1856.18
The Speakership deadlock dragged on through the month of January. 
The New York Times berated Congress for wasting its time in "idle and 
mischievous debate." Congressman John Nixon of New Jersey recalled 
that "the tedium of debate was varied now and then, by a vote for 
Speaker," but that "each ballot would seem to bring to the surface some 
new expression of sentiment of new political combination, which furn­
ished topics for renewed discussion." Davis was infuriated by the 
Americans who joined in the debate. "They argue vigorously that
17CG 36th-lst-247; HWD to SFDP, 25 December 1859, WMss 9-9628.
18New York Times, 12 December 1859; Sherman, Recollections of 
Forty Years, I, 167.
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democrats agitate the slavery question," he said, "and they vote with 
them to prove to the South that it is the Republicans and all northern 
men who are responsible for it." The solution evaded him. "What can 
you do with such people?" he complained.19
At the end of January, the Democrats, dedicated to preventing a 
fusion between the Republicans and the Americans, attempted a coalition 
of their own. On Sunday, January 22, the Democrats decided to support 
a compromise candidate, William N. H. Smith of North Carolina, "an 
Old-Line Whig ... acting with the South Americans." When they received 
assurances that Smith was not a member of the Know-Nothing Order, he 
was selected. On January 25, before the thirty-fifth ballot, Smith was 
placed in nomination and supported as "a new member, onobtrusive and 
quite unknown to his fellow members, but his colleagues presented him 
to be a gentleman of character, intelligence and worth, firmly a 
Whig, elected an American, and hostile to the administration.1,20
Friday, January 27, was the day to test the coalition. 
"Revolutionary passions," Davis thought, "were ready to explode."
Robert Mallory, an American from Kentucky, announced during the voting 
that the American party was ready for the election of William Smith. 
"Every member of our party has voted for him," Mallory declared. "That 
was the condition precedent, I understand, prescribed upon the other 
side of the House, for obtaining their votes." On the thirty-ninth
19HWD to SFDP, 27 December 1859, WMss 9-9629; New York Times, 29 
December 1859, 20 January 1860; J. H. Smith to A. Stephens, 14 January 
1860, Alexander Stephens Mss, LC; Nixon, "Election of Pennington,"
211.
20New York Times, 23 January 1860; CG 36th-lst-611.
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ballot, Smith received all the American votes, a large number of 
Democratic votes, and even five Republican votes. When Mallory made 
his appeal, enough Democrats switched their vote to give Smith enough 
to elect him, but the Republicans quickly exerted great pressure on 
members of their party who had supported him to switch back. One 
Republican who supported Smith, John Nixon of New Jersey, refused to 
switch his vote unless the Republican leadership promised to withdraw 
John Sherman as the Republican candidate. After assurances were given 
by Owen Lovejoy of Illinois that Sherman would step down, Nixon changed 
his vote and Smith was stopped just short of election.21
On Saturday, January 28, the Republicans met in caucus to make 
a new nomination for Speaker. Sherman withdrew as a candidate saying 
"Duty to himself, duty to his party, and above all, duty to his country 
dictated his course," but actually it was dictated by Congressman Nixon. 
Thad Stevens praised Sherman and pledged as he had before to support 
him "until somebody was elected, or until the crack of doom." Charles 
Francis Adams, the presiding officer, nominated William Pennington, 
Nixon’s close friend and freshman Congressman from New Jersey. Adams 
informed the caucus that Pennington would have support from two Anti- 
Lecompton Democrats from New Jersey, and two Americans, George Briggs 
of New York and Winter Davis. Thus Pennington could be elected. Thad 
Stevens rose to second Pennington’s nomination. "Mr. Chairman, I have 
said that I should continue to vote for Sherman until the Crack of doom," 
Stevens said. But, added the crusty old Pennsylvanian, "I heard that
21CG 36th-lst-611-619; Nixon, "Election of Pennington," 216; HWD 
to SFDP, 3 February 1860, WMss 9-9698.
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crack on Friday last!"22
On January 30, Sherman formally withdrew from the contest. 
Immediately the fortieth ballot was taken and showed Pennington leading 
with 115 votes, Smith had 113, and five votes were scattered. With the 
number necessary for election at 117, Pennington was only two votes 
short. The forty-first and forty-second ballots were taken but the 
election promised by Adams did not occur.23
The New York Times reported that during the forty-first and 
forty-second ballots "the Republicans brought every lever possible to 
bear on Mr. Davis of Maryland and many consultations were held as to 
how his vote could be secured." Davis told them that he could not 
vote for Pennington as long as his party's candidate, Smith was in 
contention. But then Davis softened his position and promised to 
switch to Pennington on the second or third ballot of the next day.
"The Republicans now lacking only two votes are promised aid and 
comfort tomorrow by Mr. Davis," the Times reported.
The Democrats caucused that evening to find a new candidate 
who could stop Pennington. They selected John A. McClernand of 
Illinois, a Douglas supporter thought to be popular with both the 
Anti-Lecompton Democrats and "the entire Southern opposition vote 
except Mr. Davis, of Maryland." The following day, when the Democrats 
dropped Smith and backed McClernand, Pennington picked up one more
22New York Times, 30 January 1960; Nixon, "Election of Pennington," 
213, 216, 217.
23CG 36th-1st-634.
2ItNew York Times, 31 January 1860; Sherman, Recollections of 
Forty Years, I, 179.
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vote— that of Henry Winter Davis.25
On the forty-fourth ballot, George Briggs changed his vote and 
Pennington was elected. Congressman Nixon recalled that this act gave 
Briggs "the conspicuous part in the organization of the House which he 
seemed to crave." The New York Times concluded its eight-week coverage 
of the contest reporting that "the close of the Speakership scene was 
impressive and imposing. The galleries were crowded but orderly" in 
marked contrast to the day before when Davis made his change to 
Pennington.26
Winter Davis explained his switch to his confidant, Captain Du 
Pont. Although he admired Pennington from the start, Davis explained, 
he was obliged to support Smith, his party's choice. But when "the 
Dems. resolved to leave him for McClernand— a Douglas dem. from Illinois 
and all voted for him but a few S. C. men, I then was free and voted 
for Pennington— all my colleagues refusing," Davis reported. "Now for 
the howl and yell. But it is a good days work to put an old whig in 
the chair who will constitute the committees on a basis of common 
opposition." With the presidential contest always in view Davis 
added that "as good luck would have it" Pennington was a Bates' man
The reaction to Davis' vote for Pennington was widespread. 
Several newspapers praised him, but many reported that Davis was 
involved in a "deal for filthy gain." A New York Times correspondent
25New York Times, 31 January 1860; CG 36th-lst-641.
26Nixon, "Election of Pennington," 220.
27HWD to SFDP, 3 February 1960, WMss 9-9698.
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wrote that Davis' vote was regarded by many "first, as a bid for 
Republican support to retain his seat; secondly, as a bid for the 
Attomey-Generalship under a Republican President; and lastly, as 
resulting from a "Plug Ugly nature, perverted into channels of philan­
thropic heresy." The first charge had an appearance of reality. When 
William G. Harrison, Davis' Reform party opponent in the recent 
Baltimore congressional election, moved to have the election voided, 
Elections Committee Chairman John Gilmer, Davis' "beloved friend" and 
an American from North Carolina, and the Republican committeemen voted 
to sustain Davis' election.28 The second charge, that Davis traded his 
vote for a cabinet seat, was preposterous. No man could have predicted 
who would be president thirteen months later, much less who would be in 
the cabinet.
Several newspapers charged that Davis was involved in "deals" for 
patronage and power. Indeed, Davis' old friend and former American 
Congressman from Cumberland, Maryland, Henry W. Hoffman, was nominated 
for Sergeant-at-Arms by the Republicans and elected by the House. 
Undoubtedly Hoffman had Davis' support, but Hoffman was also widely 
respected when he served in the House and might have succeeded without 
Davis' aid.29 Davis admitted to Du Pont that because of his support for
28New York Times, 3 February 1860; U.S. House of Representatives, 
Maryland Contested Election— Fourth Congressional District. Memorial of 
William G. Harrison (Washington: Misc. Documents No. 4, 36th Congress,
1st Session); U.S. House of Representatives, Maryland Contested Election 
Cases, Additional Evidence in the Two Cases Contested Elections in the 
State of Maryland (Washington: Misc. Documents No. 55, 36th Congress,
1st Session); U.S. House of Representatives, Maryland Contested Election 
Case— William G. Harrison vs. H. Winter Davis (Washington: Report No.
60, 36th Congress, 2nd Session).
29HWD to SFDP, 3 February 1860, WMss 9-9698. For the "deal"
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Pennington the Speaker had given him his pick of committee assignments. 
"Pennington gave me a choice of any place but chairman of Ways and Means 
which belonged to Sherman by all laws of decency," Davis confided to 
Du Pont. "But I told him he had better put men further South in high 
places— where they could be seen and leave me where I was: and so it
will be." Davis remained on the Ways and Means Committee where he had 
served for two terms.30
Southern newspapers vied with each other in heaping condemnation 
on Davis. The Fayetteville North Carolinian labeled Davis a Judas.
The Petersburg Press mocked that with the election of Pennington, the 
Republicans had "come forth out of their den of hypocrisy, and are 
running under their true colors, with the ensign of Black Republicans 
flying from their masthead" with "that wheel-horse of Black Republican­
ism, Know-Nothingism, Americanism, Whigism, and all other vile isms, 
Henry Winter Davis, of Maryland, as their Captain and leader!" Public 
reaction was equally sharp, and newspapers carried accounts of public 
demonstrations in the leading southern cities where Davis and 
Pennington were burned in effigy.31
Several Congressional leaders also denounced Davis. James A. 
Stewart of Maryland, a member of the House and a candidate for the
involving Hoffman see Indianapolis Daily State Sentinel, 7 February 
1860, and Harry J. Carman and Reinhard H. Luthin, Lincoln and the 
Patronage (New York, 1943), 67, for an extensive discussion of patronage 
and appointments arising out of this settlement.
30Washington Constitution, 3 February 1860; Baltimore Sun, 1, 8,
10 February 1860; Baltimore American, 2 February I860*
31The North Carolinian (Fayetteville), 11 February 1860; Petersburg 
(Va.) Press, 3 February 1860; Gaston (Md.) Star, 21 February 1860; 
Baltimore Clipper, 2 October 1860.
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Senate, accused Davis of having tried to "immortalize himself ... by 
aiding the destruction of the constitutional rights of the South." 
William Barksdale, a Mississippi Democrat, said that Davis, "a 
representative of a slaveholding constituency" was "responsible for the 
election of Pennington" and that all the "blame" for it was on him. 32
On both sides of the House, however, there was much praise for 
Davis' vote. John Nixon called it "an exhibition of moral courage ... 
as extraordinary as it was rare." A Southern Senator was reported as 
saying "let not Winter Davis be blamed for at least he had the merit of 
candor in his vote" while others "had not the manliness to avow what 
they wished." A slightly intoxicated Congressman, F. Burton Craig 
of North Carolina, privately congratulated Davis for "having the pluck 
to do as you choose— which five or six of your friends wanted to do and 
were too cowardly to do."33
Even a few Maryland newspapers reluctantly defended Davis' vote, 
calling Pennington an old Henry Clay Whig and not a Republican. The 
Baltimore Clipper called Pennington's election "a defeat of Republican­
ism" for it smashed up "the Seward faction" and caused the Republicans 
to "abandon their ultraism and their ultra candidate." Various public 
meetings throughout Baltimore and western Maryland adopted resolutions 
complimenting Davis and praising his independent position. Within a 
week of the vote, Davis wrote that his supporters were only slightly
32James A. Stewart, Maryland Politics and the Election of the 
Speaker, a speech delivered in the House of Representatives, June 2, 
1860 (n.p., n.d.).
33Nixon, "Election of Pennington," 219; New York Times, 3 February 
1860; HWD to SFDP, c. 7 February 1860, WMss 9-9693.
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discontented with his course. "The great mass not only approve but 
applaud the vote .... It is for Maryland the strongest vote possible.
It takes some time to digest the word republican," he added.31*
The most vehement condemnation of Davis' vote was a resolution 
passed by the Maryland House of Delegates censuring his action. In 
early January the lower chamber unanimously passed resolutions threat­
ening any Congressman with censure should he contribute to the election 
of any member of the "Black Republican party." The resolutions, however, 
were stalled by the Maryland Senate. "The resolutions to frighten me 
still hang in the Senate," Davis reported in January. "When they come 
here I shall have something to say. A man indicted for kidnapping 
[George Freaner] is their author1!" When the election of the Speaker 
was over, the House of Delegates made good on its threat. By a vote of 
fifty-eight to one it passed a resolution of censure charging that 
Davis had "misrepresented the sentiments of all portions of this State, 
and thereby forfeited the confidence of her people."35
On February 21, 1860, Winter Davis answered this action by the 
Maryland House of Delegates in a carefully prepared and memorized 
speech to the House of Representatives. "The honorable the Legislature 
of Maryland has decorated me with its censure," he mocked. "It is 
my purpose to acknowledge that compliment." The members of the House 
of Delegates who voted for the resolution should take their message to
31+Baltimore Clipper, 6, 24 February 1860; Easton Gazette, 4 
February 1860; Cecil Whig, 18 February 1860, Cumberland (Md.) Civilian,
20 February 1860.
35Journal of the Proceedings of the Maryland House of Delegates, 
January Session, 1860, 16-17, 353-354; Baltimore Clipper, 7, 9 January, 
7, 10 February 1860; Baltimore Sun, 7 January 1860.
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their constituents, for "I speak to their masters face to face, and 
not through them." He said he had no apologies to make for his vote 
and thought his fellow Marylanders would sustain his decision. "I told 
my constituents that I would come here a free man, or not at all; and 
they sent me here on that condition." He also denied that he repre­
sented only the Fourth Congressional district, saying he had "a wider 
constituency, a higher duty." He repeatedly referred to Pennington as 
a Whig, calling him "a Whig in the day of Whig greatness" and a symbol 
of the newly established sectional peace. Because of the election of 
Pennington, "chafed passions explode less violently in the House" and 
the possibilities of permanent peace grew. There was now no sectional 
questions to divide the country. "We must banish from our minds those 
'gorgons, hydras and chimeras dire', amid whose hideous forms we have 
so long pursued our weary way," he concluded.36
Davis1 speech was a remarkable feat. Charles Francis Adams 
thought it "one of the most effective, if not the most effective I 
ever listened to." James G. Blaine worte that for "eloquence of 
expression, force and conclusiveness of reasoning," Davis' defense 
was "entitled to rank in the political classics of America."37
"It was well received by the Democrats," Davis wrote Du Pont;
"the Republicans were greatly pleased and my weak friends stiffened 
up .... They all agree the Legislature got thirty nine well laid on."
36CG 36th-lst-117-120.
37Charles Francis Adams, Jr., An Autobiography. 1835-1915 
(New York, 1916), 46; James G. Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress; 
From Lincoln to Garfield (Norwich, Conn., 1884), I, 499; New York 
Times, 1 February 1860.
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Indeed, perhaps as a result of Davis' speech the resolution of censure 
failed in the Maryland Senate. "So it is possible," Davis concluded,
"to frighten men in Maryland into common sense as well as into folly."38
It was a masterful speech— Davis was always brilliant when on 
the defense— but it did nothing to restore Davis' divided and dying 
party. What the Reform party’s onslaught on the American party began, 
Davis' vote for Pennington had finished. The southern oppositionists 
failed to follow Davis' move toward the Republican party. The members 
of his own party in the Maryland legislature censured him, and he in 
turn scathingly attacked them. Instead of building a united opposition, 
Davis cut himself off from his own party. But he clung to a vision of 
a united opposition in the upcoming presidential contest.
38HWD to SFDP, 29 February 1860, WMss 9-9723; HWD to SFDP, c.
15 March 1860, WMss 9-9807.
Chapter 9
LINCOLN BEFORE ANY DEMOCRAT
"I am no prophet but I have faith that the hour of retribution is 
sounded," Winter Davis wrote in 1858. After those opposed to the 
administration had united in defeating the Lecompton Constitution, Davis 
was confident that there would be "a union of the whole opposition on 
such a man as Bell or Corwin in I860" to bring about the defeat of the 
Democracy.1
In Maryland Davis and the Kennedy brothers led a movement for 
the formation of an "opposition party." John Pendleton Kennedy dreamed 
of a rebirth of the old Whig party with the Americans merged into it; 
his brother, Senator Anthony Kennedy, wanted a coalition of old Whigs 
and disaffected Democrats into the broad structure of the Americans. 
Davis thought in bolder and more imaginative terms. Alone in Maryland 
and with little company nationally, Davis realized that any winning 
combination must be formed of not only the old Whigs, anti-Lecompton 
Democrats, and the Know-Nothings, but also the conservative elements of 
the Republican party.
In August 1859, Davis wrote Republican Congressman Justin Morrill
1HWD to SFDP, 6 December 1858, WMss 9-9104. See Boston Atlas 




that either John Bell of Tennessee or Edward Bates of Missouri would be 
sound candidates for the opposition. Either man could win, Davis 
predicted, and "there can be no remedy for locofoco law but the wresting 
the appointment [power] out of Locofoco hands." Within the next four 
years every seat on the Supreme Court "would be vacated by the hand of 
time." With the appointment of opposition justices the Dred Scott 
"folly" could be reversed. Without control of the Supreme Court, Davis 
noted, the House and Senate "are worthless for reforms— with it they 
are useful, without them it is adequate alone to accomplish almost 
everything." But to secure control of the Supreme Court the opposition 
would have to win the presidency.2
"We have a man on whom we can unite for President," Davis 
announced to Du Pont during the speakership contest. As between Bell 
and Bates, Davis had decided upon aging, white-bearded Judge Bates as 
his ideal candidate. A Virginian by birth, a conservative Whig in 
principle, Bates was the logical man to unite the opposition of 
dissident elements. "Northern people are willing to take him," Davis 
thought, "and he secures every right southern conservatives claim."
Davis was disturbed that his political friends, instead of joining 
behind a conservative Republican like Bates, were "playing the old 
game of trying to elect one of themselves by a minority of the 
people .... They are now trying to make a President out of Americans 
and Whigs who are in a minority in both ends of the Country!" Uniting 
all the opposition but the Republicans was like trying to play magician
2Anthony Kennedy to S. S. Nicholas, 7 June 1859, J. P. Kennedy 
Journal, 25 January 1860, Kennedy Mss, Peabody; HWD to Justin Morrill,
20 August 1859, Morrill Mss, LC.
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with the ballot box: "put in American votes— and take out a democratic
President." For without the Republicans, the Democrats would surely 
win. Defeating the Democracy was the entire purpose of the opposition 
for Davis. The country had been brought to the brink of disunion by 
two Democratic administrations and he feared that one more might be 
fatal.3
Davis informed Judge Bates of his intention to support him for 
the presidency during the Speakership contest. "I have just reed, a 
letter from Winter Davis of Md., who is the leading South American in 
the House," Bates confided to his diary. "He is serious and sad about 
the bad spirit prevailing in Congress and the Southern Democracy in the 
country, but he is firm and hopeful of better things." Davis wrote 
that there was "a good likelihood of a concentration of all the 
opposition" on Bates. Satisfied with Bates’ present position, Davis 
urged him not to further define his views, and to "write no more public 
letters— let well enought alone."4
Throughout 1859 efforts were made to bring forward a coalition 
candidate. The Baltimore Clipper proposed Virginian John Minor Botts 
as a likely opposition candidate. New Englander James Shepard Pike 
wanted "a Conservative republican, good against stealing, for a 
'judicious tariff', and not obnoxious to the remainder of the K.N.'s." 
In December the National American Central Committee met in Philadelphia 
led by Representative James Brooks of New York, his brother, editor
3HWD to SFDP, 20 December 1859, WMss 9-9625.
^Howard K. Beale (ed.), The Diary of Edward Bates. 1859-1866 
(Washington, 1933), 78-79.
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Erastus Brooks, Senator John J. Crittenden, old Whig Emerson Etheridge 
of Tennessee, John Gilmer of North Carolina, and J. Morrison Harris 
of Baltimore. They agreed to join with the National Union Committee 
to form the Constitutional Union party under the leadership of senior 
statesman Crittenden. In late December the Republican National 
Committee, meeting at the Astor House in New York City, issued a call 
for a national convention to be held in May. Instead of calling for 
a strictly Republican convention, the committee specifically designated 
the Pennsylvania People's party and the New Jersey Opposition party in 
the call, thus stressing the idea of "opposition" to the administration.5
These December developments brought a mixed reaction from Davis. 
"That preposterous squad of antiques," he labeled the National Union 
Committee. Their goal, to slay "the whole Democratic and Republican 
parties and make bone dust of them in their coffee mills," was in his 
opinion entirely unrealistic. "They had an idea that at their whistle 
and after a little 'union' shrieking all would rush to them to save 
it." After Crittenden and the Americans joined the National Union 
Committee, Davis was pleased to see "more practical men" in control and 
hoped that now "the movement will work to the practical point of union 
with, not opposition to, the Republicans: and that they will see in
Mr. Bates the only practicable point of union."6
Davis was optimistic about Bates' chances of capturing both the
Baltimore Clipper, 9 August, 21, 24, 25 December 1859;
J. S. Pike to W. P. Fessenden, 6 September 1859, Pike Mss, LC; 
Reinhard H. Luthin, The First Lincoln Campaign (Cambridge, Mass., 
1944), 21.
6HWD to SFDP, 27 December 1859, WMss 9-9629.
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fledgling Constitutional Union party nomination and the Republican 
party nomination. The Baltimore Patriot came out in support of Bates 
for President on January 4, 1860. Upon learning of the Patriot1s 
endorsement, Bates commented: "Ify nomination for the Presidency, which
at first struck me with mere wonder, has become familiar, and now I 
begin to think my prospects very fair."7
Others began to think Bates' chances good and a Bates bandwagon 
began to form. Francis P. Blair, Jr. of Missouri was confident that 
Bates could carry Missouri and could also run strong in southern 
Illinois, where the Republicans were weak. Davis assured Blair that 
if Missouri declared for Bates Maryland would follow. After conferring 
with leading Delaware oppositionists, Captain Du Pont wrote Davis that 
the Delaware convention would be instructed "to vote first, last, and 
always, for Bates." Throughout the North Bates had influential men 
supporting his candidacy. In Indiana the leading Bates supporter was 
Schuyler Colfax. Rotund Orville Hickman Browning deemed Bates' chances 
good in Illinois and attempted to rally his friends, including prairie 
lawyer Abraham Lincoln, to Bates' cause. Perhaps the most influential 
of Bates' northern advocates was Horace Greeley, editor of the New York 
Tribune.8
Baltimore American, 29 December 1859; Baltimore Patriot, 4, 5
January 1859; Bates, Diary, 81.
8S. Colfax to H. Greeley, in 0. J. Hollister, Life of Schuyler 
Colfax (New York, 1886), 142-143; SFDP to HWD, 13 January 1860, WMss 
9-2090; Theordore C. Pease and J. G. Randall (eds.), The Diary of 
Orville Hickman Browning, 1850-1864, I, 380-382, 395-396, 408; New 
York Tribune, 20 February 1860; H. Greeley to S. Colfax, 28 February 
1860, Greeley-Colfax Mss, New York Public Library.
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The Bates' boom never got a firm start. At the Missouri 
opposition convention on February 22, the delegates were clearly in 
favor of Bates but deadlocked over whether to send delegates to the 
Republican or the Constitution Union convention. A January letter to 
the St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican, designed by Bates to prove his 
Republicanism, hurt him with the Americans. In the Missouri Republican 
convention, Bates captured the majority of delegates but his friendship 
with the American party hurt him with the Missouri Germans. In Indiana 
on February 22, an opposition convention struggled to nominate Bates 
over the strong opposition of German leaders.9
In the border states there was little enthusiasm for Bates 
because of his Republican party connections. "The Southern opposition­
ists are utterly incorrigible, utterly incapable of seeing the result 
of a nomination by them of anyone but Bates," Davis complained. "Indeed 
they are bent on a third candidate and are fools enough to think that 
the Republicans will disband before nobody!!" Other oppositionists in 
the border states, secretly Republican, supported Bates but dreamed of 
a more fervently Republican candidate. "We are pushing Bates as a 
pisaller," a last resort, wrote Worthington G. Snether, the editorial 
writer of the Baltimore Patriot, "because by such a movement we can 
plead for a united opposition and give circulation to more republican 
sentiments than in any other way." Despite Bates' declining course, 
Davis insisted that the proper course was to support him for both
9St. Louis Missouri Republican, 20 January 1860; St. Louis 
Democrat, 29 February 1860; St. Louis Daily Evening News. 21 March 
1860; Luthin, First Lincoln Campaign. 64; James W. Nye to T. Weed,
8 March 1860, Weed Mss, University of Rochester.
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nominations.10
A severe setback to Bates' chances In Maryland came at a meeting 
of the Baltimore Constitutional Union party on Henry Clay's birthday, 
April 12. The city's old Whigs, backed by prominent Reform party 
leaders, challenged the Americans for control of the convention. When 
the Americans won only half of the city's delegation to the state 
nominating convention, the American party leadership balked and called 
on ward councils to elect their own slate to the state convention.*1
At the Constitutional Union state convention, which opened on 
April 19 in Baltimore, the competing delegates from Baltimore were both 
seated in an effort to achieve party unity. But unity was not possible. 
Baltimore Mayor Thomas Swann made some remarks which offended many 
Americans. Governor Thomas Hicks called the Whigs "an old broken down 
party whom the Americans will not allow to regulate matters."12
As the voting for delegates to the national convention began a 
debate began between Grayson Eichelberger and J. M. Kilgour over 
Winter Davis' position. Kilgour attacked Davis and his "fusion" plans. 
"During the remarks of Mr. K., the crowd outside applauded and hissed 
vehemently," one reporter commented. Eichelberger defended Davis' 
congressional conduct and also supported Davis' plan for Bates' 
candidacy. Halfway through the balloting, the American party delegates
10HWD to SFDP, 29 February 1860, WMss 9-9723; J. M. Botts to S. P. 
Blair, 15 December 1858, Blair-Lee Mss, Princeton; W. G. Snethen to 
T. Weed, 11 March 1860, Weed Mss, LC.
11J. P. Kennedy Journal, 14, 17 March, 2, 3, 10 April 1860,
Kennedy Mss, Peabody; Baltimore Clipper, 13 April 1860.
12Baltimore Clipper, 19, 20, 27 April 1860.
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walked out of the convention which then voted it "inexpedient" to 
nominate a candidate for the presidency. Maryland's delegation to the 
Constitutional Union convention would thus not be committed to Bates. 
Davis was sadly disappointed that the convention had not endorsed Bates. 
However, he was pleased when the tiny Republican state convention, 
dominated by Francis P. Blair, Sr., and his son, Montgomery, pledged 
its delegates to Judge Bates.13
Four days after the Maryland Constitutional Union convention 
adjourned, the Democratic national convention convened in Charleston 
and proceded to tear itself apart. After a dispute over the platform, 
the Southern delegations walked out of the convention and the remnant 
was unable to nominate a candidate. The convention adjourned to meet 
later.14
Hardly had the old Democratic party broken up than the new 
Constitutional Union party met in Baltimore. Delegates from twenty- 
one states were called to order with the words, "Let us know no party 
but our country, no platform but the Union and the Constitution." 
Present were prominent Whigs and Americans from all sections of the 
country. Former New York Governor Washington Hunt and the Brooks 
brothers represented New York, Henry M. Fuller led the Pennsylvania 
delegation, Parson William Brownlow and Andrew Jackson Donelson headed 
the Tennessee group. Other prominent leaders included Richard W.
13J. P. Kennedy Journal, 19 April 1860, Kennedy Mss, Peabody; 
Cecil Democrat, 28 April 1860; W. L. Marshall to M. Blair, 5 May 1860, 
Francis Preston Blair Family Mss, LC; Andrews, History of Maryland,
505.
11+Nichols, Disruption of American Democracy, 288-304.
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Thompson of Indiana, Alexander H. H. Stuart and Alexander Boteler of 
Virginia, the Bishop brothers of New Jersey, and Joshua Hill of Georgia. 
Mayor Swann and Congressman J. Dixon Roman headed the Maryland delega­
tion. The convention adopted a simple and evasive platform pledging 
only adherance to the Constitution and the Union. On the second day 
came the nominations. Bates, while still popular in several states, 
was clearly unacceptable to the convention after his letter to the St. 
Louis newspaper. The clear choice of the convention was Senator John 
J. Crittenden but "Henry Clay's heir" did not wish to run. The nomina­
tion fell to Senator John Bell of Tennessee, former Speaker of the 
House and former Secretary of War.15
As Bell was totally unacceptable to the Republicans, almost all 
hope of a united opposition faded. Horace Greeley summed up the 
Republican case against Bell: "I venture to say that Bell's record is
the most tangled and embarrassing to the party which shall run him for 
President of any man's in America. And as to his wife's owning the 
slaves— bosh! We know that Bell has owned slaves." As the "Old 
Gentleman's Party" (as Greeley irreverently referred to them) adjourned 
in Baltimore, attention was focused on the Republican convention 
assembling in Chicago.16
The Republicans gathered in convention at Chicago amid bright 
auguries of victory. The division in the Democratic party gave promise
15J. J. Crittenden to Logan Hunton, 15 April 1860, Crittenden 
Mss, Duke University; J. P. Kennedy Journal, 9, 10 May 1860, Kennedy 
Mss, Peabody; Baltimore Clipper, 10, 11 May 1860.
16James W. Pike, First Blows of the Civil War (New York, 1879), 
499-500; M. Blair to wife, 11 May 1860, Blair Mss, LC.
of being permanent, and with the enemy split the Republicans did not 
have to worry so much about the identity of their nominee— any reason­
ably strong candidate was likely to win. Nor did they have to make 
overtures to the Constitutional Union party, which had repelled many 
Republicans with the nomination of slaveholder Bell. Their problem 
was to find the most "available" candidate, the man least offensive to 
most factions. To many delegates, the front-running candidate, William 
H. Seward seemed to radical to carry the doubtful states of Illinois, 
Indiana, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. Some delegates in these states 
were willing to support Bates as a more conservative candidate. Frank 
Blair addressed the Indiana and Pennsylvania delegates in Bates1 behalf. 
When Lincoln's supporters heard of this, Gustave Koerner rushed over to 
attack Bates for heading the Whig National convention in 1856 and for 
supporting the Know-Nothings in St. Louis elections. It readily became 
apparent that Bates, like Seward, was unavailable.17
A committee of the leading delegates of the four doubtful states 
met for five hours the first night of the convention to decide on an 
alternative candidate to Seward. The Illinois delegation was led by 
David Davis, Henry Winter's cousin, who secured promises from the New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania delegations to support Abraham Lincoln. Having 
decided on a presidential candidate, the committee turned to the problem 
of choosing his running mate. Probably at Judge Davis' urging, Winter 
Davis was endorsed, perhaps because it was thought he would bring 
strength to the ticket in nativistic Indiana and tariff-minded
17Gustavus Koerner, Memoirs of Gustavus Koerner (Cedar Rapids, 
1909), II, 88-89.
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Pennsylvania. The judge was instructed to telegraph his cousin to ask 
if he would run with Lincoln.18
The telegram startled Winter Davis. In a hastily dispatched reply 
he declined the offer to run. Consequently the Lincoln support went to 
Senator Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, who led the first ballot with 194 
votes. Kentucky abolitionist Cassius M. Clay was second with 101, and 
scattered votes went to John Hickman of Pennsylvania, Nathaniel P.
Banks of Massachusetts, Sam Houston, and Davis. On the second ballot, 
Hamlin was selected.19
In a private letter to his cousin, Winter Davis explained his 
reasons for declining the nomination. "I did not think it advisable 
to allow myself the nomination for V. P. even if there had been any 
prospect of it which I am far from thinking." His name would have 
"embarrassed the ticket in the North West: and it would in common
with my vote for Pennington have been seized on to justify every species 
of personal imputation." In Maryland his political friends were so 
"entangled with Bell and Everett nomination to such an extent that my 
nomination at Chicago would have give the state to the democrats— cost
18King, David Davis, 140; HWD to David Davis, 10 June 1860, Davis 
Mss, CHS. The Lincoln supporters ware not the only ones seeking Davis 
as a running mate. "What I hear inclines me to believe that Winter 
Davis would be glad to go on the ticket and could draw a large vote 
after him," candidate William Seward wrote his campaign manager,
Thurlow Weed, in April 1860; see Seward to Weed, 25 April 1860, Weed 
Mss, University of Rochester. Early in May, managers for perennial 
presidential candidate, colorless Judge John McLean of Ohio also 
approached Davis about running for Vice President, but Davis flatly 
declined; see SFDP to SMDP, 10 May 1860, WMss 9-2137.
19Luthin, First Lincoln Campaign, 166-167; Baltimore Clipper,
19 May 1860.
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us a Senator so greatly needed and our whole state government."2®
Davis considered the nomination of Lincoln and Hamlin wise "under 
the circumstances," and he wished them success. "In my judgment it is 
the only mode of shaking off this democratic domination: and I greatly
prefer Mr. Lincoln to any democrat." The Chicago platform he felt was 
"like others I ever saw— supremely foolish," but the platform was not 
important. "The man is the President and he suits me."21
As Lincoln had no chance of carrying Maryland, Davis and his 
allies resolved as "the next best thing" to support the Constitutional 
Union ticket at home. "We can thus hold the state from any democrat 
unless Mr. Lincoln's friends are so confident as to name an electoral 
ticket— in which event the Democrats will assuredly have 8 votes." 
Maryland Republicans were determined to run a Lincoln slate whatever 
the cost. "I think our true policy is to force them [the Constitutional 
Unionists] to take sides either with the Democrats or the Republicans," 
wrote one party leader. "Davis is cowering from the reproach of 
Republicanism yet planning to derive the highest honors from its 
success."22
Davis attempted to make an arrangement with Lincoln through his 
campaign manager, David Davis, not to run a Republican ticket in 
Maryland. "I have been doing all I can to have the canvass so conducted
20HWD to David Davis, 10 June 1860, CHS.
21Ibid.
22T. H. Hicks to Editor, 24 May 1860, Robert Todd Lincoln 
Collection of Abraham Lincoln Mss, LC, hereinafter cited as TRL, LC; 
W. L. Marshall to M. Blair, 27, 30 May 1860, Blair, LC; Baltimore 
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that Bell shall not cross the path of Lincoln in the free states," he 
wrote his cousin. "I feel sure I will so far succeed as to prevent 
any serious division in Pa. and N.J. and they will probably settle the 
contest." The Democrats, he predicted, would carry all the Southern 
States "except Md. and possibly Tennessee and Texas." But they might 
capture Maryland if the Republicans insisted on running a slate there.
If the Republicans would stay out of Maryland, Davis pledged to see 
that Bell did not hinder Lincoln's chances in the crucial states.23
When David Davis delivered Henry Winter's message to Lincoln, the 
candidate wrote Colonel Dick Thompson, Davis' friend and a Constitutional 
Unionist in Indiana, to discuss alternatives with Davis. As a result 
of that meeting Davis addressed another letter to his cousin to be 
handed to Lincoln. "I find our mad men are bent on a Lincoln ticket 
in Md.," he complained, "and I and Blair can do nothing to arrest it."
Any split in the opposition, Davis argued, would give the state 
legislature to the Democrats. And the next legislature, he noted, would 
elect a Senator to replace Anthony Kennedy, hopefully someone favorable 
to Lincoln's administration. "You know the power of names enough to 
know that till Lincoln's policy is developed and our people begin to 
feel confidence in him personally, it will be impossible to carry the 
state for him under the name republican, yet it can be done under our 
existing organization." If the Republicans oppose the Constitutional 
Unionists in Maryland, "it will embitter our people and make them look 
on the republicans as their opponents instead of regarding them as they 
now do as only a part of the unhappily divided opposition." The local
23HWD to David Davis, 10 June 1860, CHS.
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Republican leaders were still pushing for a separate ticket. "Perhaps 
a hint from Lincoln might be useful," he concluded. David Davis 
presented the letter to Lincoln and urged him to do something "to 
prevent the thing. "2t*
At Lincoln's request, David Davis replied with "a hint" that he 
desired no Republican ticket in Maryland, the hint obviously coming from 
Lincoln. Winter Davis showed the letter to all those prominent in the 
Republican movement but with little success. Montgomery Blair reported 
to his father: "I told him [Winter Davis] that it could not be pre­
vented, that our Ex-Committee was determined to start a ticket."
Blair's closest advisors were "rampant for a ticket" and "savage on 
the KN's." Davis made a final appeal to Montgomery Blair to prevent a 
Republican ticket from being entered in Maryland. "There is great force 
in your observations about the moral power of a big vote" for Lincoln, 
Davis wrote Blair. "But as I am to suffer under the physical power of 
a democrat hue in Md. for 10 years to pay for that moral power, I had 
rather not!" Blair agreed to do his best.25
During the pre- and post-convention activity, Congress was barely 
active. Only in the last days of the session was even the most 
rudimentary business of the country acted upon. Part of the delay 
arose out of the protracted Speakership contest, part out of Pennington's 
inability to control the House, but mainly because it was an election 
year. The opposition-controlled House was in an electioneering mood.
2I*Lincoln to Richard W. Thompson, 18 June 1860, HWD to David Davis,
28 June 1860, D. Davis to Lincoln, 5 July 1860, RTL, LC.
25M. Blair to F. P. Blair, Sr., 28 June 1860, Blair, LC; HWD to
M. Blair, n.d., Blair Mss, LC.
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It passed Morrill's Homestead Bill knowing Buchanan would veto it.26
A sub-committee of the House Ways and Means Committee composed 
of Morrill, Davis, and William A. Howard prepared a protective tariff 
which they frankly admitted had little chance of passage. The bill 
established protection for America's ailing industries, such as the 
Maryland coal and iron companies, as well as a general rise in tariff 
duties. Although it was one of the most carefully drawn tariff bills 
ever written, it was primarily concocted to be a campaign issue. After 
a lengthy struggle in the House, it was passed but then buried in a 
Senate committee.27
The transcontinental railroad issue occupied the House for 
several days. Davis opposed the Pacific Railroad Bill not because he 
opposed the railroad, but because he opposed creating "the most 
stupendous monopoly that the country ever saw." He preferred a railroad 
built and operated by the government "exactly as it builds forts and 
improves harbors."28
Much of the session was devoted to exposing graft and corruption 
in Buchanan's administration. The House Ways and Means Committee, of 
which Davis was a ranking member, charged the administration with fraud 
in the procurement of coal and timber for the Navy. The administration's 
use of patronage at the Navy yards, particularly the Brooklyn Navy Yard, 
in return for votes on key issues was paraded before a disbelieving
26CG 36th-1st-1115.
27Parker, Morrill, 103-104; Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years,




public. Finally, the Covode Committee exposed corruption in the post 
offices, custom-houses and printing offices.29
The Thirty-Sixth Congress, at Superintendent Robert E. Lee’s 
urging, established a commission to investigate the course of instruc­
tion at the United States Military Academy at West Point. The 
commission was to consist of two members of the Senate, two from the 
House, and two array officers. "I think the Speaker will name me and 
John Cochrane and the V. P. will name Jefferson Davis and somebody 
else," Davis reported "and all will meet at W. Point to consult with 
him in the summer and report in Deer." As he guessed, Pennington 
named him to the West Point commission.30
When Congress adjourned in June, Davis and Nancy and pudgy Anne 
returned to Baltimore. "I find my people here in Baltimore all 
perfectly satisfied with my conduct in Washington," Davis proudly 
reported. He gloried in the "complete, hearty, rancorous, and 
satisfactory" division of the Democratic party between Breckenridge 
and Douglas. "We are sure of the State without any trouble at all," 
and even the "crazy squad of republicans" would not hurt them. But 
he was disturbed by an apparent move to Breckenridge. "The Whigs and 
independents and reformers, the newly rich, who are afraid to be in a 
majority, and the old rich who can't get into one" seemed to be moving 
to Breckenridge from Bell. All the members of the Friday Club had 
become "Bucks," he wrote. "In a word, everybody who can rise himself
29Ibid., 2950-2951.
30Ibid., 2309, 3003, 3169; HWD to SFDP, 17 June 1860, WMss
9-10276.
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and don't like me to rise is a democrat on one side or the other of the 
split."31
■a
Politics took a secondary position in Davis' life that summer.
In July he and Nancy and the baby left for West Point, "tty glory is 
culminating," he announced from the Military Academy. "First I was 
called Colonel ... then our Commission received a salute national of 
33 guns. Only think of that!" He felt embarrassed to review the 
Corps of Cadets, "I representing the disorderly House of Reps, in an 
informal and irregular and unmilitary straw hat." The commission's 
work progressed slowly. Davis, former West Pointer Jefferson Davis, 
Senator Solomon Foote, Representative John Cochrane of New York, and 
Major Robert A. Anderson met daily at the library of the Academy. "We 
have examined the English Report of 1857, the military Schools of the 
Continent, and find it bungling, irregular, unsystematic John Bullish 
as was to be expected." The Prussian military education system seemed 
superior to both Congressman and Senator Davis because it required 
practical training in addition to "the more abstract and scientific" 
studies. But both men doubted that Congress would see the necessity of 
establishing a separate "school of practice."32
The vacation from politics benefited Davis' health and attitude. 
"Nancy and I are at a Hotel a mile from the Point and Nannie is 
enjoying herself on the most extensive scale," he wrote his aunt,
"trees and grounds all round and plenty of little children to play
31HWD to SFDP, c. July 1860, WMss 9-10345.
32HWD to SFDP, 25 July 1860, WMss 9-10337; Stephen E. Ambrose, 
Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point (Baltimore, 1866), 141;
Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 3, 36th Congress, 2nd Session, 1-350.
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with— besides one to scratch her." Mrs. Du Pont reported that she had 
never seen Henry look in as good health or as strong as during his 
summer on the Hudson River. Nancy regained the weight she lost after 
the death of her second child, while Anne, her proud father reported,
"is sturdy and stout to a scandalous degree."33
In the midst of his West Point visit, Davis met his cousin David 
Davis at the Astor House in New York for a personal and political 
conference. David reported the conference to Lincoln: "Henry has a
strong desire that your administration should be a success. Henry 
dislikes the union movement generally, and the Union with either branch 
of the democracy is condemned by him emphatically." Winter Davis 
reported the meeting to Captain Du Pont: "Lincoln has the prestige
and is now as good as elected. The coalitions attempted or made [to 
defeat him] are the efforts of despair." He told Du Pont that though 
still seeming to support Bell, his position was taken "merely for local 
policy. I am disgusted at the coalitions and shall say what I think 
of them when I get home."31*
David and Winter also discussed the formation of Lincoln's cabinet 
at their Astor House meeting. Winter urged his cousin to support 
Seward as minister to the Court of St. James instead of for Secretary 
of State. "If Seward will go to England he may have Buchanan's luck; 
and Lincoln will be relieved." Davis favored Thomas Corwin of Ohio for
33HWD to Elizabeth B. Winter, 27 July 1860, Davis Mss, CHS; HWD 
to SFDP, 25 July 1860, WMss 9-10337.
3tfDavid Davis to Lincoln, 14 August 1860, in David C. Mearns, (ed.), 
The Lincoln Papers (New York, 1948), I, 271-272; HWD to SFDP, 15 August 
1860, WMss 9-10442.
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the head of the cabinet. The Lincoln administration would have but two 
opportunities to show its nationalism before the congressional elections 
next year— the inaugural address and the cabinet appointments. "To them 
every eye will be turned: any error in either is fatal." The appoint­
ment of a conservative man like Corwin, Winter assured his cousin,
would dispel the cry being raised that Lincoln would have extremists 
around him.35
On September 6 Davis and his family left West Point, the commis­
sion's investigation being finished and its report practically written.
Returning by way of New York City, Mrs. Davis shopped while Davis 
conferred with politicians. "Nancy exhausted Broadway in a day," her 
husband reported, so they took a train to Philadelphia. From there 
they went on to the Du Pont's estate. After enjoying "a day with the 
ticks," they returned to Baltimore and the fury of politics.36
As Davis suspected before leaving for the summer, the Breckenridge 
movement was gaining momentum. A vote for the Southern Democratic 
candidate was justified as a vote that would unite Maryland with the 
South and rebuke the fanaticism of the North. The Vice President's 
candidacy was supported in Baltimore as the best way to save the Union—  
and that was to defeat Lincoln and thus prevent secession. Davis was 
disgusted with the mass defections from the Constitutional Union party. 
"I see that my wise colleague Harris is canvassing Md. with the
3^HWD to David Davis, 22 August 1860, RTL, LC; HWD to David Davis, 
10 September 1860, Davis Mss, CHS; SFDP to HWD, 20 August 1860, WMss 
9-2196; HWD to SFDP, 24 August 1860, WMss 9-10451.
36HWD to SMDP, 11 September 1860, WMss 9-17137; SMDP to Edward
Syle, 19 September 1860, WMss 9-22822.
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declaration that he prefers and would vote for Breckenridge to defeat 
Lincoln." Davis privately accused Harris of defecting in order to 
obtain support for Governor or Senator. "There is more prospect of 
losing the State," Davis confided to Du Pont.37
At the end of September Davis decided to abandon his aloof 
position and publicly announce his position. For the occasion he rented 
the New Assembly Rooms and ran advertisements in the newspapers. The 
address was scheduled for 8 P.M. on September 28. An hour before the 
speech was to begin, people packed the hall and an estimated two 
thousand stood outside in a slight drizzle to hear Davis speak. When 
he appeared on the stage, he was received with deafening cheers and 
applause. William Alexander, President of the American Party Superior 
Council, introduced Davis. The crowd immediately settled as he began 
his speech.38
The Democracy was finally dead, he declared, and Breckenridge and 
Douglas were fighting over who would have the honor of burying the 
corpse. In fiery words Davis blasted the whole record of the Buchanan 
administration beginning with its handling of foreign policy and the 
recourse to the sword to solve international problems. He flayed the 
Democrats' mishandling of the crisis of 1857. He denounced the party's 
corruption, citing the Fort Welling Report, the Willett's Point Report, 
the Covode Committee Report, and the brokerage of Navy Yard offices. He 
berated Buchanan for his support of the Lecompton Constitution. The 
Democracy had ignored the interests of the "great agricultural classes"
37HWD to SFDP, 3 August 1860, WMss 9-10431.
3 Baltimore Clipper, 28 September 1860.
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by opposing the Agricultural College bill, the interests of the work­
ingman by refusing to remodel the tariff, and the interests of the 
commercial classes by opposing the Pacific Railroad. It was time for 
a "new deal," a time to "sweep out from the office the flocks of unclean 
birds that have been nesting for the last four years." For as long as 
the Democracy reigned, "so long there will be nothing but one eternal 
howl on the negro question to keep itself in power."
A major part of his speech was devoted to a defense of the 
"opposition"— the Constitutional Unionists and the Republicans. The 
opposition parties needed each other. Bell, if President, could not be 
successful without the congressional support of the Republican party; 
and Lincoln, if President would not have broad enough support without 
the help of the southern opposition Congressmen. The Republicans and 
the Unionists agreed that the slavery question is completely settled, 
Davis claimed; "in the language of Mr. Webster, there is not a foot of 
Territory within the jurisdiction of the United States of which, 
slave or free, is not irrevocably settled by some law." The conser­
vative Republicans had "acquiesed in the fugitive slave law, in the 
existence of slavery in the District of Columbia, and in the right to 
carry slaves from one State to another." No question on slavery now 
existed "except such as the Democrats may see fit to open." The way 
to settle the slavery question, Davis concluded, "is to be silent on 
it."39
Discounting threats of disunion as "a cry of wolf, with no wolf 
threatening the fold," he denounced the coalitions forming to defeat
39Ibid., 29 September 1860.
199
Lincoln. In Maryland "we do not make bargains with our political 
opponents and lie down in the same bed after they have slobbered over 
us for years." If the coalitions succeeded and no candidate was 
elected, the election in the House of Representatives would be a 
"bloody scene." If no selection would be made there, the office would 
be vacant and the union might be dissolved. "Peace is within our grasp, 
if we only see fit to hold fast. If we choose to encourage war, we 
may encourage it too far." He urged his fellow Marylanders not to fall 
prey to the Democratic howl, but to remain firm for Bell.
He closed with a story from his favorite work of history, Gibbon’s 
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. An iconoclastic rage had induced 
the people of Egypt to sweep away all idols. In Alexandria was a temple 
with a great image of Serapis. Legend told the people that if the 
statue of Serapis was destroyed the world would crumble to dust. The 
Christians stood in awe before that heathen statue until one strong man 
seized an axe, mounted the ladder and struck the idol repeatedly, until 
it fell piece by piece to the ground. The trembling multitude waited 
for the Heavens to fall and the earth to crumble. As the minutes 
passed, the people realized that they were foolish for fearing the 
idol. "I take it that they who smite the Democratic party," he 
concluded, "will find that no disaster will follow its destruction."^0
The address was well received by the audience, Davis wrote Du 
Pont, "though it was so directly counter to everything that had been 
said and done during my absence, that I was very doubtful when I began 
whether I should finish without a row." To defend the Republicans in
1+0 Ibid.
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Baltimore was a dangerous undertaking, but Davis' ability as an orator 
and his bold and independent stand won the crowd. "So much for my 
enemies," he crowed.41
Newspaper reaction to Davis' speech was savage. While applauding 
Davis for supporting Bell, the Baltimore Clipper blasted him for his 
support for Lincoln and the Republicans. The Baltimore American called 
the speech "a Lincoln pronunciamento in Bell clothing, or rather an 
eccentric Republican sheep with a Union Bell on its neck." Distin­
guished lawyer and scholar William Price, a Bell elector, wrote an 
article attacking Davis as "the first missionary of the Republican 
church" and "an enemy in the guise of a friend."42
Despite Davis' appeal for unity within the Union party, the 
friends of Bell continued to fight each other. In October the party 
split over the mayoral contest. The Reform party nominated Davis' 
former friend, George William Brown, and the old Americans nominated 
former Sheriff Samuel Hindes. Brown overwhelmed Hindes by an 8,000 
vote majority. "It is worse than I supposed," Davis lamented. "The 
result of yesterday is the work of Mr. Bell's friends of the shop­
keeping and trading classes— never reliable in an emergency and always 
ready to follow a false lead of their enemies."43
As the presidential election drew near, Davis doubled his efforts
41HWD to David Davis, 1 October 1860, RTL, LC; HWD to SFDP,
8 October 1860, WMss 9-17139.
42Baltimore Clipper, 1, 2 October 1860; Daily Baltimore 
Republican, 3 October 1860; Baltimore American, 1 October 1860.
4Baltimore Clipper, 20 August, 3, 13, 20 September, 10 October 
1860; Cecil Whig, 20 October 1860; HWD to Nicholls, c. 1860, in 
Steiner, Davis, 191; HWD to SFDP, 12 October 1860, WMss 9-17138.
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to keep the Union vote together and minimize Republican defections.
"The Republicans are all now crazy with the hope of a very large vote 
in Md.," Davis noted, "and they are fools enough to think a good vote 
here is worth what it costs— a Senator next year who would actually 
hold the balance of power in the Senate." Davis' speeches began to 
have an effect. Many voters who were planning to defect to the 
Republicans after the bitter mayoralty contest were returned to Bell. 
Old Frank Blair complained that the stampede to Lincoln was intense in 
Maryland "but Winter Davis told them that this was not the way to win 
favor from Lincoln .... This suggestion has influenced multitudes all 
over Maryland and will make our vote meagre, where a week ago promised 
to be very considerable."1*1*
The night before the election Davis predicted victory for Bell in 
Maryland "by a plurality, not a majority." He continued, "in the City 
reigns confusion worse confounded. The fool drygoods men who elected 
Brown are now heartily sick of their folly." Davis thought that Bell 
would get all of the Hindes vote, "and if half of the shopkeepers and 
jobbers vote for him who voted for Brown we shall have a plurality."1*5 
Election day was peaceful and orderly in Baltimore. One of the 
last acts of the American-dominated city council was to divide the 
wards into precincts and thus reduce the large crowds at the polls who 
precipitated violence. All day long Davis surveyed the polls and was 
disappointed at the large number of Whigs who were voting for Brecken-
^J. P. Kennedy Journal, 11 October 1860, Kennedy Mss, Peabody;
HWD to SFDP, 18 October 1860, WMss 9-17140.
45HWD to SFDP, 5 November 1860, WMss 9-17141.
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ridge and was amazed at the small turnout for Douglas. That the night 
the results of what Davis termed "the insane canvass" were known. While 
Lincoln swept the North and captured the Presidency as Davis expected, 
Breckenridge carried Baltimore and Maryland.46
"We have lost Maryland by a hundred or two votes owing to the 
Republican diversion," Winter complained to his cousin David. The one 
thousand Lincoln votes in Baltimore which "proved fatal" were "chiefly 
instigated by an insane desire to be first at the distribution of 
offices," Davis charged. His disgust at losing the State was "balanced 
in great measure by my profound satisfaction at this demonstration that 
my policy is the only one which can rescue Md." The loss of the state 
seemed to be too great a price to pay for a few votes for Lincoln. He 
was disgusted with the Maryland Republican leadership who ran a ticket 
only to advance themselves in the national party. "Whether Mr. Lincoln 
will appreciate the service of jeopardizing a Senator who will hold the 
casting vote of the Senate during half his term remains to be seen."47
46HWD to SFDP, 6 November 1860, WMss 9-17143.
47HWD to David Davis, 8 November 1860, Davis Mss, CHS; HWD to
SFDP, 7 November 1860, WMss 9-17144.
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"The Govt. Is in the hands of its enemies," Winter Davis lamented 
as the second session of the Thirty-Sixth Congress assembled in Washing­
ton. By early December, the legislatures of South Carolina, Georgia, 
Mississippi, Florida, and Alabama had ordered the election of consti­
tutional conventions to prepare for secession. "I confess," he wrote 
Captain Du Pont, "I see no escape from revolutionary conflicts or 
disgraceful dissolution."
President Buchanan's annual message, Davis thought, was "the final 
blow to the Government he is sworn to support." The message displayed 
the President's inability to come to grips with the crisis; instead of 
providing solutions, it dispensed blame. It laid emphasis on the wrongs 
committed on the South by the North. Although he noted that the states 
had no right to withdraw from the Union, Buchanan ended his address with 
a long argument to prove that he, as President, had no constitutional 
authority to coerce a state. Davis considered the message "a party 
diatribe against the republicans to inflame and justify the revolu­
tionists." Buchanan's denial of the legality of secession and his
^WD to SFDP, 10 December 1860, WMss 9-17147. This chapter 
originally appeared as "Pre-Civil War Compromise Efforts: A Re- 
Evaluation," in Louisiana Studies, XII (Spring, 1973), 376-382.
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disavowal of authority to prevent secession "in the same breath,"
Davis thought, was "wholly without precedent and could proceed from 
none but so treacherous, selfish, and timid as the President." With 
frail and pliant Buchanan in office, Davis predicted that "from now 
till the 4th March is haymaking time for those who wish to make a safe 
revolution!"2
On the second day of the session, Davis' close friend, Congressman
Alexander R. Boteler of Virginia, proposed to send the part of the
President's message which related to the "present perilous condition
of the country" to a special committee of one member from each state.
By an overwhelming majority, indicating the conviction of the country
that something needed to be done, the Committee of Thirty-Three was
established. "I voted for it," Davis explained, "but why I don't know
except that everybody seemed to be for it."3
Davis' devotion to the Union was strong. The first article of his
political faith— as a Whig, then an American, and now a Constitutional
Unionist— was that the Union was paramount and indivisible. As there
was no legal way to dissolve the Union, initially he saw no need to
compromise with the South.
The Constitution provided adequate authority to deal with
secession. Revising the preamble, he wrote:
We, the people, to establish justice (which S. C. has destroyed) 
assure domestic tranquility (which S. C. troubles) &c &c 
to ourselves and our posterity (when does that end?) do 
ordain (any high churchman will admit orders to be indelible)
2HWD to SFDP, 10 December 1860, WMss 9-17147.
3Ibid.; CG 36th-2nd-6.
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this Constitution for the U. S. of America.1*
Article I, Section VIII provided for calling the militia to execute the 
laws of the Union and to suppress insurrection, but apparently, Davis 
noted, Buchanan never read that section. Davis found further support 
in Section X of Article I which prohibited a state from making treaties 
with other states or from maintaining an army or navy without the 
consent of Congress. Buchanan obviously ignored this, Davis wrote, when 
he allowed Georgia's legislature to appropriate one million dollars for 
defense.5
Davis found Article VI of the Constitution to be the strongest 
legal obstacle to "peaceful secession." That article declared the 
Constitution and all federal laws to be "the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
Thus, any act a state passed contradictory to the laws of the United 
States was unconstitutional. Davis contended that if South Carolina 
declared herself out of the Union, that is, not subject to the Consti­
tution, her judges were bound to disregard that declaration. The same 
provision and oath bound state executives and legislators. "It is 
rather difficult to see how there is any loop-hole to creep out at," 
he argued, "for every officer of the State must be sworn to take the 
Constitution as the supreme law over that of his own State; and if he 
refuse to take it, he cannot be an officer of the State."6




Peaceful secession he summarily dismissed. "A State can therefore 
get out only by breaking out." General Jackson, whom he abhored as an 
authority on every other topic, was his source for dealing with 
forceable secession. "Jackson did not mince words. He calls Secession 
'insurrection and treason'." As Buchanan would not resist secession 
forcefully, Davis did not see how any good could come out of the 
congressional compromise committee. "The Committee of 33 is a humbug," 
he decided, "but as it will amuse mens minds it may do no harm."7
Two days after its creation, the Speaker announced the membership 
of the Committee of Thirty-Three. Pennington appointed sixteen 
Republicans, fifteen Democrats, a pro-secession American, and Winter 
Davis. Ohio’s Thomas Corwin, Davis’ candidate for Secretary of State, 
was named chairman. Several members who were offered appointments 
refused to serve. Representative William Boyce of South Carolina 
naturally declined as did secession-minded George Hawkins of Florida, 
who complained that he would not participate because he felt the 
committee would accomplish little and because he objected to the make 
up of the body. He claimed Dhvis was not a fair exponent of the 
opinions of the people of Maryland. "Mr. Speaker," Hawkins addressed 
the House, "there was a Stewart, a Hughes, a Kunkel, a Harris, and a 
Webster, from whom a selection could have been made, neither of whom 
comes here with a marked and emphatic disapprobation of the State of 
Maryland." The Baltimore Clipper echoed Hawkins' discontent with 
Davis' appointment. "Mr. Davis does not, and cannot reflect the 
sentiments of the majority of the people in this State," it argued in
7Ibid.
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an editorial. "His appointment upon this important Committee of 
Adjustment, by whatever hocus pocus it was compassed, is nothing more 
nor less than an outrage upon the people of Maryland."8
Davis reasoned that the attack by Representative Hawkins was
I
inspired by his Maryland colleagues, J. Morrison Harris, Edwin Hanson 
Webster, and James Stewart. "I wish either of them were in my place," 
Davis grumbled. Pennington told Davis that he had hesitated to name 
him on the committee because the Republicans hoped to see him in the 
Cabinet. "I found there was an effort making to keep me off for home 
influence and I resolved that I would go on it." He easily persuaded 
Pennington to appoint him. But when he contemplated the difficulty in 
arriving at a comprehensive plan of adjustment, he began to have 
reservations. "I wish heartily I could have been spared from this 
thankless service— like Anderson at Fort Moultrie."9
The Committee of Thirty-Three held its first session on Tuesday, 
December 11, and thereafter meetings were scheduled daily. Initially, 
Davis felt the possibility for a compromise solution was good for 
secession-fever seemed to be abating. Boyce of South Carolina, who 
swore he would not serve on the committee, attended the second session. 
Crawford of Georgia told Davis he doubted that his state would follow 
South Carolina’s lead. Davis was encouraged by a conversation with his 
old friend Representative Andrew Jackson Hamilton of Texas who reported
that four out of five men in Texas were for the Union and opposed to
8CG 36th-2nd-22, 37; Baltimore Clipper, 7 December 1860;
A. C. Robinson to A. Boteler, 7 December 1860, Boteler Mss, Duke;
W. G. Snethen to Lincoln, 8 December 1860, RTL, LC.
9HWD to SFDP, c. 12 December 1860, WMss 9-17149.
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breaking it up. Most encouraging of all to Davis was the fact that 
Representative John D. Ashmore of South Carolina arrived in Washington 
without his family but sent for them within a week "and expects to stay 
till March 4th."10
From the outset of the committee’s deliberations, Davis was sure 
that everything which "any man of honesty can ask will be granted— the 
fullest assurances against any desire to trouble slavery in the States, 
D. C., Dock Yarks &c, Slave trade between states, repeal of Liberty 
bills, enforcement of the fugitive slave law," would be conceded to the 
South. Despite these concessions, he felt the "mischief makers" would 
push for more. "Now in my judgment nothing can be done to restrain 
S. C. (and possible Ga. and Miss.) but such declaration and enactments 
must deprive the Secessionists of the countenance of men of position 
and honesty." He felt sure that "the plague can't spread beyond S. C. 
and the Gulf."11
On December 13 Davis presented a series of resolutions designed 
to begin the committee toward the process of eventual compromise. The 
first called for the states to review their statutes and repeal any 
which hindered the execution of the laws of the United States— a 
diplomatic appeal to the northern states to annul their personal 
liberty laws. He coupled that with a bill to mitigate the most
1(1 Ibid.; Charles Francis Adams, Diary, 11 December 1860, Adams 
Mss, Massachusetts Historical Society microfilm; Journal of the 
Committee of Thirty-Three in Report of the Select Comm-tttee of 
Thirty-Three on the Disturbed Condition of the Country, in Reports
of Committees of the House of Representatives, 36th Congress, 2nd 
Session, Vol. 1, No. 31, p. 2, hereinafter cited as Journal of the 
Committee of Thirty-Three.
n HWD to SFDP, c. 12 December 1860, WMss 9-17149.
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bothersome aspects of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. His bill 
provided for trial by jury, and exempted citizens of the North from 
being compelled by law to aid in the return of a fugitive. A more just 
and effective fugitive slave law, Davis thought, would go far to 
soothing sectional controversy. With snow beginning to fall, Congress 
hastily adjourned for the weekend when private conferences and dinner 
parties focused on compromise. On Monday morning, the committee 
decided to begin consideration of compromise by taking up Davis' 
proposal, and the following day the committee agreed to his resolution 
on Personal Liberty Laws and sent his bill amending the Fugitive Slave 
Act to a special sub-committee headed by Davis. "We begin to obtain 
results," Davis reported.12
Throughout December Davis contemplated a comprehensive three 
point settlement: first, the repeal of the Personal Liberty Laws;
second, a new and less obnoxious Fugitive Slave Act; and third, Charles 
Francis Adams' proposal to prohibit interference with slavery in the 
states by an irrevocable Constitutional Amendment. "These matters 
really cover all the bad ground and if treated fairly ought to soothe 
the existing irritation," Davis predicted.13
Two opposite influences began to shatter all hope of compromise. 
President-elect Abraham Lincoln wrote Representative William Kellogg, 
the Illinois member of the committee, to "entertain no proposition for
12Journal of the Committee of Thirty-Three, 5-8; HWD to SFDP,
29 December 1860 (misdated 18 December), WMss 9-17148. Also see 
Patrick Michael Sowle, "The Conciliatory Republicans," (Duke 
University: Ph.D. dissertation, 1963), 86.
13HWD to SFDP, 29 December 1860, WMss 9-17148; Journal of the 
Committee of Thirty-Three, 11-12.
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a compromise in regard to the extension of slavery." Lincoln further 
outlined his policy to Senator Lyman Trumbull, a member of the Senate 
compromise committee. He wanted no compromise on the territorial 
question, although as a sop he stated that he was for "an honest 
enforcement of the constitution— fugitive slave clause included." At 
the same time that the Republican party’s chief was declining substan­
tive compromise, the Democracy revealed what seemed to be its true 
objective— the restoration of the Missouri Compromise line. "Be not 
deceived by those venerable words," Davis warned, "they mean something 
quite new." The Missouri Compromise line adopted in 1820 referred only 
to the territory acquired by the Louisiana purchase. The Democrats now 
proposed to extend the 36° 30' line to the Pacific and demand recog­
nition and protection for slavery in the territories south of that 
line "hereafter acquired"— an open invitation to Southern expansionists 
to agitate for the acquisition of Cuba, Lower California, Sonora, and 
Central America. At a minimum this was a demand to make slave states 
out of the Mexican Cession territory, Davis explained, and more probably 
"to carry slavery to the South pole."14
On December 20, the day South Carolina seceded, Davis broke up 
an unproductive session with a proposition that stunned both Republicans 
and Democrats. The session was dull, Charles Francis Adams recorded in 
his diary, "until Mr. Winter Davis first broke in with a cannon shot 
clear through the line." Davis called for the immediate admission to
14Lincoln to Kellogg, 11 December 1860, in Roy P. Basler, ed., 
Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, 1953), IV, 150, 
hereinafter cited as CWAL; Lincoln to Trumbull, 17 December 1860, 
CWAL, IV, 153; HWD to SFDP, 18 December 1860, WMss 9-17148.
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statehood of New Mexico including the Arizona Territory. His proposal 
was as adroit as it was bold, for it slipped through the horns of the 
slavery extension dilemma. As the Democrats demanded that slavery be 
protected in the territory of New Mexico, the only area south of the 
proposed 36° 30' line, and as Lincoln and the Republicans adamantly 
opposed the extension of slavery into any territory, the admission of 
that territory as a state, letting its people decide for or against 
slavery, solved the problem. The chances were that New Mexico would 
enter as a slave state— its territorial legislature in 1859 established 
slavery. But not even Lincoln proposed to intervene with slavery in 
the states.15
The Republicans supported Davis' proposal but the Democrats 
repudiated it. "It is now apparent," Davis concluded after the 
meeting, "that the Southern Locofocos do not care for the present 
territory— but are struggling for leave to conquer Mexico with a 
pledge that it shall be slave." Annexing territory seemed to be their 
goal. "I for one will never yield that bribe to land piracy and
15Charles Francis Adams, Diary, 20 December 1860, Adams Mss;
HWD to SFDP, 1 January 1861, WMss 9-17150. Some historians— notably 
Allan Nevins— have claimed that Davis' resolution to admit New Mexico 
was more advantageous to the North than to the South. Nevins claimed 
that although New Mexico might enter as a slave state, she would soon 
become free because of her "terrain, climate, products and traditions 
were hostile to slavery." Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln; Prologue 
to Civil War, 1858-1861 (New York, 1950), II, 408. This arguiwant, 
however, is simply a refinement of Charles W. Ramsdell's article,
"The Natural Limits of Slavery Expansion." Only if one equates slavery 
with the cotton economy can New Mexico be written off to the South.
But in fact, informed Southerners who demanded the New Mexico territory 
most often spoke of minerals, not cotton. For an excellent critique 
of the Ramsdell thesis see Eugene D. Genovese, The Political Economy 
of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South
(New York, 1967), 251-264.
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perpetual war, let who else will," Davis vowed.16
The day after Davis shocked the committee with his proposal, he 
offered three resolutions to solidify his plan. His first resolution 
proposed immediate statehood for New Mexico, including Arizona, with 
any constitution it may adopt. The second balanced the first by 
admitting Kansas as a free state. The third eliminated the final 
Republican objection by prohibiting the acquisition of future territory 
by the United States, "by conquest, discovery, treaty, or otherwise, 
nor shall any State not formed of territory of the United States be 
admitted into the Union" except by a two-thirds vote of the Congress 
and with the approval of the President. Davis explained his proposals 
to Charles Francis Adams as an attempt to break the combinations the 
Southerners were trying to form. "His amendment was intended to force 
a refusal on their part as evidence of the hollowness of their claim 
of the Missouri Compromise," Adams wrote. "I am not sure that it would 
be wise to adopt it in that sense ourselves." Indeed, the Republicans 
in caucus decided to support Davis' proposals.17
The question of compromise in the House committee revolved around 
the status of the territories and future lands acquired by the United 
States. In the meetings after Christmas the Republicans, as a party 
maneuver, supported Davis' plan for the admission of New Mexico with a
16HWD to SFDP, 1 January 1861, WMss 9-17150. Republicans may 
have been converted to Davis’ scheme by testimony of the New Mexico 
delegate that it would soon be another free state, but Southerners 
would have disputed this contention.
17Journal of the Committee of Thirty-Three, 14; Charles Francis 
Adams, Diary, 21 December 1860, Adams Mss.
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provision to prohibit the future acquisition of territory. The 
Democrats, unwilling to rule out future expansion, consistently opposed 
a plan they had previously espoused. Davis' earlier efforts to secure 
the repeal of Personal Liberty laws now seemed worthless. "Personal 
Liberty Bills are of no importance at all," wrote Justin Morrill. 
"Privately here they admit all this." Adams agreed that repeal of the 
laws would not count "a feather's weight" in preserving the Union.18
The proposal that appealed to Southerners was the work of Senator 
John J. Crittenden. The Kentucky Senator's resolutions extended the 
Missouri Compromise line to California with protection for slavery in 
territories south of that line and territories "hereafter acquired."
This would be included in an unalterable constitutional amendment. The 
second and third parts of the Crittenden Compromise deprived Congress 
of the power to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia as long as 
Maryland or Virginia held slaves and prohibited Congress from inter­
fering with the interstate slave trade. A fourth part fortified the 
Fugitive Slave Act.19
As popular as the Crittenden Compromise was with Democrats, North 
and South, Whigs, and moderate Republicans, it was unacceptable to 
Lincoln and the bulk of the Republican party. Davis opposed Crittenden's 
plan from a practical as well as a philosophical ground. "It is 
impossible to get 2/3 in the H. R. and S. and 3/4 of the States
18Journal of the Committee of Thirty-Three, 15-19, 20-21; Morrill 
to wife, 29 December 1860, Morrill Mss, LC; C. F. Adams to Dwight 
Foster, 31 December 1860, Adams Mss.
19J. J. Crittenden to Orlando Brown, 6 December 1860, Orlando 
Brown Mss, Filson Club; CG 36th-2nd-114, for text of the Crittenden 
Resolutions.
214
afterwards" to support such a plan, he argued. Besides, "it yields 
to revolutionists in one end of the country but it arouses the intensest 
agitation in the majority of States." The plan was "mischievous in 
itself" and was proposed by "a man who wants to see mischief" to 
Crittenden "who innocently accepted them.1,20
Throughout the early days of January 1861, Winter Davis chaired 
a subcommittee which arbitrated the numerous compromise provisions that 
had been submitted. What had begun as a sincere effort to find a 
solution to the secession crisis degenerated into an atrocious patchwork 
compromise. After deliberating over the Crittenden Compromise at the 
expense of Davis’ proposal for several days, the Committee finally acted 
on the report of Davis’ subcommittee. Davis' proposal to admit New 
Mexico as a state passed by a close vote. A constitutional amendment 
providing that the Constitution should never be altered in such a way 
as to abolish or interfere with the domestic institutions of any state, 
including slavery, was passed by a four to one margin. Then, Davis 
presented five resolutions— to enforce federal laws, to uphold the 
Constitution, to urge the states to repeal personal liberty laws and 
enforce the Fugitive Slave Act, to protect travelers, and to punish 
invasions such as John Brown’s. These five were all passed. The 
committee then adjourned for the weekend.21
On Monday, January 14, the Committee of Thirty-Three met in final 
session to adopt its report to the House of Representatives. Absent 
were the members of the seceded states of the South— South Carolina,
20HWD to SFDP, c. 1 February 1861, WMss 9-17153.
2Journal of the Committee of Thirty-Three, 33-37.
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Florida, Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama. Chairman Thomas Corwin 
read his report of the committee’s accomplishments and asked that it 
be read to Congress. But on the vote, only five members supported in 
total what the committee had passed in segments: Corwin, Davis, Dunn 
of Indiana, Stout of Oregon, and Stratton of New Jersey. Twenty-three 
members were in opposition. Albert Rust of Arkansas, who had been 
critical of the committee from its inception, moved that the entire 
proceedings be dismissed and no report adopted. There was still enough 
desire for compromise to allow reference of the issue to the House 
itself. Hence, the chairman was authorized to report to the House the 
accomplishments of the committee with his own views as to its merits. 
But in addition to Corwin's report, six others were submitted as 
minority reports— thereby eliminating whatever impact Corwin's report 
might otherwise have had oh the confused situation.22
"My disgust equals yours," Davis wrote Du Pont, "but I have been 
gritting my teeth and have sworn to be patient till the 4th of March." 
Again he was impatient with the extremes. "For me I wish the question 
whether this is a Government or a Society of Friends to be settled: If
the latter we can save some money and be as respectable." His willing­
ness to compromise with Democrats he had long opposed was becoming 
exhausted. Each time he proposed a solution they pressed for more. 
There was "no assignable cause for the excitement" in the South, he 
complained. First it was personal liberty laws, then New Mexico, and 
now future territories. "It flits like the neuralgia from point to 




Corwin's report of the Committee's actions and the six minority 
reports touched off a month of heated debate. Many members made 
lengthy speeches discussing the propositions in minute detail. While 
the opposing sides were willing to reach agreement on personal liberty 
laws (Rhode Island repealed its law at the end of January) and on a 
fugitive slave law, they could not agree on the status of slavery in 
New Mexico and the conditions under which new territory could be 
acquired. Pennsylvanian Thaddeus Stevens reflected many Republicans' 
disgust at admitting New Mexico. He called it an attempt "to seduce 
back rebellious States" by making a state out of "two hundred and fifty 
thousand square miles of volcanic desert, with less than a thousand 
white Anglo-Saxon inhabitants, and some forty to fifty thousand 
Indians, Mustees, and Mexicans, who do not ask for admission. "2t*
On February 7 Charles Francis Adams reported that "the galleries 
showed decided indications that something was expected. ... The speech 
of the day was Winter Davis's." Taking the floor, Davis retraced recent 
events, blasting Buchanan as "the chief destroyer of his country's 
greatness." Peaceful secession was an unacceptable alternative, Davis 
argued. To allow the South to depart was to yield free commerce 
forever, to create a thousand miles of interior border to be protected 
with a vast standing army, to invite the aggression of Europe, to open 
the door to the conquest of Mexico, and to "abandon the high perogative
23HWD to SFDP, 15 January 1861, WMss 9-17151; HWD to SFDP, c.
12 December 1860, WMss 9-17149.
24New York Herald, 23, 26, 28 January 1861; CG 36th-2nd-622, 623.
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of leading the inarch of freedom, the hope of struggling nationalities, 
the terror of frowning tyrants, the boast of the world, the light of 
liberty."25
Davis then discussed the alternative to peaceful secession, 
coercion, possibly followed by armed conflict. He declared that the 
laws must be enforced "and they who stand across the path of that 
enforcement must either destroy the power of the United States, or it 
will destroy them." He trusted that conflict was centuries off. 
Peaceful methods of enforcing the laws of the United States would allow 
time for reflection and cooling off. The Constitution provided 
adequate power to meet every emergency and it required Congress to 
guarantee a republican form of government to every state. He urged 
citizens in the seceded states to form their own governments which the 
President could support. That would not mean war, he said; "it is no 
more war than arresting a criminal is war."26
He attributed the cause of the excitement to the Democrats. They 
"exaggerated and blackened the purposes" of the Republicans in the 
House and Senate and purposely incited the South. No amendments to the 
Constitution were necessary if the Southern politicians would only go 
to the people with the views of such moderate Republicans as Corwin 
and Adams. Having little hope of that, he urged passage of his 
resolutions on the Personal Liberty laws and the Fugitive Slave Act.
He warned that Southern demands for the reinstatement of the Missouri
25Charles Francis Adams, Diary, 7 February 1861, Adams Mss;
Davis, Speeches and Addresses, 203-205.
26Davis, Speeches and Addresses, 206.
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Compromise line so as to enable the South to extend slavery "over the 
whole of Mexico— over all the regions of Central America" were 
"absolutely impossible." Neither the House nor the Senate nor three- 
fourths of the states would agree to the extension of slavery "one 
inch." "Scale the heavens, if you please, without wings; pass the 
abyss which divides heaven from hell, but do not talk about a thing 
like this." Instead he urged the admission of New Mexico as a state.
That simple act, he said, would eliminate the controversy, not by 
compromise, but by an act of justice. Statehood for New Mexico could 
be accomplished by a simple majority in the House and Senate and the 
signature of the President. Statehood for New Mexico would remove the 
last source of controversy. It was either the creation of New Mexico 
as a state or the destruction of the nation.27
Davis pleaded for the preservation of the Union and pledged that 
Maryland would not join the conflict. He appealed to the rest of the 
South for moderation. "In Maryland we are dull," he said, "and cannot 
comprehend the right of secession. We do not recognize the right to 
make a revolution by a vote." He closed with an appeal for reconcil­
iation under the guarantees of the Constitution.28
Charles Francis Adams felt that the speech was impressive, but 
noted that Davis "is too much in antagonisms to rise above the partisan." 
Still he thought Davis "fastened the House completely." Reaction in 
Maryland was sharp. His strong appeal for the enforcement of the laws 




Even in Baltimore, Davis’ views were considered too extreme. Coercion 
of the South was more opposed than secession.29
In the House, Davis' speech, despite its immediate impact, had 
little effect. At the close of the session, Davis' amended amendment 
to the Fugitive Slave Act was passed by a vote of 92 to 83. But his 
motion to admit New Mexico was lost, the Crittenden Compromise was 
defeated, and the report of the Washington Peace Conference was ignored. 
Only Corwin's revised constitutional amendment, which simply declared 
that slavery could not be interferred with by the federal government, 
was passed With the necessary two-thirds vote. When the Senate passed 
the Corwin amendment on March 2 by a vote of 24 to 12, the proposed 
thirteenth amendment was sent to the Senate where it died. Three 
months of committee meetings, conferences, and debates had produced no 
comprehensive measure to ease the crisis. Whether the crisis would 
worsen depended on the actions of the new administration.30
29Charles Francis Adams, Diary, 7 February 1861, Adams Mss; 
Baltimore American, 8, 12 February 1861; "The Vice-Presidency," (n.p., 
1868), in Bradford Mss, Maryland Hall of Records; W. P. Fessenden to
family, 10 February 1861, in Francis Fessenden, Life and Public Services 




Washington City on March 1, 1861, was noisy and nervous. The 
inauguration of President-elect Abraham Lincoln was to take place three 
days hence. Throughout Willard's Hotel, where Lincoln's party was 
staying, rumors spread of definite Cabinet appointments and other rumors 
of changes in those appointments. One story was that Lincoln had 
decided to exclude Montgomery Blair from his council and instead 
appoint Winter Davis. Late that Friday evening, Norman B. Judd, the 
Illinois Republican who had nominated Lincoln for the presidency, came 
to speak with the President-elect. In great agitation Judd inquired,
"Is it true, Mr. Lincoln, as I have just heard, that we are to have a 
new deal after all, and that you intend to nominate Winter Davis instead 
of Blair?" Lincoln answered this question as he did all others; first 
pausing, smiling, and then quietly replying, "Judd, when that slate 
breaks again, it will break at the top."1
True to his word, Lincoln gave a place to Montgomery Blair, making 
him Postmaster General. In deciding on Blair instead of Davis, Lincoln 
made a choice of great significance. Although Blair was from a powerful 
political family, he had no standing in the South and his appointment
1John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History (New
York, 1890), III, 270.
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would not propitiate the Southern oppositionists. Lincoln's decision 
to recognize Blair and his Maryland Republicans over Davis and his 
Unionists indicated to many that Lincoln would make no concessions 
to the South. Secondly, Lincoln's choice set Davis and Blair at odds 
with each other and created a feud which had lasting import for Maryland 
politics. And finally, Lincoln's decision to pass over Davis for the 
Cabinet and later for the diplomatic corps wounded Davis' pride and 
helped turn him into a critic of the administration, a position he would 
sustain throughout the war.
From the day of Lincoln's election, newspapers throughout the 
country had speculated that Davis might go into the Cabinet. His vote 
in the important speakership contest of 1860, his campaign support of 
Lincoln, his leadership of the Southern opposition, and his national 
reputation made him a logical candidate. The New York Times reported 
that "prominent politicians most intimate with the President-elect" 
considered Davis to be Lincoln's choice for Attorney-General. The New 
York Herald concurred regarding Davis' probable selection, while 
disagreeing with the Times over the rest of the Cabinet positions. 
Throughout the months of November and December Davis was constantly 
mentioned as a Cabinet possibility.2
The rumors were not surprising to Davis. In the heat of the 
presidential campaign Captain Du Pont advised him that certain unnamed 
Republican leaders had spoken with confidence regarding Davis' appoint­
ment as Attorney General. While disclaiming any desire for a Cabinet
2New York Times, 8 November 1860; New York Herald, 20, 29 
November 1860; New York World, 9 January 1861.
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seat, Davis nevertheless took an active interest in the rumors and 
speculation, particularly those which concerned himself. Davis was 
irritated by a letter from a local New York politician describing a 
plan to keep Davis out of the Cabinet in order to elect him Speaker 
of the House.3
Despite his seeming interest in a Cabinet post, Davis refused 
to be an active candidate or to allow others to campaign for him. In 
November, while visiting Baltimore, Captain Du Pont spoke to him about 
efforts being made to secure him a portfolio. Davis insisted that 
Lincoln must not be pressured into appointing his advisors. "Hr.
Lincoln must be free and keep himself free," Davis insisted, "or he 
will make shipwreck of himself and the Govt." If there was to be a 
struggle by states and individuals for patronage, Davis wanted no part 
of it. "I never canvassed for a nomination or election in my district," 
he swore, "never asked a man in any conviction of society for his vote, 
never crossed the threshold of a Mechanics house." When laughed at 
for not seeking votes and for wearing gentleman's yellow gloves, Davis 
replied that he was always willing to go into public life, but it had 
to be on "his own terms."4
Davis had powerful backing for a Cabinet post. James R.
Partridge, Secretary of State for Maryland, wrote Davis' cousin and 
Lincoln's campaign manager, David Davis, regarding Henry Winter's 
future. Partridge protested the scheme to withhold Davis from the
3SFDP to HWD, 10 October 1860, WMss 9-2205; HWD to STOP, 17 
November 1860, WMss 9-17145; HWD to SFDP, c. 12 December 1860, WMss
9-17149.
4SFDP to SMDP, 25 November 1860, WMss 9-2216.
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Cabinet in order to elect him Speaker. Partridge declared that 
because of Davis' pro-Union, anti-secession stand "he could not be 
returned from this District." Davis passed Partridge's letter on to 
Lincoln.5
Winter Davis also had powerful backing from his cousin, David, 
for the Illinois Davis was the closest friend Abraham Lincoln had.
They had ridden the circuit together for years before Lincoln became 
involved in Republican politics and Davis moved to the bench. Judge 
Davis served as floor manager for Lincoln in the Chicago convention and 
had engineered Lincoln's successful campaign. The Judge's opinions 
thus carried great weight with Lincoln, and although the cousins had 
political differences, the Judge supported his younger relative for 
the Southern position in the Cabinet.6
The most vocal of Davis' supporters was the political wizard of 
New York, Thurlow Weed. On December 20, Weed met with Lincoln in 
Springfield to discuss the composition of the Cabinet. As Seward's 
political manager, Weed was determined to secure a Cabinet that Seward 
would approve. After Lincoln disclosed his preferences for the top 
positions, naming Seward, Bates, and Chase, considering Cameron, Welles, 
and Smith, and mentioning others, Weed asked Lincoln to give one or two 
posts to border state Unionists. Lincoln balked, demanding to know 
whether such men would be forced to surrender their political views to 
hime or he to them. Weed replied that loyal men could be found in
5J. R. Partridge to David Davis, 21 November 1860, RTL, LC.
6King, David Davis, 168-170.
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Maryland, Virginia, Tennessee, and North Carolina. "Well, let us have 
the names of your white crows," Lincoln retorted.
"Henry Winter Davis of Maryland," Weed replied.
"David Davis has been posting you up on this question," Lincoln 
said. "He came from Maryland and has got Davis on the brain." Lincoln 
then changed the subject by telling a story about an old farmer in court 
who replied on being asked his age, "Sixty." The judge told the old 
man that he knew him to be much older than that. "Oh," said the farmer, 
"you're thinking about that fifteen years that I lived down on the 
Eastern Shore of Maryland; that was so much lost time and don't count."
Undaunted by Lincoln's dismissal of Davis, Weed suggested instead 
John A. Gilmer of North Carolina. Lincoln said that Gilmer was 
acceptable, but so was Montgomery Blair. When Lincoln mentioned Blair, 
Weed caustically asked, "Has he been suggested by anyone except his 
father, Francis P. Blair, Sr.?"7
Weed's interview with Lincoln indicates that while Davis was not 
objectionable to Lincoln, he was more inclined to Gilmer or Blair.
Davis had made many enemies in Maryland who vented their disapproval 
of Davis to the President-elect. The most vitriolic of all was Worthing­
ton G. Snethen, a former editor of the Baltimore Patriot. Snethen 
represented the "pure" Republicans in Maryland who eschewed any 
connection with the American party in the election of 1860. "Mr. Davis 
was not then a Republican in principle, and is not now," Snethen wrote 
Lincoln's friend, Senator Lyman Trumbull. "The Republicans of Md. would
7Harriet H. Weed (ed.), Autobiography of Thurlow Weed (Boston, 
1883), I, 603-614.
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never permit themselves to be smothered to death under his incubation 
and that of his Plug-Ugly party," Snethen warned. Snethen wrote 
Senator Chase that Davis was leading a conspiracy to deny a "Republican 
administration in personnel as well as policy," and described to 
Senator John P. Hale Davis' "unfair hostility" to the Republicans of 
Maryland. Finally, Snethen complained directly to Lincoln: "We
Republicans of Maryland know not Mr. Davis. He is not of us."8
Montgomery Blair was a much more "available" candidate than Davis. 
The son of old Frank Blair, an advisor to presidents since Jackson, 
Montgomery Blair represented the fledgling Republican party in Maryland. 
He had the unanimous support of the Republican delegates to the Chicago 
convention as well as the Republican electors in Maryland. In addition, 
the Blairs had gone to great troubles to obtain Montgomery a position. 
The President-elect was deluged with letters of recommendation for 
him. Frank Blair, Jr., Montgomery's brother and a prominent Republican 
in Missouri, visited Lincoln in Springfield on December 11, after 
which he wrote his father saying that he had no doubt that Montgomery 
would get the nomination, but urged him to continue to apply pressure.
Blair concluded his letter in a typical Blair manner: "I think that
you ought not to be too delicate or squeamish about this manner."9
8Snethen to Chase, 14 November 1860, Chase Mss, LC; Snethen to 
Trumbull, 21 November 1860, Trumbull Mss, LC; Snethen to Lincoln,
26 November 1860, RTL, LC; Snethen to Hale, 28 November 1860, John 
P. Hale Mss, New Hampshire Historical Society; Snethen to Lincoln,
8, 13, 21 December 1860 RTL, LC.
9Preston King to Lyman Trumbull, 15 November 1860, Trumbull 
Mss, LC; F. S. Corkran to M. Blair, 18 November 1860, Blair-Lee Mss, 
Princeton; B. F. Wade to P. King, 20 November 1860, RTL, LC; Maryland 
Citizens to Lincoln, December 1860, RTL, LC; F. P. Blair, Jr. to
F. P. Blair, Sr., 23 December 1860, Blair Mss, LC.
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The day after Frank Blair's visit, Lincoln wrote Trumbull that 
he expected to be able to offer Blair a cabinet position, but it was 
evident that he was still uncertain about his intentions. Seeking to 
secure more definite information on prospective appointees, Lincoln 
dispatched his trusted friend, Leonard Swett, to consult with various 
leaders in Washington regarding the Cabinet appointments.10
In early January Davis met Swett in Washington. Maintaining his 
pose as a non-candidate, Davis urged the appointment of John A. Gilmer. 
He summarized his feelings in a letter to his cousin David. The 
condition of the country "imperatively requires that one Cabinet office 
be taken from North Carolina," and Gilmer was "the mainstay of the Union 
in N. C." Swett was impressed with Davis. He knew many preferred 
Gilmer to Davis, but Swett had doubts about the North Carolinian. "They 
all say he is a timid man, changeable, no opinion of his own," Swett 
advised Lincoln. Swett then recommended Emerson Etheridge of Tennessee 
and Davis. "Etheridge is a talented but a rattling man," Swett 
concluded; "Henry Winter Davis, it seems to me, has more ability than 
any of them."11
Despite the Blair’s intrigues and Swett*s recommendation of Davis, 
Lincoln decided upon Gilmer. In December the President-elect wrote
10Lincoln to Trumbull, 24 December 1860, CWAL, IV, 162; William
E. Smith, The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics (New York, 
1933), I, 513-515; M. Blair to F. P. Blair, Jr., 27 December 1860, 
Blair Mss, LC; F. S. Corkran to Lincoln, 31 December 1860, RTL, LC; 
M. Blair to Lincoln, 29 January 1861, RTL, LC.
^Seward to Lincoln, 25 December 1860, CWAL, IV, 164; L. Swett 
to David Davis, 1 January 1861, Davis Mss, CHS; L. Swett to Lincoln, 
5 January 1861, RTL, LC; HWD to David Davis, 5 January 1861, Davis 
Mss, CHS.
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Gilmer inviting him to visit him in Springfield, but Gilmer ignored 
Lincoln's letter. By mid-January Gilmer had still not replied, but 
Lincoln had not given up hope that he would. Lincoln confided to 
Seward, his choice for Secretary of State, that he preferred Gilmer 
because he had "a living position position in the South," but that 
Gilmer was "only better than Winter Davis in that he is farther South." 
Lincoln realized that if Gilmer would serve he would have to exclude 
Davis. One man in the Cabinet not a Republican was sufficient; two 
would put him in danger of losing the confidence of his party.12
While the dilemma over the Southern appointment grew, Swett 
counseled Lincoln on January 15 to delay any appointment for Maryland 
until it was certain Maryland would not secede. Needing time to settle 
the pieces into place, and perhaps heeding Swett's warning, Lincoln 
let it be announced that he had selected Bates and Seward for the 
Cabinet and that no further selections would be announced until he 
arrived in Washington. In spite of a second visit by Frank Blair to 
Springfield to press his brother's claim to a Cabinet post, Lincoln 
maintained his silence.13
In February, the President-elect left for Washington, his two 
week trip ending suddenly with an early morning flight through Baltimore 
to foil a rumored assassination plot. With his arrival on February 23, 
the pressure to appoint either Montgomery Blair or Winter Davis reached 
a feverish pitch. Seward and Bates had already been selected; Caleb
12Lincoln to Seward, 29 December 1860, CWAL, IV, 164; Lincoln to 
Seward, 12 January 1861, CWAL, IV, 173.
13L. Swett to Lincoln, 15 January 1861, RTL, LC; Washington Star,
17 January 1861; Cincinatti Daily Gazette, 24 January 1861.
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Smith, Gideon Welles, Salmon P. Chase, and Simon Cameron were assured 
a position. All the positions were therefore awarded except for the 
Postmaster Generalship. As it was conceded on all sides that this last 
post should go to a Southerner, the choice was limited to Davis and 
Blair. "Something of the obstinacy and bitterness of the entire contest 
was infused into this struggle over a really minor place," wrote 
Lincoln’s secretaries, John G. Nicolay and John Hay. "This was partly 
because it was supposed to be the casting vote of the new Cabinet, 
which should decide the dominancy of the Whig Republicans or Democratic 
Republicans in Mr. Lincoln’s administration." The excitement over the 
last position "expanded beyond any original design until Mr. Lincoln 
realized that it was no longer a merely local strife between Blair and 
Davis in Maryland, but the closing trial of strength and supremacy 
between Whigs and Democrats."111
Lincoln's train arrived in Washington City at 6 A.M. By early 
afternoon Old Frank Blair and Montgomery himself called on the 
presidential party at Willard's Hotel to urge the latter's appointment. 
Other Blair supporters greeted the President-elect in the following 
days. Willard's was crowded with people who came to ask Lincoln for 
some favor. One who was unable to see Lincoln, Francis S. Corkran, 
a Baltimore merchant, Quaker, and founder of the Republican party in 
Maryland, left a note. "Let not our labours for years be blasted," 
he pleaded. "Republicanism in Maryland is dead if Winter Davis is
11+Harry J. Carman and Reinhard H. Luthin, Lincoln and the 
Patronage (New York, 1943), 49; Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln,
III, 369.
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allowed to sit at thy Cabinet board."15
Aware of the efforts made in Blair's behalf, Davis' supporters—  
without his encouragement— redoubled their efforts. Governor Henry 
Smith Lane of Indiana, an old Whig turned Republican, was in Washington 
for the inaugural. Having carried Indiana for Lincoln, Lane sought to 
be heard in Republican councils. An advocate of compromise and 
conciliation, he urged Lincoln to name Winter Davis to the Cabinet—  
and assured him that the appointment would be pleasing to Indiana 
Republicans. The same day Lincoln received an even stronger endorse­
ment— that of sixty-nine Representatives in the Thirty-Sixth Congress. 
Signed by the entire delegations from Connecticut, Minnesota, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont, and the Republican delegations from Indiana, 
Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York, it carried 
great weight. But impressive as the list was (it included the names of 
Speaker William Pennington, Henry L. Dawes, William A. Howard, John 
Bingham, Galshua Grow, John Covode, and Justin Morrill), it contained 
not one name from a slave state— not even Maryland!16
The following day, Wednesday, February 26, Lincoln received 
Governor Thomas Holliday Hicks of Maryland. Hicks was called to 
Washington by Lincoln to determine his views on Blair and Davis. No 
record of their conversation has been found, but the substance of what 
Hicks told Lincoln was soon "leaked" to the press. As a long-time
1 Baltimore Sun, 25 February 1861; Allen C. Clark, Abraham Lincoln 
in the National Capital (Washington, D. C., 1925), 9; F. S. Corkran to 
Lincoln, 26 February 1861, RTL, LC.
16H. S. Lane to Lincoln, 25 February 1861, RTL, LC; Petition of 
Representatives of the House to Lincoln, 25 February 1861, RTL, LC.
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member of the American party, Hicks was understandably opposed to Blair, 
whom he considered a non-resident who had only lately moved to his 
father's estate from St. Louis. Surprisingly, Hicks also opposed his 
long-time ally Davis, who he characterized as obnoxious to the people 
of Maryland. Following Hicks, Lincoln received Mayor James G. Berrett 
of Washington who strongly supported Blair over Davis.*7
Secretary of State-designate Seward and Thurlow Weed gathered all 
their strength for one last effort in Davis' behalf. On Febraury 28 
Seward's friend, Elbridge G. Spaulding of Buffalo, gave a dinner at the 
National Hotel for Lincoln. Among the guests were General Winfield 
Scott, Senator Crittenden, Judge Bates, Charles Francis Adams, Simon 
Cameron, Seward, Weed, David Davis, and Henry Winter Davis. "It was 
quite formal and a little dull," Adams complained. "All the candidates 
talked of for the Cabinet seemed to have been gathered together." The 
occasion was more significant than Adams recorded in his arid diary.
For within two days after the dinner— after meeting Winter Davis for 
the first time— Lincoln decided to appoint Montgomery Blair.18
"I am far from being disappointed about a seat in the Cabinet," 
Davis protested to Captain Du Pont, "for I always knew that however 
public opinion and public policy might concur in assigning me a place 
there, yet at the last the pressure of particular interests and 
combinations and the pertinacity of selfish solicitation would carry 
the day." Again and again, like a man haunted by a spector, he
1 Baltimore Sun, 28 February 1861; Baltimore American. 2 March
1861; Cecil Whig, 9 March 1861; Radcliffe, Hicks and the Civil War,
552; Charles Halpine to J. G. Berrett, 16 March 1861, RTL, LC.
18Charles Francis Adams, Diary, 28 February 1861, Adams Mss.
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professed that he did not care. "No one is less discontented with the 
result than I am," he wrote Du Pont. "NoboJy sheds fewer tears or was 
less disappointed than I about the Cabinet," he wrote a week later.
Undoubtedly Davis feigned a lack of concern to hide his wounded 
pride. He thought that his services to the Republican party and his 
support of Lincoln in New Jersey and New York entitled him to a Cabinet 
post. Urged on by the Du Ponts, he followed with increasing interest 
the rumors regarding the Cabinet that flowed from Springfield and 
Washington. In mid-February he asked both Captain and Mrs. Du Pont 
for their opinion as to whether or not he should accept a Cabinet 
position if tendered to him. When both replied "no emphatically,"
Davis was grieved and requested an explanation. "My present resolution 
is to accept if tendered," he wrote on February 20. A week later he 
was still considering his chances. While publically discounting any 
possibility of appointment, privately he told friends that there would 
be three Southern members— Bates, Gilmer, and someone else, probably 
himself. But he still refused any efforts on his behalf; he declined 
to join "the vile scramble for Cabinet appointments." An appointment 
to a Republican administration would end his political career, he wrote, 
"but it is quite as certain that this administration ends the Govern­
ment if it be a failure; and I will not shrink from any responsibility 
cast on me without any solicitation on my part. While not joining 
"the vile scramble" it seems clear that Davis coveted an appointment
19HWD to SFDP, 12 March 1861, WMss 9-17158, 20 March 1861,
WMss 9-17160.
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and was deeply disappointed when it was not forthcoming.20
Openly he complained about the absence of Southern men in 
Lincoln's administration. "The really important thing," he wrote, was 
that there should have been three men from the slave states. Any Union 
men from the South would do, "the individuals were wholly or compara­
tively unimportant." He was disappointed that Gilmer of North Carolina 
had declined Lincoln's invitation, for he felt that allowed Chase, 
Cameron, and Blair to enter. Unrealistically he argued, "Had Gilmer 
entered, I suspect all three would have been excluded."21
Privately he complained about the "pressure of particular 
interests" and "the pertinacity of selfish solicitation." "Blair and 
Chase and Wells (sic) were pushed in," he complained, "not for political 
reasons, but by personal pressure and by combinations of private 
interest and against the almost unanimous wishes of the great mass 
of the Republicans in the H. R." He consoled himself by saying that 
in a fair and open process he would have been selected before Chase, 
Welles, and Blair. He seemed pleased that the majority of his 
supporters had "very properly remained quiet spectators." But he was 
sorely abused by rumors that Governor Hicks had opposed him, that 
Senators Anthony Kennedy and James A. Pearce had denounced him, and 
that Baltimorians who professed themselves to be Constitutional
20HWD to SFDP, 20 February 1861, WMss 9-17155, 28 February 1861, 
WMss 9-17157, c. 1 March 1861, WMss 9-17156; SFDP to HWD, 17 February 
1861, John D. Hayes (ed.), Samuel Francis Du Pont, A Selection from 
His Civil War Letters (Ithaca, N.Y., 1969), I, 31-32, hereinafter
cited as Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters.
21HWD to SFDP, 12 March 1861, WMss 9-17158.
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Unionists had protested against him.22
Davis laid the ultimate blame for overlooking him on President 
Lincoln. For months, through campaign threats and the secession of the 
Gulf South, Davis had yearned for the arrival of the Republican 
administration. "Contain your disgust till the 4th March," he advised. 
Inauguration Day was "as anxiously looked for now as were night or 
Blucher at Waterloo," he wrote. Now the Lincoln administration had 
arrived and he was disappointed. "Lincoln is doing worse than even 
his enemies ventured to impute to him," Davis complained. Opponents had 
charged that Lincoln would be too "soft" on the South— that he would 
appoint a disproportionate number of Southern men to high places; on 
the contrary, Davis thought that Lincoln was "bent on excluding them 
from every post of power and honor."23
As soon as the Cabinet was announced, the rush began for 
diplomatic posts. Having been passed over for the Cabinet, Davis was 
immediately considered in newspapers as a logical candidate for a 
foreign post. Rumors reached Davis in mid-March that Lincoln was about 
to offer him a mission. Which post he was to be offered was not clear; 
whether to accept it troubled him greatly. "How about accepting it—
I mean politically?" he questioned Captain Du Pont. "Some friends 
say take it— others say no— I don't care and don't know what is best.
I feel no disposition to go abroad in the present condition of the 
country, and if I accept the offer it will be said I am willing to
22Ibid.
23HWD to SFDP, 1 January 1861, WMss 9-17150; HWD to SMDP, 2 January
1861, WMss 9-26330; HWD to SFDP, 20 March 1861, WMss 9-17160.
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take anything." The appointment to Italy appealed to him because he 
thought Nancy would like the country. Any other mission seemed less 
appealing. He was sure his political picture had been "promoted by 
exclusion from the Cabinet. I am not sure it will not be so again by 
not taking a foreign appointment."21*
Davis expected that the diplomatic appointments would be 
determined in the same way as the Cabinet posts— by political pressure 
instead of merit, and he once again refused to allow any application 
to be made in his behalf. He assessed his prospects correctly.
Lincoln, after consulting with Secretary of State Seward, passed over 
Davis again. Charles Francis Adams, on Seward's urging, was appointed 
minister to England. Republican Vice Presidential candidate in 1856, 
William L. Dayton of New Jersey, was awarded the mission to France. 
Illinois political ally Norman Judd went to Berlin. Senior Republican 
and Chairman of the Committee of Thirty-Three, Thomas Corwin, secured 
the post in Mexico. That still left eight full missions to be dispersed. 
For these positions— Austria, Sardinia, Russia, China, Spain, Brazil, 
Peru, and Chile— Lincoln bowed to political pressure and nominated men 
of less stature and qualifications than Davis. Anson Burlingame, a 
"lame duck" Congressman from Massachusetts, received the Austrian 
mission, while George Perkins Marsh of Vermont, a financially generous 
Republican supporter, was named for Italy (Sardinia), the post Davis 
wanted. Lincoln acknowledged that he had named Burlingame and March 
"because of the intense pressure of their respective states." Other 
appointments were made in a similar fashion. Carl Schurz went to Spain
24HWD to SFDP, 12 March 1861, WMss 9-17158.
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as a sop to German Republicans. The Russian mission went to Cassius 
Marcellus Clay to satisfy the radical abolitionists. Peru went to 
defeated Republican Congressman Christopher Robinson of Rhode Island. 
Chile was awarded to Thomas H. Nelson, an Indiana lawyer.26
Instead of using the diplomatic appointments to strengthen his 
administration in the unseceded South where it was in serious trouble, 
Lincoln awarded all but one of the missions to the North. And the one 
Southerner, Cassius M. Clay, an abolitionist editor, was a man without 
respect in his own state. As in the Cabinet selection, so in the 
diplomatic nominations, Lincoln allowed himself to be pressured into 
appointing Northerners, "pure" Republicans, with little regard for the 
perilous condition of the South.
The Fourth of March— the date long awaited by Davis— turned out 
to be a disappointment. Davis bitterly complained to his long-time 
friend in the House, Justin Morrill. "Alas! for in this world as in 
the next to those who ask it shall be given and ... to those who do not 
ask nothing will be given. Therefore nothing was tendered to me at 
all." If Lincoln had offered him a Cabinet position, he would have 
accepted it "— not for the honor but for the work and the responsibil­
ity." No diplomatic position interested him except Italy and perhaps 
France. "I should have considered them reluctantly and only because I 
think Mr. Davis would have like the frolick; and I don’t know that I 
could have resisted the lobby on that question."26
25Lincoln to Seward, 11 March 1861 CWAL, IV, 281; Lincoln to 
Seward, 18 March 1861, CWAL, IV, 292; Carman and Luthin, Lincoln and
the Patronage, 79-109.
26HWD to J. S. Morrill, c. March 1861, Morrill Mss, LC.
236
.Davis considered the appointments at both the Cabinet and 
diplomatic level an "irretrievable blunder." While he thought the 
nominees generally able, he despaired at the "senseless greediness" 
which excluded all representatives of the slave states "where alone 
the President needs strength." How long, he wondered, would it be 
before men understood that "it is impossible for one half the Country 
to govern the other half." The Republican party was a strictly 
Northern organization. This was acceptable to Davis prior to Lincoln’s 
inauguration, but now was the time "to consolidate and re-unite the 
solid masses of the two regions who agreed in everything but the negro 
question." He still dreamed of a union of the Northern and Southern 
opposition. The secession of the Gulf South made a policy of reunion 
"unexpectedly easy and more wise," he argued, "for the Administration 
was forced into being the symbol of the national existence; and to it 
everybody was bound however he might think on the negro question." But 
Lincoln, by refusing to acknowledge Southern Unionists, "white crows," 
had undermined their strength in the South.27
In Maryland, the strength of the Unionists was weakening. For 
weeks, secessionists had been pressing Governor Hicks to call a special 
session of the legislature to deal with the crisis of the Union. Hicks, 
backed by Davis and Partridge, had thus far succeeded in containing the 
secessionist spirit. The upcoming fall elections would determine the 
sympathies of the state. Davis was particularly bothered about the 
unstable situation in Maryland, but felt that if Lincoln would only 
follow his counsel in dispensing local patronage, that his supporters
27Ibid.
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could carry the state and sustain the administration. "But this will 
not be done," he lamented. The most he expected was "a division between 
the small squad of men who call themselves republicans and are 
injurious as Garrisonian is in [Vermont] and the Union masses of the 
State."28
After being excluded from an office of his own, Davis appealed to 
Lincoln for justice concerning the appointments in Maryland. He assured 
the President the great majority of Marylanders were "unionist uncondi­
tionally," opposed to the Democratic party, adverse to the "small band 
of men calling themselves Republicans," but "not proslavery." Maryland 
could be won to support the administration if the President would 
broaden his base and show them something besides "a northern anti­
slavery policy."29
Davis suggested removing all federal office holders in Maryland 
saying they were "generally disunionist, either absolute or condition­
ally." He also warned the President of the so-called Reformers, many 
of whom claimed to be Unionists but whom Davis labeled as "supporters 
of the democratic party and the bitterest opponents you can have." 
Instead of appointing Republicans exclusively, he urged Lincoln to award 
the majority of the Maryland patronage to those who opposed the Demo­
cratic party. The Republicans need not be excluded from their "fair 
share" of the patronage, which he estimated to be the Republican vote 
in Maryland versus the Constitutional Union vote in the presidential 
election, or as 2,000 is to 40,000. The appointment of Unionists,
28Ibid.
29HWD to Lincoln, c. March 1861, RTL, LC.
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instead of Republicans or Reformers, he argued, would "stand as symbols 
of your policy to the whole mass of the people." If the administration 
backed the opposition leaders, Davis predicted, "thousands who have no 
hopes or care for office at all will yield your administration a hearty 
support," the Union men would carry the fall elections for Congress, 
for Governor ("so important in these revolutionary times"), and for the 
legislature which would elect a United States Senator. "An opposite 
policy," he warned, "entails absolute defeat."30
There is no evidence that Lincoln ever replied to Davis' appeal 
but Montgomery Blair soon contacted Davis and promised to be fair 
regarding local appointments. "We agreed not to quarrel about the 
Cabinet," Davis reported to Du Pont. Blair pledged to consult Davis 
before the Maryland appointments were made. "I expect him to do so," 
Davis wrote, but having been twice disappointed added, "but I will feel 
more certain when it is done."31
In early April, Davis called a meeting of Unionist leaders from 
across Maryland to confer at his home in Baltimore regarding the federal 
appointments. The day after the Baltimore meeting, William H. Purnell 
went to Washington with Davis' slate and presented it to Blair. A 
compromise was struck between Davis' slate and Blair's Republican 
friends. For the position of Collector of the Port of Baltimore, a job 
which in addition to carrying a generous salary also meant control of 
several hundred lesser offices, Davisite Henry W. Hoffman was agreed 
upon. For Postmaster of Baltimore, the second most lucrative post,
30Ibid.
31HWD to SFDP, 20 March 1861, WMss 9-17160.
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Blairite William H. Purnell, comptroller of the treasury under Hicks, 
was selected. For Appraisers, three Unionists were picked, Frederick 
Schley, Charles P. Montague, and Joseph F. Meredith. Two of Blair's 
associates, Francis S. Corkran and William Pinkney Ewing, both 
Republicans, were chosen Naval Officer and Naval Agent at the Custom 
House. Washington Bonifant and William L. Marshall, both delegates to 
the 1860 Republican Convention, were named United States Marshall for 
Maryland and Customs House Surveyor respectively. The list of top 
appointments included five Unionists and four Republicans.32
On April 11, the day before the firing on Fort Sumter, Governor 
Hicks accepted Lincoln's invitation to come to Washington to discuss 
the perilous state of the nation and the Maryland appointments. Hicks 
urged the President to accept the advice of Davis, Purnell, and Thomas 
Swann in making appointments, but in any event to delay doing anything 
for several days.33
The majority of the local patronage positions were dispensed by 
two departments, Treasury and Post Office. Salmon Portland Chase, 
newly appointed Secretary of the Treasury, was unpopular with Davis 
for his Democratic antecedents and his "radical" anti-slavery views.
Davis felt Chase had been forced into the Cabinet for "personal reasons,"
32"List of Suggested Candidates for Public Office in Maryland 
Submitted by Winter Davis," RTL, LC; HWD to M. Blair, 6 April 1861, 
Blair Mss, LC; HWD to SFDP, 6 April 1861, WMss 9-17162; W. P. Ewing 
to Lincoln, 2 February 1861, RTL, LC; Snethen et al. to Lincoln, 4 
February 1861, RTL, LC; Snethen to Lincoln, 25 March 1861, RTL, LC; 
F. S. Corkran to Chase, 17 December 1860, Chase Mss, LC; F. S. 
Corkran to F. P. Blair, Sr., 7 March 1861, Blair-Lee Mss, Princeton.
33Hicks to Seward, 28 March 1861, RTL, LC; Lincoln Memorandum 
on Maryland Appointments, 11 April 1861, CWAL, IV, 328.
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that is, he had been offered a position out of respect and had clung to 
the offer "with the tenacity of a bull dog." Chase also was not dis­
posed to listen to Davis regarding appointments. On April 13 he 
presented the President with his own list of nominations. Despite a 
letter from Old Frank Blair on the necessity of creating a "Union party" 
in Maryland, Chase recommended an almost straight Republican slate.
For Collector of Customs he suggested Judge Marshall in place of 
Hoffman, and for General Appraiser he suggested John Fulton in place 
of Schley. Lincoln, on Hicks' advice, disallowed Chase's nominations, 
and named the slate recommended by Davis and Blair.31*
At long last Lincoln's policy of "justice to all" had been 
extended to Davis and his Unionists. But by the time the Unionists 
and Republicans were appointed on April 13, the situation in the United 
States and in Maryland had drastically changed. For on that day, the 
garrison at Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina, 
surrendered after forty hours of bombardment and civil war had begun.
31fHWD to SFDP, c. 1 March 1861, WMss 9-17156, 12 March 1861,
WMss 9-17158; F. P. Blair, Sr. to Chase, 26 March 1861, Chase Mss,
HSP; John P. Kennedy Journal, 2 April 1861, Peabody; J. Morrill to 
Seward, 10 April 1861, Seward Mss, Rochester; Chase to Lincoln,
13 April 1861, RTL, LC; Baltimore Clipper, 16 April 1861; also see 
Reinhard H. Luthin, "A Discordant Chapter in Lincoln's Administration: 




On Sunday, April 1A, the first act of the great American tragedy 
was concluded. Three miles out In the Charleston harbor, Major Robert 
Anderson, Winter Davis' old friend from their days on the West Point 
commission, surrendered Fort Sumter to the Provisional Forces of the 
Confederate States. In Washington, Lincoln and his Cabinet met. They 
framed a proclamation naming the states of South Carolina, Georgia, 
Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas as having 
"combinations" too numerous to be suppressed by the available forces of 
the government. They called for the militia of the states of the Union 
to furnish 75,000 troops to "suppress said combinations, and to cause 
the laws to be duly executed." The proclamation also called both 
Houses of Congress to convene in special session at noon on the Fourth 
of July.
The following day, when Lincoln's proclamation was made public, 
mass meetings were held in scores of cities, towns, and villages. 
Veterans of the War of 1812 and the Mexican War paraded. Prominent 
citizens made speeches. The crowds sang "The Star Spangled Banner" 
and "America." But in Baltimore the citizens were sullenly silent.
No rallies, no meetings, no speeches were made in support of the Union. 
The only meeting of any significance was that held on Fell's Point 
where the raising of a secessionist flag caused a great crowd of
2A1
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Southern sympathizers to form.1
Baltimore and Maryland had wavered in their sympathies since 
the election in November. Almost every day legislators petitioned 
the governor to convene the legislature in order to enact an ordinance 
of secession. Politicians estimated that half the legislature was out- 
and-out secessionist. Even the Unionist support was conditional. At 
his inaugural, the mayor of Baltimore declared that the true policy of 
Maryland was to remain in the Union, but only "so long as she can do so 
with honor and safety." Instead of rebuffing the commissioner from 
seceded Mississippi, Governor Hicks told him that Maryland was "devoted 
to the Union" but "unquestionably identical with the Southern States in 
feeling." Throughout the months of November and December secession 
fever mounted in Maryland. Many newspapers called for a convention to 
let the people decide. The Baltimore Exchange, edited by Davis' brother- 
in-law, Frank Key Howard, called for a special session of the legis­
lature, "a people's assembly." The issues of the day, the Exchange 
wrote, could not be solved by dodging them. The day of "masterly 
inactivity" was gone. Even the Baltimore Clipper, heretofore staunch 
in its devotion to the Union, began to waver.2
The success of secession depended upon Governor Hicks. If he 
succumbed to pressure and called a special session of the legislature,
Baltimore Clipper, 15 April 1861.
Baltimore Exchange, 23 November 1860; Baltimore Clipper, 13 
November, 20 December 1860, 12 January 1861; Richard W. Thompson to 
Lincoln, 25 December 1860, RTL, LC; T. H. Hicks to John Contee, (copy),
6 December 1860, Edward McPherson Mss, LC; T. H. Hicks to J. J.
Crittenden, 9, 19 January 1861, Crittenden Mss, LC; T. H. Hicks to A.
H. Handy, 19 December 1860, Executive Letterbook, Maryland Hall of 
Records; Thomas Swann to S. P. Chase, 28 January 1861, Chase Mss, HSP.
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there was little doubt that Maryland would soon have a secession 
convention. Although Hicks declined to convene the legislature (he 
called it a "party trick"), the governor was not firmly committed to 
keeping Maryland in the Union. He wrote to a friend that "if the Union 
must be dissolved, let it be done calmly, deliberately, and after a 
full reflection on the part of a united South."3
To counteract the growing secessionist fever, Davis began to 
rally the Union forces of Maryland. "I have been deluging Md. with 
letters," Davis wrote Du Pont in late December. He urged Baltimore 
merchants and political friends throughout the state to support Hicks. 
Although cheered by their replies, he was shocked to discover a 
"conspiracy to revolutionize Md." A petition signed by one-half of 
the Maryland Senate was presented to Governor Hicks in late December 
urging him to call a special session of the legislature.1*
To counter the new secessionist thrust, Davis issued a special 
New Year's Day letter to his constituents of the Fourth Congressional 
District. It constituted the most forceful and dramatic appeal against 
secession issued in Maryland. He called peaceful secession a delusion. 
"The soil of Maryland will be trampled by armies struggling for the 
national capital," he warned. If Maryland joined the Confederacy, 
commerce with the North would be broken, fugitive slaves would no longer
3Hicks to John Contee, (copy), 6 December 1860, Edward McPherson 
Mss, LC; "Proclamation to the People of Maryland," 3 January 1861, 
Executive Papers, Maryland Hall of Records.
**HWD to SFDP, 29 December 1860 (misdated 18 December), WMss 
9-17148; HWD to Dear Sir, c. late December 1860, Aldine Collection,
MdHS, for an example of Davis' letters; HWD to SFDP, 1 January 1861,
WMss 9-17150.
244
be returned, and Baltimore's railroad ties with the North would be 
useless. The South's position of free trade would prostrate the iron 
and machine works of Maryland before European commerce. Without the 
Fugitive Slave Act, slaves would "walk over the Pennsylvania line 
unmolested," he predicted. The re-opening of the African slave trade 
would reduce the market value of Maryland slaves below the cost of 
raising or supporting them. And taxes would increase he argued. The 
cost of an army to defend the Mason-Dixon line would be "ruinous," 
he declared.
Despite the disastrous consequences of joining the South, there 
were men in Maryland, he noted, "madly bent on revolution," conspir­
ators who would instigate a state convention. Such a move, Davis 
warned, would solve nothing. If the state had been subjected to
(
unconstitutional and oppressive acts by the Lincoln administration, 
then it would be proper to convene the legislature and seek redress. 
"But also let the people prepare their hearts for War, and their 
fields for desolation, and their children for slaughter," he exclaimed. 
"Let them prepare for an era of proscriptions, confiscations, and 
exiles, to be followed by anarchy, and be closed by the rude despotism 
of the sword." Therefore he urged Marylanders to remain loyal. A 
firm attitude in Maryland would strengthen Union sentiment in the other 
border states and that was the chief hope of peace. "Your example 
will arrest the spirit of revolution," he predicted.5
5"Addresses to the Voters of the Fourth Congressional District," 
in Speeches and Addresses, 189-198. Governor Hicks, at the urging of 
Davis and Partridge, issued a similar proclamation to the people of 
Maryland. While advocating the maintenance of the Union, Hicks never­
theless emphasized his sympathy for the South. "I am a slave holder
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Davis was encouraged by the reaction to his address. The demand 
for extra copies was so great that the Baltimore Evening Patriot 
published one thousand extra copies of it and then republished it in 
the following day's edition. "In Md. I think we have the revolutionists 
down," Davis boasted.6
Week by week the citizens of Maryland moderated in their 
opposition to a Republican administration. Secession fever, which had 
mounted as the lower South seceded, dwindled as Virginia and North 
Carolina resisted the stampede to leave the Union. Confederate- 
sympathizers in Maryland came to agree more and more that some form 
of overt threat had to be forthcoming from Lincoln's administration 
before they would leave the Union. They also began to demand that no 
action by taken by the Federal Government to compel the Gulf South to 
return to the Union. "No coercion," they cried.7
Winter Davis opposed the war, but saw no alternative to "coercion." 
After the secession of South Carolina, he predicted that there would 
be civil war in six months. In January he lamented to his cousin David 
that the Lincoln administration would be "summed up in history as the 
suppression of the Southern rebellion." According to Davis, Lincoln
not by accident but by purchase," he emphasized, and he vowed that he 
"should be sorry to be obliged to live in a state where slavery does 
not exist." "Proclamation to the People of Maryland," 3 January 1861, 
Executive Papers, Maryland Hall of Records.
6HWD to SFDP, 2 January 1861, WMss 9-26330; Baltimore Clipper,
2 January 1861; SFDP to SMDP, 4 January 1861, WMss 9-2231.
7HWD to John B. Morris, 2 January 1861, Autograph Collection, 
Maryland Hall of Records; HWD to SFDP, 14 February 1861, WMss 9-17154; 
Lewis H. Wheeler to John V. Pomeroy, 8 January, 10 March 1861, Baker- 
Wheeler Mss, University of Virginia.
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could dismiss every political question currently debated "and open the 
history of revolts and their suppression for his daily reading. He 
will be inaugurated under the protection of U. S. cannon and cannot be 
inaugurated without it." Even if Lincoln used "all proper forbearance," 
Davis thought there would be war. Despite his earnest efforts in behalf 
of congressionally-sponsored compromise and his appeals for a coalition 
cabinet, Davis had little hope that secession could be dealt with 
peacefully. At times he favored war to the peaceful destruction of the 
United States. "I prefer a vigorous collision, a permanent separation 
and a decent death if that is all God has allowed this great fabric of 
civil liberty to be reared for," he wrote one gloomy day in March.
"But death by a vote— only think of it in history!!"8
Secession had to be dealt with forcefully, Davis held. To allow 
the Gulf South to secede and do nothing about it would only encourage 
secessionists in the border states and eventually in Maryland. The 
independence of the Gulf States was "a perpetual excitement to 
rebellion" elsewhere. Under the Constitution, only the Congress has 
authority to call forth the militia "to execute the Laws of the Union, 
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." Accordingly, Davis wrote 
and introduced a Force Bill similar to that enacted during the 
nullification crisis of 1833. Opposition from Southerners who opposed 
"coercion" kept Davis' bill from ever being reported by committee.
Davis also supported a bill reported by Benjamin Stanton of Ohio for the 
House Committee on Military Affairs which would have authorized the
8HWD to David Davis, c. 5 January 1861, Davis Mss, CHS; HWD to
SFDP, 20 March 1861, WMss 9-17158.
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President to accept volunteers into the regular army. The volunteer 
bill, opposed by Democrats as a virtual declaration of war upon the 
South, was debated in the House for over a week before being killed 
without ever coming to a vote. "The 4th March will find us at war and 
unarmed," Davis complained. "If Anderson be regularly beseiged we have 
no body to raise the seige."9
Davis played no role in the events leading up to the attack on 
Fort Sumter. As he strongly favored the reinforcement of the fort, 
he was intensely interested in the deliberations of Lincoln's cabinet.
He was relieved to learn in late March that it had been decided—  
largely at Postmaster General Blair's urging— not to surrender the fort. 
When in April the flag came down at Sumter, Davis was as surprised and 
bewildered as other Americans.10
Lincoln's April 15 call for 75,000 militia also contained a call 
for Congress to convene in special session in July. As elections would 
be necessary in Maryland before the meeting of the new Thirty-Seventh 
Congress, Davis announced on April 16 that he would be a candidate for 
re-election "upon the basis of the unconditional maintenance of the 
Union." Unconditional meant that he would support any measure designed 
to restore the Union— any measure including coercion.11
Lincoln's call for troops provoked Virginia to secede on April 17. 
In Maryland it brought angry protests and repeated demands for a
9HWD to SFDP, 20 February 1861, WMss 9-17155; HWD to SFDP, 28 
February 1861, WMss 9-17157.
10HWD to SFDP, 24 March 1861, WMss 9-17161.
^Baltimore Clipper, 16 April 1861.
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secession convention. Rumors that Federal troops would pass through 
Baltimore stirred secessionist fever. Secretary of War Cameron urged 
Governor Hicks to take "immediate and effective measures" to prevent 
"unlawful combinations of misguided citizens" from trying to prevent 
the transit of troops across Maryland. But when confronted at a mass 
meeting in Baltimore by three cheers for Jefferson Davis and three 
groans for Governor Hicks, the governor seemingly succumbed to the crowd 
and pledged that no Maryland troops would be sent south.12
The morning of Friday, April 18, 1861, dawned clear and bright.
The town was resonant with rumors and excitement. Newsboys peddling 
the Baltimore Sun, the Exchange. and the South shouted, "All about the 
Yankee invaders." Men congregated on street corners where talk was 
loud and sentiment ran high against the "Northern Scum." That afternoon, 
the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment was attacked by a Confederate mob as 
it attempted to pass through Baltimore.13
The Massachusetts troops were on route to Washington, D. C. As 
there was no direct railroad route from Philadelphia to Washington, 
the regiment was forced to cross Baltimore from the President Street 
Depot to the Camden Station on the south side. During their march, a 
crowd gathered and began pelting the soldiers with stones, brickbats,
12John P. Kennedy Journal, 16 April 1861, Kennedy Mss, Peabody; 
Nicholas B. Wainwright (ed.), A Philadelphia Perspective: The Diary
of Sidney George Fisher Covering the Years 1834-1871 (Philadelphia, 
1967), entry for 18 April 1861, p. 385; Cameron to Hicks, 18 April 
1861, Executive Papers, Maryland Hall of Records; Baltimore Clipper, 
19 April 1861.
13Ernest H. Wardell, "A Military Waif: A Memoir of the Old
South," (1907), MdHS.
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and oyster shells. In an attempt to quell the disorder, Mayor George 
William Brown moved to the head of the line of Massachusetts troops.
But the mob, estimated at ten thousand, continued to hurl bricks and 
to fire randomly at the troops with revolvers and muskets. It was an 
"awful melee," a wild mob of crazy men and boys shrieking their desire 
to annihilate the hated Yankees. Four soldiers were killed, eight were 
seriously wounded, and a number suffered cuts and contusions. Soon 
the troops fired back, killing twelve persons and wounding dozens.14
After the troops departed, the mob took over the city, gunshops 
were plundered, stores were closed, and a rally was called for four 
o'clock in the afternoon. At that meeting, Governor Hicks, intimidated 
by the scores of secessionist flags and badges, seemed to capitulate 
to the disunionists. "I bow in submission to the mandate of the people," 
he shouted to the angry crowd. "If separate we must, in God's name 
let us separate in peace."15
That evening an emergency conference was held at Mayor Brown's 
home. Brown and Hicks afterward telegraphed the President to demand 
that no more troops be sent across Maryland. To ensure that no 
troops could pass through the state, the mayor, with the governor's 
consent, ordered the railroad bridges north of Baltimore burned. At 
four A.M. on Saturday morning, police and civilians led by the marshall
14"Record Proceedings of the Governor 1855-1861, Memorandum of 
19 April 1861," pp. 396-397, Maryland Hall of Records; Hicks and Brown 
to Lincoln, 19 April 1861, RTL, LC; Henry Winter Davis, "Memorial 
Concerning the Events of 19 April," MdHS.
15Baltimore American, 20 April 1861; Lewis H. Wheeler to John N. 
Pomeroy, 20 April 1861, Baker-Wheeler Mss, University of Virginia.
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of Baltimore burned bridges at Harris Creek, Bush River, and Gunpowder 
River. Baltimore was isolated and Washington stood in danger.16
Davis’ patient efforts to rally Unionist support vanished in an 
afternoon of hate and violence. "I find everything reversed in an 
hour," he wrote on the evening of the riot. He blamed the conflict on 
"raw troops" and "that Old Fool" Hicks. The governor, he wrote, "got 
frightened" and failed to stand up for the Union. Other Unionist 
leaders like Reverdy Johnson and Columbus O'Donnell were "decoyed to 
the Mayors office and instantly took the tone and policy of the 
secessionists." The Union people in Baltimore were "demoralized— and 
utterly unarmed." It was even thought unsafe for Davis' wife and 
daughter to remain in their house on St. Paul Street, and Davis 
convinced Nancy to leave Baltimore and stay at her father's estate 
outside the city. Nancy agreed "only on condition that I would not 
sleep there either," Davis confessed later.17
The day after the riot Davis and his allies moved to "arrest 
the revolution" in Maryland. Edward H. Petherbridge, a Davis partisan 
and Crier of Judge Bond's Criminal Court, secured a temporary colonel's 
commission from the governor and immediately set off with sixty other
Davis men to guard the state arsenal at Pikesville. With the state
armaments in possession of the Unionists, Davis stealthy rode to 
Washington to see President Lincoln. His goal was to convince Lincoln
16George W. Brown, Baltimore and the 19th of April 1861 (Baltimore, 
1887), 58; David Creamer's Diary, a Transcript of Notes taken at Grand 
Jury Investigation in Reference to the Riot in Baltimore, 19 April 1861, 
David Creamer Mss, LC.
17HWD to SFDP, 19 April 1861, WMss 9-17163; HWD to SFDP, 29
April 1861, WMss 9-17164.
<
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and Seward to act boldly to save Maryland. When he arrived he 
discovered that Lincoln had telegraphed Hicks and Brown a conciliatory 
reply promising that he would not bring any troops through Baltimore. 
Davis pressed Lincoln to be firmer on that issue and unequivocally 
state the necessity of occupying the state. At Davis' insistence 
Lincoln telegraphed an invitation to Hicks and Brown to come to 
Washington by special train to discuss the crisis. The result of their 
meeting on Sunday was an arrangement whereby Federal troops would be 
brought to Washington without entering Baltimore if the state and city 
officials would restrain the mobs.
On Monday afternoon Lincoln addressed a group of Baltimore 
citizens who came to plead with him not to allow the passage of any 
more "Yankee troops" across Maryland. Lincoln's reply indicated his 
growing impatience with "luke-warm Unionism." "Our men are not moles, 
and can't dig under the earth," he told them. "They are not birds, and 
can't fly through the air. There is no way but to march them across, 
and that they must do. But in doing this there is no need of collision. 
Keep your rowdies in Baltimore, and there will be no bloodshed." That 
evening Davis called on Secretary of State Seward to ask for a proclama­
tion to "secure the quiet of Md. and to warn the people of the 
resolution of the Govt, to bring troops through." Seward, interrupted 
in the middle of writing to Hicks, promptly inserted Davis' suggestion 
into the letter. "The letter has produced the happiest effects," Davis
18Tyler Dennett (ed.), Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries 
and Letters of John Hay (New York, 1939), 3; HWD to SFDP, 29 April 




On April 25 Davis returned to Baltimore. With the railroads still 
severed, he was forced to take a carriage and "had to go out of the 
ordinary route to avoid being turned back— for roving bodies of horse 
[men] swarmed on the road wild with excitement and searching and 
arresting suspicious or obnoxious persons." To the secessionists 
Davis was both suspicious and obnoxious. The Baltimore correspondent 
of the New York World reported that "there is a very bitter feeling 
here against Henry Winter Davis. The mob are thirsting for a victim, 
and many are the threats uttered against him." Despite the dangers to 
him personally, Davis returned to Baltimore and with his appearance 
Union men began to organize. "I am happy to say that a great reaction 
has set in," Davis wrote Seward. After Davis' men organized an armed 
guard for the public buildings, the newly appointed federal office­
holders took their positions. "We are now up and doing and feel that 
we are still masters of the State," he wrote several day later. Mary­
land Unionists were unexpectedly aided by the arrival in the Annapolis 
harbor of the Eighth Massachusetts Regiment under command of Benjamin
F. Butler. Although requested by the governor not to land, Butler, 
fearing that the city was in danger and that the great ship Constitution 
might be seized by a mob, nevertheless landed at the Naval Academy, 
occupied the capital city, and secured the territory between Baltimore 
and Washington for the Union.29
19Lincoln to Baltimore YMCA, 22 April 1861, CWAL, IV, 341-342;
HWD to SFDP, 29 April 1861, WMss 9-17164.
20J. P. Kennedy to S. P. Chase, 24 April 1861, Chase Mss, HSP;
New York World, 25 April 1861; HWD to Seward, 26 April 1861, Seward 
Mss, Rochester; HWD to SFDP, 29 April 1861, WMss 9-17164.
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While Davis lobbied in Washington, the. governor had finally 
yielded to secessionist pressure and issued a call for the state 
legislature to convene. Secretary of State Partridge, incensed at 
Hick's weakness, resigned in disgust. As the last legislature had 
unseated the Unionist Baltimore delegation, a new local election was 
necessary before the legislature reconvened. A Southern and States' 
Rights party convention met and selected a slate composed of pro- 
Southern sympathizers, almost all former "Reformers." The following 
day the election was held and the Confederate sympathizers were elected 
without opposition. In Davis' absence the Union men had disorganized. 
"We made no opposition," reported John Pendleton Kennedy, "being quite 
willing that they should take the responsibility of their own policy."21
Davis called it an "illegal election" and said that it demon­
strated that not one-third of the people of Baltimore sympathized with 
the secessionists. The threat of force used by the State's Righters to 
nominate their slate had exposed their aims, he thought, and had 
"united all good men for the Government on terms which no one would 
have believed a week before."22
When the legislature convened in Frederick, the new Baltimore 
delegation, led by Coleman Yellott, introduced a bill to appoint a 
Committee of Public Safety whose six commissioners would control the 
militia in place of the governor. Of the six commissioners named in
21"Record Proceedings of the Governor 1855-1861, 22 April 1861," 
p. 397, Maryland Hall of Records; G. S. Blake to G. Welles, 22 April 
1861, Welles Mss, LC; J. P. Kennedy Journal, 26 April 1861, Kennedy 
Mss, Peabody; John G. Proud to Mark Howard, 14 May 1861, Welles Mss,
LC.
22HWD to SMDP, 5 May 1861, WMss 9-17165.
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the bill, five supported secession. Davis strongly opposed the passage 
of the Public Safety Bill labeling it "a military despotism." To his 
surprise, the Democrats who controlled the legislature buried the bill 
in the Committee on Federal Relations as well as refusing to pass an 
ordinance of secession.23
Davis watched the proceedings in Frederick while campaigning for 
the special congressional election set by Governor Hicks for June 13. 
Prior to the riot in Baltimore, he had announced for re-election "upon 
the basis of the unconditional maintenance of the Union." He felt his 
strong support of the Union would be a more popular position than the 
Unionist position taken by former Douglas Democrats and Reformers. "My 
ground of unconditional maintenance of the Union is the only one 
tolerated at all and I think three fourths of the State are on that 
basis." Davis thought his chances good when the city Union convention 
met on May 4 and passed his resolutions. The next step was to secure 
the Union party nomination.24
The competition for the Union party endorsement was intense.
Henry May, who lost his seat in Congress to Davis in 1855, was a strong 
contender. "I can beat them all," Davis predicted, "especially as May 
has been on both sides of the Union question." Millionaire secessionist 
Ross Winans, whom General Butler had considered "a very proper specimen 
of traitor to be hanged," was put foxward by many leading businessmen
23Ibid.; also see Jacob Englebrecht Diary, 27 April 1861, MdHS; 
Jean H. Baker, The Politics of Continuity: Maryland Political Parties
from 1858 to 1870 (Baltimore, 1973), 55-57.
24HWD to SFDP, 12 March 1861, WMss 9-17160; HWD to SMDP, 5 May
1861, WMss 9-17165.
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of the city. Reverdy Johnson called on John Pendleton Kennedy to urge 
him to seek the nomination. Although Kennedy professed to be unwilling 
to go back into public life, he said he would accept the nomination if 
all other candidates withdrew. "I must beat everybody combined or 
I am beaten," Davis wrote, "for I am the wolfshead."25
When the congressional nominating convention assembled on May 17, 
Davis' supporters were in the majority. Opposition delegates sought 
to postpone the nomination, but their efforts at delay were overruled 
and the convention proceeded. After Henry May offered a resolution 
that was defeated, the opposition withdrew from the convention. Davis 
and Kennedy were then nominated and on the vote Davis won handily,
42 to 18.26
The nomination was clouded by charges issued by Henry May and 
others that the ward meetings had been rigged in Davis' favor. They 
charged Davis' men with "trickery" and "rowdyness" and with using the 
ruffian tactics of the old Know-Nothing clubs— the same charges in the 
1859 election. Davis was troubled by the charges brought against his 
supporters, but dismissed them as partisan politics. May's charges 
lacked specifics, Davis reasoned, and furthermore they assailed 
"responsible men." Although he decided to campaign "on the question 
of conditional union, i.e. secession open or disguised, and uncondi­
tional Union," he first sought to publicly allay the charges of
25HWD to SFDP, 12 March 1861, WMss 9-17160; John P. Kennedy 
Journal, 16, 17 May 1861, Kennedy Mss, Peabody; The South, 15 May 
1861; HWD to SFDP, 14 May 1861, WMss 9-17166.
26Baltimore Clipper, 18 May 1861; The South, 18 May 1861;
J. P. Kennedy Journal, 18, 19 May 1861, Kennedy Mss, Peabody.
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corruption.27
On May 20, a storm of applause and cheers greeted Davis' entrance 
to the hall where he was to make his acceptance speech. Immediately 
he announced his decision to accept the nomination in spite of rumors 
of "circuitous circumstances." If there was fraud, let it be found.
The charges of corruption and fraud were the same as those arraigned 
against him and his friends at every preceding election. He had never 
countenanced rowdyism at the polls, he claimed.28
Having dismissed the damaging charges against his supporters and 
himself as a "miserable libel," he moved to a defense of his record.
He covered the election of Speaker Pennington in detail. On the eve 
of a "great revolution" there was danger in allowing the Speaker's chair 
to remain vacant, and he had felt it his duty to place a man of 
conservative views such as Pennington in control. "If any one could 
say that the Republic received any damage from that vote, let him rise 
and say it, or forever after hold his peace." The audience, silent for 
a minute, burst into applause.29
He explained his role in the efforts to achieve compromise. The 
Crittenden plan, he charged, was nothing more than the Breckenridge 
platform "dressed up in Constitutional amendments." Instead, he had 
urged the passage of an amendment to guarantee the existence of slavery 
in the states where it existed. He vowed to seek a reunion of the
27HWD to SFDP, 19 May 1861, WMss 9-17167; Baltimore Clipper,
20 May 1861.
2Baltimore Clipper, 21 May 1861.
29Ibid.
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country on that basis and be silent on issues which divided Americans. 
But the South, having departed by arms, "must fall by arms." Like 
others of his day, Davis emphasized Southern Unionism. The majority 
of the South, he said, were still loyal to the United States and would 
rally if the government sent a force to enforce the laws. As usual, 
Davis had been eloquent and almost brilliant. His oratorical talents 
were never displayed to better effect as he lashed his opponents with 
sarcasm and invective. But oratory alone would not persuade all 
Marylanders of his position— particularly his view of the necessity 
of "coercion."3®
Soon after Davis accepted the Union nomination, Henry May 
declared to run as an independent candidate. But before May's 
candidacy was established, the Southern and States' Rights party met 
and nominated Robert McLane, formerly Buchanan's minister to Mexico. 
McLane, characterized by Unionists as a "trading politician," had 
initially pledged that he would repel "invaders" and make "the 
Susquehanna run red with blood." Although McLane had cooled in his 
disunionist sentiments, he was supported by the secessionists. After 
pressure from William W. Glenn, owner of the Baltimore Exchange and 
a former Friday Club friend of Davis', McLane declined the nomination 
and the States' Rights party united behind May.31
"Our canvass is proceeding well and I hope for good results," 
Davis wrote Du Pont, "but prediction is out of the question. Party
30Ibid.; The South, 21 May 1861.
31Baltimore Clipper, 27, 31 May, 1 June 1861; Samuel Harrison 
Journal, 1 June 1861, MdHS; National Intelligencer, 3 June 1861;
New York Tribune, 5 June 1861; William W. Glenn Diary, 8 June 1861, MdHS.
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lines are obliterated and my bitterest opponents are zealously working 
for me and my late friends against me." Indeed, the position of the 
Germans and the Americans were reversed. At the meetings of Germans and 
other immigrants, he was cheered for his unconditional Unionism where 
previously he had been detested for his Americanism. And at a meeting 
of the twentieth ward, formerly a Davis stronghold, the crowd was 
listless and indifferent. Only a small crowd showed up to listen to 
him in the eighteenth ward where he normally drew enthusiastic audiences 
and where he had polled a one thousand-vote majority.32
Baltimorean Samuel Harrison, in his inq>ortant journal, related 
the difficulties which Davis faced in his campaign. "Mr. Davis labors 
under the disadvantage of having been the Candidate of the party which 
has had the support of the political clubs in this city," Harrison 
wrote. "Whether he was really implicated in the enormous frauds which 
were perpetrated in the last election for Congress is not known; but it 
militates against him that he accepted the election in which was 
attended the most outrageous corruption." Nevertheless, Harrison 
supported Davis in the present contest because of his "open and unequi­
vocal position." Henry May, Harrison felt, was "crying peace— peace— " 
which he took as a disguised plea for the dissolution of the government. 
But no one could really say where May stood on secession, Harrison 
concluded. His position was "shrouded in a mist." While Davis was 
committed to a firm defense of the nation, May’s appeals to Unionism
32HWD to SFDP, 1 June 1861, WMss 9-17168; J. A. J. Creswell,
"An Oration," Speeches and Addresses, xxvi; Baltimore Clipper, 28, 29 
May, 4 June 1861; The South, 4 June 1861.
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and patriotism served as a successful mask for specific policies.33
Although Davis feared violence at the polls and sought to have a 
Federal marshall's posse patrol the polls, the election proceeded 
orderly and quietly. Davis lost by a wide margin, 6,290 to Hay's 
8,328. "1 am defeated by a combination of the Secessionists with the
namby pambles of the peace party which elects Hr. Hay," Davis lamented 
election night. He had polled about the same vote as previous elections 
in the ninth through the sixteenth wards, those which composed the 
commercial and residential areas of the city. But in the heavily 
populated, industrial, working class wards, the seventeenth through 
the twentieth, where he had previously polled between 4,500 and 5,000 
votes he got a bare 2,300. Many of his old friends and supporters 
in the heavily Know-Nothing wards had deserted him. "The Bell men 
party staid at home or partly voted against me," he decided.3**
33Samuel Harrison Journal, 6, 8, 12 June 1861, HdHS. There was 
also the possibility of a sizeable lack of support for Davis' campaign 
from the Republican Unionists. The division of the "spoils" between the 
Americans and the Republicans had been complicated by the inability of 
many to assume their duties because of the riot. Davis recommended 
that any not standing firm be replaced. Among those he named was 
Washington Bonifant, Federal marshall-designate and a close friend of 
Hontgomery Blair. Other patronage squabbles followed. See Lincoln 
to H. W. Hoffman, c. 15 April 1861, CWAL, IV, 333; Hoffman to Chase,
23 April 1861, Chase Hss, LC; HWD to Thurlow Weed, c. late April
1861, Weed Hss, Rochester; Baltimore Sun, 24, 25, 27 April 1861;
Dennett, Diary and Letters of John Hay, 1 Hay 1861, p. 16; Edward
Bates to H. Blair, 4 Hay 1861, Blair Hss, LC; HWD to Seward, 8 June 
1861, Seward Mss, Rochester; Lincoln to Hoffman, 11 June 1861, CWAL,
IV, 404; HWD to M. Blair, c. 12 June 1861, Blair-Lee Hss, Princeton.
3**N. P. Banks to E. Bates, 12 June 1861, Banks Hss, Duke; Samuel 
Harrison Journal, 13 June 1861, MdHS; HWD to SFDP, 13 June 1861, WMss 
9-17169; The South, 14 June 1861; Baltimore Sun, 14 June 1861, Baltimore 
Clipper, 14 June 1861; John T. McPherson to Edward McPherson, 6 July 
1861, McPherson Mss, LC; A. D. Evans to B. F. Butler, 15 June 1861, 
Butler Mss, LC.
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"My failure has disturbed me less than I fear it has troubled 
my friends here and elsewhere," he wrote. "I was always doubtful of 
the result." He thought that his defeat could be attributed to a 
coalition of "3,000 peace union men, anti-coercionists and personal 
enemies, with 5,000 Secessionists in the District— everyone of whom 
voted for May to defeat me. All party lines were swept away." May 
told the Union men he was for the Union and that he was "a States 
right man, as good as Jeff Davis to the Secessionists," Davis complained. 
And the Union men "were fooled into voting for him and led to do it by 
personal hostility." The secessionists, Davis reasoned, voted for May 
"from hate to me, and because it was the best they could do."35
Despite his defeat, there were certain things in which Davis 
could rejoice. The rest of the Unionist congressional slate was elected. 
"Our success has surpassed my own expectations," he noted. "In every 
district but mine the candidates were elected by the people to support 
the Government and to aid it to suppress the rebellion." It had been 
his desire to settle the issue of Maryland's loyalty and to find out 
"in the event of a renewal of domestic trouble how many could be really 
counted on to put down the revolution." The vote statewide left little 
in doubt. Even in Baltimore, he concluded, secession was dead.35
Years later his colleague, Judge Len Bond, recalled the bitter 
election of 1861. Davis "single handed and alone, without the aid of 
a solitary journal, surrounded by but a few friends, amid the denuncia­
tions of conservative union men and the maledictions of rebels" had
35HWD to SFDP, 15 June 1861, WMss 9-17170.
36HWD to SMDP, c. late June, 1861, WMss 9-17181.
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campaigned on the platform that "there was to be no compromise, and 
that the only road to safety was across the battlefield." Bond related 
that although defeated, Davis was satisfied with the result. "With 
six thousand of the workingmen of Baltimore on my side, won in such a 
contest," Davis boasted, "I defy them to take the state out of the 
Union."37
He tried to take his defeat philosophically. Nancy was bitterly 
disappointed at the result and saddened that secession and the election 
had marred the cordiality of Baltimore society. Initially Davis was 
relieved to be free from the pressures of public life and looked 
forward to having "plenty of time to renew broken studies and almost 
forgotten pursuits and to re-chew my law dust." He considered his 
public career closed. "I have no sort of expectations of being called 
again into public life," he wrote Mrs. Du Pont. "I think it quite 
probable that having played my brief part to my own satisfaction I 
may have the fate of surviving on the very memory of myself in the 
minds of other people" while others could "float on the tide which 
perhaps without my, little aid might not have turned." He was proud 
of his part in "arresting the revolution" and hoped the memory of it 
would sustain him. But in less than one week his thoughts returned to 
political life. He began to regret not having been appointed to the 
Cabinet. "I confess I never felt the objection that many of my friends 
expressed to my entering the Cabinet if asked," he wrote Captain Du 
Pont. "I always knew that there would be work to do which will not 
recur again in my life: but it is ordered otherwise." But within
37H. L. Bond to Editor, 13 January 1866, New York Evening Post.
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months he embarked on the most important work of his life— the emanci­
pation crusade in Maryland.38
38SFDP to SMDP, 30 June 1861, Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters. I,
87-90; HWD to SMDP, c. June, 1861, WMss 9-17181; HWD to SFDP, 5 July
(misdated 3 June) 1861, WMss 9-17159.
Chapter 13
TWO YEARS OF DISAPPOINTMENT
At the age of forty-four, when many politlcans are just beginning 
their careers, Henry Winter Davis was out of office, out of favor, and 
out of sorts. The boldness of his statements and the independence of 
his course during his three terms in the House of Representatives had 
established him as a leading political figure. But now he was out of 
power. And although he professed to be satisfied with being a private 
citizen again, he was too much engaged in the events of the time to sit 
idly by while other men directed the greatest event of the age— the 
American Civil War.
"Your Maker has a task for you yet and we must abide His will," 
counseled Captain Du Pont shortly after his congressional defeat. But 
not even Du Pont could say what that task would be. Some friends 
encouraged him to pursue a career in the diplomatic corps, some 
suggested a military position, and still others pushed him for the 
United States Senate. But none of their wishes were realized and 
eventually Davis found his own task— emancipation in Maryland.1
Shortly after Davis' loss to Henry May, it was widely rumored that 
he would be named as minister to Austria. He had long coveted the 
position, but friends of Anson Burlingame of Massachusetts had pressured




Lincoln into appointing their "lame duck" Congressman. When Burlingame 
was declared persona non grata by the Hapsburg court, Lincoln was 
compelled to appoint someone else. Bowing to pressure from Senator 
Charles Sumner, the President gave the post to historian John Lothrop 
Motley. Captain Du Pont was disturbed by the apparent slight to Davis. 
"As it was the only first class mission left, he felt convinced it be 
offered to you," Mrs. Du Pont wrote Davis. "The omission is so glar­
ingly ungrateful and unjust," she complained.2
The Union rout at Manassas Junction in July 1861 turned Davis' 
attention to the war. He began to follow troop movements as well as 
to read and study all available books on military history and strategy. 
What he read convinced him that the commanders at Bull Run were 
incompetent. They had neglected the principle of massing forces. It 
was not enough, he reasoned, simply to defeat and drive back the 
Southern army; the government had to gather "a force great enought to 
destroy the military array of the Confederates." He hailed the promo­
tion of General George McClellan as commander of the Army of the 
Potomac and predicted that "the next fight will be with combined 
masses."3
As the Union army routed at Bull Run rushed pell-mell to 
Washington, Davis realized that Baltimore was not safe. Maryland 
needed a home guard to defend the city and to relieve the Federal
2Carman and Luthin, Lincoln and the Patronage, 88; David Donald, 
Charles Sumner and the Rights of Man (New York, 1970), 16; New York 
Tribune, 15 June 1861; SMDP to HWD, 13 August 1861, WMss 9-22986.
3HWD to SFDP, 23 July 1861, WMss 9-17172; HWD to SFDP, late 
July, 1861, WMss 9-17173; HWD to Justin Morrill, c. late July, 1861, 
Morrill Mss, LC; HWD to SMDP, 4 August 1861, WMss 9-17174.
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troops there for duty elsewhere. Coincidentally William Henry Purnell, 
postmaster of Baltimore and organizer of Purnell's Legion, an upper 
Maryland local defense unit, wrote Davis about accepting a possible 
commission. The idea of raising and commanding an army was new to Davis. 
But as other politicians— Nathaniel P. Banks, Benjamin F. Butler, John 
C. Fremont, and John McClemand— held high ranking positions in the 
army, he considered it a possibility. "I know I could keep Md. quiet 
with more ease and certainty than anyone the Administration could send 
here, not a Marylander— if I had Carte Blanche," he wrote. He feared 
that under the system established by Lincoln he would be no more 
effective than General John Dix, who commanded the Department of 
Maryland. If all orders were to be dictated by a small band of 
Republicans in Washington, he vowed he would not place himself under 
their control. "I should resign or be Court-martialled in a week."1*
As in the distribution of cabinet positions, Davis kept a firm 
policy of not actively seeking a commission. But he did make known to 
numerous influential citizens his plan for enlisting his followers in 
Baltimore into a home guard which would relieve 10,000 troops for the 
front lines. A 5,000 man local defense unit could easily replace Dix's 
forces for "in a civil was partisans on the spot are worth twice as 
many stronger troops." But months passed and Davis received no orders. 
"Not a word has been said about ra£ commission," he lamented in 
September 1861. "I cant ask favors and shall live in the midst of
^HWD to SFDP, 29 August 1861, WMss 9-17178; SFDP to HWD, 4
September 1861, Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters, I, 141-143; HWD to
SFDP, 9 September 1861, WMss 9-17180.
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great events without having to do with them or even seeing them."5
While Davis would not actively puruse an appointment in either 
the cabinet, the foreign service, or the army, he actively sought 
election to the United States Senate. On the day the Union party 
nominated Augustus W. Bradford for governor, Davis offered Bradford 
his support and volunteered to campaign for him across the state. 
Naturally Davis was concerned to see Bradford elected, but undoubtedly 
he was also trying to keep his chances as a Senatorial candidate alive—  
the support of the new governor would be crucial in the contest. In 
September he was certain of Bradford's election but continued to stump 
the city and state to secure the election of pro-Davis state legislar- 
tors.6
Typical of his campaign stump speeches in that contest was an 
address to the Union party rally on October 16. Long before he 
appeared, the crowd chanted his name and when finally he made his 
entrance into the hall, he was greeted by "a shout of applause that 
seemed to shake the building to its centre." For over two hours he 
held the crowd spellbound by railing against secession, King Cotton, 
and traitors. "The time for 'doubting men’ has gone," he cried, "even 
the time for 'peace' men has gone." Maryland must declare itself 
"redeemed." He particularly lashed out at Benjamin C. Howard, a 
cousin of his brother-in-law and now States Rights candidate for
5HWD to SFDP, 9 September 1861, WMss 9-17180; John A. Dix 
to Chase, 10 September 1861, Salmon P. Chase Mss, HSP; HWD to SFDP,
22 September 1861, WMss 9-17182; HWD to SFDP, c. 4 October, 1861,
WMss 9-17183.
6HWD to Augustus W. Bradford, 15 August 1861, Bradford Mss,
MdHS; HWD to SFDP, 9 September 1861, WMss 9-17180.
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governor. These "Peace Party" men were no better than secessionists, 
he said, for peace to them meant submission to the rule of Jefferson 
Davis. The only kind of peace he supported was "the restoration of the 
United States authority in every State from which it has been driven.
That every rebel soldier with arms in his hands shall lay them down or 
be destroyed."7
Not content to blast the Democrats, he continued in this speech 
and later ones to criticize officials in Washington. He reproached the 
War Department for not using Maryland soldiers to defend Maryland, the 
Cabinet for its inefficiency, the President for declaring martial law, 
and those "ignorant fanatics" who talked about "decrees of emancipation." 
Although openly critical of some of the administration's policies, he 
praised Lincoln's administration as "the last and only hope of the 
American people."®
Campaign oratory was only part of Davis' role in his quest for 
the Senate. He organized and financed legislative candidates pledged 
to support him in the upcoming Senatorial contest. Supporters of 
Montgomery Blair and Reverdy Johnson— those who gained control of the 
Union State Central Committee— were less organized and needed to appeal 
to outside sources for campaign funds. Reverdy Johnson appealed to 
Secretary Chase and his trusted assistant, Hiram Barney, the Collector 
of the Port of New York, for thousands of dollars for Union candidates. 
Davis urged Barney not to give them the money. "It is throwing money 
away to send it," he wrote Barney, for "our party machinery has gotten
7Baltimore Clipper, 19 October 1861.
®Ibid.
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sadly out of gear."9
"We are here now safe," Davis reported before the election, "and 
I trust In a week we will have a loyal Government as well as people."
On election day the Union party triumphed. The whole ticket was elected 
In a victory which matched victories In the same week by Unionists in 
Massachusetts, New York, Michigan, New Jersey, Illinois, and Wisconsin. 
Bradford beat Howard by a margin of better than two to one, with the 
largest margin polled in Baltimore. "Our domestic traitors are 
prostrate," Davis rejoiced. While savoring the victory, Davis received 
word that Captain Du Pont's squadron had attacked and captured Port 
Royal, South Carolina, the first naval victory of the war.10
In the weeks between the Union party victory and the meeting of 
the legislature, Davis rallied his supporters in quest of the Senate 
seat. But then, as he had done so often before, Davis overstepped his 
bounds. Always a man of principles, always outspoken on the issues, 
Davis never knew quite when he had said or done enough. He accepted 
an invitation to speak in Brooklyn, New York, in November 1861, and 
used that platform to attack the Lincoln administration for using 
illegal measures to suppress the rebellion, for suspending the writ of 
habeas corpus, for declaring martial law, for silencing newspapers, and
9Hiram Barney to Chase, 18 October 1861, Levin E. Straughn to 
E. Humphreys, 25 October 1861, Chase to Barney, 28 October 1861,
W. W. Hoffman to Barney, 29 October 1861, HWD to Barney, c. October 
1861, HWD to Barney, 31 October 1861, Montgomery Blair to Chase,
2 November 1861, Chase Mss, HSP.
10HWD to SMDP, 26 October 1861, WMss 9-17186; HWD to SMDP,
15 November 1861, WMss 9-17187; HWD to SFDP, 15 November 1861, in 
Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters, I, 243; Baltimore Clipper, 7, 16 
November 1861; Baltimore American, 6 November 1861.
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for resorting to arbitrary arrests. The Constitution gave Lincoln 
sufficient powers, he said, and "I will not add to it a dictatorship—  
arbitrary and discretionary power without the guidance and above the 
control of written law. I protest against it in the name of republican 
liberty."11
Public reaction to his Brooklyn speech was hostile. Several 
newspapers berated him for raising a discordant voice. His Maryland 
friends who had applauded his lesser criticism of the administration 
during the previous campaign now began to question his intentions. Even 
his wife Nancy scolded him saying, "You are always getting your friends 
into hot water and disturbing the public peace generally." Brooklyn
speech— My Brooklyn speech!" he grumbled, "Is it not of sinister import 
that a simple defense of the principles of American free government—  
on the basis of Webster and John Marshall sould like an attack on the 
administration?" He could not understand why men found it objectionable. 
"I was terrified at the exercise of arbitrary and illegal power by the 
Govt ... and I thought it time that some one who is on the side of the 
Govt should tell a few plain truths and rescue the cause of the 
Constitution." He had intended his speech to be an impetus to reform. 
"When they call my speech an attack of the Adm. they little know what 
it would have been had I wished to injure and not to save them; for 
no administration has been so Incompetent and so corrupt— not even 
Buchanans." But his speech could not be explained away. It was a 
shrill attack on the administration when Unionists were calling for
^ Speeches and Addresses, 262, 265, 289.
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unity.
Davis' Brooklyn speech dimmed his previously bright prospects in 
the upcoming Senate race. His early work had brought results—  
endorsements by several newspapers on both the Eastern and Western 
shores, the election of pro-Davis legislators, and the selection of his 
friend, Colonel John Summerfield Berry as Speaker of the House of 
Delegates. But when Berry organized the committees, he gave the 
chairmanships to supporters of Reverdy Johnson and United States Attor­
ney for Maryland William Price. "The is the old story of my treatment 
by everyone on whom I rely on outside of the great mechanical class," 
Davis lamented. Particularly upsetting to Davis was the appointment of 
Reverdy Johnson to head the Committee on Federal Relations "as if to 
patronize his claims for the Senatorship!!" As the session progressed 
support for his candidacy dissipated. "I have more friends in the 
Legislature than either of the aspirants— and if they be not bullied or 
fooled I shall have a majority," Davis confidently predicted. But the 
defection of Speaker Berry broke the confidence of his supporters and 
he "fully expected a Bull Run— a shameful and causeless rout after a 
victory."13
The Maryland legislature met for weeks without passing any 
worthwhile legislation and without electing a Senator. For two months 
the election was delayed during which time Davis' support waned and 
outside forces were brought to support other candidates. Shortly 
before the Union caucus met, Davis lost his confidence. "Everybody has
12HWD to SMDP, 4 December 1861, WMss 9-17190.
13HWD to SFDP, 18 December 1861, WMss 9-17192.
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gone to sleep in Maryland," he complained. Governor Bradford no longer 
supported him; Speaker Berry turned on him; his friends in the legisla­
ture vacillated in their support. "Every other man is a candidate," he 
reported. "It is like the College of Cardinals— and likely to follow 
the policy of electing the oldest man (Price) that he may speedily die 
and make a vacancy."11*
When the caucus met on.February 26, 1862, many of Davis' 
supporters defected to William Price leaving Davis a distant third 
behind Price and Reverdy Johnson. On each succeeding ballot his friends 
deserted him and on the fifteenth ballot Reverdy Johnson won the 
nomination. Davis was furious about letting former Douglas Democrats 
like Johnson into the Union party. "We were fools," he exclaimed. He 
was equally distressed by the conduct of his professed friends. "The 
bad faith of persons, long devoted friends, which occasioned the result 
is annoying. I consider my public life ended, and I shall occupy my 
time as best I may in reading and study, Law there is none to practice 
here." He took the defeat very hard and none of the kind words offered 
by his friends that he was being saved for "some wise purpose" helped.
He needed a chance to stay active and to be involved. Without that he 
suffered.15
Personal suffering followed his political defeat. In January 
1862 he received first a rumor and then the fact of his aunt Elizabeth
1J*HWD to SFDP, 8 February 1862, WMss 9-17198.
15Reverdy Johnson to Chase, 27 January 1862, Chase Mss, LC; 
Baltimore Clipper, 1, 5 March 1862; E. W. Syle to SMDP, 11 March 
1862, WMss 9-26650; HWD to SMDP, 18 March 1862, WMss 9-17202; SFDP 
to SMDP, 15 March 1862, in Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters, I, 367; 
SFDP to HWD, 13 April 1862, WMss 9-2560.
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Brown Winter's death. "I have never known such another— so unself ish~ 
so devoted— so abounding in good deeds— so untiring in well-doing," he 
wrote of her. He was grieved that when the war began she was visiting 
in Virginia and could not get out. "It would have been a great 
consolation to her and to me had I been with her at the last," he wrote, 
for she "was to me in the place of a mother."16
His aunt's passing was followed by other family problems. His late 
sister's youngest son died suddenly in Washington. Communications with 
his first wife's family— always a source of joy— were cut off as the 
Cazenoves and the Lees turned rabid secessionists. War claimed the 
lives of many favored relatives— Madison Tyler, Augustine Washington, 
and Robert Scott— "a long list for a short time," he mourned. And 
closest to home was the arrest and imprisonment of his brother-in-law, 
editor Frank Key Howard, the husband of Nancy's younger sister. Davis 
never cared for Howard either politically or socially, but the burden 
the latter's imprisonment placed on his sister-in-law and his nieces and 
nephew caused him grief.17
With his law practice suffering from the economic depression in 
Baltimore, with his political career seemingly ended, and with hostility 
daily shown toward him in Baltimore, Davis began considering Nancy's
16HWD to SMDP, 5 January 1862, WMss 9-17194; HWD to SMDP, c. 
January 1862, WMss 9-17197; E. W. Syle to SMDP, 15 January 1862, 
WMss 9-26628; HWD to N. P. Banks, 15 January 1862, Banks Mss, LC; 
HWD to Seward, 28 January 1862, Banks Mss, LC.
17HWD to N. P. Banks, 26 March 1862, Banks Mss, LC; HWD to 
SMDP, 20 June 1862, WMss 9-17206; F. K. Howard to L. Trumbull,
8 December 1861, Trumbull Mss, LC; F. K. Howard to T. Bayard, 25 
December 1861, Bayard Mss, LC; HWD to SMDP, 4 December 1861, WMss 
9-17190; SMDP to HWD, 7 January 1862, WMss 9-23087.
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request that they move to New York City. "Possibly I may gratify 
her," he wrote. He was "eminently uncomfortable," reported his 
brother-in-law Edward Syle. "Something to do what he felt was worth 
doing would be a great boon to him," Syle thought. Although the 
Reverend Mr. Syle advised him to "bide his time," Davis, as impatient 
as always, sought "something to do." Haltingly at first, but then 
vigorously he joined the crusade to eradicate slavery. He became the 
foremost leader of the emancipation movement in Maryland.1®
From his boyhood, Davis had opposed the peculiar institution, but 
his dedication to the law and the Constitution forbid him from opposing 
it politically. Although he attacked slaveholders and the slave power 
in speeches in the House, he was careful not to assail slavery, private 
property, itself. During 1861 and 1862 his opinions began to change. 
Captain Du Pont's successful attack on Port Royal placed the Federal 
government in control of thousands of slaves who were left when their 
masters fled. Often Du Pont wrote Davis of the condition of the Port 
Royal slaves: "We have some ten thousand negroes within our lines,
almost starving and some naked or nearly so. The negroes want arms 
very much! and what is more seem brave." Du Pont was impressed with 
"contraband pilots" who guided his ships under fire. "What is to 
become of all these people, when the rebellion is put down," he asked 
Davis. "Surely they cannot be returned as slaves."19
"Your letter impressed me deeply with the miserable condition of
18E. W. Syle to SFDP, 22 April 1862, WMss 9-12493.
19SFDP to HWD, 25 February 1862, WMss 9-2490; SFDP to HED,
24 June 1862, WMss 9-2618.
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of the negroes under their Patriarchal tortures,11 Davis replied. He 
was not willing, however, to settle for an illegal method of freeing 
them. General John C. Fremont's proclamation confiscating all slaves 
in Missouri was not the proper way, he thought. He rejoiced at the 
recall of Fremont whom he considered the "chief instigator of the 
abolition onslaught in Congress." He agreed that it was "a great 
temptation to seek a short remedy" for slavery and conceded that the 
"fanatics are half justified in their views." Nevertheless he still 
eschewed proclamations. "Slavery receives its death wound in this 
struggle; it may languish for years but is not likely to be again a 
power," but the death of slavery by illegal means might kill the nation 
in the process.20
In May 1862, when Captain Du Pont's army counterpart, General 
David Hunter, issued a proclamation freeing the slaves in his district, 
Davis protested. "He is not the authorized instrument," Davis wrote,
"and his proclamations and those like them will merely aggravate the 
difficulties of the inevitable transition." The loss of life and the 
senselessness of the killing will eventually turn people to emancipation, 
he predicted. "The only alternatives seem to me the sudden and bloody 
extinction of slavery or its languishing, wasting death of exhaustion." 
He preferred the latter.21
When Mrs. Du Pont asked Davis if immediate emancipation was both 
"impolitic" and "unjust," he replied that it was impolitic because it 
was inpossible without a gross violation of the fundamental principles
20HWD to SFDP, 20 May 1862, WMss 9-17204.
21HWD to SMDP, 20 May 1862, WMss 9-17204.
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of the government. "Unjust it is not and cannot be to restore freedom 
to any one in slavery." He granted that there may be suffering and 
inconvenience and confusion from emancipation— but "no injustice." 
Slavery was "an evil very grevious, a wrong wholly indefensible," but 
it had to be dealt with as a doctor deals with cancer— carefully removed 
and not rashly t o m  out. The evil must be tolerated until time and 
circumstances permit its eradication, "but no longer."22
Confiscation of enemy property, particularly slaves, seemed to 
be a much more legal and therefore practical method, Davis wrote.
The first Congressional confiscation act in 1861 was strenuously 
opposed by many Congressmen on the grounds that although Congress 
could confiscate slaves, it could not free them. Davis thought this 
was illogical; the United States was to be a proprietor as other 
proprietors and could deal with its property in any way it saw fit.23
The most sweeping confiscation act, the second, came under 
attack by moderates and conservatives who labeled it a bill of attainder. 
In two lengthy letters to Congressman Justin Morrill, Davis defended 
the constitutionality of confiscation. It was not a bill of attainder, 
he argued, because it did not punish past action but future action.
The Constitution said that forfeiture of property should not be a 
sentence for treason— but it did not prohibit Congress from making 
forfeiture the consequence of other acts. Davis suggested other 
precedents. First, the slave trade laws for over sixty years had 
established confiscation of property as punishment. Persons found
22Ibid.
23HWD to SFDP, 18 December 1861, WMss 9-17192.
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guilty of illegal slave importing were fined and imprisoned and their 
ships were confiscated and their slaves freed. Second, persons caught 
selling "spirituous liquors" to Indians were liable for imprisonment 
and confiscation of their boats, stores and packages. Davis also argued 
around the constitutional prohibition against confiscation as a 
punishment for treason. "The traitors who burned the Maryland bridges 
and shot the Massachusetts men on the 19th of April were guilty of 
treason," he wrote, "but they were also guilty of resisting the laws 
of the United States, and of a riot, and of obstructing mail routes, and 
for any of those crimes any punishment, any confiscation may be 
constitutionally imposed. "2t*
The bill which came out of Congress was not at all to Davis' 
liking. He wrote that it "authorizes the President to inaugurate a 
revolution in order to suppress the insurrection." As drawn, the act 
was "one of those shapeless agglomerations which comttee's of conference 
after long labor bring forth— with the features of both parents and 
usually the worst of both." Although he pleaded with Morrill to 
include legal protection for the freedmen, the bill was devoid of such 
a clause. Furthermore, the Confiscation Act of 1862 freed only slaves 
who escaped or were captured. "Surely a fool drew that section," he 
wrote. "I am for freeing every slave of every rebel."25
In March 1862, to resist the rising tide of abolitionism,
Lincoln recommended compensated emancipation to the Congress. He 
urged an appropriation to purchase slaves from loyal owners in the
21f Speeches and Addresses, 292-302.
25HWD to SFDP, c. 19 July 1862, WMss 9-17209.
277
border states. His proposal met opposition from both radicals and 
conservatives, and resulted only in a bill for compensated emancipation 
in the District of Columbia. In July the President appealed to the 
border states once again and sent a bill to Congress to compensate any 
state that might abolish slavery. Few in Maryland approved such a plan 
except Davis and his friends.26
When Davis' old ally, Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio, 
introduced a Maryland compensation bill in the House, opponents tried 
to block its passage by insisting on exorbitant compensation. Davis 
petitioned key Congressmen and Senators regarding a fair evaluation of 
slaves. Using tax and census figures, he demonstrated that the assessed 
value of slaves in Maryland was about fourteen million dollars and that 
the average value was only $163 a slave. As the legislature was always 
controlled by the slaveholding counties, he felt it only just to use 
the tax values they created. "There is no market in the South, and 
sales in the State seem to show that the assessed value is quite as much 
as the slaves will sell for here, if not more," Davis argued. The 
appropriation of ten million dollars suggested in Bingham's bill he 
declared to be "more than ample." But conservatives in Congress, led 
by Maryland's John Crisfield, succeeded in having the bill recommitted 
to committee, where it died.27
26"Appeal to the Border State Representatives to Favor Compensated 
Emancipation ... address by Lincoln at the White House," CWAL, V, 317- 
319; Lincoln to Congress, 14 July 1862, CWAL, V, 324; David Davis to 
L. Swett, 26 November 1862, David Davis Mss, CHS.
27CG 37th-3rd-381; HWD to William Pitt Fessenden, 3 February 1863, 
Miscellaneous Collection, New York Historical Society; HWD to Ira 
Harris, Harris Msp, Brown University; CG 37th-3rd-1293-1294.
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As the long summer of 1862 drew on, President Lincoln sought 
a means of quelling the pressure of the abolitionists. On July 13, 
while riding back from a funeral, he told Secretaries Welles and Seward 
that he was prepared to issue a presidential proclamation emancipating 
Southern slaves. Rumors of his impending action stung Washington City. 
"The President can issue no decree of emancipation," Davis wrote Du 
Pont; "If he could he would be my master and could take my home and 
imprison me at pleasure." Davis argued that the military, including the 
President as Commander-in-Chief, could under certain circumstances take 
slaves, but he could not alter the legal relationship of the master 
and slave, "any more than he can that of a horse." When Lincoln issued 
his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation after the battle of Antietam, 
Davis Was appalled. "Poor fool," he sneered, "he does not know what 
he is doing." Davis declared the proclamation to "powerless but for 
mischief" and an offspring of the President's terror. "The defeats 
before Washington frightened the Prest. into the emancipation," he 
reasoned.28
When Lincoln Issued the permanent Emancipation Proclamation on 
New Year's Day, 1863, Davis was utterly disgusted with the President's 
action. Davis thought it discredited Lincoln's former proposal of 
compensated emancipation and destroyed any chance to get the Congress 
and the loyal states to change the Constitution. "I fear the best hope 
of ending slavery is gone."29
I
28David Donald (ed.), Inside Lincoln's Cabinet; The Civil War 
Diaries of Salmon P. Chase (New York, 1954), 152; HWD to SMDP, 24
September 1862, WMss 9-17220.
29HWD to SMDP, 2 January 1863, WMss 9-17228.
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As early as May 1862, Davis began to propose another way of 
abolishing slavery, a way which was both constitutional and effective. 
Under Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution, Congress was charged 
with guaranteeing "to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government." He held that there were no state governments in the 
rebellious states until new governments were organized. Thus the 
states were subject to the legislative control of Congress. It would 
be "unfair and impolitic" to make a radical blow at slavery before the 
loyal people had an opportunity to resume the responsibilities of 
government and abolish slavery themselves. "But if they fail or refuse 
for any considerable time," Davis noted, "— and that is not unlikely in 
S. C., Miss., Ala.— then Cong, is the government of the State ... and 
it may free every negro in the State by act of Congress just as it has 
forbidden slavery in the Territories and freed slaves in the D. C."30
Davis found further validity for his plan in the arguments of 
Southerners made in favor of secession. Secession asserted the right 
of self-government independent of the Constitution of the United States. 
If Congress could not legislate for any state which threw off its 
allegiance to the United States, then the state was in fact independent. 
"So the denial of secession," he argued, "carries with it the right to 
govern the State if it will not govern itself in subordination to the 
Const, of the U. S."31
In the fall of 1862 Davis drew up a bill embodying his view of
30HWD to John Sherman, 30 May 1862, Sherman Mss, LC; HWD to SFDP,
11 July 1862, WMss 9-17208.
31Ibid.
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reconstruction which he had Senator John Sherman submit to the Congress. 
He had acted after visiting Congress for a day and seeing "the cloud of 
opposition overshadowing the face of everyone— there was the light of 
battle nowhere— but the depression and gloom of defeat." He believed 
that if Congress would enact his bill it might regain its lost stature. 
His position in that bill and in speeches around the country later that 
year indicate a middle position between the conservatives who held that 
the states continue to exist with their rights impaired and the radicals 
who thought that the southern states were alien enemies. "To call them 
alien enemies admits that their secession was effectual," Davis wrote. 
"It admits that they are not traitors, but enemies. I say they are 
traitors and not enemies; citizens under the law." He refused to go 
along with those radicals who claimed that the South had become a 
territory. He criticized the concept of "territorialization" on the 
ground that the states were "continuing, perpetual elements of our 
Union, and their citizens always beneath the Constitution." When the 
Thirty-Seventh Congress adjourned on March 3, 1863, it had failed to 
act on his bill which disappointed him greatly.32
Long before that early "reconstruction" bill failed in Congress, 
Davis was working on an additional plan to end slavery— to secure 
abolition by enlisting slaves in the army. This seemed to make good 
practical sense. The Union needed all the troops it could get to 
prosecute the war. Moreover, since the war was drifting into a war 
against slavery, it was right that the Negro should be allowed to fight
32Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years, I, 359; HWD to SFDP,
2 January 1863, WMss 9-17227; HWD to SFDP, 28 January 1863, WMss
9-17230.
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for his emancipation. Finally, In Davis' opinion, the enlistment of 
slaves into the army was a legal and efficacious means of securing 
their freedom.
When General David Hunter in Hay 1862 announced the formation of 
a black brigade composed of captured slaves from the Sea Islands, Davis 
was curious. "Can you make soldiers of them?" he inquired of Du Pont. 
As a student of history, he deemed the idea of arming of slaves 
eminently suitable. He noted that Napoleon incorporated blacks into 
his army in Egypt and that they fought well. "Why will they not do as 
well as the Bengal Sepoys?" Du Pont responded with high praise for 
Hunter's South Carolina black volunteers. "The batallions, after six 
weeks, drill better than my men after sixteen months of drilling," Du 
Pont answered. A second testimonial came from a slave Davis had 
inherited from his father. Old Frank Garner, "who went gunning with 
me to prevent my shooting myself instead of the birds" when he was a 
boy, paid Davis a surprise visit after many years of separation. A 
teamster who drove an ammunition wagon for the Army of the Potomac, 
Gamer told Davis of black men's courage in battle. Davis soon dis­
counted reports that blacks ran under fire saying they couldn't run 
worse than the white soldiers at Bull Run. "Let us hope the best and 
read in History and law that all men are of one blood and that not 
race but discipline and organization and a cause make soldiers of 
every race."33
On October 30, 1862, at Concert Hall in Newark, New Jersey, Davis
33HWD to SFDP, 11 July 1862, WMss 9-17208; SFDP to HWD, 8 July
1862, in Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters, II, 156; HWD to SFDP, c. 19
July 1862, WMss 9-17209.
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announced his support for enlisting blacks and for a strict confiscation 
bill, the two methods he preferred until a constitutional amendment 
establishing compensation could be passed. He urged a confiscation bill 
that went "deeper into the skin" than the "flimsy thing" passed by 
Congress. He wanted a confiscation bill that would sequester the lands 
of the Southern leaders and redistribute them as bounties to blacks who 
enlisted in the fight for freedom. Confiscation and a black army were 
the two legal methods he advocated for achieving emancipation.3l*
In Maryland the question of emancipation was widely discussed 
throughout 1862. Few politicians agreed with Davis that "the suppres­
sion of the rebellion carries with it the ultimate and not distant 
extinction of slavery everywhere." In January 1862 the "loyal" Maryland 
legislature, the General Assembly minus its imprisoned secessionist 
members, ratified the constitutional amendment that would forbid the 
Congress from ever abolishing slavery in the states. Almost all of 
Maryland's leading politicians were opposed to emancipation; every one 
of the six Maryland Congressmen owned slaves. Governor Bradford 
bitterly complained to Lincoln about the interference of the Federal 
government with Maryland slavery. While Congress debated an act to 
abolish slavery in the District of Colun&ia, the Maryland legislature 
unanimously opposed its passage, and when Congress enacted the bill 
former Governor Thomas Hicks pleaded with the President to veto the 
bill. When Lincoln proposed compensated emancipation for the border 
states, the entire Maryland delegation voted against it and Congressman 
Crisfield led the opposition. When Senator Pearce died in late
3l*Speeches and Addresses, 303-306.
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December 1862, Governor appointed Hicks to the unexpired term, 
signifying his conservative position on the slavery issue. Except for 
a small band of friends and the Republicans, Davis was alone in his 
fight for Maryland emancipation— alone except for Montgomery Blair.35
Postmaster General Blair was a longtime advocate of gradual, 
compensated emancipation with colonization. As a self-styled "dry 
nurse" to Maryland emancipation, he opposed immediate freedom for fear 
that such a move would bring on race war. Blair insisted on deportation 
and colonization since he opposed "the amalgamation of the races" and 
feared the creation of a "hybrid nation." Only an emancipation coupled 
with colonization on a separate continent or island would satisfy Blair. 
Davis disagreed. Colonization of blacks was an "impossibility," he 
declared; "and if it were practicable, it would not be desirable." The 
lands of the South needed to be cultivated and the nation could not 
afford to lose its agricultural labor force even if it was possible 
"pecuniarily or physically to remove four millions of them from the 
country." There was clearly a difference between the views of Davis 
and Blair.35
35Maryland Senate Journal 1861-1862, 164, 173; Maryland House 
Journal, 1861-1862, 97; Baltimore American, 9 January 1862; Bradford 
to Bates, 9 May 1862, Executive Letterbook, Maryland Hall of Records; 
Hicks to Lincoln, 26 May 1862, Hicks Mss, MdHS; Charles B. Calvert 
to Lincoln, 10 July, 3 August 1861, 6 May 1862, RTL, LC; J. A. Pearce 
to W. P. Fessenden, Fessenden Mss, LC; J. Crisfield to wife, 27 January, 
25 April 1862, Crisfield Mss, MdHS; Crisfield to Hicks, 28 June 1862, 
Hicks Mss, MdHS; Bradford to Hicks, 29 December 1862, Executive 
Letterbook, Maryland Hall of Reocrds; Baltimore Clipper. 30 December 
1862; HWD to Lincoln, 9 February 1863, John G. Nicolay Mss, LC.
36M. Blair to D. Wallack, 21 June 1862, Blair Mss, LC; M. Blair 
to Lincoln, 21 November 1861, in Smith, Blair Family in Politics, II, 
195; M. Blair to Allen B. Davis, 8 April 1862, Blair Mss, LC; "Speech 
of Hon. Montgomery Blair at the Union Mass Convention, Concord, N.H."
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Although Davis spoke of himself as being excluded from Maryland 
politics because of his emancipationist views, he was not, in fact, 
without political friends. Even in conservative Baltimore there were 
men, not only Republicans but Unionists, who came to favor a moderate 
emancipation program. In May of 1862, led by Archibald Stirling, Jr. 
and Henry Stockbridge, both close friends of Davis, the City Union 
Convention, the controlling body of the Union party in Baltimore, passed 
a series of resolutions which would have been inconceivable even a 
year before. They approved the President's plan for compensated 
emancipation and censured the legislature for not calling a constitu­
tional convention at its last session, a convention to destroy slavery 
and the slave power of the Maryland tidewater. Throughout 1862 they 
lobbied in Washington for passage of the ten million dollar compensated 
emancipation bill.37
During the Christmas season of 1862, Lincoln installed Major 
General Robert C. Schenck as the military commander of the Middle 
Department which included Maryland. Fifty-three year-old Schenck, 
Representative-elect from Ohio, soon became a close personal friend 
and political ally of Winter Davis. With Schenck's support the Union 
League was founded in Maryland and soon became the most powerful 
political organization in the city. The Union League, with John
(New York, 1863); M. Blair to S. L. M. Barlow, 10 October 1863, Barlow 
Mss, Huntington Library; Blair to Sumner, 25 October 1863, Blair Mss,
LC; "Speech of the Hon. Montgomery Blair at the Meeting Held at 
Cleveland," (New York, 1863). Also see Baker, Politics of Continuity, 
94-95.
37"Baltimore City Union Convention Resolutions— Archibald Stirling, 
Jr., President," (Baltimore, 1862), Thaddeus Stevens Mss, LC; Baltimore 
Clipper, 22, 29 May 1862.
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Dukehart, an old Davis Know-Nothing ally as president, was a military 
and patriotic association with passwords, hand shakes, and ceremony 
similar to the old Know-Nothings. Thus, even without aid from Bradford, 
Hicks, Blair and company, Davis was able to rebuild a powerful organ­
ization. "Our newly baptized Republican brothers of the Church of 
Davis and Co," as one critic labeled them, soon began to agitate for 
emancipation and to boom Davis for Congress.38
By March 1863 Davis had decided to run for Congress in the fall.
His opponent for the Union party nomination was a formidable one, Thomas 
Swann, former mayor of Baltimore and former president of the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad. But Davis' friends had the advantage of being better 
organized. In addition, Davis received word from the President that he 
would not intervene in the contest to support one Unionist over another. 
Davis' campaign manager, Judge Hugh Lennox Bond visited Lincoln after 
hearing rumors that Secretary Chase would throw the patronage of the 
powerful Treasury Department behind his old friend Swann. The President, 
concerned over the possibility that the Democrats might gain control of 
the House of Representatives, promised Bond he would be neutral. "Ah!" 
Davis crowed when informed of Lincoln's decision, "they are coming to 
their senses. I'll go now and see them." The President received Davis 
on March 17 and afterward wrote Davis a letter. "The supporters of the 
war should send no man to Congress who will not go into caucus with 
the unconditional supporters of the war," Lincoln wrote. "Let the
38Baltimore Clipper. 20 December 1862; HWD to SMDP, 1 January 
1963, WMss 9-17226; "Opening, Initiatory, and Closing Ceremonies for 
Union Leagues, August, 1862," (Baltimore, 1862); F. S. Corkran to 
M. Blair, 6 June 1862, RTL, LC.
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friends of the government first save the government, and then administer 
it to their own liking." Davis used Lincoln's letter to secure the 
impartiality of Secretary Chase and Postmaster General Blair.39
In May ward meetings were held all over the city to select 
delegates to the City Union convention. His supporters worked the 
ward meetings countering rumors that Swann was the candidate of the 
administration, endorsed by Blair and Chase. On Friday, June 5, 1863, 
the City Union congressional convention met at Temperance Temple.
Davis and Swann were nominated whereupon the outnumbered Swann delegates 
walked out of the convention in protest over the selection of the 
delegates. A ballot was taken despite the protest and Davis was 
nominated by a vote of 47 to 2.1+0
"I don't know whether to rejoice or mourn my nomination," Davis 
wrote Mrs. Du Pont, "— what follows no one knows.” There was reason 
to rejoice. The disaffected Swann supporters were soon reconciled to 
the Union party by hopes of electing Swann to the Senate to succeed 
Hicks. Swann, although bitter about the tactics of Davis' friends in 
the convention, nevertheless agreed not to run against Davis. But 
there was also much to mourn. Instead of supporting Davis, Postmaster 
General Blair refused to endorse his nomination and began to mount a
39H. L. Bond to Kate, 16 September 1862, Bond-McCulloch Mss, 
MdHS; Bond to SFDP, 1 March 1863, WMss 9-14336; Bond to SFDP, 23 
March 1863, WMss 9-14525; Lincoln to HWD, 18 March 1863, CWAL, VI,
140-141; HWD to Lincoln, 20 March 1863, RTL, LC.
^Baltimore Clipper, 19, 27 May, 6 June 1863; Hicks to James L.
Dorsey, 4 June 1863, Dorsey Mss, MdHS. Also see Nancy Anne Miller,
"Thomas Swann: Political Acrobat and Entrepreneur" (Virginia
Polytechnic Institute: M.A. thesis, 1969), 65, for Swann's efforts
to secure the nomination.
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strong opposition. "My nomination ought to be equivalent to an 
election," Davis wrote, "and it would be were Blair anything but a 
trickster utterly unreliable and treacherous as a monkey." Blair 
pushed Swann into the chairmanship of the Union State Central Committee, 
and urged Swann to make a run against Davis. Without Secretary Chase's 
backing, Swann refused. Despite Blair's call for a "man of stature" to 
oppose Davis, none volunteered except an alcoholic attorney, Henry 
Stump.1*1
Having won control of the Baltimore Union party, Davis' friends 
set out to capture the Maryland Union party. In the spring of 1863 
the Maryland Union League challenged the Union State Central Committee 
for leadership of the Union party. At Davis' suggestion, the Union 
League called a convention to nominate candidates for the top state 
offices contested in the upcoming election. Although startled by the 
transformation of the previously non-political Union League into a 
political party, the State Central Committee proceeded with a convention 
to nominate its own candidates.1*2
Sometime before either convention met, young William L. W. 
Seabrook, Commissioner of the Land Office, encountered Davis on a 
steamer from Baltimore to Annapolis. Seabrook protested the "irregular"
1*1HWD to SMDP, 12 June 1863, WMss 9-17260; W. G. Snethen to 
Chase, 8 June 1863, Chase Mss, LC; Swann to Chase, 8 June 1863,
Chase Mss, HSP; HWD to Morrill, 11 August 1863, Morrill Mss, LC;
Bond to Chase, 18 August 1863, Chase Mss, HSP; HWD to SFDP, 24 
August 1863, WMss 9-17273; Blair to Bradford, 12 September 1863,
Bradford Mss, MdHS; Donald (ed.), Inside Lincoln's Cabinet. 186;
Blair to Swann, 17 October 1863, Blair Mss, LC; Baltimore Clipper.
22 October 1863; Speeches and Addresses, 387.
^Baltimore Clipper, 29 May, 2 June 1863.
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action of the Union League. Unmoved, Davis replied that the loyalty of 
those who did not sustain emancipation was questionable and he had 
grown "impatient" with the "halfway measures" of the State Central 
Committee. Nevertheless, Davis did not discourage Seabrook from 
attempting to effect a compromise between the two groups.1*3
No arrangement was possible between the warring Union State and 
Union League conventions. They met separately and nominated separate 
slates for comptroller and land commissioner. The Union League 
convention also organized a new state central committee with an aim of 
carrying each Congressional election. In the First Congressional 
District, Davis' men nominated John A. J. Creswell to oppose the 
regular nominee, incumbent John W. Crisfield. In the Second District, 
incumbent Edwin H. Webster changed his views on emancipation 
sufficiently to be endorsed by the "Unconditionals." The radicals of 
the Fourth District supported incumbent Francis Thomas after Thomas 
made a pledge to support Lincoln's administration. The slaveholding 
counties which made up the Fifth Congressional District put Benjamin 
Gwinn Harris as the States' Rights party candidate and were surprised 
to see the Unconditional Unionists nominate John C. Holland. With a 
state wide ticket, Congressional candidates, and a legislative ticket, 
the Union League backed Unconditional Union party began its campaign 
for emancipation in the South and a new constitution abolishing slavery 
in Maryland.4 **
**3W. L. W. Seabrook, Maryland's Great Part in Saving the Union 
(n.p., 1913), 8-9.
^Baltimore Clipper, 17, 24 June 1863.
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The major issue raised in the campaign was the arming of slaves. 
While Davis was in Maine advocating the use of black soldiers, his 
campaign manager Judge Len Bond issued a public letter to Secretary of 
War Stanton requesting the Federal government to draft Maryland slaves 
to help fill Maryland's quota under the Conscription Act of 1863. 
Military service was the duty of all persons who enjoyed the protection 
of the government, Bond claimed, be they slave or free. If Congress 
allowed minors to serve in the army without compensation to their 
fathers, it should require service from a slave without compensation 
to his master. The protection of slaves from the draft was both 
unequal and unjust. "The government makes no such allowance to a poor 
father whose son is enlisted nor to a mechanic who apprentice is 
drafted," Bond concluded. The drafting of Maryland slaves became the 
central issue in the campaign.1'5
Although the enlistment of slaves was opposed by Postmaster Gen­
eral Blair, Governor Bradford, Senator Hicks, former Mayor Swann, and 
others, enlistments continued under the direction of General Schenck. 
General William Birney, son of the abolitionist James G. Birney, 
directed the recruitment of a black brigade in Maryland. Davis and the 
Unconditional Union party upheld Schenck's policy. In a speech at 
Philadelphia that was widely reprinted in Maryland, Davis advocated 
arming slaves. He applauded the conduct of black soldiers in the 
American Revolution, the War of 1812, and recently at Port Hudson, 
Louisiana. "Men are men in spite of the skin, and deeper than skin,"
l'5HWD to SFDP, 21 August 1863, WMss 9-17272; Baltimore American,
19 August 1863.
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he lectured, and ’’without a negro army an attempt at emancipation is 
idle." Once blacks were made soldiers they would have to be freed 
and given the rights of free laborers for "there is mightly little 
of the slave left in the man who has a musket on his shoulder."
Support for a black army was support for emancipation, he cried, "and 
the only question is whether the enlistment of the slaves will leave 
any to emancipate."416
Throughout the state Davis took his message of emancipation and 
black soldiers. In Baltimore, Rockville, Towsontown, and even on 
Maryland's Eastern Shore in such hostile towns as Cambridge, Denton, 
Easton, Salisbury, and Snow Hill, Davis attacked slavery and defended 
the arming of slaves. He capitalized on the widespread opposition to 
conscription by advocating the enlistment of slaves to fill the draft 
quota. His intense campaigning produced surprising results. "All 
opposition has been disorganized— even Blair has been obliged to call 
off his dogs," Davis noted. He credited "the astonishing development 
of the emancipation feeling" in Maryland to his "resolute determination." 
In October he wrote Senator Sumner that he was "certain of a popular 
majority for emancipation" and the election of at least three members 
of Congress and a majority of the Maryland General Assembly. With that 
"cometh the End," the end of slavery.1*7
^Bradford to Thomas, 9 September 1863, Swann to Bradford, 14 Sep­
tember 1863, Bradford Mss, MdHS; Donn Piatt, Memoirs of the Men Who 
Saved the Union (New York, 1887), 44-45; Baltimore Clipper, 16 September 
1863; Speeches and Addresses, 307.
^Baltimore Clipper, 25 September, 13, 15, 16, 29 October 1863;
HWD to Morrill, c. 26 September 1863, Morrill Mss, LC; HWD to Sumner,
21 October 1863, Sumner Mss, Harvard University.
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On election day, Davis was jubilant. The Unconditional Union 
candidate for comptroller won by a two to one margin, Davis and three 
other Unconditional Unionists were sent to Congress, and the party 
captured forty-seven of seventy-four seats in the House of Delegates, 
a majority sufficient to call a constitutional convention. "The 
revolution in this state is wonderful beyond all former experience in 
the U.S.," he wrote Du Pont. "Emancipation is the will of three- 
fourths of the people." Although the party was aided by a proclamation 
from General Schenck ordering the arrest at the polls of any man not 
willing to swear a loyalty oath, the victory was nevertheless an 
overwhelming endorsement of Davis' emancipation plan.48
Davis' re-election was a great personal triumph. His victory 
ended "two years of disappointment." After his defeat in 1861 he had 
watched the events of his time with dismay. "Oh! if there were only 
an ounce of brains in Washington!" was his constant cry. Everything 
seemed to be done too much, too little, or too late. In 1861 he had 
pleaded for 9,000 old muskets to arm a home guard when Baltimore was in 
perilous condition, but was refused. In July 1862, when Maryland was
48HWD to SFDP, 4 November 1863, WMss 9-17279. On the extent 
of military interference in the election see Charles L. Wagandt,
The Mighty Revolution; Negro Emancipation in Maryland, 1862-1864, 
especially Chapter 11, "Election by Sword and Ballot," 155-184. 
Wagandt's otherwise excellent study overstates the extent of 
interference and its significance. Instead see Jean H. H. Baker, 
Politics of Continuity, 88-91. J. G. Randall in Lincoln the 
President, III, 287-288, notes that the formula for the 39th Congress 
called for one representative for every 122,614 persons and that 
as Davis polled only six thousand votes it is questionable how much 
Davis represented the sentiment of Baltimore. Randall concludes, "His 
heavily overweighted influence in Congress was out of proportion to 
the constituency whose views he reflected." But Davis' vote in this 
election, as he had no formal opposition, compares favorably with 
the rest of the Unionist ticket and his vote in 1855 and 1861.
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secure, Blair asked Davis to raise a brigade. "It was pretty cool 
to ask me to spend $10,000 for them after a year of neglect and every 
species of annoyance in my state affairs," Davis complained. "The 
fools at the head of affairs!"1*9
Davis was troubled by the handling of military affairs. "Military 
force scientifically handled could have extinguished the rebellion" 
in one year, he thought. He was pleased when Lincoln dismissed Cameron 
as Secretary of War, but dismayed to find that Stanton had been appoint­
ed. "If the American government is to be subject to the crazy 
caprices of Stanton, I dont think it is worth the trouble that is taken 
to preserve it," he wrote.50
Davis' confidence in Secretary of State Seward declined as the 
war progressed. Seward's handling of the French invasion of Mexico 
was incompetent and degrading according to Davis. "Seward's tone is 
a whine of complaint— alternating with childish illusion," Davis noted. 
"He seems more bent on getting cotton for France and England than 
letting them know that they must submit to the inconveniences our war 
imposes on them." As the administration would not stand up to Louis 
Napoleon, Davis vowed that he would.51
**9HWD to SMDP, 9 October 1862, WMss 9-17221; HWD to SFDP, 14 
August 1862, WMss 9-17212; HWD to SFDP, 13 April 1863, WMss 9-17243; 
HWD to SFDP, 11 July 1862, WMss 9-17208.
50HWD to SFDP, 10 March 1862, WMss 9-17200; HWD to SMDP,
9 August 1862, WMss 9-17213; HWD to Morrill, 16 August 1862, Morrill 
Mss, LC; HWD to SFDP, 3 September 1862, WMss 9-17216; HWD to SFDP,
28 January 1863, WMss 9-17230.
51HWD to SFDP, 10 February 1863, WMss 9-17234; HWD to SFDP,
3 March 1863, WMss 9-17233; HWD to Sumner, 21 October 1863, Sumner
Mss, Harvard University.
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Even silverheaded Attorney General Edward Bates, formerly Davis' 
favorite for the presidency, came under Davis' attack. The Marylander 
had been extremely disappointed over the suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus by Lincoln and blamed this unconstitutional act on faulty 
legal advice. When Davis was engaged by Admiral Du Pont to represent 
him in the adjudication of prize cases, Davis was dismayed to see the 
incompetence in the Justice Department. Bates claimed to be ignorant 
of "salt water law" and turned the case over to a Buchanan Democrat.
"I begin to wonder over the absolute death of all high legal knowledge 
in the country," he lamented.52
Whatever the motives that initially brought Davis into conflict 
with other departments of the government, loyalty to his closest friend 
impelled him to break with the Department of the Navy. Late in 1862 
Secretary Welles and Assistant Secretary Gustavus Vasa Fox had ordered 
Admiral Du Pont to attack Charleston, South Carolina. Although Du Pont 
doubted that his monitors could take Charleston, Du Pont nevertheless 
led a massive attack on Forts Sumter and Moultrie. After his fleet 
was hit 439 times by enemy artillery, Du Pont, fearing complete disaster, 
called off the attack. His failure before Sumter was severely criti­
cized by correspondnet Charles C. Fulton, editor of the Baltimore 
American, the political organ of Postmaster General Blair. Recrimina­
tions for the defeat followed. Du Pont blamed poor planning and the 
previously untested monitors. The Navy Department blamed Du Pont and 
relieved him from duty. Davis was infuriated by the treatment Du Pont
52HWD to SFDP, 20 February 1863, WMss 9-17237, 23 February 1863,
WMss 9-17238, 1 March 1863, WMss 9-17232.
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received at the hands of the President, Welles, Fox, Fulton, and Blair. 
"Fulton is a fool and scroundrel combined," "a dirty puppy," Davis 
growled. When he found out that Fulton was with the fleet as Blair's 
post office agent he was indignant. "So Fox and Blair and Blair and 
Fox use Fulton— It seems as if my enemies were spiting me by attacking 
Du Pont. I am sorry he suffers for my sins."53
Davis' view that Du Pont's troubles were the result of "a Blair- 
Fox conspiracy" deepened his troubled relations with Blair. Their ties 
had never been very strong— Davis blamed Blair for losing a cabinet 
position and Blair was envious of Davis' following. They broke finally 
over the slavery issue. While Davis' forces swept Maryland for 
"unconditional emancipation," Blair was condeming the "radicals" and 
their policy of "amalgamation, equality, and fraternity." Blair worked 
hard to get Swann to run against Davis and tried to turn Lincoln against 
him. "Blair took the ground that I would go to Cong, to oppose the 
Adm.!" Davis remarked. "He thinks he is the Adm. If so, he is not 
far out about me." Blair was not far wrong. After "two years of dis­
appointment" Davis returned to Congress to settle his differences with 
Lincoln, Seward, Bates, Welles, and particularly Blair.54
53John D. Hayes, "Introduction," Du Pont Letters, I, lxxvii-xc;
HWD to SFDP, 13 April 1863, WMss 9-17243; 14/15 April 1863, WMss 
9-17244; Baltimore American, 15 April 1863; HWD to SMDP, 22 May 1863, 
WMss 9-17254.
54HWD to SFDP, 28 May 1863, WMss 9-17256; "Speech of the Hon. 
Montgomery Blair on the Revolutionary Schemes of the Ultra Abolition­
ists, and in Defense of the Policy of the President, Delivered at 
the Unconditional Union Meeting at Rockville, Montgomery Co., Maryland," 
(New York, 1863); HWD to SFDP, 4 November 1863, WMss 9-17279.
Chapter 14
PAYING DEBTS LONG DUE
Winter Davis went to Congress in December 1863 to settle some 
old scores with the Lincoln Administration. The latest issue to 
arouse his anger was the appointment of Brigadier General Henry H. 
Lockwood to succeed General Robert Schenck as commander of the Middle 
Department. When Schenck resigned his position to enter Congress,
Davis urged the appointment of Colonel Don Piatt, who would continue 
Schenck's policy of recruiting Maryland slaves for a Negro regiment. 
Lincoln considered Piatt a "good fellow," but thought Schenck and Piatt 
ran Maryland too independently. Davis saw Lincoln's action as a per­
sonal affront. "If this is the final answer of the Adm. to our 
application for Piatt to continue Schenck's policy," Davis thundered,
"I have a debt to pay which I am too honest to leave long due."1
If Davis' vow to "pay debts long due" gives some clue to his 
motives in the Thirty-Eighth Congress, so too does a close examination 
of what he hoped to achieve— emancipation in Maryland, a constitutional 
amendment prohibiting slavery everywhere, reform of the Navy, aid to 
French-occupied Mexico, and an end to the arbitrary encroachments and 
usurpations of the President. There was a confusion between Davis'
^HWD to SFDP, 5 December 1863, WMss 9-17284; Donn Piatt, Memories 
of Men Who Saved the Union, 46.
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personal and political purposes and his genuine Interest In reform—  
a confusion which Davis himself never resolved.
Before Davis could mount his campaign against the administration, 
he became engrossed in the organization of the House of Representatives. 
The acting clerk of the House, Emerson Etheridge, attempted to throw 
control of the House to a coalition of Democrats and border state 
Unionists by omitting names on the House roster of sixteen members 
pledged to support the administration, including the entire Maryland 
delegation. Etheridge, an old American party ally of Davis', omitted 
the names of the sixteen on the contention that their certificates of 
election were not valid according to the requirements of a law enacted 
the previous March. When apprized of Etheridge's "plot," Davis fumed 
that this was just what he had warned the last Congress might occur
when they were considering the law.2
At an administration caucus on Sunday, December 6, a committee of
five was appointed to deal with the "Etheridge plot." While committee­
men Henry L. Dawes and Frederick A. Pike visited Etheridge in an attempt 
to dissuade him from his purpose, committeemen James A. Garfield and 
Davis plotted more direct action. "We have planned a small campaign 
which has a fight as one of its remote contingencies ...," Garfield 
stated. Davis was ready to install a Republican "by any means 
necessary"— including force. Fortunately for the public peace, Ethe­
ridge allowed a motion by Dawes to add the names of the Maryland 
members after the roster was read. A test of strength developed on a
2HWD to SFDP, 11 December 1863, WMss 9-17286. The best account of 
the Etheridge plot is Herman Belz's "The Etheridge Conspiracy of 1863:
A Projected Conservative Coup," Journal of Southern History, 36 
(November, 1970), 549-567.
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motion to table Dawes' resolution, and the Republicans won. The names 
of the Maryland delegates and other excluded members were then added to 
the roll.3
With the addition of the sixteen, the administration had suffi­
cient strength to elect Republican Schuyler Colfax of Indiana as 
Speaker. But Davis predicted that the administration's supporters 
would not be "tame or subservient— It will hold the Adm. responsible—  
or revolt." He considered the balance of power in the House lay with 
"Schenck, Garfield, the Missouri men, and myself and Creswell, Smithers 
and some others" who would not fear to oppose Lincoln.1'
Colfax's election was followed by what Davis termed the "wretched 
scramble for places"— the committee appointments. He sought the 
chairmanship of the Committee on Naval Affairs, but instead had to 
settle for the chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Whereas Charles Sumner found the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee more influential than any cabinet post, Davis 
belittled the House committee for being largely occupied with "clerk's 
duties." He yearned for some larger, more challenging task.5
3S. S. Colfax to Charles Lanman, 16 August 1863, Charles Lanman 
Mss, LC; Lincoln to James W. Grimes, 29 October 1863, Lincoln to 
Hamlin, 29 October 1863, Lincoln to Frederick F. Low, 30 October 1863, 
CWAL, VI, 546-552; Lincoln to Zachariah Chandler, 30 October 1863, 
Chandler Mss, LC; Justin Morrill to Emerson Etheridge, 17 November 
1863, Morrill Mss, LC; Dennett, Diaries and Letters of John Hay, 123; 
Cox to Manton Marble, 5 December 1863, Manton Marble Mss, LC; Henry 
L. Dawes to wife, 6, 7 December 1863, Dawes Mss, LC; CG 38th-lst-4,
5; Garfield to home, 9 December 1863, in Theodore C. Smith, Life and
Letters of James Abram Garfield (New Haven, 1925), I, 365; HWD to 
SFDP, 11 December 1863, WMss 9-17286.
l*CG 39th-lst-7; HWD to SFDP, 11 December 1863, WMss 9-17286.
5HWD to SFDP, 11 December 1863, WMss 9-17286; David Donald,
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Davis' major concern in the Thirty-Eighth Congress was the issue 
of reconstruction. On December 8 the President issued his annual mes­
sage to Congress with an attached "Proclamation of Amnesty and Recon­
struction." This pronouncement laid out the President's program for an 
orderly transition from military rule to civilian government for the 
Southern states. It extended a full pardon to anyone who would take an 
oath of loyalty to the Constitution of the United States, excepting high 
civil, diplomatic, and military leaders of the Confederacy. When the 
number of white males equal to ten per cent or more of the state's vote 
in the Presidential election of 1860 had taken the oath, they could then 
re-establish the civil government by holding elections for state and 
local officials.
The immediate reaction to Lincoln's "Ten Per Cent Plan" was 
highly favorable. "Men acted as if the millennium had come," wrote 
the President's secretary, John Hay. Both radicals and conservatives 
seemed satisfied with Lincoln's course. Republican Senators Zachariah 
Chandler and Charles Sumner and Democratic Senators James Dixon and 
Reverdy Johnson joined in praising the document.
Shortly, however, a hostile reaction emerged. As Hay noted, "the 
millennium had not arrived." Thaddeus Stevens objected to the plan as 
undemocratic. "If ten men fit to save Sodom can elect a thousand 
Sodomites in Virginia," Stevens said, "then the democratic doctrine that 
the majority shall rule is discarded and ... we no longer have a repub-
Charles Sumner and the Rights of Man (New York, 1970), 14; CG 38th-lst-18.
6CG 38th-1st-12.
7Dennett, Diaries and Letters of John Hay, 131-132; Nicolay 
and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, IV, 109-110.
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lie, but the worst form of despotism." Others felt the proclamation 
would hinder the war effort. Senator William Pitt Fessenden of Maine 
wrote: "Abraham's proclamation, take it altogether, was a silly
performance .... Think of telling the rebels that they may fight as 
long as they can, and take a pardon when they have had enough of it."8
To Winter Davis, Lincoln's proclamation was not merely inept, it 
was "a grave usurpation upon the legislative authority of the people." 
In his view Congress was charged under Article IV, Section 4 of the 
Constitution to "guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 
Form of Government." The Southern states had rebelled and overthrown 
the legal governments. It was Congress' duty, not the President's, to 
restore the states to their proper condition. Davis had been appalled 
by Lincoln's proclamations, executive orders, and military regulations 
which invaded fields previously the domain of legislative action— his 
proclamation of martial law, the suppression of newspapers, the 
emancipation proclamation, the suspension of habeas corpus, the 
arbitrary arrests of citizens, and now a plan of reconstruction. Davis 
was determined to put an end to such sweeping presidential actions in 
the absence of congressional authorization.
When Thaddeus Stevens moved to send the President's plan to a 
standing committee, Davis moved that it be referred to a special select 
committee. After a short debate, the House sustained Davis' resolution 
for a special committee by a vote of 91 to 80. The following day, the
8Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, IX, 112; John Hope Franklin, 
Reconstruction: After the Civil War (Chicago, 1961), 19; Francis
Fessenden, Life and Public Services of William Pitt Fessenden, I, 
266-267.
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Speaker announced the membership of the Committee on the Rebellious 
States and named Davis as chairman. He and the other members faced an 
enormous task. Not only did they have to consider the President' plan, 
but as Congressman Henry Dawes' reported, "everybody abounds in schemes 
for settling the troubles in the rebel states— and at least six plans 
are offered in the House in the shape of a Bill."9
While deliberating reconstruction formulas, Davis found time to 
load a "mine to explode the Navy Dept." Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont, 
his closest friend, became involved in a protracted controversy with 
Secretary Welles and Assistant Secretary Gustavus Fox. It began 
April 7, 1863, when Du Pont's ironclads had attacked Fort Sumter and 
were pounded by Confederate artillery. Four of his ships were disabled 
and a fifth was so severely damaged that it sank the following morning. 
After consulting with his top commanders, Du Pont made a decision not 
to continue the attack the next day— a decision which proved highly 
controversial. Secretary Welles was extremely embarrassed by the 
failure of the attack on Charleston and blamed Du Pont. Admiral Du Pont, 
a proud man, accused Welles of forcing an ill-conceived plan of attack 
on him.10
One reporter among the score of correspondents with Du Pont's 
fleet was Charles C. Fulton, editor and reporter for the Baltimore 
American, the political organ of Postmaster General Blair, and a fierce 
critic of Winter Davis. Fulton received special privileges from
9CG 38th-lst-33; Henry L. Dawes to wife. 16 December 1863,
Dawes Mss, LC.
10HWD to SFDP, 16 January 1864, WMss 9-17298; Hayes, Du Pont 
Letters, I, lxiii-lxxv.
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Assistant Secretary Fox, Blair's brother-in-law, to cover the Charleston 
attack. When Fulton filed his report, he was fiercely critical of Du 
Pont. Under the headline "A Disgraceful Result," Fulton charged that 
Du Pont alone called for a halt to the attack, that seven of the nine 
monitors were still in fighting condition, and that if the attack had 
been continued for three hours longer Fort Sumter would have fallen.
As Assistant Secretary Fox had authority to censor Fulton's remarks,
Du Pont and Davis assumed that the report had official sanction. In 
official reports and letters Du Pont defended his course. A bitter 
exchange of letters with Welles led to his removal as commander of 
the South Atlantic blockading squadron, and Du Pont retired, an 
extremely bitter and wronged nnn.11
Throughout the entire period of dispute with the Navy Department 
Davis had been Du Pont's closest counsellor. Initially, Davis had 
advised patience, a courteous appeal to the President to review the 
case, and a possible libel suit against Fulton. Davis' cousin David, 
now a Supreme Court Justice, assured him that Lincoln would certainly 
restore Du Pont to his command or otherwise rectify the situation after 
he received all the facts. As time passed and the department and the 
President failed to act, Davis became increasingly impatient and criti­
cal of Welles and Fox. He enlisted two colleagues, Representative 
Jesse 0. Norton of Illinois and Senator Benjamin Franklin Wade of Ohio, 
to offer resolutions calling for the Navy Department to make public 
the correspondence between Du Pont and his superiors. Whan the full 
facts were made public, Davis thought, Du Pont would be exonerated by
^Hayes, Du Pont Letters, I, lxxiv-xc.
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the people, If not the government. But administration supporters, 
on Welles' advice, blocked efforts to make the correspondence public.12
In late February 1864, Davis became embroiled In a bitter debate 
with Representative Frank Blair, Jr. of Missouri, the younger brother 
of Montgomery. When the Charleston attack was mentioned during a 
discussion of a naval appropriations bill, Davis took the floor to say 
"if there be shame and humiliation in connection with the attack on 
Charleston, it is because the Department thought a cotton-spinner was 
better than an admiral to plan the execution," a sarcastic reference to 
Assistant Secretary Fox's former employment in textiles. Frank Blair 
rose to defend his in-law Fox from the charge of "cotton-spinner" 
whereupon Davis deftly challenged him to call for the facts. The 
following Monday, Frank Blair introduced a resolution calling on the 
Secretary of the Navy to submit all correspondence on the attack on 
Charleston, including Welles' and Fox's evaluations. This went beyond 
Davis' request for the correspondence and allowed the department to 
color the case.13
Welles responded to the House's request with a six-hundred page, 
self-serving document entitled Report of the Secretary of the Navy in 
Relation to Armored Vessels. Its ponderous size and style gave the 
appearance of being a substantial rebuttal to Du Pont's charges. The 
report brought the controversy to a stalemate, and both Admiral and
12CG 38th-lst-38, 43; HWD to SFDP, 19 December 1863, WMss 9-17289,
also in Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters, III, 297; HWD to SFDP, 26 
December 1863, WMss 9-17292; HWD to SFDP (Private), 26 December 1863, 
WMss 9-17293.
13CG 38th-lst-830, 877; Beale (ed.), Diary of Gideon Welles, I,
531; HWD to SFDP, 1 March 1864, WMss 9-17303.
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Mrs. Du Pont requested Davis to drop the case. Du Pont had not been 
reinstated or vindicated by the department. Nevertheless, he was 
pleased with Davis* efforts. If it had not been for "fear of my friends, 
particularly of Winter Davis whose tongue and pen they greatly fear,"
Du Pont wrote, the Navy Department would have arrested him and court- 
martialed him before a packed court.11*
Unwilling to drop the matter until he had the upper hand, Davis 
devised a "mine" to explode Welles. It was a bill to create a "Board 
of Admiralty." Convinced that "Welles is a fool," Davis wanted a board 
of naval officers to limit the power of Welles and Fox over technical 
and operating matters. In Davis' view, it was Welles' unquestioning 
confidence in the monitors which had led to Du Pont's drubbing at 
Charleston. The monitors could withstand punishment fairly well, but 
they could not inflict great damage. Davis* proposed board would make 
decisions regarding "such grave questions as how to construct an 
Ironclad Fleet and proper Engines." On April 11, 1864, he introduced 
the bill which was referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs where it 
remained submerged for the rest of the session.15
Not all of Davis' attention that winter was directed at antagon­
ists in Washington. As undisputed Unconditional Unionist leader in 
Maryland, he directed his forces in the Maryland legislature to complete
^Hayes, Du Pont Letters, I, xcii; HWD to SMDP, 23 April 1864,
WMss 9-17316; SFDP to William Whetten, 15 August 1864, in Hayes (ed.),
Du Pont Letters, III, 368.
15HWD to SFDP, 24 December 1863, WMss 9-17291; HWD to SFDP, undated, 
January 1864, WMss 9-17296; SFDP to HWD, 25 January 1864, in Hayes 
(ed.), Du Pont Letters, III, 310; CG 38th-1st-1531; HWD to SFDP, 21 
April 1864, WMss 9-17315; HWD to SFDP, 17 or 18 May 1864, WMss 9-17322.
the job that had begun with the election in November. The Unconditional 
Unionists, those who supported immediate emancipation in Maryland, had 
secured a majority in the upcoming Maryland General Assembly where they 
planned to call a constitutional convention to rid the state of the 
"peculiar institution." Between the November election and the January 
session, however, Davis' control slipped while conservative Unionists 
Montgomery Blair, Senator Hicks, and Mayor Swann's strength increased. 
Stunned by the overwhelming mandate for emancipation in Maryland, Blair, 
Hicks, and Swann began to advocate immediate emancipation with some 
form of compensation. "The creeper Blair was among the first— with the 
marvelous instinct of his class— to hear the sound of the people's 
feet coming to him," Davis commented. Many not as ardent for emancipa­
tion as "the Davis school," but who nevertheless opposed slavery, turned 
to Blair, Hicks, and Swann for leadership. In addition, Davis' 
supporters fought among themselves for position and patronage. A 
contest between two Davisites, William J. Jones of Cecil County and 
Henry S. Stockbridge of Baltimore City, resulted in the election of 
conservative Thomas H. Kemp of Queen Anne's County as Speaker of the 
House of Delegates. The election of Kemp "gave our enemies everything," 
Davis complained. Early in the session came another example of Davis' 
lack of control. Judge Thomas A. Spence, a Davis partisan and an 
Unconditional Unionist, was defeated in the caucus by incumbent Senator 
Hicks for the nomination of the United States Senate. Davis worried 
about the future of emancipation in Maryland if it was controlled by 
"those creeping things"— Blair, Hicks, and Swann.16
16Levin E. Straughn to Creswell, 23, 28 November 1863, John A. J. 
Creswell Mss, LC; Samuel Harrison Journal, 25 November 1863, MdHS;
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Davis' worry was not whether there would be a constitutional 
convention, for all Unionists agreed upon that. The issue was how the 
call would be made. While many conservative Unionists wished to post­
pone the convention for from two to four years, the Davisites wanted an 
immediate election to decide for or against a constitutional convention 
with a simultaneous selection of delegates. Davis also feared that 
Confederate sympathizers would be allowed to vote, which would result in 
throwing the control of the convention to those in favor of compensated 
emancipation. The convention bill which finally passed the General 
Assembly was a compromise. It provided for an immediate convention and 
selection of delegates. But gone from the Unconditional Unionists' bill 
was the oath of allegiance which would have prohibited Confederate 
sympathizers from voting. Included were provisions to prohibit unin­
vited Union army troops from patrolling the polls as in the 1863 
election. All this spelled trouble to Davis. He charged that lukewarm 
emancipationists and proslavery advocates had formed a coalition to try 
"to get the majority of the convention and plunder the State treasury 
of six or seven million of the sinking fund or create a new debt to pay 
the slave owners who refused what Congress offered last year."17
To ensure the success of the convention and his unconditional 
emancipationists at the polls, Davis wanted a more resolute man than 
General Lockwood as commander of the Middle Department. On January 25, 
1864, he called on Lincoln at the White House. He urged the appointment
Thomas Swann to Chase, 27 December 1863, Chase Mss, HSP; William J.
Jones to Creswell, 12 January 1864, Bond to Creswell, 19 January 1864, 
George Earle to Creswell, 18 January 1864, Creswell Mss, LC; HWD to 
SFDP, 16 January 1864, WMss 9-17298.
17HWD to SFDP, 28 January 1864, WMss 9-17299.
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of Colonel Don Platt or even Brigadier General William Bimey, both 
strong emancipationists, to replace Lockwood. Lincoln refused with 
unusual bluntness. Lincoln said "he considered the difference a per­
sonal quarrel and would do nothing to aid one set to vent their spite 
on another." Davis was insulted by the President's reply and without 
speaking took his hat and left the room. Davis considered the break 
complete. Henceforth there would be no need for further political 
connections with Lincoln.18
On the following day the President sent David Davis to visit his 
cousin. The rotund Supreme Court Justice assured Winter that Lincoln 
had not meant to be offensive. The insult did not matter, Winter 
replied, "the important part of this is that Lincoln is thoroughly 
Blairized" and would not aid the emancipation crusade in Maryland. If 
unconditional emancipation was lost in Maryland, Davis threatened, he 
would make sure that Lincoln did not get Maryland's electoral votes in 
November. A month later Justice Davis again visited his cousin with a 
peace offering from Lincoln. Anyone Davis wanted whom Stanton would 
approve would be given command of the Middle Department. Major General 
Lew Wallace, later famous as the author of Ben Hur, received the commis­
sion and was instructed to aid the cause of emancipation, but not to 
have it said that "the bayonet had anything to do with the election."19
Lew Wallace proved to be a very able politician. After negoti­
ating with Davis, he paid a full-dress uniform visit to Governor
18Ibid.; Blair to Bradford, 26 January 1864, Bradford Mss, MdHS.
19HWD to SFDP, 28 January 1864, WMss 9-17299; Lew Wallace, Lew 
Wallace; An Autobiography (New York, 1906), II, 668; HWD to SFDP,
5 March 1864, WMss 9-17305; S. T. Wallis to W. W. Glenn, 9 March 1864, 
Glenn Mss, MdHS.
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Augustus Bradford in Annapolis. Bradford promised to call for troops 
when local officials asked for them, and he agreed to a loyalty oath 
more stringent than Schenck's oath in 1863. Davis was delighted with 
the transformation Wallace had effected in Bradford.20
With typical energy Davis entered the campaign for emancipation
in Maryland. He crisscrossed the state stumping for the convention
and in behalf of Unconditional Unionist candidates. Typical of his
many speeches was his address to the Maryland Unconditional Union 
convention on April 1. He told the spellbound audience that a new 
constitution would not only end slavery but crush the slaveholders who 
controlled the state. Through "rotten-borough counties," he said, the 
slave power dominated the legislature taking "to themselves the lion's 
share of our political honor, and to cast upon you the ass's share of 
every political burden." He spurned compensated emancipation. Two 
years before the comptroller's report had estimated the value of slaves 
at fourteen million dollars for tax purposes. Now, he railed, when 
slavery is threatened, they claim the value to be thirty million 
dollars. Slavery was just another political institution like the 
tariff, he argued. When the tariff was changed and fortunes were 
destroyed, no compensation was offered. None should be offered now. 
"Four generations of uncompensated labor" was the slaveholders' 
compensation.2!
A central argument of the Blair-Hicks-Swann faction was that
20Wallace, Lew Wallace, II, 682; Lincoln to Stanton, 31 March
1864, CWAL, VII, 276-277.
21Speeches and Addresses, 385-392.
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Davis stood for Negro suffrage which would lead to Negro equality.
Again and again they tried to pin the label of " amalgamations t" upon 
him. In speech after speech, Davis countered the charge while never 
directly refuting it. "I am perfectly content that the negro shall be 
equal with them, but not with me or my friends," he mocked. Those who 
were afraid of Negro equality were not much above it. "In my judgment, 
they that are afraid of marrying a negro woman had better go to the 
Legislature and petition for a law to punish them if they are guilty 
of that weakness." He labeled the charge of being in favor of Negro 
equality a "smear" to defeat emancipation.22
On election day the voters of Maryland approved the convention by 
a vote of 31,593 to 19,524 and gave Davis' Unconditional Unionists 
majority control of the convention. Pleased by the results, Davis 
wrote two letters. To General Lew Wallace he wrote a congratulatory 
letter praising him for his part in the "great cause." Davis was 
particularly grateful for Wallace's conversion of Governor Bradford from 
foe to a friend of unconditional emancipation. "You managed Bradford
to a marvel," Davis wrote. But to President Lincoln he sent a short,
factual note relating the returns. "All the free counties— electing 
half the delegates, 48— are unanimous for emancipation .... The 
emancipationists can count now a clear majority." There was no thanks 
for Lincoln's letters, appointments, or other aid for "the great cause."23
22M. Blair to T. G. Pratt, 27 March 1864, Blair Mss, LC; Baltimore
Clipper, 8 April 1864; Speeches and Addresses, 389.
23HWD to Lew Wallace, undated, in Wallace, Lew Wallace, II, 683;
HWD to Lincoln, 7 April 1864, RTL, LC; HWD to SFDP, 8 April 1864, WMss 
9-17309; George Vickers to Bradford, 8 April 1864, Bradford Mss, MdHS; 
for a complete account of the election see Wagandt, The Mighty Revolu­
tion, 197-220.
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Wholly disenchanted with Lincoln, Davis hoped for a change In the 
leadership of the country In the upcoming presidential election. "I 
really fear Lincoln is inevitable" as the Republican party nominee,
Davis wrote Du Pont, but "still the matter is not yet settled." But he 
refused to join the group organizing to support Treasury Secretary 
Salmon Chase for the presidency. "Mr. Cahse professes well but prac­
tices poorly," Davis contended. Like Lincoln, Chase tried to remain 
friends with both factions in Maryland. "They can't be friends with me 
and my enemies at once," Davis said. He feared that the time was coming 
when he would be forced to either "retire into myself where I dwelt for 
the last two years and a half— or come to an open war" with Lincoln. 
Davis was not the type of man to walk away from a fight. And his posi­
tion as chairman of two committees, the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and the House Committee on the Rebellious States, gave him ample 
opportunity to make a fight and try to bring Lincoln down.21*
The House Foreign Affairs committee was occupied with common­
place business until the young Mexican Minister, Mat^as Romero, 
interested Davis in Mexico's problems. In later 1861 and early 1862,
21*HWD to SFDP, 11 December 1863, WMss 9-17286; HWD to SFDP, 31 
December 1863, WMss 9-17295. Several historians have incorrectly 
associated Davis with the "Chase Boom" and even with the "Pomeroy 
Circular" of Febraury 1864; see Fawn M. Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens; 
Scourge of the South (New York, 1959), 197, among others. Often
the source for the charge is a letter written by the author of the 
Pomeroy Circular, J. M. Winchell, to the New York Times on 15 September 
1874 (see Brodie, Stevens, 197, 397 fn. 42). In his article Winchell 
makes no mention of Davis. It is hard to form a conclusive judgment 
about a negative issue, but the evidence strongly indicates that Davis 
did not have a part in the Pomeroy Circular and did not support Chase, 
although many of his friends did; see "Organization to make S. P.
Chase President, 9 December 1863," signed by Henry W. Hoffman,
Frederick Schley, and John F. McJilton, Chase Mss, LC.
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France, Spain and England had sent troops to Mexico to force the 
collection of Mexican debts. Even after the three nations negotiated 
a settlement with the government, the French remained, augmented their 
troops, and began to make war upon the government of President of Benito 
Juarez. This flagrant violation of the Monroe Doctrine was largely 
ignored by Secretary of State Seward who did not think that Mexico was 
an immediate problem. The Civil War and the possibility that some 
European nation might recognize and assist the Confederacy occupied 
Seward's time and he preferred a policy of "masterly inactivity" in 
regard to Mexico.25
Congress, too, was disinterested in the French invasion of Mexico. 
Only a hard-drinking Democratic Senator from California, James A. 
McDougall, championed the Mexican cause in Congress. A political 
opponent of the administration, McDougall was also genuinely disturbed 
by the disruption of trade on the Pacific coast. But other than 
McDougall, the Congress was silent on Mexico.26
Although long sympathetic to the struggle for republican govern­
ment in Mexico, Davis decided to take up Mexico's cause in Congress only
25Three studies published in the early 1930s carefully cover 
France's imperialistic schemes: see J. Fred Rippy, The United States
and Mexico (New York, 1931), 260; James H. Callahan, American Foreign 
Policy in Mexican Relations (New York, 1932), 433; and Dexter Perkins, 
The Monroe Doctrine. 1826-1867 (Baltimore, 1933), 427. A recent study 
of the problem is Alfred Jackson Hanna and Kathryn Abbey Hanna, 
Napoleon III and Mexico: American Triumph over Monarchy (Chapel Hill,
1971), 47-57. Seward’s role is described in Glyndon G. Van Deusen, 
William Henry Seward (New York, 1967), 365-370.
26Russell Buchanan, "James A. McDougall— A Forgotten Senator," 
California Historical Society Quarterly. 15 (1936), 199-212; also see 
Robert W. Frazer, "Trade between California and the Belligerent Powers 
during the French Intervention in Mexico," Pacific Historical Review, 
15 (1946), 390-399.
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after Romero convinced him that the Mexican question might decide the 
next American presidential election. Since the election of Polk, policy 
toward Mexico had influenced presidential campaigns. It seemed logical 
to Davis that the crisis in Mexico might again affect the election 
despite the Civil War. Long a critic of Seward's policies and his 
conservative position on emancipation, Davis took up the French inter­
vention in Mexico as a potential campaign issue as well as from a 
sincere desire to aid the Mexican people.27
Davis' involvement in the Mexican question began gradually.
Several times in Congress he denounced France's designs on Mexico but 
without offering a resolution condemning France's course. However, 
when Representative John A. Kasson of Iowa introduced a joint resolution 
declaring that Congress opposed the imposition of a monarchial system of 
government in Mexico, Davis became more deeply involved for the resolu­
tion was referred to his committee. The administration pressured Davis 
to delay action on the resolution. "Seward thinks L[ouis] N[apoleon] 
wants to get out of Mexico," Davis confided to Du Pont, "and does not 
want any declaration of policy in Congress."28
To counter Seward's influence, Romero, one of the most skillful 
diplomats and political intriguers of his day, sent Davis copies of 
the official French newspaper Mbniteur which reported that Lincoln 
and Seward approved Napoleon Ill's course in Mexico. Then Romero 
visited Davis and insisted that if the House approved Kasson's
270n Davis' early interest in the Republic of Mexico see his
speech on 24 September 1863, "No Peace Before Victory," Speeches and 
Addresses, 336.
28CG 38th-lst-410; HWD to SFDP, 4 March 1864, WMss 9-17304.
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resolution it would Increase the unpopularity of the expedition In
France and would make the Mexican people redouble their efforts to
resist the Invasion. Finally Romero interested Davis in the political
angle. "It is believed here, and not without foundation," Romero wrote,
"that the Mexican question can decide the next presidential election."29
Convinced by Romero of the necessity and the political expediency
of a congressional statement on the French intervention, Davis, on
April 4, abandoned Kasson*s mild resolutions and introduced a strongly
worded joint resolution. It declared,
That the Congress of the United States were unwilling by 
silence to leave the nations of the world under the impression 
that they are indifferent spectators of the deplorable events 
now transpiring in the Republic of Mexico; and that they there­
fore think it fit to declare that it does not accord with the 
policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchial 
government erected on the ruins of any republican government 
under the auspices of any European power.
Davis coupled his resolution with an impassioned speech in which he
pleaded for a reversal of the Democratic party's expansionist foreign
policy and instead urged Americans to cultivate the friendship of "the
sisterhood of American republics."30
After a brief discussion, Davis' resolution was adopted by a vote
of 109 to 0. The overwhelming approval of the resolution indicated
29Matfas Romero, Correspondencia de la lagacion mexicana 
Washington durante la intervencion extanjera (Mexico, 1870-1892), IV,
20, 21, 23-24, 76-78, 100-102, 108-109, 112-113; HWD to SFDP, 4 March 
1864, WMss 9-17304; CG 38th-lst-825, 909. On Matfas Romero see 
Marvin Goldwert's excellent article, "Matfas Romero and Congressional 
Opposition to Seward's Policy toward the French Intervention in Mexico," 
Americas, 22 (July, 1965), 22-40. Also see Robert R. Miller, "Matfas 
Romero: Mexican Minister to the United States during the Juarez-




the growing popular Indignation over the French Intervention In Mexico 
and growing disapproval of Seward's handling of It. The resolution went 
to the Senate where Charles Sumner, at Seward's request, burled it In 
committee.3*
The Davis resolution had an Immediate effect both at home and 
abroad. The New York Herald endorsed the House action and criticized 
"the namby-pamby, wishy-washy foreign policy of the administration."
It editorialized that if the administration could not remedy its faulty 
policy, then "it must be superseded. This is really the position of 
the House of Representatives." The Washington Daily Morning Chronicle, 
the Philadelphia Age, the Cincinnati Gazette, the New York World and 
many other journals agreed with the unanimous vote of censure and urged 
the administration to reform its ways. Even the proadministration New 
York Times declared that the vote on the resolution was "but the 
expression of the universal feeling of the people."32
The government of France reacted sharply to the Davis resolution. 
The French charge d'affaires in Washington demanded an immediate explan­
ation from the State Department. But before Seward's explanation could 
be conveyed to France, the French Foreign Minister, Dryouyn de l'Huys, 
was informed of the resolution and called for the American minister.
"Do you bring us peace of war?" de l'Huys asked. The American minister 
brought peace. Seward's explanation arrived shortly informing the
31Ibid.; Edward L. Pierce, Memoirs and Letters of Charles Sumner 
(Boston, 1894), IV, 193; Donald, Sumner and the Rights of Man, 142-143.
32New York Herald. 6 April 1864; Washington Daily Morning Chronicle, 
8 April 1864; Philadelphia Age, 6 April 1864; Cincinnati Gazette, 13 
April 1864; New York World, 7 April 1864; New York Times, 6 April 1864.
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French government that although the resolution "was a true Interpreta­
tion of the unanimous sentiment of the people of the United States," 
the House of Representatives could not determine the policy of the 
government. Any change In that policy, Seward wrote, would come from 
the Executive. Seward's explanation of the Davis resolution eased the 
crisis In Franco-American relations. But Louis Napoleon's Mbnlteur 
touched off a controversy in America when it published statements that 
the United States had given "satisfactory explanations" of the House 
resolution.33
One week before the National Union party nominating convention, 
Davis lauched a major attack on Seward and the administration. On 
May 23 he pushed a resolution through the House calling on the executive 
department to communicate to the House the explanation given to the 
French government. That evening Lincoln and Seward met at the White 
House to draft a reply to what John Hay called "Winter Davis' guerilla 
Resn." Hay worried that Davis' call for the correspondence between 
Seward and the French was "introduced from the worst motives" and that 
if made public might cost Lincoln his party's nomination. To appear to 
truckle to the will of a foreign power was a weakness the American 
people would not tolerate. But Hay worried for naught. When Davis 
tried to introduce a resolution condemning the administration for 
commenting on his earlier resolution to the French, the House refused 
to suspend the rules to entertain his motion.34
33Van Deusen, Seward, 368; Callahan, American Foreign Policy, 295; 
W. H. Seward to W. L. Dayton, 7 April 1864, in CG 38th-1st-356; CG 
38th-lst-2427.
3**CG 39th-lst-2427; Lincoln to the House of Representatives, 24 May 
1864, CWAL, VII, 359; John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Complete Works of
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In June, after two weeks of Illness, Davis returned to the House 
and continued his attack on Lincoln and Seward. On June 27 he Intro­
duced the following resolution: "Resolved, That the Congress has a
constitutional right to an authoritative voice In declaring and 
prescribing the foreign policy of the United States ... and It Is the 
constitutional duty of the President to respect that policy." This 
resolution was both a political manuever designed to discredit the 
President's foreign policy and an earnest attempt to restore to Congress 
its constitutional role in developing foreign policy. Secretary of 
State Seward saw only the political angle and called the resolution 
"a fulcrum" to pry the administration from office. Attorney General 
Bates thought Davis a "bold man" who was shooting for "the leadership 
of his faction" by tying to establish the supremacy of Congress over 
the President. Bates predicted that Davis would "kill himself off" for 
"the original radicals will not trust him— His knavery is of a different 
sort from theirs." Bates was correct. The House of Representatives 
proved to be in no mood to embarrass the President or to engage in a 
constitutional struggle in the midst of a presidential campaign. It 
voted to print Davis' resolution, but despite Davis' demand for a vote 
on it, the resolution was tabled and effectively killed for the 
session.35
Step by step Davis had tried to settle "old debts." He failed
Abraham Lincoln (New York, 1905), X, 121, 136-137; Dennett, Diaries 
and Letters of John Hay, 184; HWD to SFDP, c. 1 June 1864, WMss 
9-17328; CG 38th-lst-2741, 2776.
35CG 38th-lst-3309; Seward to Bigelow, 6 June 1864, in John 
Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life (New York, 1909-1917), II, 
192; Beale (ed.), Diary of Edward Bates, 380.
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in his fight with Welles and then with Seward. But it was not over 
the administration of the Navy or the conduct of foreign policy— but 
over Lincoln's reconstruction plans that Davis made his most determined 
effort.
Chapter 15
NO CONFIDENCE IN LINCOLN
No President asserted his right to govern In the absence of 
congressional authorization more than Abraham Lincoln. To save the 
Union he Ignored the Constitution and the laws. "As commander-in­
chief," he said, "... I suppose I have a right to take any measure 
which may best subdue the enemy." Accordingly he raised armies, spent 
money, suspended habeas corpus, suppressed newspapers, and dictated the 
terms by which the South would re-enter the Union, all without congres­
sional sanction.1
Winter Davis was out of Congress during the first two years of 
Lincoln's administration. He returned the week Lincoln proclaimed 
his policy of reconstruction. Davis called Lincoln's Ten Per Cent 
Plan "a grave usurpation upon the legislative authority of the people." 
In place of the President's plan, the Committee on the Rebellious 
States on February 15, 1864 reported Davis' own plan for reconstruction 
of the Southern states. After a brief debate, the House ordered Davis' 
bill, H. R. No. 244, to be printed and referred back to committee.2
1John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln 
(New York, 1905), VIII, 32; J. G. Randall, Constitutional Problems Under 
Lincoln (Urbana, 1951), 36-41, 378; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The 
Imperial Presidency (Boston, 1973), 60-64.
2The origins of the Davis Bill are uncertain. John Sherman in 
Recollections of Forty Years, I, 359, states that sometime during the
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On the following day the House took up the question of admitting 
representatives from newly reconstructed Arkansas. Davis objected to 
seating them on the ground that "the admission of a member of the House 
presupposes the existence of the State." Lincoln's proclamation was 
insufficient for establishing state governments in Arkansas, Louisiana, 
or elsewhere, he insisted. He labeled the government established under 
Lincoln's direction in Louisiana as an "hermaphodite government, half 
military, half republican, representing the alligators and frogs of 
Louisiana." The establishment of state government must be done by the 
House, the Senate and the President, he argued. He therefore called on 
the House to call up his bill from committee— but his motion was de­
feated. 3
37th Congress (of which Davis was not a member), Davis drafted a bill 
"to guarantee to each state a republican form of government." The bill 
provided for the orderly return of the rebellious states to the Union, 
for the election of a constitutional convention for each state, and 
for the election of Senators and Representatives to Congress. "I 
introduced it at his request," Sherman recalled. "It was referred to 
the judiciary committee, but was not acted upon it." Sherman wrote 
that this was the "same bill" Davis later introduced as H. R. No. 244.
In his penetrating study of war-time reconstruction, Reconstructing 
the Union: Theory and Policy during the Civil War (Ithaca, 1969), 319,
Professor Hetman Belz doubts the accuracy of Sherman's recollections of 
the origins of the bill. However, among Sherman's undated correspon­
dence in the Library of Congress (Vol. 54) is a letter from Davis that 
begins: "I send you the draft of a Bill enbodying the principles we
were discussing the other evening." As the body of the letter discusses 
the admission of West Virginia and the possibility of Governor Francis 
Pierpont moving to Alexandria, it most probably was written sometime 
between 10 December 1862 and Pierpont's move to Alexandria on 20 June 
1863. A search of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary's records in 
both the National Archives and the Library of Congress (printed bills) 
failed to uncover a copy of a bill resembling Davis'. Thus, the 
question of whether Davis drafted the bill in 1862 or as a response 
to the President's proclamation of December 1863 remains in doubt.
3CG 38th-lst-682-686.
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It was not until March 22, over three months after he was named 
chairman, that Davis was able to bring up H. R. No. 244 for a third 
reading and debate. His bill embodied his most matured thoughts on 
reconstruction. Though more stringent than Lincoln's plan, his bill 
was significantly more conservative than the program later adopted and 
known as Radical Reconstruction. Furthermore, his plan was a congres­
sional one and was a step toward limiting the growth of the war powers 
of the Executive in time of peace. *♦
Davis' bill was divided into fourteen parts. The first authorized 
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint 
a provisional military governor for each seceded state. Whenever in 
any state military resistance ceased, the governor was to enroll each 
male citizen who would take an oath of allegiance. When a number equal 
to ten per cent of the 1860 electorate took such an oath, the state 
could then election delegates to a convention. The third section 
established the size of the convention and representation based on the 
white population. The fourth declared that the delegates would be 
elected by "white male citizens." The fifth excluded from voting any 
person who held "any office, civil or military, state or confederate, 
under the rebel usurpation," as well as any man who had "voluntarily 
borne arms against the United States." The sixth concerned the conven­
ing of the convention. The seventh established two important stipula­
tions. First, the convention acting for the state had to declare 
"their submission to the constitution and laws of the United States." 
Second, it had to write into its new constitution provisions to exclude
‘♦Ibid., 1243.
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high-ranking Confederates from voting or office-holding, to abolish 
slavery forever, and to repudiate the Confederate debt. Section eight 
provided that when the constitution had been approved by a vote of all 
qualified citizens, the governor could call state elections, and the 
final result was to be approved by Congress. Then Congress would 
authorize the President to issue a proclamation declaring that the 
state was restored to the Union. The tenth section re-established the 
laws of the states before rebellion, except those pertaining to slavery. 
The eleventh stipulated that taxes should be collected as before the 
rebellion.
The remaining sections included highly controversial provisions. 
Long doubtful of the legality of the Emancipation Proclamation, Davis 
provided in section twelve "that all persons held in slavery were freed." 
Davis also thought the Emancipation Proclamation was insufficient to 
protect the rights of freedmen. Thus section thirteen extended the 
protection of the courts to the newly freed slaves. It provided that 
any person interfering with the liberty of a person declared free by 
this act would be fined no less than $1,500 and imprisoned not less 
than five nor more than twenty years. The final section declared that 
all persons who after the passage of the bill held office in the rebel 
government or military were not citizens of the United States.5
Many provisions of the Davis Bill coincided with many terms in 
Lincoln's Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, but several were
5Among the places "An act to guarantee to certain States whose 
Governments have been usurped or overthrown a Republican Form of 
Government" can be found is Henry S. Commager's Documents of American 
History (8th ed.; New York, 1968), 436-439.
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sharply antagonistic to It. The two plans were In agreement on the 
exclusion of higher ranking officers of the Confederate government and 
army, on the appointment of provisional governors, and surprisingly, 
on the exclusion of Negroes from oath-taking, voting for representa­
tives and office-holding.
But Davis and Lincoln disagreed on emancipation, the loyalty oath, 
and control of reconstruction. Both Lincoln and Davis favored the 
adoption of an amendment to the Constitution prohibiting slavery, but 
until one was adopted Lincoln thought that the President had the power 
to free the slaves whereas Davis felt it was a congressional respon­
sibility. Lincoln held to the theory that in time of war the Consti­
tution restrains the President less than it does the Congress. He 
conceived of his Emancipation Proclamation as an extension of his 
war-making powers. Ye Lincoln, himself, in conversation with a 
trusted advisor, doubted that if he freed the slaves during the war 
that they would remain free after the war. Davis held that Congress 
had the power to emancipate the slaves. As the southern states were 
in rebellion, there were no duly constituted governments in those 
states. And the Constitution provided that "the United States shall 
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." 
Therefore, the Congress became the legislative body for the states in 
rebellion and as their government could abolish slavery.6
6Theodore C. Pease and James G. Randall (eds.), The Diary of 
Orville H. Browning (Springfield, 1925), I, 555. For a view of the 
constitutionality of Davis' position, see Charles 0. Lerche, Jr., 
"Congressional Interpretations of the Guarantee of a Republican Form 
of Government during Reconstruction," Journal of Southern History.
15 (May, 1949), 192-210.
A second major difference in the President's and Davis' plans 
was over the loyalty oath, a good illustration of the difference in 
spirit between the two plans. Lincoln's plan appealed to the potential 
Unionism of the Southern people. He wished to show "charity" to the 
South in order to heal the wounds and quickly restore the Union. Davis 
and other Radicals felt that the South would never voluntarily come 
back into the Union— it would have to be coerced. In his opening speech 
on the bill Davis stressed that no Southerners who came North "from the 
darkness of that bottomless pit" showed any sign of repentance.
Lincoln's oath stipulated that a person would pledge "future fidelity 
to the Union," whereas Davis' required the so-called "ironclad oath" 
which declared that the person never voluntarily aided or participated 
in the rebellion. In Davis' bill loyalty included past conduct and 
excluded those who might change their faith and return to the Union. 
Davis felt that few would "repent"; Lincoln thought many would. "On 
principle, I dislike an oath which requires a man to swear he has not 
done wrong," Lincoln said. "It rejects the Christian principle of 
forgiveness on terms of repentance. I think it enough if a man does 
no wrong hereafter."7
The major difference in the two plans was over which branch of 
government should control it, the President or the Congress. Lincoln 
viewed reconstruction as an executive function, since the commander-in­
chief first had to establish military control in the rebellious states. 
Also his pardoning power was of great importance for it would be used
7Harold M. Hyman, Era of the Oath: Northern Loyalty Tests during
the Civil War and Reconstruction (Philadelphia, 1954), 48-49.
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as a weapon to get the process started. On the other hand, Davis saw 
Congress' role as supreme. The questions to be dealt with were not 
really military, he held, but civil and thus legislative. Furthermore, 
Congress would decide when the elected representatives would be read­
mitted. Congress would also initiate constitutional amendments if they 
proved necessary. Congressional reconstruction was not based on 
"revolutionary authority," he explained, but as "an extension of the 
Constitution of the United States, of the fourth section of the fourth 
article ... which not merely confers the power upon Congress, but 
imposes upon Congress the duty of guarantying to every State in this 
Union a republican form of government.” He concluded that "there is no 
government in the rebel States except by the authority of Congress."
In a sense, the Davis bill was as much an instrument for striking at 
the President's war-time extension of power as a process of reconstruc­
tion.8
After its presentation on March 22, 1864, the bill was not 
discussed on the floor of the House again for almost a month. Then, 
from later April through mid-May, the bill was debated each day after 
the morning calendar was cleared. Evening sessions were held so that 
everyone might be heard. Yet as the President's secretaries reported, 
"the bill was not opposed to any extent by the Republicans in the 
House; the Democrats were left to make purely partisan opposition to 
it. The President declined to exercise any influence on the debate."9
8For a variant discussion of the features of the bill see Belz,
Reconstructing the Union, 198-210, and William B. Hesseltine, Lincoln's 
Plan of Reconstruction (Chicago, 1960), 112-114.
9CG 38th-lst-1243; Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, IX, 119.
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On Wednesday, May 4, after six weeks of debate, Davis reported 
from his committee two amendments which significantly changed the bill 
and eased some of the objections to it. His first amendment removed 
the ten per cent provision and required a loyal majority before a 
constitutional convention could be held. Practically this meant that 
reconstruction would be postponed until the end of the war, but 
certainly until after the 1864 presidential election. The second 
amendment softened the operations of the clause which excluded officers 
of the state and Confederate governments and military from voting or 
office-holding. The amendment excluded only civil officers of the 
ministerial rank, and military offices with the rank of colonel or 
above. The House approved the two amendments by a voice vote.10
Davis opposed further amendments including Republican efforts to 
"radicalized" the bill. Thaddeus Stevens, described by Davis as 
"grum, savage, sarcastic, mordant as ever— living on brandy and opium
to subdue perpetual pain," proposed a preamble to the bill. It stated
that when a rebellious state came under federal control it would be 
deemed and held to be a territory of the United States subject to the 
control of Congress. This "conquered territory" theory was more 
radical that the Davis bill which held that the states were still states. 
Steven's preamble was defeated when seventeen Republicans (including 
Davis' lieutenants, John A. J. Creswell, James A. Garfield, and
Nathaniel Smithers) joined the Democrats.11




Republicans joined with their Republican colleagues to pass the bill 
by a vote of 73 to 59, with Thaddeus Stevens and forty-nine others 
absent or not voting. The Davis Bill passed the House in a strict 
party vote, which was an indication that the measure was not considered 
"radical" by the party.12
Upon passage by the House, the Davis Bill went to the Senate where 
it was referred to the Committee on Territories, chaired by Benjamin 
Franklin Wade. One of the original anti-slavery Senators, "Bluff Ben" 
Wade, as he was familiarly known, was "stout, sturdy, and muscular, 
a little above medium height" with "iron gray hari, sharp bright eyes, 
and firm-set jaw” that characterized his combative personality. Wade 
became a valuable ally for Davis when he finally chose to act. But 
Wade did not present the Davis Bill untill all other attempts at 
Congressional emancipation failed. It was only after the antislavery 
amendment was defeated in the House on June 15 that Wade presented the 
Davis Bill, the only practical antislavery action possible before the 
upcoming campaign.13
With only a few weeks left in the session of Congress, Davis 
wrote Wade: "Can you not do something practical towards emancipation
this session by getting a vote on H. Bill 244 relative to the Rebel 
States which you have reported?" He reminded Wade of the strong points 
of the bill. "It provides you know not merely to govern them till fit 
to govern themselves, but also to emancipate all slaves, to give them
12Ibid., 2108; Samuel S. Cox, Three Decades of Federal Legislation 
(Providence, 1885), 602.
13CG 39th-lst-2117; Noah Brooks, Washington in Lincoln’s Time 
(New York, 1895), 25-26; CG 38th-lst-2995.
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and their posterity the writ of Habeas Corpus in the U. S. courts 
wherenow if tree they could seek protection.” Noting that "the 
constitutional amendment is dead— as I always knew and said it was,” 
he repeated that "the Bill before you is the only practical measure of 
emancipation proposed in the Congress.” And congressional emancipation 
was necessary because Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation "if valid 
expressly exempt large regions in the rebel States.” Davis concluded 
by urging to get a vote on the bill and not to allow delay by a lengthy 
debate among Republicans. "It will be a beautiful crown to our session,” 
he predicted.
On July 1, with but two working days remaining in the session,
Wade succeeded in having the bill brought up and discussed. After the 
entire bill was presented, Wade offered two amendments from the 
committee. He read and then withdrew a minor amendment dealing with 
the compensation of the provisional governor. The second amendment was 
an attempt to create universal manhood suffrage by striking out the 
word "white.” Although an advocate of Negro suffrage, Wade urged that 
the second amendment too be dropped because it would "jeopardize the 
bill.” The amendment was defeated by a vote of 5 to 24.15
Then Senator B. Gratz Brown, a Blair relative from Missouri, 
offered a substitute bill which dealt only with the electoral votes 
of the seceded states in the upcoming presidential election. The effect 
of Brown's amendment would be to deny the rebellious states the right 
to vote for electors for President and at the smae time to continue
ll*HWD to Wade, 21 June 1864, Benjamin F. Wade Mss, LC.
l5CG 38th-1st-3448.
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Lincoln's plan of reconstruction. Wade spoke against Brown's amendment. 
He urged positive action instead of Brown's negativism, congressional 
rather than presidential reconstruction. Conveniently forgetting that 
Davis had originally proposed a ten per cent provision, Wade launched 
a bitter attack on the President's use of the one-tenth provision by 
calling it "anti-republican, anomalous, and entirely subversive of the 
great principles" of America. The Davis Bill was the only "honorable" 
plan to adopt, he concluded. Despite Wade's oratory, six Republicans 
joined the Democrats to approve Brown's substitute bill by a vote of 
17 to 16. The entire bill, which now consisted of merely Brown's 
amendment, passed the Senate on a 26 to 3 vote.16
The evening of July 1 was quite bleak for Winter Davis. With but 
one working day left in the session, the Senate had amended beyond 
recognition his reconstruction bill. Normally a conference committee 
would be appointed by each house to reconcile the differences. But the 
lack of time made such a strategy impossible. Most probably Davis and 
Wade met that evening and decided to urge the passage of the original 
Davis Bill. In the House, Davis would recommend not to concur in the 
Senate substitution; with that done, Wade would endeavor to have the 
Senate recind its substitution.
On July 2 the House began its last business day. Judging from 
the number of speeches given, it must have been at least one o'clock 
before the Speaker took up the Senate amendment to H. R. No. 244.
Davis immediately moved that the House not concur with that amendment 
and appoint a conference committee instead. In a strict party vote,
16Ibid., 3449, 3550, 3457-3461.
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the House rejected a Democratic move to table the bill. By another 
party vote the Senate amendment was rejected. Davis, James Ashley 
of Ohio, and John Dawson, a Pennsylvania Democrat, were named to the 
conference committee. Within minutes, the Clerk of the House, Edward 
McPherson, one of Davis' closest friends, reported the action of the 
House to the Senate.
It was not until just before the dinner recess that Wade obtained 
the floor. He implored the Senate to recede from its amendment and 
adopt the House version. Democratic Senators James McDougall and Thomas 
A. Hendrick repeatedly interrupted Wade to demand a dinner recess— a 
respite that would allow them time to round up additional votes. With 
Sumner's aid, Wade outmaneuvered his Democratic colleagues and secured 
a vote. By a vote of 18 to 14 with 17 absences (including Gratz Brown) 
the Senate receded from the Brown amendment. The Davis Bill, now known 
as the Wade-Davis Bill, had been enacted.17
On the last day of the session, the Fourth of July, the Speaker 
of the House, Schuyler Colfax, signed the bill and sent it to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate, Daniel Clark, who also signed it. 
Clark placed it with several other bills and sent it to President 
Lincoln who was in his office at the Capitol signing bills. When the 
Wade-Davis Bill was placed on the President's desk, Lincoln put it 
aside and continued with his work. Several members of Congress who had 
come to see him sign the bill remained silent. Finally Senator 
Zachariah Chandler asked the President if he was going to sign the bill.
17Ibid., 3518, 3481; Journal of the House of Representatives, 
38th Cong., 1st Sess., 1000-1001.
329
"This bill has been placed before me a few moments before 
Congress adjourns," Lincoln replied. "It is a matter of too much 
importance to be swallowed in that way."
"If it is vetoed," Chandler retorted, "it will damage us fear­
fully in the Northwest. It may not in Illinois; it will in Michigan 
and Ohio. The important point is that one prohibiting slavery in the 
reconstructed States."
"That is the point upon which I doubt the authority of Congress 
to act."
"It is no more than you have done yourself," snapped Chandler.
"I conceive that I may in an emergency do things on military 
grounds which cannot be done constitutionally by Congress," Lincoln 
replied.18
After Chandler abruptly left the room, Lincoln spoke to his 
secretaries: "I do not see how any of us can deny and contradict what
we have always said, that Congress has no constitutional power over 
slavery in the states." He feared that the Radicals might make trouble 
over this issue. "If they choose to make a point upon this I do not 
doubt that they can do harm. They have never been friendly to me 
.... At all events I must keep some consciousness of being somewhere 
near right: I must keep some standard of principle fixed within
myself."19
Lincoln had decided to pocket veto the Wade-Davis Bill. Although 
not a new use of the veto power, it had previously been used by
18Dennett (ed.), Diaries and Letters of John Hay, 204-205.
19Ibid., 206.
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Presidents only on less consequential matters. And as Lincoln had 
not tried to influence Congress during the long debates over the bill, 
no one expected such a course of action.20
Rumors spread through Congress that the President would pocket 
veto the bill. It was confirmed when Thaddeus Stevens, Elihu Washbume, 
and John Dawson waited on the President to inform him that the House 
was ready to adjourn. Lincoln greeted the committee with "a pump 
handle shake" but spoke not a word. Stevens delivered the message for 
the House and Lincoln maintained his stony silence. After a few 
minutes the committee left.
"The Prest. has not much grace, Mr. Stevens," Dawson said while 
returning to the House.
"Damned littled!" replied Stevens.
"It seems to me the Prest. hasn't much courtesy."
"Not a damned bit."
"Mr. Stevens, the Prest. looked to me as if he were ashamed of 
himself— out of place— like a tom hoy at a feast," Dawson ventured.
"Damned like— I think!" snarled Stevens.21
A few minutes after the House adjourned sine die, the committee 
informed Davis that Lincoln would not sign the bill and had not returned
20In accordance with Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution,
a bill automatically becomes law if not acted upon by the President 
within ten days if Congress is in session, but automatically fails 
if Congress is adjourned. Prior to Lincoln's pocket veto fo the Wade- 
Davis Bill, this power had been used only nineteen times and only 
once by Lincoln. The pocket veto had generally been used on private 
bill, never on a piece of legislation as important as the Wade-Davis 
Bill. See Carleton Jackson, Presidential Vetoes. 1792-1945 (Athens, 
1967).
21HWD to SFDP, 8 July 1864, WMss 9-17329.
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it with his veto to Congress. He had pocket vetoed the bill. Davis 
stood at his desk staggered by the news. "Pale with wrath, his bushy 
hair tousled, and wildly brandishing his arms," he cursed the President 
"in good set terms" to the largely vacant hall of the House.22
Lincoln's action was an extremely hard blow for Davis. His long 
labors for the bill had been to no avail. "Blair and Dolittle etc. 
could not abide my carrying what everybody said was impossible," Davis 
wrote Du Pont, "and nobody else would undertake it except a few 
energetic friends with whom I asked throughout to compel reluctant 
submission." His only consolation was that he thought Lincoln might 
find the veto "a mill stone to swim with" in the upcoming election.23
On July 8, in a totally unprecedented action, Lincoln issued a 
proclamation detailing his reasons for not accepting the Wade-Davis 
Bill. He explained that he was unprepared "to be inflexibly committed 
to any single plan," moreover, he was unwilling to undo the work already 
begun in Louisiana and Arkansas, and he was unable to believe that 
Congress had the "constitutional competency" to abolish slavery.
However, he stated that he was willing to let any state choose the 
congressional plan if it desired.21*
Lincoln gave another version of his argument to John Hay. He 
said that it was "unwise for either Congress or himself to prescribe 
any fixed and formal method" for reuniting the Union. He recalled he
22Brooks, Washington in Lincoln's Time, 168.
23HWD to SFDP, 8 July 1864, WMss 9-17329.
^"Proclamation concerning Reconstruction, July 8, 1864," CWAL, 
VII, 433-434.
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read somewhere "of a robber tyrant who had built an iron bedstead on 
which he compelled his victims to lie. If the captive was too short 
to fill the bedstead, he was stretched by main forces until he was long 
enough; if he was too long, he was chopped off to fit the bedstead." 
Lincoln thus analogized the Wade-Davis Bill to the Procrustian bed.
"If any state coming back into the Federal relations did not fit the 
Wade-Davis bedstead, so much the worse for the state," Lincoln 
concluded.25
Lincoln's proclamation angered the Radicals. "What an infamous 
proclamation!" wrote Thaddeus Stevens. "The President is determined 
to have the electoral votes of the seceded States .... The idea of 
proscribing a bill and then issuing a proclamation as to how he will 
conform to it, is matched only by signing a bill and then sending in a 
veto. How little of the rights of was and the law of nations our 
Prest. knows! But what are we to do? Condemn privately and applaud 
publicly?" Davis agreed with Stevens. "The chief motive for the pocket 
veto was to keep open the field to supply by sham states any deficien­
cies in the votes of the real States," he wrote. Davis was not willing 
to "condemn privately and applaud publicly." He determined to issue a 
public protest against Lincoln's vet as a first step in a remarkable 
and unprecedented plan to replace Lincoln with another candidate for 
President.26
Since his stormy conference with Lincoln on January 25, Davis
25Brooks, Washington in Lincoln's Time, 171.
26Stevens to E. McPherson, 10 July 1864, Thaddeus Stevens Mss,
LC; HWD to SFDP, 9 July 1864, WMss 9-17331.
had worked to block Lincoln's renomlnatlon. He encouraged John C. 
Fremont to announce that he would be a candidate for President If 
Lincoln were renominated, but that he would acquiesce In any other 
selection. But Davis noted, "I dont think he has sense enough for 
this; for it does good to the country but does not advance him toward 
the Presidency." In Maryland, Davis' supporters gained control of all 
but two of the delegates to the National Union party convention. 
Although instructed by the Maryland convention to vote for Lincoln, 
the delegates "are all anti-Lincoln and will show it if a result can 
be accomplished," Davis boasted.27
Everywhere the opposition to Lincoln's renomination was growing 
Davis noted. Historian George Bancroft assured him that Lincoln was 
unpopular "among thinking men" in the country. Davis wrote that 
"everybody in Washington is opposed to Lincoln" and "only one man in 
the H. R. is known to favor him." But despite the growing opposition 
he feared that "Lincoln will be nominated by acclamation." The 
nomination for the Vice Presidency concerned him also. "Several 
persons have mentioned the V. P. to me— but I have said I have no 
ambition for the place." He feared Lincoln would offer the position 
to Andrew Johnson of Tennessee "who will cheat us if he gets into power. 
When the Union convention at Baltimore enthusiastically nominated 
Lincoln and Johnson, Davis' fears were confirmed.28
During the three weeks following Lincoln's renomination, Davis
27HWD to SFDP, 27 March 1864, WMss 9-17307; HWD to SFDP, c. 1
June 1864, WMss 9-17328.
28HWD to SFDP, 27 February 1864, WMss 9-17301.
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was confined to bed with a case of variloid, a mild form of smallpox.
He was still not fully recovered when he returned to Washington to push 
for Senate action on his reconstruction bill. Lincoln's veto piqued him 
but he saw in it an opportunity to bring about the President's with­
drawal as a candidate. "I should not be surprised if you see a great 
change by Sept.," Davis predicted to Du Pont, "and Lincoln pushed off or 
another able man put in the field who will bring the election to the 
H. R."29
In consultation with supporters of General Benjamin F. Butler 
and other Radicals, Davis decided to issue a public reply to the 
President's veto proclamation as the first step in a plan to force 
him off the Union ticket. After securing Senator Wade's signature 
to it, he published his manifesto in the New York Tribune on August 
6, 1864.30
The Wade-Davis Manifesto was extraordinary document. Berating 
Lincoln in the most severe language, it accused him of the most "studied 
outrage on the legislative authority of the people" that had ever been 
committed. It accused him of holding the electoral votes of the 
seceded states "at the dictation of personal ambition" and of establish­
ing "dictatorial usurpation in Louisiana." In ringing language the 
document declared "that the authority of Congress is paramount and must
29HWD to SFDP, 22 June 1864, WMss 9-17327; HWD to SFDP, 8 July 
1864, WMss 9-17329.
30J. W. Shaffer to B. Butler, 23 July 1864, in Jessie Ames 
Marshall (ed.), Private and Official Correspondence of Gen. Benjamin 
F. Butler (Norwood, Mass., 1917), IV, 512-513; HWD to E. M. McPherson, 
c. late July 1864, Edward McPherson Mss, LC; Wade to Greeley, 1 August 
1864, Greeley Mss, LC; HWD to Wade, 3 August 1864, Wade Mss, LC;
New York Tribune, 5 August 1864.
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be respected." If the President "wishes our support, he must confine 
himself to his executive duties— to obey and execute, not make the 
laws— to suppress by arms armed rebellion, and leave political 
reorganization to Congress."31
The protest caused an uproar in the White House and across the
nation. "We,have Lee and his   on one side, and Henry Winter Davis
and Ben. Wade and all such Hell cats on the other," blasted Postmaster 
General Blair. "The assaults of these men on the Administration may 
break it down," worried Secretary Welles. "It is not worth fretting 
about," the President told some friends. "It reminds me of an old 
acquaintance who, having a son of scientific turn, brought him a 
microscope. The boy went around, experimenting with his glass upon 
everything that came in his way. One day, at the dinner table, his 
father took up a piece of cheese. 'Don't eat that, father,' said 
the boy; 'it is full of wrigglers.' 'My son,' replied the old gentleman, 
taking at the same time a huge bite, 'let 'em wriggle; I can stand it 
if they can!'" Privately, however, the President was troubled.
Thurlow Weed and Henry Raymond both advised him that he could not be 
re-elected. Washbume in Illinois and Cameron in Pennsylvania agreed 
with their assessment. On August 23 Lincoln wrote a memorandum stating 
that it "seems exceedingly probably that this Administration will not 
be re-elepted."32
31New York Tribune, 5 August 1864.
32J. K. Herbert to Butler, 6 August 1864, in Marshall (ed.),
Butler Correspondence. V, 8-9; Beale (ed.), Diary of Gideon Welles.
II, 95; Francis B. Carpenter, Six Months at the White House with 
Abraham Lincoln (New York, 1867), 145; J. G. Nicolay to Therena,
21 August 1864, RTL, LC.
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The first reaction of the national press to the Wade-Davis 
Manifesto was shock. "Very bad taste," said the Chicago Tribune. The 
pro-administration New York Times wrote that the "real objective" of 
the protest was to defeat Lincoln’s re-election and that it was "by 
far the most effective Copperhead campaign document thus far issued."
Two weeks after its publication, Davis bitterly complained that "Wilkes' 
Spirit of the Times is the only decided paper now! All the rest are 
trimming— None heartily for Lincoln— all afraid to speak ... None 
attack our Protest but the Times— none venture to controvert or 
approve it." The wavering of the newspapers disturbed him. "Papers 
are money machines," he wrote, "and as timid and uncertain as all other 
capital." Whatever the reason, the Manifesto had failed to trigger 
a reaction against Lincoln in the press.33
Despite the Manifesto's seeming unpopularity, Davis pressed for 
further action. He helped organize a meeting of Republicans opposed 
to Lincoln which met at the home of former New York Mayor George 
Opdyke on August 18. Among those attending were Davis, Governor John 
A. Andrew of Massachusetts, editor George W. Wilkes, John Austin Stevens, 
Jr., President of the New York Chamber of Commerce, David Dudley Field, 
and Colonel J. W. Shaffer, General Butler's aide. A decision was 
reached at that meeting to circulate a call for a convention to meet 
in Cincinnati, Ohio, on September 28 to nominate another Republican 
candidate.34
33Chicago Tribune, 11 August 1864; New York Times, 9 August 1864;
HWD to SFDP, 18 August 1864, in Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters, III, 370.
31fHWD to SFDP, 5 August 1864, WMss 9-17336; HWD to SFDP, 11 August
1864, WMss 9-17337; J. W. Shaffer to Butler, 17 August 1864, in
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After the meeting, the group split up to enlist others to join 
their movement. General J. K. Herbert went west to see Secretary Chase 
and others. Governor Andrew returned to New England to gather names to 
add to the call. Davis remained in New York to co-ordinate the plan, 
and wrote letters to Senators Zachariah Chandler and Ben Wade and others 
seeking support. Soon it was evident the movement was not taking hold. 
The leaders had underestimated Lincoln’s popularity with the rank and 
file. Du Pont wrote Davis that Delaware Republicans believed "Old 
Lincoln was sent down from above to meet the rebellion.” Davis was not 
deterred. He replied that "those who think Lincoln came down from 
Heaven will soon be convinced that he was on his way lower down and 
was not intended to stop here much longer." But when others, including 
Wade, cautioned no action until after the Democrats nominated a 
candidate, Davis despaired "at the loss of time occasioned by the 
perverse arrangements of snails," his fellow conspirators.35
Shortly before a second meeting of the conspirators was held at 
the New York home of David Dudley Field, the Democratic national 
convention in Chicago nominated General George B. McClellan for Pres­
ident on a "Peace Platform." The nomination of McClellan, the bete 
noire of the Radicals, and Sherman's capture of Atlanta the day 
after the meeting terminated the plot. Although Horace Greeley,
Marshall (ed.), Butler Correspondence, V, 67-68; HWD to SFDP, 18 
August 1864, in Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters, III, 369-370; W. C. 
Phillips to Lincoln, 20 August 1864, RTL, LC.
35J. A. Stevens to Trumbull, 24 August 1864, Lyman Trumbull 
Mss, LC; HWD to Chandler, 24 August 1864, Chandler Mss, LC; HWD to 
J. A. Stevens, 24, 25 August 1864 in New York Sun, 30 June 1889;
J. G. Nicolay to Major, 25 August 1864, Nicolay Mss, LC; HWD to 
SFDP, 24 August 1864, WMss 9-17339.
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Whitelaw Reid, Field, Opdyke and others abandoned the cabal, Davis 
refused. Reid and Stevens urged him to drop the call for the convention 
and support Lincoln's re-election. "I hope that you will draw the 
flaming sword of rhetoric shortly too and deal some heavy blows at the 
'Peace Party' and their peaceful chief 'little McClellan!'" Stevens 
wrote. Passionately opposed to Lincoln, Davis was not likely to support 
the President unless Davis would force some major reform in the 
administration.36
While the plan was collapsing, Senator Zachariah Chandler began 
a series of efforts designed to reconcile the Radicals to Lincoln. 
According to Davis' account, Chandler arrived in Washington on August 
26. He found out who Lincoln's "boon companions are, the men who crack 
jokes Sunday night till 1 A.M.— not politicians or Cabinet members but 
the President's familiar spirits— imbued them with the darkest views 
of Lincoln's prospects, and sent them night after night to regale him 
[Lincoln] with some new tale of defection or threatened disaster, 
never appearing himself for eight days till Lincoln was in the condition 
of a child frightened by ghost stories and ready to take refuge anywhere. 
He sat and said let us sit upon the ground and tell sad stories of the 
death of kings— or would have said, had he read Shakespeare."37
36SFDP to HWD, 26 August 1864, in Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters,
III, 375; HWD to SFDP, 31 August 1864, WMss 9-17340; Whitelaw Reid to 
John Opdyke, 2 September 1864 in New York Sun, 30 June 1889; John A. 
Andrew et al. to Greeley, Godwin and Tilton, 3 September 1864, Theodore 
Tilton Mss, New York Historical Society; George Wilkes to Butler, in 
Marshall (ed.), Butler Correspondence, V, 134-135; HWD to J. A. Stevens,
4 September 1864 in New York Sun, 30 June 1889; J. A. Stevens to HWD,
WMss 9-17343.
37Chandler to wife, 27 August, 2, 6, 8, 18 September 1864,
Chandler Mss, LC; J. K. Herbert to Butler, 3 September 1864, in Marshall
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Then Chandler took Senator James Harlan, Congressman Elihu 
Washbume, and Union League President James M. Edmunds to visit Lincoln, 
and they "accidently fell into the same strain of dolorous music which 
had so depressed his nerves— till it seemed that all the world thought 
him dead. They then intimated that the country thought well of him 
... and if he would remove Blair all might still be well." But Lincoln 
refused to remove Blair. The next morning the group went again and 
this time put the proposition to him directly. If they would induce 
Fremont to withdraw and Wade to support Lincoln, then would "the 
swimming Lincoln drop the weight which was sinking him," Montgomery 
Blair? The President agreed.
Chandler hurried off to New York to see Wade and Fremont. He 
could not find Wade but explained the bargain to Fremont. After 
consulting with his advisors, Fremont decided to withdraw but without 
demanding any conditions. Then Chandler discovered that Wade was about 
to endorse Lincoln anyhow. The Michigan Senator quickly returned to 
Washington and told Lincoln that the deal was fixed. Unfortunately, 
the Pathfinder's letter of withdrawal was already received in Washington 
and it was highly denunciatory of Lincoln. The President was irritated 
by the tone of the letter and wished to back out of the bargain.
(ed.), Butler Correspondence, V, 120-121. Davis' account of the "Blair- 
Fremont Bargain," as corroborated by Hugh Lennox Bond's account, 
substantiates the version set forth by Winfred A. Harbison in "Zachariah 
Chandler's Part in the Reelection of Abraham Lincoln," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, 22 (September, 1935), 267-276, rather than 
Charles R. Wilson's "New Light on the Lincoln-Blair-Fremont 'Bargain' 
of 1864," in American Historical Review, 42 (October, 1836), 71-78.
See HWD to SFDP, 24 September 1864 (misdated 28 or 29 September) in 
Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters, III, 393-394, and H. L. Bond to Kate,
27 September 1864, Bond-McCulloch Mss, MdHS.
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Finally Lincoln yielded and wrote Blair requesting his resignation.38
"Blair is gone! Our necks are relieved from that galling 
humiliation," Davis exclaimed upon hearing the news from Chandler. 
Almost immediately he agreed to enter the campaign to re-elect Lincoln. 
It was not an easy decision to make. He was so disgusted with Lincoln 
that he could hardly bring himself to endorse him. He wrote Du Pont 
that he had "no confidence in Lincoln" but he was "terrified at the 
prospect of McClellan." The Democratic platform, he wrote Charles 
Sumner, "compelled people to swallow their disgust and elect Lincoln." 
He complained to Thaddeus Stevens that he would not campaign outside 
Maryland so great was his aversion to Lincoln and would not even enter 
the contest in his home state except that "the Blair vomit does me 
great good."39
Many doubted that Davis' support would aid Lincoln very much. 
Davis' endorsement, according to one ally, was that Lincoln "is 
neither wise nor honest, good people, but if I can vote for him, it 
would be ridiculous for you to be more squeamish." John Hay advised 
the President that Davis was stumping for Lincoln but doubted that his 
advocacy would be effective. Lincoln replied, "If he and the rest can 
succeed in carrying the State for emancipation, I shall be very willing
38H. L. Bond to Kate, 27 September, Bond-McCulloch Mss, MdHS;
HWD to SFDP, 24 September 1864, in Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters, III,
394.
39Ibid.; Chandler to wife, 24 September 1864, Chandler Mss,
LC; HWD to SFDP, c. 28 September 1864, WMss 9-17344; HWD to Sumner,
29 September 1864, Sumner Mss, Harvard University; HWD to Stevens,
30 September 1864, Thaddeus Stevens Mss, LC.
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to lose the electoral vote."1*0
The new "free" constitution in Maryland, largely drafted by Davis' 
lieutenants Archibald Stirling, Jr. and Henry Stockbridge in the 
recently adjourned constitutional convention, was in jeopardy. The 
mayoralty election in Baltimore seriously distracted Unionists from 
campaigning for the new constitution. Davis' candidate, Stirling, was 
engaged in a fierce struggle with the Blair-Swann candidate, John Lee 
Chapman, for control of Baltimore. Davis' opposition to Lincoln and to 
his Maryland opponents severely undermined Stirling's candidacy. "He 
never lets up on Hicks or Swann or anybody," an associate wrote of Davis. 
"They differed from Davis, ergo they are fools. Being fools they cannot 
be good for anything as long as they live. So with Lincoln— Davis has 
written him down as an ass, and on all occasions he deplores the cruel 
necessity of voting for him."1*1
On October 12, the new constitution was ratified by a small 
majority. "Emancipation is now accomplished," Davis exclaimed.
"Nearly all the poor whites who voted for Creswell and negro enlistments 
last year voted now against the Constitution which freed the negroes." 
They were joined by Democrats and slaveholders in opposing the consti­
tution. "Such a coalition never before existed in Md. and that it 
failed is a miracle," Davis thought. The soldiers' vote saved the 
constitution, but it did not save Stirling who was routed by Chapman
1*°Peter G. Sauerwein to Edward McPherson, 8 October 1864, 
McPherson Mss, LC; Dennett (ed.), Diaries and Letters of John Hay, 216.
**Sauerwein to McPherson, 8 October 1864, McPherson Mss, LC; 
also see William Starr Myers, The Maryland Constitution of 1864 
(Baltimore, 1901) and Baker, The Politics of Continuity, 104-109.
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in the contest for mayor.42
Stirling’s defeat signaled Maryland's dissatisfaction with the 
Davis wing of the Union party. That displeasure was soon manifested 
again in the Union party convention. As the new constitution mandated 
new state-wide elections, the party met on October 18. It was chaired 
by Henry Hoffman, long-time Davis associate, who had recently been won 
over to Lincoln by the offer of another four years as collector of 
customs in Baltimore. With help from Hoffman the convention nominated 
an anti-Davis slate led by Thomas Swann for governor. Davis accused 
Blair and Swann of using rebel votes at primary meetings; he accused 
Hoffman of "cowardly and selfish hesitations and trimmings." He 
despaired that "not a man who carried the constitution is nominated for 
office under it!" Tired and unwell, Davis was not able even to secure 
his own renomination. On October 21 he was passed over in the Third 
Congressional convention in favor of a war hero, Colonel Charles E. 
Phelps. Having lost his party's nomination, he decided not to run 
independently for Congress because "the demoralization is so great that 
I do not feel inclined to go through the labor it would require to make 
it successful."43
Davis' radicalism had cost him the leadership of the Union party 
and his seat in Congress. His opposition to Lincoln was too strident
42HWD to SFDP, 19 October 1864, WMss 9-17347; Wagandt, The 
Mighty Revolution, 258-263.
43Thomas Swann to James Orme, 13 October 1864, Gratz Collection, 
HSP; Baltimore Clipper, "The President to be Protected Against His 
'Friends'," 15 October 1864; Jacob Engelbrecht Diary, 19 October 1864, 
MdHS; HWD to SFDP, 19 October 1864, WMss 9-17347; Baltimore Clipper,
22 October 1864; Swann to Chase, 24 October 1864, Chase Mss, HSP;
Mark Howard to Welles, 28 October 1864, Welles Mss, LC.
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for even his most loyal supporters. His forthright advocacy of 
emancipation, labeled by Blair and Swann as the first step toward Negro 
equality, was too advanced for conservative Maryland. His supporters 
had forced the convening of the constitutional convention, had driven 
Blair and Swann to support emancipation without compensation, had 
written the free constitution, and then were "pitched overboard," 
wrote one Davis ally. "We owe everything to D's genius. He did not 
appear in public and the outside world have no idea of his activities. 
But he created the emancipation party in this state. He educated and 
stimulated us who wrote for the newspapers, made the speeches, affected 
the organizations and secured the victories. But for him Emancipation 
instead of being a fait accompli would hardly be whispered this day in 
Maryland. He is a glorious fellow: but confound him! He ruined us as
a party in the very hour of our triumph. We have died in childbed.
On election day in November, Maryland went for Lincoln, Swann 
won the governorship, while Creswell, "Davis* echo," was defeated on 
the Eastern Shore. The big loss, however, was the fact that Davis, who 
did not seek re-election, would not be in the Thirty-Ninth Congress.
The eccentric Radical, Count Adam Gurowski, called the loss of Davis' 
services "a public, and at any rate ... a parliamentary calamity."
At the White House, Lincoln's secretaries were elated at Davis' defeat. 
"You have more of the feeling of personal resentment than I," Lincoln 
told them. "If any man ceases to attack me, I never hold the past 
against him." It seemed to Lincoln that recently Davis had been
^Peter G. Sauerwein to E. McPherson, 22 October 1864, Edward 
McPherson Mss, LC.
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"growing more sensible" and had ceased assailing him. "I hope for his 
own good he has," Lincoln added. But Radical Peter Sauerwein of Mary­
land knew Davis better: Davis "is up when he is down. Look out for him
at the next Session."45
45Wagandt, The Mighty Revolution, 266; Baltimore Clipper, 29 
February 1864, Gurowski, Diary, III, 380; William E. Barton, The 
Life of Abraham Lincoln (Indianapolis, 1925), 303; Dennett (ed.), 
Diaries and Letters of John Hay, 234; Sauerwein to McPherson, 22 
October 1864, McPherson Mss, LC.
Chapter 16
BEFORE I GO
When Congress reconvened in December 1864, Winter Davis was in 
an angry mood. Denied his party’s nomination by a surprise, maneuver, 
he was a "lame duck" Congressman with but three months to serve.
Despite his short remaining tenure, Davis emerged as one of the top 
leaders in the second session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress, ranking 
in importance with Thaddeus Stevens. Visitors to Washington thought 
Davis the most conspicuous member of the House; Davis and Stevens, 
it was said, were the only members who could command the attention 
of the otherwise inattentive House. Recently turned forty-seven 
years-old, Davis nevertheless still appeared "boyish" to his friends. 
His thick auburn brown hair and mustache showed only a trace of gray. 
His well-knit frame was without a pound of superfluous flesh and his 
"high, clear, ringing voice" showed the vigor of a man many years 
younger.1
Davis had many plans for the second session. "Before I go I have 
two works I am bent on doing if possible," he disclosed privately,
"— one is to develop the Mexican game of France and Seward's part in
1SFDP to HWD, 30 December 1863, in Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters. 
Ill, 303; David Davis to Julius Rockwell, 13 March 1864, David Davis 
Mss, CHS; Brooks, Washington in Lincoln's Time, 18; Ainsworth P. 




it— the other to show what the Navy is and why it is so." In his mind 
the two questions were interrelated. Seward had so mishandled the 
situation in Mexico that Davis felt only force could remove Napoleon 
Ill's troops. And that war, "which is at the threshold when the 
rebellion is suppressed," would rely heavily on the Navy which Davis 
considered to be woefully mismanaged.2
His first objective was Seward. On December 15 he re-introduced 
his resolution declaring Congress's right to develop foreign policy.
By Davis' own description, the statement was also a rebuke to "Seward's 
mean apology to France for my Mexican Resolution." As the adoption of 
the resolution would have been an outright censure of Lincoln and 
Seward as well as a precedent-setting assumption of power, administra­
tion supporters succeeded in tabling it by a vote of sixty-nine to 
sixty-three. "Most so voted from fear of following me," Davis explained, 
but "many from sycophany— some from surprise and misapprehension."
Galled by the defeat, he scolded the members of the House for their 
timidity. Through Seward's explanations to the French, "the world was 
given to understand ... that Congress is such a thing as the French 
Assembly— the docile reflex of the executive will— its resolution a vain 
and presumptuous usurpation." He charged that before all the nations 
of Europe Seward had "slapped the House of Representatives in the face." 
As the House refused to assert its dignity and its control of foreign 
policy, Davis refused to serve any longer on the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs.3
2HWD to SFDP, 20 December 1864, WMss 9-17352.
3Ibid.; CG 38th-2nd-48, 49.
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His request to be excused from the committee touched off a sharp 
debate. From all quarters members rose to sustain him while others 
rose to ridicule hum. Committee member "Sunset" Cox declared that if 
Davis was excused he too wished to be discharged. "The gentleman from 
Maryland, not only in this matter but in others has asserted the 
congressional right against executive usurpation, and he deserves the 
thanks of every national man of every party for it," Cox said. James 
G. Blaine, who favored Seward's handling of the affair, nevertheless 
urged Davis to continue as chairman of the committee. Thad Stevens 
asked the House not to excuse Davis. The acidic Henry Dawes said he 
thought it best to "bear yet a little longer their [Davis' and Cox's] 
presence here, and not to part company with them before it had been 
so ordered by the people of their district." On the vote, the motion 
to excuse Davis was not agreed to. The request to be excused did much 
good, Davis thought. "This opened people's eyes. I revolved to move 
it [his Mexican resolution] every resolution day till the end of the 
Session."4
On Monday, December 19, 1864, Davis again submitted his resolution, 
but this time it was moderated and separated into two parts. The first 
declared that Congress had a constitutional right to "an authoritative 
voice in declaring and prescribing the foreign policy of the United 
States ... and it is the constitutional duty of the executive depart­
ment [formerly read 'the President'] to respect that policy." Admin­
istration supporters voted in favor of the first part in hopes of 
defeating the second denunciatory section. "They voted the first and
kIbid.
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most essential but most questionable part almost unanimously," Davis 
crowed, "only 8 nays!!" The second part contained the censure of 
Lincoln, now worded to strike only Seward. It stated that "any 
declaration of foreign policy by Congress ... while pending and 
undetermined, is not a fit topic of diplomatic explanation with any 
foreign power." On the vote, many Republicans joined the Democrats 
and the resolution carried by a sixty-eight to fifty-eight margin. The 
Democrats "stood up like men and saved me from an utter overthrow,"
Davis wrote Du Pont. When the Republicans saw that the Democrats 
could force through the resolution, "self preservation took precedence 
of Abraham's devotion and they sacrificed him on the altar they had 
prepared for me."5
Seward was angered by Davis' resolutions. While discussing them 
with a New York Congressman, Seward suddenly exploded: "Seward said
incoherently he didn't care for the H. R., that he would not for the 
world the resolution should go abroad as it would in the next steamer; 
that he had saved the country and nobody mentioned him while they went 
mad over Farragut and Grant!" While shouting, Seward's "veins swelled—  
his arms were widely tossed" and the Congressman expected "to see Seward 
tear his hair before the scene closed."6
Seward soon overcame his personal bitterness toward Davis. In
5CG 39th-2nd-65; HWD to SFDP, 20 December 1864, WMss 9-17352;
HWD to SFDP, c. early January 1865, misdated 1864, WMss 9-17297; Van 
Deusen, Seward, 399; Hugh Lennox Bond thought Davis' "flank movement 
on Lincoln by attacking Seward's pusillanimous explanation of the House 
of Representatives resolutions respecting Mexico" passed because of 
the disgust which followed the St. Alban's, Vermont, raid; see Bond 
to Kate, 17 December 1864, Bond-McCullouch Mss, MdHS.
6HWD to SFDP, 15 January 1865, WMss 9-17353.
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front of the White House several days later, Davis suddenly encountered
the Secretary of State. "It was a gloomy day," Davis recounted, "but
a wide space was illuminated by the radiant smile with which he greeted
me; and though very cold my hand glowed with the warmth of the cordial
7grasp!!— Funny," Davis noted, "but sad!"
Secretary Welles was also offended by Davis' resolution. "It 
was conceived in a bad spirit and is discreditable to the getters up 
and those who passed the resolutions," Welles noted in his diary.
"Davis has never been and never will be a useful Member of Congress. 
Although possessing talents he is factious, uneasy and unprincipled," 
Welles concluded.8
Davis maintained an equally low opinion of Welles. In December 
when it was rumored that Welles would be replaced by Du Pont, Davis 
was delighted. "Mow that is altogether too good to be true and too 
wise to be accomplished I fear," Davis wrote. "Still no body can tell 
when a gleam of common sense may strike Lincoln." Weeks later 
Assistant Secretary of War Richard Henry Dana told Davis that Stanton 
and Welles, "the Sword of the Lord and Gideon," would soon leave the 
Cabinet. Davis replied that the only interest he had "was that the 
sword of the Lord should take off Gideon's head and be done with it." 
According to one source, Davis was so "very bitter against the Secretary 
and his assistant, and his feelings are so personally engaged" that 
Davis would "use every means in his power to injure them."9
7Ibid.
8Beale (ed.), Diary of Gideon Welles, II, 202.
9HWD to SFDP, 4 December 1864, WMss 9-17351; HWD to SFDP, 15
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In late January rumors spread that Davis was about to attack 
the Navy Department. Welles and Fox also heard the rumor when editor 
Charles Fulton wrote Fox that "Winter Davis is about to annihilate the 
Navy Department." Fulton advised them to remain silent. "I know of 
no man, except General Butler, who is so apt to annihilate himself as 
Mr. Davis, if he is only let alone. If attacked he is good on the 
defensive." Mrs. Du Pont, worried that Davis' newest attack might 
further implicate her husband, pressed Davis not to make any allusion 
to the Admiral on the floor of Congress.10
In the middle of a debate on a naval appropriation bill, Davis 
brought up a bill to reform the Navy department, his "Board of Admiralty" 
bill. The chairman ruled it out of order. When Davis appealed, the 
House overruled the chair and Davis was allowed to begin his attack.
The department was grossly mismanaged, he argued. The Secretary of the 
Navy, "his irresponsible assistant secretary, who is the real and acting 
Secretary of the Navy," and the Chief of the Bureau of Engineers were 
the only three policy-makers in the department. No other naval power 
in the world had such an inadequate planning body and thus suffered such 
misconduct. What was needed, he claimed, was a board of naval officers 
to guide the department's decisions.11
"Costly failures" and "scandalous improvidence" plagued the
January 1865, WMss 9-17353; Percival Drayton to SFDP, 21 January 1865, 
in Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters, III, 430.
10C. C. Fulton to Fox, 24 January 1865, in Hayes (ed.), Du Pont 
Letters, III 430; SMDP to HWD, 25 January 1865, WMss 9-23678; HWD to
SMDP, 27 January 1865, WMss 9-17355.
n CG 38th-2nd-509; HWD to SFDP, 8 February 1865, WMss 9-17356.
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department’s war efforts. The naval battle at Hampton Roads, "an 
accidental collision between one vessel and another, without its 
scientific bearing having been adjudged and considered by competent 
officers," led to the spending of $9.2 million for twenty monitors.
Of the twenty built, Davis charged, five were so heavy that their 
gun turrets had to be removed and fifteen had to have their decks 
raised to keep them from sinking. Failure had followed failure. The 
department then decided to build two swift ocean-going iron-clads. It 
spent $2.3 million to build the Dictator and the Puritan, but the 
Dictator could not carry enough coal to cross the Atlantic and neither 
ship could go faster than six knots.
If the Department had not "gone crazy on monitors," Davis said, 
it would have followed the recommendations of its senior officers and 
produced Monadnocks or New Ironsides. He cited Admiral David D. Porter 
who claimed that the Mbnadnock design was the best iron-clad vessel 
and "could destroy any vessel in the French or British navy." Finally, 
Davis charged that the boilers designed by the department for the 
monitors were, by their own examiner's reports, inferior in quality to 
ordinary commercial steam machinery. All these failures proved that the 
Department needs "some supervising board, some advisory power beyond 
authority which is at the head of the Navy Department ... to secure to 
the nation the benefit of the money that it is now expending in the 
structure of vessels."12
As the "Board of Admiralty" bill was not merely a reform but an 
attack on the department, administration supporters rallied to Welles'
12Speeches and Addresses, 480-512.
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and Fox's defense. Alexander Rice of Massachusetts, chairman of the 
Committee on Naval Affairs, labeled Welles' department "the most 
complete and among the most efficient of all the Departments of Govern­
ment." Rice decried what he called Davis' double purpose in proposing 
the Admiralty Board— to denounce the leadership of the Navy under a 
guise of reforming it. He did not deny Davis' charges of engineering 
blunders, but dismissed them as "slight variations from the calcula­
tions."13
The following day others rallied to the department's aid. Fred­
erick A. Pike of Maine called the blunders Davis cited as insufficient 
reason to change the structure of the department and chastised Davis 
for his attack. Fernando Wood of New York City noted that the criticism 
were well founded, but claimed that no one man could be blamed for the 
mistakes. John A. Griswold of New York rebuked Davis for holding the 
Navy up to ridicule. Before Davis could reply, debate was closed and 
his amendment was defeated by a vote of forty-three to fifty-five.1^
By chance, Robert Schenck, Davis' ally, was in the chair when the 
naval appropriations bill was next discussed in the Committee of the 
Whole. Normally an amendment once considered cannot be brought up 
again. But Davis moved his Admiralty Bill, Schenck ruled it in order, 
and on an appeal from the chairman's decision, Schenck's decision was 
sustained. "Then I replied to the Naval Com'ttee at length and without 
gloves," Davis reported. He charged Rice and Pike with being bought 




with the construction of the Dictator. If the efficiency of the Navy 
was so high, Davis asked, then how did five rebel cruisers sweep Amer­
ican commerce from the sea and avoid six hundred Navy cruisers? "I am 
here to-day pleading the cause of the American navy against the Navy 
Department," he cried. "I am saying what four of five officers of the 
navy would say had they a voice in this House." He closed by condemning 
the department for its "tyranny" in silencing the officers of the Navy.15
The Board of Admiralty bill passed the Committee of the Whole but 
was defeated by the House, sixty to seventy. "My Bill has failed,"
Davis complained to Du Pont. He accused Naval Committee chairman Rice 
of "begging his friends to vote against it on personal grounds." The 
Connecticut and New Hampshire delegations were forced to vote against 
it because of a forthcoming election in which "a Welles clique jeopards 
their success." Others were influenced by the promise of new ship yards 
for their districts and additional appointments to the Naval Academy.
"I am not in the least degree sore at the loss of the Bill," Davis 
professed. "It was hardly possible to expect anything else."16
At Du Pont's urging and expense, Davis kept up the assault on 
Welles and Fox by having his speeches on the Admiralty Board bill 
printed in pamphlet form and distributed. He enlisted his old ally 
Senator Wade to introduce his bill in the Senate where it was soundly 
defeated. Unwilling to face defeat, Davis vowed that if any naval bill 
came up in the House before the session closed he would again introduce
15Ibid., 623; HWD to SFDP, 8 February 1865, WMss 9-17356.
16Ibid.; G. V. Fox to W. E. Chandler, 6 February 1865, William 
E. Chandler Mss, LC.
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his bill.17
Davis had hoped that his attack would lead to the dismissal of
Welles and Fox and perhaps even precipitate a general reshuffling of the
Cabinet. He was pleased by a lengthy doggerel which General Schenck
composed while Davis was speaking to the House on his bill.
In Esop’s day Wells were agape 
And thus in one a Fox was found 
But Reynard made his own escape 
And left a silly Goat their drowned 
But Davis now with cruel facts 
Driven straight home with sturdy knocks 
In spite of all their cunning acts
Shuts up the Wells and drowns the Fox!
In expectation of Welles' removal Davis had purchased a bottle of 1802
vintage French wine which he planned to share with Admiral Du Pont
upon the "Neptunian exit." As late as February 21, Davis still thought
that "Welles cant stand these attacks and must succumb." But Welles
and Fox retained Lincoln's confidence. "It looks as if Welles and Fox
are to remain," Davis dejectedly wrote at the end of the session.
Recognizing that he failed, Davis directed Du Pont to drink the long-
cherished bottle, not to the dismissal, but ,fto the confusion of Welles
and Fox!!"18
Preoccupied with Seward and Welles, Davis played only a minor role 
in the effort to effect compromise between the President and the Congress 
over reconstruction— the central issue of the second session. While Davis
17HWD to SFDP, 15 February 1865, WMss 9-17359; CG 38th-2nd-823-
826; William Whettan to SFDP, 16 February 1865, in Hayes (ed.), Du Pont 
Letters, III, 433; CG 38th-2nd-853.
10HWD to SFDP, 15 February 1865, WMss 9-17359; HWD to SFDP, 21
February 1865, WMss 9-17361-A; HWD to SFDP, 1 March 1865, WMss 9-17363;
HWD to SFDP, 12 March 1865, WMss 9-17364.
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remained firm in his conviction that the Congress should control the 
process of reconstruction, other Radicals sought a compromise with 
Lincoln. Instead of allowing restoration measures to be sent to 
Davis1 Committee on the Rebellious States, the House twice in the first 
week ordered bills to be sent to the judiciary committee. Even in 
Davis' committee, compromise efforts were underway led by James Ashley 
of Ohio. On December 15 Ashley reported a modified Wade-Davis bill in 
which Congress would recognize Lincoln's ten per cent government in 
Louisiana in return for Lincoln's acceptance of political equality for 
freedmen. Lincoln read Ashley's bill carefully and according to his 
secretary "liked it with the exception of one or two things"—  
principally Negro suffrage and the Congressional emancipation clause.19
On December 20, two days after Lincoln reviewed Ashley's bill, 
Ashley reported it out of committee with two compromise amendments. 
First, in place of universal manhood suffrage, it now extended the 
franchise to those blacks who served in the array or navy. Second, in 
contrast to the Wade-Davis bill which declared slaves freed in parts 
of states exempted by Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, the revised 
bill emancipated slaves "in the States or parts of States in which such 
persons have been declared free by any proclamation of the President.29
Reluctantly Davis agreed to the compromise Ashley Bill. "Banks 
has been pressing his Louisiana govt.," Davis informed Du Pont. "All 
Hass, took his part and the Prest. joined. It was plainly a combination




not to be resisted— so I had to let Louisiana in under Banks' govt, 
on condition of its going in the Bill defeated by the Prest. last 
year." Although assured by Ashley and Charles Sumner that Lincoln 
would support the bill, Davis remained in doubt. "I think he is being 
manipulated by persons hostile to me in a very ugly frame of mind—  
though he has no malice towards anyone," Davis wrote.21
He was disturbed by a report from General John Schofield, one of 
Lincoln's White House advisors. Schofield told Davis that he urged 
Lincoln to confer with Davis regarding reconstruction as he had done 
with other Congressmen. Lincoln told Schofield, "If I do, he will want 
to govern me!!" This greatly annoyed Davis. "Because I will be 
treated with respect and insist that Congress has a voice in the Govt, 
that is governing the Prest. in his view!!" He informed Du Pont that 
Schofield's story was "not pleasant nor very hopeful for the future."22
In an effort at reconciliation with the President, Davis changed 
his long-time habit and attended the White House's New Year's Day 
reception. "It was horrible beyond expression," Davis related. "We 
were nearly torn to pieces by a struggling rabble trying to get in—  
when in there was not a gentleman or lady to be seen— the vulgarest 
dirtiest rout I ever saw on such an occasion." Davis could not even 
get an interview with Lincoln so pressed was the President’ by "devout 
worshippers."2 3
In mid-January, when the House again considered the revised Wade-
21HWD to SFDP, 20 February 1864, WMss 9-17352.
22Ibid.
23HWD to SFDP, c. early January 1865, WMss 9-17297.
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Davis Bill, new opposition developed from opposite viewpoints. Instead 
of suffrage limited to black soldiers, the Radicals now demanded uni­
versal manhood suffrage. The conservatives objected that the bill would 
disrupt Lincoln’s governments in Louisiana and Arkansas. When oppon­
ents of the bill moved to postpone consideration of it, Davis protested 
that "a vote to postpone is equivalent to a vote to kill the bill." 
Despite Davis' warning, the House voted overwhelmingly to table the 
measure.2^
During most of February, Davis was ill and confined to bed 
suffering from fever and general exhaustion. He was absent when Ashley 
attempted to amend the bill by including universal suffrage and then 
compromised to exclude all blacks— even soldiers. The amended bill 
as presented to the full House on February 21, 1865, contained neither 
recognition of Louisiana and Arkansas nor an extension of the suffrage. 
It was a compromise bill intended to assert congressional control over 
reconstruction.25
Not fully recovered from his illness, Davis returned to the House 
to counter Henry Dawes' speech which many observers felt would prove 
fatal for the bill. Davis carefully prepared his reply to Dawes. As 
in most of his speeches to the House, Davis assumed the air of a teacher 
instructing his pupils— this time on the niceties of constitutional law. 
Methodically he explained the provisions and the modifications of the 
bill, all in very restrained language. But when he came to Lincoln's
21*Sumner to Francis Lieber, 27 December 1864, in Pierce (ed.),
Sumner, IV, 205; CG 38th-2nd-280, 301.
25CG 38th-2nd-967; Belz, Reconstructing the Union, 262-267.
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handling of the original Wade-Davis Bill he flared up. The President 
"without authority of the law" first declared that he would not sign 
the bill and then usurped power to execute the parts of the bill he 
wanted. We need "reason and not executive wishes," Davis ranted. 
Congress must pass a bill to guide the Southern states which would be 
conquered by the Fourth of July or certainly by December. If this bill 
did not pass, at the next session of Congress there would be "at our 
door, clamorous and dictatorial ... sixty-five representatives ... and 
twenty-two senators" claiming admission. If any man thought that when 
the Southern representatives arrived, "they will not cross the threshold 
of the House," then that man was a fool and "had better put his puny 
hands across the flowing flood of the Mississippi and say that it shall 
not enter the Gulf of Mexico." The time to stop the flood was now, 
not when it arrived. And if the Southern representatives who appeared 
were not rebels but representatives "of the bayonets of General Banks 
and the will of the President," they would be but "servile tools of 
the executive" would "embarrass your legislation, humble your 
Congress" allow the South to rise up in its rath and "swamp you here 
with rebel representatives and be your masters."26
The bill the committee presented, he said, attempted to lay down 
the law for the President's guidance. "When I came into Congress ten 
years ago," he concluded, "this was government of laws. I have lived 
to see it a government of personal will." In a decade the Congress had 
dwindled from a powerful legislative body to "a commission to audit 
accounts and appropriate money to enable the executive to execute his
26CG 38th-2nd 967-970.
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will and not our?."27
The House had long been accustomed to the venom of Davis' remarks, 
but had rarely such a fervid plea. His cold, clear rhetoric, his hard 
reasoning, and his forcefulness of delivery combined to produce a 
masterful speech. But the conservative opposition remained unmoved, 
and the House voted to table the bill, ninety-one to sixty-four. Few 
members were farsighted enought to see the need for a reconstruction 
bill before the war ended. Many later regretted the loss of the bill.28
With his term in Congress nearly expired, Davis mounted one 
last crusade— to close military courts trying civilians in loyal areas. 
Numerous Marylanders, including his brother-in-law, editor Frank Key 
Howard, had been placed under arrest and imprisoned after the suspension 
of the writ of habeas corpus. Davis agreed that swift and sure measures 
were necessary to protect the public peace. But the suspension of 
habeas corpus was intended to "avert dangers, not to punish crimes." 
Recently several cases had come to his attention, the most prominent 
being that of Moses Weisenfeldt, a Baltimore merchant convicted by a 
military tribunal of trading with the Confederacy.29
On March 2, when an army appropriations bill was under consider­
ation, Davis introduced a bill by way of amendment that would prohibit 
trials by military commissions in any state or territory where the
27Ibid., 970.
28Ibid.
29Lincoln to Joseph Holt, 17 February 1865, CWAL, VIII, 303; 
Secretary of War— Pardons, 18 February 1865, Record Group 94, Adjutant 
General, Letters Received, P 269, National Archives; Stirling to 
Creswell, c. 1 March 1865, Creswell Mss, LC.
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courts of the United States were open. Several members objected that 
Davis' amendment was not germane to the subject, and the chairman ruled 
it out of order. But Davis appealed the decision and won. Then he 
explained to the House that his bill, although presented hastily, was 
a necessity. American citizens were being tried illegally.3® Cadaver­
ous old Thad Stevens asked him for an example. Davis mentioned one 
Baltimorean charged with counterfeiting Confederate money.
"Well," said Stevens, "I think that a man who was fool enough to 
spend his time in such work ought to suffer severe punishment."
"If all fools are at the mercy of the military courts," Davis 
replied, "and they are to judge of it, they have a wide jurisdiction."31
On a call of the House, Davis' amendment to the army appropria­
tions bill was passed, seventy-three to seventy-one. When the Senate 
refused to concur in the "Winter Davis amendment," Davis again addressed 
the House. With less than one and one-half hours remaining in his 
congressional career, Davis made a stirring speech in support of civil 
liberties. He decried the new crimes, "Military offenses," that were 
without the authority of law; he denounced the use of military tribunals; 
and he censured Lincoln for refusing to "stop the illegal proceedings 
and submit the cases to the courts of the United States." By parli­
amentary tactics and sheer stubbornness, Davis succeeded in keeping 
the House's amendment attached to the bill. But when the Senate again 




the House adjourned at noon, sine die.32
Within a few days, Davis, Nancy, and their daughters, Nannie 
and Mary, returned to Baltimore. Out of political office Davis 
devoted his attention to his law practice, now badly neglected. In 
December 1864 it was rumored that Davis would succeed Attorney General 
Bates, but again Davis was excluded.33 Admiral Du Pont pressed him 
about his prospects for an appointment. "Is anything in contemplation 
for you— are not the Republicans going to insist upon something?" "Of 
course not," Davis replied. Although he claimed he had "three friends 
where any one else in the House had one," his colleagues had to take 
care of themselves, their "clamorous constituency behind them," and 
would support him "at the hazard of the executive displeasure!" Few 
would risk annoying Lincoln by recommending his greatest tormentor in 
the Congress for an appointive post. Davis insisted that none of his 
colleagues "compromise himself on my account— for then I dont feel free 
to compromise myself when the occasion requires it and that is all the 
time— if every idea of republican government is not to be forgotten in 
the pursuit of office and favor." Although he attempted to philo­
sophical about his situation, he was nonetheless plainly irritated.
"I ask for nothing, expect nothing, and can do nothing, either for the
32Ibid., 1333, 1421.
33HWD to SFDP, 4 December 1864, WMss 9-17351. When former 
Comptroller of the Treasury Hugh McCulloch was moved up to Secretary 
of the Treasury, Consul General John Bigelow promoted to Minister to 
Paris, and when Iowa Senator James Harlan was appointed Secretary of 
the Interior, Davis was surprised and disgusted at the appointment 
of subordinates. He quipped, "If Madam die, chief cook promoted to 
wife." HWD to SFDP, 19 or 20 March 1865, WMss 9-17365.
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country, ray friends, or myself."31*
With no prospect of an appointive position, Davis began to eye 
the one major elective office open in Maryland— the United States Senate 
seat held by the late Thomas Holliday Hicks. Hicks had been planning to 
resign his seat and take over Henry Hoffman's position at the Custom 
House, a far more lucrative position. Then Montgomery Blair, 
disappointed over losing the Chief Justiceship to Chase, would receive 
Lincoln's support for the Senate. But the "tyrant death" interferred 
with their scheme. Hicks died while the Maryland legislature was in 
session, thus necessitating an election instead of an appointment by 
the governor.
The Blairs' plottings were well known to Davis. "Greeley is in 
coalition with the Blairs to get one of them into the Senate from Md.—  
the Prest. and [Senator Edwin D.] Morgan both working in the same 
cause," Davis reported. Although many urged Davis to run for the 
Senate, he decided to forgo the race and support a more "available" 
candidate. The new state constitution no longer mandated the election 
of one Senator from each shore, but Davis decided to support an Eastern 
Shoreman for the old "Eastern Shore seat," a move calculated to scuttle 
the Blairs. "I think I will foil them and put Creswell in over their 
heads." Creswell, a Davis ally since early 1863, was from Elkton, on 
the Eastern Shore.35
3itSFDP to HWD, 1 January 1865, in Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters, 
III, 420; HWD to SFDP, c. early January 1865, WMss 9-17297.
35HWD to SFDP, 13 February 1865, WMss 9-17358; HWD to SFDP,
15 February 1865, WMss 9-17359; Thomas H. Hicks to Blair, 29 December
1864, Blair Mss, LC.
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uWe are in the biggest kind of fight now over the U. S. Senator 
in Hicks' place," reported Judge Hugh Lennox Bond, Davis' chief 
political strategist. "Blair is on the rampage but if he does not get 
his horns sawed off mark me for a dead Radical." The first goal was to
get the General Assembly to agree to the old system and elect the
Senator from the Eastern Shore. Rivalries were high between the two 
shores. "Our men will never desert their shore," wrote one Eastern 
Shore politician. By playing on the loyalty of the Eastern Shore
Democrats, the Radicals succeeded in the first part of their plan. The
next step was to unite support for Creswell by getting the lieutenant 
governor, Dr. Christopher C. Cox to withdraw. When Cox quit the race, 
Creswell received the Union party nomination and was elected by the 
General Assembly on March 9, 1865.36
The election was shadowed by charges of corruption. There were a 
number of men who charged that bribery was used to gain votes. Gustavus 
Fox, Blair's brother-in-law, accused the Treasury and the War Depart­
ments of using their influence against Blair. In a speech months later, 
Blair accused Davis' associates of assessing Baltimore merchants doing 
business with the Federal government for funds to finance Creswell's 
campaign. A special committee was appointed by the General Assembly to 
investigate the charges. The committee pronounced the charges as 
entirely without foundation. But many politicians, including Davis' 
friends, continued to believe that Lieutenant Governor Cox had been
36H. L. Bond to Kate, 22 February 1865, Bond-McCullough Mss,
MdHs; HWD to Bond, c. February 1865, Bond-McCollough Mss, MdHS; George 
M. Russum to Creswell, 2 February 1865, W. L. Frazier to Creswell,
17 February 1865, Creswell Mss, LC; William W. Glenn Diary, 10 March 
1865, MdHS; Maryland House Journal 1865, 386.
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"run off the track for the U. S. Senate by the threat of a Court 
Martial" for accepting bribes in his position as a medical purveyor for 
the draft. That some contracts and patronage were used to influence the 
senatorial contest is undoubtedly correct. But it must be remembered 
that Blair's men controlled the Post Office and used its considerable 
patronage in his behalf. The charge that Cox was intimidated into 
withdrawing is less plausible. Davis would never allow an associate 
to make such a threat. Moreover, Cox's position as lieutenant governor 
was too important in the evenly divided state senate, and further, there 
is no indication that even if Cox had made the race he would have 
defeated the Davis forces.37
"Creswell's election is the coup de grace to my enemies in the 
State," Davis predicted. With Creswell in control of federal patronage 
owing to his position as the only Republican Senator, Davis was confi­
dent of the success of "the whole company of the radically righteous." 
The day after Creswell's election Davis wrote the new Senator with a 
request and some advice. He asked Creswell to "empty some saddles," 
to remove from office "those who skulked" as well as those who openly 
opposed them. His counsel concerned the way Creswell should proceed in 
the Senate. "If you wish to be anybody and to do anything, be inde­
pendent of the cowardly sycophants of the President who surround you,"
37Earle to Creswell, 3 February 1865, W. S. Reese to Creswell, 
3 February 1865, Earle to Creswell, 7 February 1865, C. C. Cox to 
Creswell, c. early March 1865, Creswell Mss, LC; W. H. Purnell to 
M. Blair, 9 March 1865, RTL, LC; Baltimore Clipper, 10 March 1865; 
William W. Glenn Diary, 29 March 1865, MdHS; Peter G. Sauerwein to 
McPherson, 1 August 1865, Edward McPherson Mss, LC; "Speech of 
Montgomery Blair delivered at Clarksville, Howard County, Md. on 
August 26, 1865," p. 21
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he suggested. "Make him feel the Legislature Is above him, and he must 
obey Its will, and never ask how a vote will affect your election on any 
future occasion and you will be a power, useful to your country and 
appreciated by the State."38
Davis was adamant that his "radically righteous" wing of the 
Union party should control the federal patronage. When Blair and 
Swann's men came to Davis after Creswell’s election "in the purest of 
garbs of heartfelt repentance," Davis saw no need for Christian charity. 
"I think fasting is a prescription of the Church to accompany prayer 
in such cases," he noted sarcastically. The top position was the 
Collector of the Customs, the dispenser of several hundred other jobs. 
Hoffman, having betrayed Davis, was to be replaced. But the leading 
candidate, Edwin Hanson Webster, former Union officer and incumbent 
Congressman from the Fourth Congressional District, was unsatisfactory 
to Davis. "This won't do," Davis wrote Creswell. "No one can hold 
that place but one on our side or Hoffman." Nevertheless, Creswell, 
hoping to conciliate the factions, kept negotiating with Webster, Swann, 
and Mayor Chapman. Davis consulted his advisors, Bond and Archibald 
Stirling, and wrote Creswell again. "I have been reflecting on the 
proposed Custom House arrangements and the more I think of it the more 
serious and dangerous it looks." If the Collector was "not with us— as 
you are— he would be our master." The Collector would also be a strong 
candidate for Reverdy Johnson's Senate seat in 1868, a position which 
Davis wanted for himself. Bond and Stirling would agree to accept
38HWD to SFDP, 12 March 1865, WMbs 9-17364; HWD to Creswell,
10 March 1865, in Cecil Whig, 25 January 1879.
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Webster only if the rest of the patronage "be disposed of wholly to 
our satisfaction, you of course included; and that a distinct pledge 
about the Senatorship should be given."39
On March 20 Lincoln wrote Governor Swann asking him to locate 
Senator Creswell and bring him to a meeting at the White House.
Following his long established policy of "Justice for All," Lincoln 
had decided to let Swann and Creswell, representing the two factions, 
make up the new slate of officeholders. Davis wanted no compromise with 
Swann and Blair. "In your arrangement with Swann you ought to press 
him on the question of his patronage as Governor and if he don't yield 
on the equivalent in U. S. patronage, the Prest. cant fail to see that 
in doing nominal justice he is really giving a dominant influence to 
one wing," Davis wrote Creswell.110
Creswell continued to balk at Davis' direction. He was willing 
to compromise on the issue of patronage in hopes of reuniting the 
wings of the party behind him. He secured the selection of General 
Andrew Denison, a Davisite, for Postmaster of Baltimore and the 
appointment of Davis men to lesser offices. But Creswell also agreed 
to Webster as the man for Collector of Customs. "Our friends will not 
agree to Webster unless first he will agree not to remove but to retain 
all our friends now in office," Davis declared, and also to pledge "not
39HWD to SFDP, 12 March 1865, WMss 9-17364; HWD to Creswell,
15 March 1865, RTL, LC; HWD to Creswell, c. April 1865, Cecil County 
Historical Society.
^Lincoln to Swann, 20 March 1865, CWAL, VIII, 369; Swann to 
Lincoln, 20 March 1865, RTL, LC; Sauerwein to McPherson, 27 March 
1865, McPherson Mss, LC; Lincoln Memorandum— Maryland Appointments,
9 March 1865, RTL, LC; John A. Bingham to HWD, 11 March 1865, Creswell 
Mss, LC.
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to be a candidate for Senator, nor use his power to support Swann or 
Blair or any of our opponents while holding the Collectorship."1*1 
Davis explained to Creswell the necessity for demanding all 
those conditions regarding the patronage in Maryland. His whole 
political course had been blocked by men who agreed with him in 
principle but who were not resolute enought to put it into action. "I 
will not sink to an office hunting politician, but I will pursue the 
interests of this country alone, and that over every interest personal 
and party," he assured Creswell. "It is not my purpose to change my 
style of supporting the Administration; I will neither be driven into 
opposition nor silent ...." Undoubtedly Webster agreed to Davis' 
conditions since Creswell and Swann soon nominated him along with 
Denison and others to Lincoln for appointment. On April 14 Lincoln 
initialed the slate. In Davis' words Lincoln also agreed to remove 
"all the men who so treacherously smote me last fall at the President's 
instigation, Hoffman and all."1*2
On the evening of April 14 Davis was jubilant. "Everybody was 
lifted from the ground— in exultation and joy at the end of the war," 
he reported. He and Nancy bantered about what they would now do for 
news— now that the war was over. Before he returned to Washington, 
Davis was informed by Creswell that Lincoln was in "high glee" and that 
"we should have peace and quiet at once!"
The next morning Davis was awakened early by his servant calling
lflHWD to Creswell, c. April 1865, Cecil County Historical Society.
tf2Ibid.; HWD to Creswell, c. March 1865, Creswell Mss, LC; Lincoln 
Memorandum, Maryland Appointments, 14 April 1865, CWAL, VIII, 411;
HWD to SFDP, 15 April 1865, WMss 9-17370.
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to him, "Mr. Lincoln is killed!" Davis was stunned. "This kind-hearted 
man had fallen a victim to the scoundrels he was trying to protect and 
conciliate! I feel thankful now that however Indignant at his conduct 
I never felt any personal bitterness towards him," Davis professed.**3
On April 19, exactly four years after the attack on the Massachu­
setts troops in Baltimore, Davis attended Lincoln's funeral in Washing­
ton. "The ceremonies in the Prest. house were very well conducted," 
Davis reported. "The prayers and discourses were full of bad eulogy, 
questionable politics, doubtful prophecy bordering on the boastful—  
some religion but no Christianity— This I stood and endured an eternity 
of two or three hours!"**1'
His four years of struggle with Lincoln were over and a War 
Democrat, Andrew Johnson, was President. While others recalled the 
war and the slain President, Davis was preoccupied with the future.
**3HWD to SFDP, 15 April 1865, WMss 9-17370.
^HWD to SFDP, 19 April 1865, in Hayes (ed.), Du Pont Letters,
III, 468.
Chapter 17 
THE FOLLY OF MAKING PLANS
"What of the future?" Winter Davis asked Du Pont. "That is 
the great question." What type of man was Andrew Johnson? What 
type of president would he be? What course would he follow? Davis 
had long harbored grave doubts about Johnson. In 1864, when the 
Tennessean was nominated for Vice President, Davis had predicted that 
Johnson will "cheat us if he gets into power." Now Johnson was in 
power.1
Davis also worried about the return of the Blairs. At the 
inaugural in March, Johnson had gotten drunk and publicly humiliated 
himself. He had been taken by the Blairs to their Silver Spring, 
Maryland, estate to recuperate. "If sober," Davis conjectured, Johnson 
might deal more severely with the seceded states, "but his advisers—  
only think how the Devil takes care of his own— will be Old Blairt and 
young Blairt" The Blairs’ act of kindness toward Johnson had sealed 
a bond between them, all old Locofoco Jacksonian Democrats. With 
"alcoholic" Johnson and his Blair advisers in control, the future seemed 
bleak to Davis.2
After arriving in Washington for Lincoln's funeral, Davis'
2HWD to SFDP, 15 April 1865, WMss 9-17370.
2HWD to SFDP, c. 1 June 1864, WMss 9-17328; HWD to SFDP, 15 April
1865, WMss 9-17370; Smith, The Blair Family. II, 327.
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opinion began to change. Of the six hundred mourners in the dimly 
lit East Room of the White House, "the Blairs were not visible!"
Davis considered it "a prophecy— the shadow of the coming change at 
last." Ohio Radicals Wade and Schenck assured Davis that Johnson would 
change the Cabinet, would not rely on the Blairs, and would consult the 
Radicals.3
Explanations of Johnson's insobriety also proved satisfactory. 
Former Vice President Hanibal Hamlin gave Davis his account of 
Johnson's inaugural drunkenness. According to Hamlin, Johnson had been 
perfectly sober when he arrived at the Capitol for the ceremonies but 
was still suffering from typhoid fever and exhaustion. He requested 
"some stimulant" to help him through the long day. Hamlin brought him 
two very large drinks of brandy "and that on his weak nerves upset 
him." In addition, other Congressmen and Senators assured Davis that 
Johnson did not drink heavily when formerly in Congress, and General 
Ambrose Burnside denied charges that Johnson had been intemperate while 
military governor of Tennessee. **
On April 20, after coaxing by Schenck and Wade, Davis called on 
the new President at the White House. Davis found him surrounded by 
callers but he "had more revelation of his mind and purposes and of 
the man in him in ten minutes that I got in four years out of Lincoln." 
The assassination was "a great crime— but the change is no calamity," 
he concluded after his brief visit. "I suppose God had punished us




enough by his weak rule— and undid it! I spoke to no man in Washington 
who did not consider the change a great blessing."5
In the days that followed, Davis had frequent meetings with the 
President and Radical leaders. Wade, Chandler, Julian and others told 
him that Johnson would soon appoint a new Cabinet, retaining only 
Stanton. Former Senator Preston King, a close friend of the Blairs 
and Johnson, swore that "Blair will have no influence." Senator 
Solomon Foot of Vermont convinced Davis that "Johnson behaves with 
great gravity and solemnity as if sensible of the responsibility thrown 
on him— which is more than can be said for his predecessor. So there 
is hope," Davis concluded.6
His hope soon faded. Unlike other Radicals who honeymooned with 
Johnson well into 1866, Davis soon began to distrust the President.
After a month in office Johnson had not replaced a single Cabinet 
officer. "It is still rumored that Cabinet changes impend— but 
Johnson is silent and cautious," Davis noted with suspicion. It seemed 
to him that the President was "reaping the fruits of keeping Lincoln's 
advisers," particularly following their advice on the trial of Lincoln's 
alleged assassins. The Cabinet, after hearing an opinion by Attorney 
General Speed, held that the assassination was a military crime since 
it struck down the commander-in-chief and therefore approved a trial 
of the alleged assassins by a military commission instead of a criminal
5HWD to SFDP, 22 April 1865, WMss 9-17372.




A military court of ten officers, headed by Judge Advocate General 
Joseph Holt, quickly found the eight accused guilty of complicity in 
the assassination. David E. Herold, Lewis Payne, George A. Atzerodt, 
and Mrs. Mary E. Surratt were condemned to death. Herold, Payne, and 
Atzerodt had participated in the plot to kill Lincoln and Seward, while 
Mrs. Surratt had merely kept the boarding house where the conspirators 
met with John Wilkes Booth. Mrs. Surratt steadfastly denied any part 
in the plot. Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, who set Booth's broken ankle, and 
Samuel B. Arnold, who provided him with horses, were sentenced to life 
imprisonment. A stage carpenter, Edward Spangler, and a youth, Michael 
O'Laughlin, were given six years in prison.
The investigation soon spread beyond the eight. The commission 
tried to associate the assassination with a conspiracy which included 
the raid on St. Albans, Vermont, on October 19, 1864, and the burning 
of ten hotels in New York City in November 1864. Stanton privately 
told Davis that Confederate Minister Jacob Thompson and others in 
Richmond were involved in the plot and that $100,000 was raised to 
execute it. On May 2 President Johnson asserted that the government 
had sufficient evidence to implicate Jefferson Davis, Jacob Thompson 
and other Confederates in the assassination plot.8
On May 13, Davis, who had strongly opposed the use of military 
commissions in the last session of Congress, wrote the President pro-
7HWD to SFDP, 11 or 12 May 1865, WMss 9-17375; HWD to SFDP,
7 May 1865, WMss 9-17374.
8HWD to SFDP, 22 April 1865, WMss 9-17372.
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testing the use of a military court to try the alleged assassins. A 
resort to such agencies would "prove disastrous to yourself, your 
administration, and your supporters who may attempt to apologize 
for it," he predicted. "The only safety is to stop now, deliver the 
accused to the law and let the Courts of the United States satisfy the 
people that the prisoners are either guilty or innocent m  law; for the 
people want justice not vengeance." Privately Davis doubted that 
Jefferson Davis was implicated in the plot but felt convinced of the 
guilt of the eight accused. Nevertheless, he protested the way in which 
they were tried. Despite his and others' objections, Johnson signed 
the death sentences for Herold, Payne, Atzerodt, and Mrs. Surratt and 
they were hanged on July 7. Mudd, Arnold, and Spangler were sent to 
Dry Tortugas to serve their sentences.9
Davis was also disturbed by the illegal action Johnson directed 
against John T. Ford, owner and proprietor of Ford's Theater, the 
site of the attack on Lincoln. For unknown reasons, Johnson ordered 
the theater permanently closed. Ford retained Davis to represent him. 
After protracted negotiations aimed at reopening the theater, Davis 
advised his client to sell his property to the Federal government, which 
converted it to a Confederate archives. The illegal destruction and 
occupation of the theater offended Davis' sense of justice, and he 
refused to absolve the President from major responsibility for those 
illegal actions.10
9HWD to Johnson, 13 May 1865, Andrew Johnson Mss, LC; HWD to 
SFDP, 18 or 19 May 1865, WMss 9-17376; War Department Orders No. 356, 
Stanton Mss, LC.
10HWDandWm. Schley to Stanton, 18 July 1865, Andrew Johnson to 
Stanton, 19 July 1865, Stanton to HWD and Wm. Schley, 19 July 1865,
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Bad as was the President's course on military commissions, even 
worse in Davis' view was his handling of patronage. The Creswell-Swann 
agreement, which divided patronage between Davis and his conservative 
opponents, was initialed by Lincoln on the day he was shot. On the 
advice of the Blairs, Johnson ignored the agreement and authorized the 
ever-pliable Creswell and Democratic Senator Reverdy Johnson to compose 
a new slate. Upon hearing of Johnson's decision, Davis wrote Creswell, 
"Is Johnson to Tylerize us?" meaning to follow the example John Tyler 
and desert the party that elected him. Clearly that was what Johnson 
planned; he sought to force a coalition of conservative Republicans, 
Northern "War" Democrats, and white Southerners while excluding Radical 
Republicans. Apprised that the Creswell-Johnson agreement almost totally 
excluded his supporters in favor of Blair men, Davis led a delegation 
which called upon the President on July 24, but with no result. Feeling 
betrayed, Davis pleaded with Senator Sumner for help. "Our affairs in 
Md. may well puzzle you," he noted, "but they are clear enough now and 
draw light on the purposes of the Prest." Johnson's appointment of 
Edwin H. Webster to the Customs House and William H. Purnell to the 
Post Office in Baltimore gave the patronage to the conservatives.
"Unless their confirmation be refused," Davis predicted, "— goodbye to 
radical representatives and Senators from Md."11
Stanton Mss, LC; HWD to Creswell, 13 December 1865, Creswell Mss, LC.
1^HWD to Creswell, 17 April 1865, Aldine Collection, MdHS; HWD 
to Chandler, 1 May 1865, Chandler Mss, LC; Reverdy Johnson to Andrew 
Johnson, 10 July 1865, Creswell to Andrew Johnson, 10 July 1865, 
Andrew Johnson Mss, LC; HWD to Creswell, 14 July 1865, Creswell Mss, 
LC; HWD to Sumner, 26 July 1865, Sumner Mss, Harvard. For the best 
analysis of Johnson and Blair's design for a new party see La Wanda 
and John H. Cox, Politics, Principle, and Prejudice, 1865-1866 
(Glencoe, 111., 1963), Chapters 2-3.
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The major cause of Davis' growing discontent with Johnson stemmed 
from the President's handling of reconstruction. With the war at an 
end, Davis' views advanced over those expressed in the Wade-Davis Bill.
A few days before the President's proclamation on reconstruction was 
expected Davis encountered two Virginia Unionists. The "probable 
alternatives" of the President's policy, he predicted, "were negro 
suffrage— or ostracising all who had been in arms or office." When 
one of the Virginians "pleaded his prejudices" against Negro suffrage, 
Davis "left them with an admonition that we had learned that prejudices 
could be swallowed in a pinch."12
In a letter to House Clerk Edward McPherson, Davis laid out his 
new thoughts on reconstruction. Johnson had only three possible choices, 
Davis declared. First, the President could allow governments to be 
established by the entire white population of the South. That would 
fill Congress with former Confederates and would "place the sceptre in 
the hands from which we have just wrested the sword." Self-interest 
would compel the "rebel representatives" to repudiate the public debt, 
restore their officers to the army and navy, place their veterans on 
the pension rolls, restore slavery under the form of apprenticeship, 
and pass discriminatory legislation against the freedmen. Should the 
President decide to establish the Southern states on that basis,
Congress should refuse to accept their representatives, Davis argued.13
Or the President might establish governments based only on the
12HWD to SFDP, 22 May 1865, WMss 9-17377.
13HWD to Edward McPherson, 27 May 1865, Edward McPherson Mss, 
LC; this letter is reprinted in Speeches and Addresses, 556-563.
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support of loyal Southerners by excluding from voting all who gave aid 
and comfort to the rebellion. This plan, Davis wrote, had two defects. 
First, the mass of the Southern people had supported the rebellion; and 
second, the Unionists who were unable to oppose secession would be no 
more successful in controlling the government now. If power were 
centered in "an odious oligarchy" of Southern Unionists, the masses 
would soon rise up, overthrow them, and the "rebel representatives" 
would soon be in control.11*
The only course "consistent with the national peace and safety" 
was one "recognizing the negro population as an integral part of the 
people of the Southern States, and by refusing to permit any State 
government to be organized on any other basis than universal suffrage 
and equality before the law." Negroes depended on the continued 
supremacy of the United States for their freedom and they would work 
to keep it in power. "To permit the white to disfranchise the negroes 
is to permit those who have been our enemies to ostracize our friends." 
To those who claimed that the Negro was ignorant and incapable of voting 
Davis replied: "If they be ignorant, they are not more so than large
masses of white voters of the South, or the rabble which is tumbled on 
the wharves of New York and run straight to the polls."15
A government established on the basis of universal suffrage was 
not an idealistic or premature idea. "Premature agitators are cocks 
which crow at midnight; they do not herald the dawn, but merely disturb 




premature agitation, but a political necessity to preserve "the chief 
fruits of the war." But to effect this result, Davis mourned that he 
had no power. He could only "hope and fear."16
Davis1 fears were well founded. On May 29, when Johnson issued 
two proclamations, Davis was clearly disappointed. The first one 
offered amnesty to certain former Confederates while excluding several 
groups from the general amnesty including everyone having $20,000 worth 
of taxable property. The second one re-established civil government 
in North Carolina based on an all-white electorate. "Johnson still 
hugs Lincoln’s cabinet and is getting his reward," Davis lamented.
"The Va. and N. C. reorganization will cost him the confidence of his 
friends I suspect; and what is more and worse if persisted in will throw 
the Govt, into the hands of its enemies."17
Charles Sumner, also disappointed in Johnson's proclamations, 
wrote Davis seeking his opinion. Davis responded: "I do not think
they [the Republicans] can either coax or compel Prest. Johnson to 
change his course. They can drive him to Tylerize the party— but that 
is no remedy." The only possible means of opposing Johnson's govern­
ments and securing Negro suffrage, Davis predicted, was "to fix the eyes 
of the country not on the rights of the negro— nor the general 
requirements of justice and humanity— they are vague generalities that 
solve nothing— but on the direct and practical consequences" of allowing 
the South to return to power "with the men who led or the men who 
followed in the rebellion." When the Northern people saw that Negro
16Ibid., 563.
17HWD to SFDP, 18 June 1865, WMss 9-17381.
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suffrage was the only way to make sure that the Interest is paid on 
the war debt, that Confederate officers were excluded from the army and 
navy, and that basic freedoms were given to the freedmen, then they 
would agree to universal suffrage.18
Davis advised Sumner that there were two means to establish 
Negro suffrage. The Congress could require it as a condition of the 
recognition of any state "declaring none republican in form which 
excluded negroes from voting." Or the Congress could initiate a 
constitutional amendment prescribing universal suffrage "as the basis 
of every State," submit it to the legislatures of the states "now 
represented in Congress," and declare it ratified when three-fourths 
of them passed it. "This is the safer course," Davis thought, but he 
doubted that Congress had nerve enough to pursue either. "The 
Republicans allowed themselves to be dragged at Mr. Lincoln's tail for 
four years; I am not sure they will not trot at Prest. Johnson's tail 
for another four years," he concluded. "I trust you are not as I am 
in despair."19
As his Maryland friends and enemies always claimed, Winter Davis 
was up when he was down. Although despairing of success, he sought to 
mobilize public opinion against the President's policy and for universal 
suffrage. He accepted an invitation to speak at Chicago's Fourth of 
July celebration. "I had rather have held my tongue and staid at home 
if that had been possible," he confided to Du Pont, but to stay home 
meant to make himself available to speak in Baltimore "where I should
18HWD to Sumner, 20 June 1865, Sumner Mss, Harvard.
19Ibid.
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have been stifled by people I detest and who detest me but did not dare 
to pass me over; and as good luck would have it Chicago saved me."20
All over the country, the Fourth of July that year was celebrated 
by huge crowds jubilant at the end of the long war. In Chicago's 
Sanitary Fair gathered an audience of over ten thousand headed by 
dozens of dignataries. After the reading of the Emancipation Procla­
mation, Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address, the Declaration of Inde­
pendence, and a song by a chorus of one thousand singers, Davis rose 
to deliver the main address.21
The Declaration of Independence had been made a reality by the 
expulsion of slavery from the land, he said. Precious blood had 
crushed slavery and the false ideology which supported it. Who did not 
now know that secession was not a peaceful remedy, he asked? Who did 
not now know that the South could be defeated? And who did "not now 
know that the negro is a man? for he has proved his manhood at the 
poin1' of the bayonet."22
Now that the United States had passed through "the valley of the 
shadow of death" what course should it follow? In foreign policy it 
should insist that the French leave Mexico. With flights of rhetoric 
he blasted Napoleon III and the French for placing a European prince on 
a hereditary throne in Mexico. "Let them leave Mexico," he shouted. 
They are a "perpetual menace to us .... We wish for no conquests, but 
we have established freedom here, and we will have freedom from here
20HWD to SFDP, 18 June 1865, WMss 9-17381.




In domestic policy he urged his latest plan of reconstruction.
He said he opposed extremes. Hanging Confederate leaders would only 
multiply the number of martyrs. Military occupation of the South was 
inconsistent with democratic ideals. But he greatly feared turning 
the governments over to former Confederates. Although some Confederates 
might have accepted defeat, he had met none who were repentant. And 
there was no loyal white population in the South strong enough to form 
a government. The Unionist strength in the South was as weak as it had 
been before the war when it failed to prevent secession. Only by 
including Negroes among the loyal could governments be established.
"It was not a matter of justice or humanity to the negro ... as if 
justice or humanity ever determine any great question of the world," 
nor was it "the rights of the negro," but "our safety" that was at 
stake. "It is a question of power, not right— a question of salvation, 
not of morals." The black vote in South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, 
Louisiana, and Georgia "can break the terrible unity of the Southern 
vote that plunged us into the rebellion." He said he had known many 
Negroes, lived near them, and supposed he had as much prejudice as any 
in the audience. But if the black man was an equal on the battlefield, 
then he should be an equal at the ballot box.zl*
President Johnson's proclamations, he claimed, placed undue 
confidence in the white people of the South. Southerners would never 




to consecrate "forever the mass of the people as the basis of the 
republican government of the United States." The purpose of such 
an amendment was not "philanthropy" or "justice and humanity" but "the 
integrity of the government." "We need the votes of all the colored 
people; it is numbers, not intelligence, that count at the ballot-box."25
No speech Davis ever made met with such approval. The crowd 
applauded for an indeterminable time. He was mobbed as he left the 
platform. Newspapers were almost unanimously laudatory. He had managed 
to state his case for Negro suffrage in such a way as to appeal to the 
whites of the North.26
The trip to Chicago had been an exhausting one for Davis. A week 
before he left he had a bad shock. His friend Admiral Samuel Francis 
Du Pont died from an early morning bronchial attack. "Ify loss is 
irreparable," Davis wrote Mrs. Du Pont, "not merely in the loss of my 
best friend but of the only adviser whose judgment I was willing to take 
against my own." This friendship, while close, had nevertheless been 
formal. There was little jocular exchange between them, only discussions 
of men and events between two highly educated, reserved, and somewhat 
aristocratic men. Du Pont's death was both a personal and political 
tragedy for Davis.27
25Ibid., 583.
26Sarah Davis to George P. Davis, 9 July 1865, David Davis Mss,
CHS; Beale (ed.), Diary of Gideon Welles, II, 325; Chicago Tribune,
5 July 1865, New York Times, 6 July 1865.
27HWD to SMDP, 17 July 1865, WMss 9-17382; Davis wrote biograph­
ical sketches of Du Pont and sent them to several newspapers, see 
Philadelphia North American, 27 June 1865, and New York Evening Post,
26 June 1865. Davis also prepared a pamphlet biography for family 
and friends, see Henry Winter Davis, Sketch of the Public Services of
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Still despondent over Du Pont's death, Davis returned from Chicago 
looking forward to a summer of escape from politics and law. In late 
July, Davis, Nancy, eight-year old Nannie, and three-year old Mary left 
for Long Branch, New Jersey. "Nancy feels little like going to any 
watering place," Davis wrote, "but the children require it." For two 
months Davis and Nancy spent long afternoons in quiet conversation, 
dozing, and playing with their daughters on the Jersey shore. "We find 
a few acquaintances here," he reported, "but generally it is a desert 
with water and cool air in which the children luxuriate." By the end 
of August, restless and inquisitive, Davis left his family at Long 
Branch to spend a week in Saratoga, New York, discussing party intigues 
and political events with vacationing politicians. In late September, 
the Davis family returned to Baltimore after visiting with Mrs. Du Pont 
at Louviers for a few days.28
Upon returning to Baltimore Davis encountered "the press of 
worrying duties which accumulate as a penalty of absence." After 
consulting with his political advisers in Baltimore, he decided to 
renew the attempt to block the appointment of Webster and Purnell to 
Collector and Postmaster. "I have seen Stirling and Bond," he notified
Rear Admiral S. F. du Pont, United States Navy (Wilmington, 1965).
Du Pont’s old adversary, Secretary Welles, treated him as badly in 
death as he had in life. Welles wrote: "Rear Admiral Du Pont ... died 
this A. M. in Philadelphia. Du Pont possessed ability, had acquire­
ments, was a scholar rather than a hero. He was a courtier, given 
to intrigue, was selfish, adroit, and learned. Most of the Navy were 
attached to him and considered his the leading cultured mind in the 
service. He nursed cliques .... Although very proud, he was not 
physically brave." Beale (ed.), Diary of Gideon Welles, II, 320.
28HWD to SMDP, 8 August 1865, WMss 9-17383, 25 August 1865,
WMss 9-17384, 31 August 1865, WMss 9-17385.
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Creswell, "and we will be down on you on Tuesday like the wolves on the 
fox." Week after week he barraged Creswell with petitions and remon­
strances against Webster and Purnell. Again he petitioned Sumner for 
help. "In Maryland our condition is bad enough— under the heel of Blair 
and his trimmers. Will not the Senate repeal such nominations?"29
From September to November elections were held in the North for 
state and local offices, and the results were "very gratifying" to Davis. 
In state after state the Republicans had been denounced as the "nigger 
party." At a rally in New York City, Montgomery Blair declared that 
"This is a white man's country" and called Negro suffrage the first step 
toward Negro equality, amalgamation of the races, and Negro domination. 
When the Democrats, exploiting the anti-Negro sentiment in the North, 
were defeated in all eight gubernatorial races, it was nor possible for 
Republicans to insist on Negro suffrage for the nation. Should Congress 
pass a constitutional amendment requiring universal suffrage, he advised 
Sumner, "I will undertake to carry it in Maryland— jL£ we can get the 
administration off our backs." He said he would insist on the enforce­
ment of the Maryland registry law which executed the disfranchising por­
tions of the new constitution. Only when the conservatives agreed to 
allow blacks to vote would he permit ex-Confederates to vote, "which then 
can be safely done; for 30,000 negro votes will balance 8,000 rebel 
votes!"30
29HWD to SMDP, 21 September 1865, WMss 9-17386; HWD to Creswell, c. 
October 1865, Creswell Mss, LC; H.L. Bond to Chase, 13 November 1865, 
Chase Mss, LC; HWD to Creswell, 18 November 1865, 5, 9, 22 December 
1865, Creswell Mss, LC; HWD to Sumner, 5 December 1865, Sumner Mss, 
Harvard.
30HWD to Creswell, c. October 1865, Creswell Mss, LC; New York 
Times, 19 October 1865; M. Blair to S.L.M. Barlow, 19 November, 9 Decem-
In hopes of rallying support in Congress for a constitutional 
amendment, Davis wrote a lengthy article on reconstruction and Negro 
suffrage which was published in The Nation, a new weekly magazine.
Boldly breaking with President Johnson, Davis assailed the President's 
reconstruction policy. Johnson's proclamations supposedly summoned the 
"loyal people" of the Southern states to reorganize their state govern­
ments, but in "reality they exclude the whole negro population, half the
aggregate population and nearly the whole of those who have always been 
loyal in these States." Whatever Johnson's purpose might be, his policy 
was that of the enemy, Davis wrote. The President had not punished 
traitors. He had pledged that only loyal men would control the South,
but he had delivered the South to the disloyal. He had pledged "that
the aristocracy should be pulled down, yet he has put it in power again; 
that its possessions should be divided among Northern laborers of all 
colors, yet the negroes are still a landless, homeless class; that he 
was opposed to military commissions, yet they still defile the land, and 
others for higher victims are said to be in preparation!" The President 
had said that the states should decide the question of suffrage, but 
instead he was leaving it to the whites to decide whether the blacks 
should vote. The President had disobeyed the Constitution in not requir­
ing an oath as a qualification of suffrage. "His whole conduct was a 
usurpation .... The President's intermeddling is wholly illegal," Davis 
charged.31
ber, Barlow Mss, Huntington Library; M. Blair to J. Van Buren, 10 Novem­
ber 1865, Gratz Collection, HSP; for the results of the fall elections 
of 1865 see Eric McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction (Chicago, 
1960), 76; HWD to Sumner, 5 December 1865, Sumner Mss, Harvard.
31HWD to J. M. McKim, 13 November 1865, Department of Rare Books,
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Davis suggested that Congress not acknowledge any state which dis­
franchised blacks on the grounds that the state government was not "rep­
ublican." To avoid the charge of hypocrisy (Connecticut, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin had recently turned down amendments extending the franchise to 
blacks), Davis offered a new approach. Connecticut's refusal to allow 
blacks to vote did not interfere with "the republicanism of her govern­
ment, for the persons excluded form no material or appreciable portion 
of her citizens," he wrote. "But negro suffrage is one thing in Connect- 
cut and another thing" in the South where blacks constituted from one- 
third to two-thirds of the population. "If two thirds who are black 
may be excluded in South Carolina," he argued, then "two thirds who 
are white may be excluded by the blacks in North Carolina." Congress 
had never admitted a state which excluded one-third of its male citizens 
from voting, and he urged it not to admit one now.32
Congress should require states to be reorganized on the basis of 
universal manhood suffrage and institute a "universal suffrage amendment" 
to the Constitution. Only the vote could protect the black man. "Power 
alone is security, and with it comes respect, and dignity, and educa­
tion," Davis reasoned. "They who propose to postpone negro suffrage till 
the negro is educated, need political education more than the negro."33
If Johnson refused to support universal suffrage, then "we must 
break the coalition at any cost. The President can have our support
Cornell; Henry Winter Davis, "Winter Davis on Reconstruction," The 
Nation, I (November 30, 1865), 680-682, reprinted in Speeches and 
Addresses, 585-596.
32Speeches and Addresses, 590.
33Ibid., 593-594.
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only by conforming his conduct to our principles. "3Jt
This article in The Nation was as bold and astute as anything he 
had ever written— including the Wade-Davis Manifesto. It announced for 
Negro suffrage and declared that the President must either adhere to the 
policy or be deserted by his party. While others still expressed hopes 
that the President might yet come around to some form of Negro suffrage, 
Davis clearly saw Johnson's design. While others called for concilia­
tion, Davis denounced the President's "usurpations" and his "illegal 
intermeddlings" in language as shrill as he ever used on Lincoln.
His call for universal suffrage was politically shrewd. To regain 
his political control of Maryland, Davis had become the arch-radical. 
Just as in 1863 when he carried emancipation in Maryland by appealing 
to the poor white men in the southern portion of the state by showing 
them that the Negro would relieve them from the draft, so in 1865 he 
was "radical" agains with a "practical" solution. Negro suffrage, he 
argued, was not necessary for reasons of "justice" or "humanity," but 
to uphold national safety, to protect the victory so dearly won, to 
ensure "republican government," and continue the right of the people 
(read the Republican party) to rule.
As the Thirty-Ninth Congress convened in December 1865, fifty- 
eight Confederate senators and representatives, including four Confed­
erate generals and six Confederate Cabinet members, appeared in Wash­
ington demanding to be seated, just as Davis had predicted. Davis' 
friend Edward McPherson omitted the names of the Confederates from the 
roll of the House and his decision was sustained by a vote of the House.
3ltIbid., 596.
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Davis was "greatly relieved and delighted by what I hear and see of the 
spirit of the new Congress," he wrote Sumner. It looked to him "as if 
the days of Congressional subserviency were passed and the fate of the 
nation in the keeping of the people."35
During the second week of the session, Davis visited Washington 
on legal business. Not finding his cousin, David Davis, at the Supreme 
Court, he went to the Capitol. Upon entering the Hall of the House he 
received a "general, spontaneous, and cordial" greeting from members on 
both sides. The crowd which gathered around him became so boisterous 
that he was forced to leave the Hall for an anteroom. The general 
reception by his former colleagues "touched his heart most sensibly." 
While in Washington he pressed Creswell and others to work steadfastly 
to secure a change in the patronage appointments, and he urged speedy 
adoption of a bill to provide for Negro suffrage in the District of 
Columbia. Naturally he returned to Baltimore discontented— anxious 
to be back in Congress. "I see few people and hear little of the 
world out of my office where I divide my time between law and looking 
over old letters," he complained to Mrs. Du Pont. "Political affairs 
I fear are drifting into a bad way," he advised his cousin, "but I
35HWD to Sumner, 5 December 1865, Sumner Mss, Harvard. Many 
historians have claimed that the Radicals including Davis were 
still eager at this time to come to an agreement with Johnson. Many 
cite a letter from William A. Howard to Charles Sumner in which 
Howard wrote, "I learn that Winter Davis has written Wade that he 
is getting more and more reconciled to Johnson and urges him to forbear 
all attacks." Howard to Sumner, 12 November 1865, Sumner Mss,
Harvard. There seems to be little evidence for this contention.
Davis' letter to The Nation was a strong attack on Johnson and no 
such letter from Davis to Wade appears in Wade's correspondence.
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can't help it and so don't trouble myself about it."36
A few days before Christmas, Davis attended a political meeting 
at the Union Club on Charles Street, only a few blocks from his home. 
Walking with Davis to the meeting, John T. Graham lectured him for not 
wearing an overcoat on a cold December night. Ever boyish, Davis 
poked fun at Graham's scolding. But by the time they reached the club,
Davis was cold. Leaving the meeting early, he went home. He was
perfectly well on Christmas day, making calls and attending church, 
but that evening he was seized by a chill followed by a fever. The 
next day the doctor diagnosed it as pneumonia. The fever mounted, his 
pain increased, and he lapsed into delirium. Within two days, he was 
much better, and the doctor assured Nancy that his inflamed lung had 
entered into the convalescent stage. Relieved that "all cause for 
anxiety had ceased," Nancy wrote Mrs. Du Pont the good news. But on 
the evening of December 29 his condition once again became critical. 
Still conscious, he suffered greatly. When Nancy spoke of a planned 
trip to visit Mrs. Du Pont, Davis replied, "Oh, the folly of making 
plans for a day, much less for a year." He sank rapidly that night and
died at 2:30 P.M. on Saturday, December 30, 1865.37
On the morning of January 2 visitors flocked to the Davis home. 
Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase was among the first to arrive. Davis
36HWD to SMDP, 15 December 1865, WMss 9-17392; HWD to Creswell,
22 December 1865, Creswell Mss, LC; HWD to David Davis, 23 December 
1865, David Davis Mss, CHS; CG 39th-lst-Appendix-161.
37Steiner, Henry W. Davis. 372; Nancy Davis to SMDP, 28 December 
1865, WMss 9-27548; Philadelphia Public Ledger and Daily Transcript.
1 January 1866; Nancy Davis to SMDP, c. January 1866, WMss 9-27606; 
Henry T. Blow to Lyman Trumbull, 1 January 1866 (telegram), Lyman 
Trumbull Mss, LC; Baltimore American, 3 January 1866.
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was lying in a casket in the front parlor. "His face was pale— very 
pale," Chase recorded in his diary, "but it was difficult to think of 
him as dead." For several hours "a continuous stream of people of all 
classes and colored as well as white were passing up taking their last 
look, and returning down the stairway." Some of Nancy's relatives "who 
did not sympathize with the liberal and reforming spirit of Davis" 
objected to allowing Negroes to enter the home. But Nancy insisted 
saying, "Let every one who loved Winter Davis and wishes to look on 
him for one last ime be gratified."3®
After the Episcopal service for the dead at one o'clock, the 
funeral procession slowly moved to the cemetery. At the head was 
Chief Justice Chase, Secretary of War Stanton, Senate President L.
S. Foster, Interior Secretary James Harlan, Senators Charles Sumner, 
Edwin D. Morgan, S. C. Pomeroy, William Sprague, the Maryland 
Congressional delegation, other Congressmen, Judges, Governor-elect 
Swann, Lieutenant Governor Cox, Mayor Chapman, members of the Baltimore 
bar, and the family including Justice David Davis. Nancy too walked in 
the procession. "She seemed petrified with grief," Chase recorded.
"Not a tear, nor a sob, but anguish that seemed hardly to comprehend 
itself." Late in the afternoon the graveside prayers were said and 
Henry Winter Davis was laid to rest.33
Newspapers throughout the land carried notices of Davis’ death, 
some saccharine, but others sober and balanced. Several of the men
38Salmon P. Chase Diary, 7 January 1866, Chase Mss, HSP.
39Ibid.; Baltimore American, 3 January 1866; David Davis to
E. W. Syle, 8 January 1866, David Davis Mss, CHS.
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who served with him in Congress left evaluations of him in their 
autobiographies and memoirs. Taken together, the obituaries and 
contemporary opinions provide a just estimate of Davis that included 
his virtues, his vices, his accomplishments, and his failings.
Davis' greatest assets were his quick mind, his electrifying 
eloquence, and his fearlessness. As a child he received special 
tutoring and very early acquired a love of learning. At Kenyon College 
and the University of Virginia, he received a classical education and 
training in "the labor of law." Throughout his life he read widely in 
the classics, literature, history, religion, philosophy, and law. 
Although frequently described as "that rare specimen of the scholar 
in politics," it was less his learning than his natural brilliance 
that made him widely respected. As one contemporary wrote, Davis saw 
clearly where other men groped in darkness. His restless, active mind 
cut through difficult problems. As Charles Sumner noted, Winter Davis 
"abounded in ideas."1*0
Although an accomplished writer, Davis achieved his greatest 
success as an orator. He made his ideas come alive and hypnotized 
his audiences. A master of the English language, brilliantly logical, 
with a keen understanding of a crowd, he was in all respects one of the 
finest, if not the finest, orator of his day. Instead of flowery 
speeches filled with rhetorical extravagancies and classical quotations, 
he was direct, concise, and clear. He could hold the attention of 
audiences of thousands for hours. And he could make them believe him.
t*°Charles Sumner, Works (Boston, 1870-83), X, 104; Raymond W. 
Tyson, "Henry Winter Davis: Orator for the Union," Maryland Historical
Magazine, 58 (March, 1963), 18.
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His colleagues In the House remembered his numerous speeches before 
that body. John Sherman called him "the most accomplished orator In 
the House while he was a Member." S. S. Cox, a frequent opponent of 
Davis, declared that he was "the most gifted in eloquence and logic of 
any member within the author's acquaintance." James G. Blaine called 
Davis' speech in reply to the censure of the Maryland legislature as 
"entitled to rank in the political classics of America." Blaine also 
thought that "as a debater in the House, Mr. Davis may well be cited 
as an exemplar. He had no boastful reliance upon intuition or 
inspiration or spur of the moment," but carefully prepared his 
speeches in advance. "In all that pertained to the graces of oratory," 
Blaine concluded, "he was unrivaled."1*1
Visitors in the House galleries rated Davis the most eloquent 
member. Correspondent Whitelaw Reid recorded that the normally chaotic 
House would be tamed only by Davis. Reid had seen "even Thad Stevens 
speaking in the midst of as much confusion as ever prevailed in a large 
primary school during a temporary absence of the teacher; but I never 
saw Winter Davis adress the Chair two minutes till there was a sudden 
hush among all the members and every eye was turned from documents or 
letters to the member from Maryland." Ainsworth Spofford, head of the 
Library of Congress, noted that whenever Davis spoke "the hush of 
absorbed listeners was such that even his slightest tones penetrated 
to the remotest corners of the galleries." Young Henry Adams frequently 
visited the House during "the secession winter of 1860-60." "It is
**Gherman, Recollections, I, 194; Samuel S. Cox, Three Decades of 
Federal Legislation (Providence, 1885), 92; Blaine, Twenty Years in 
Congress, 499.
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very seldom In that noisy, tumultuous body that any member can command 
attention," Adams noted; "but when Mr. Davis rose, members dropped 
their newspapers, put down their pens, stopped their conversations and 
crowded around him." Based on these and other evaluations, one can 
hardly disagree with publisher John W. Forney of the Washington Dally 
Chronicle who concluded that Davis was "the most incisive and brilliant 
orator of his time."1*2
Davis had extraordinary courage to speak and act on his strong 
convictions. "Above all," wrote the New York Times, "he had courage; 
courage to think and courage to speak. He had convictions, and was 
bold in pursuing them to their consequences." He lived the advice he 
once gave an associate: "If you wish to be anybody and do anything,
be independent ... and never ask how a vote will affect your election 
on any future occasion and you will be a power, useful to your country 
and appreciated by the State." As Justice David Davis said of him,
"He bent the knee neither to power nor constituents." For his inde­
pendence in speech and action, he was excluded from Baltimore society, 
censured by the Maryland House of Delegates, vilified by the press, 
passed over for appointments, and voted out of office. "Such were his 
independence and self-reliance that they sometimes alienated personal 
friends and political allies," wrote one observer, "but he believed in 
choosing his own path and following his own advice."1*3
1*2New York Times, 14 January 1866; Ainsworth P. Spofford, 
"Washington Reminiscences," Atlantic Monthly, 81 (June 1898), 753;
Henry Adams, The Great Secession Winter of 1860-61 (New York, 1958),
15; John W. Forney, Anecdotes of Public Men (New York, 1873), I, 374.
1*3New York Times, 2 January 1866; HWD to John Creswell, 10 March 
1865, in the Cecil Whig, 25 January 1879; David Davis to Rockwell,
11 March 1866, in KingV Lincoln’s Manager: David Davis, 308.
393
When Davis arrived at a course of action, he would not tolerate 
those who went only half-way or those who would not go at all. "He will 
hold no terms with the ’Softs'— the Eleventh Hour men," wrote a friend. 
"He turns violently against even his friends if they hesitate to go his 
lengths or oppose his ideas. There never was a prouder or more intoler­
ant man. We think he is great— our greatest man in power and ability 
by long odds; but no constituency ever had so much trouble with their 
pet." When Davis came out for immediate, uncompensated emancipation, 
for example, he labeled the gradual emancipationists as "trimmers."
"With him was no trimming, no half-hearted advocacy or opposition, none 
of the double-faced subserviency which discriminates the demagogue from 
the statesman," wrote Spofford. "His yea was always yea, and his nay, 
nay, whether in speech or in vote." A man who incurred Davis' dis­
pleasure was rarely forgiven. "He never lets up on Hicks or Swann 
or anybody," wrote a supporter. "They differed from Davis, ergo they 
were fools. Being fools they cannot be good for anything as long as 
they live."**1*
Davis carried his opposition to men and measures to an extreme.
When the Bishop of Maryland, the Governor, the "Locofocos," the "Secesh," 
or even Presidents Pierce and Buchanan acted in a way he disapproved, he 
denounced them as "usurpers," "timeservers," or "tyrants." When the 
Republicans came into power, he hurled his verbal shrapnel at Lincoln, 
Seward, Bates, Welles, Fox, and particularly Blair. He dismissed them 
all as "fools" and Lincoln as "an ass." His inability to know when he
^Peter G. Sauerwein to McPherson, 8 October 1864, McPherson 
Mss LC; Spofford, "Washington Reminiscences," 754.
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had said or done enough crippled his effectiveness as a Congressman.
Although always prominent, Davis was not always productive in 
Congress. John Sherman thought him "a poor parliamentarian, a careless 
member in committee, and utterly unfit to conduct an appropriation or 
tariff bill in the House." Sherman described him as "impatient of 
details, querulous when questioned or interrupted." In many ways 
Davis was a "political outsider." He did not perform well on committees 
except where he was chairman, he was not a leader on the floor, and he 
authored few pieces of legislation. Politicians distrusted him because 
of his independence and eccentric behavior. They considered him "what 
a balky horse is to the driver, or an enfant terrible in the household—  
a man upon whom they could not depend."1*5
Winter Davis was a maverick, an independent spirit, an outsider, 
who had confidence in his ability to see "as clear as the sunlight."
Once deciding upon a course he pushed ahead without reservation. His 
greatest accomplishments resulted from his uncompromising stand and his 
shrewd decisions. He was an early and consistent opponent of the admis­
sion of Kansas under the Lecompton constitution. When the word "Repub­
lican" still signified some hoary-headed abolitionist, Davis defied 
all by voting for Pennington for Speaker. When Massachusetts soldiers 
were murdered in the streets of Baltimore, Davis spoke out for the 
Union. "To him before and above all other men," wrote James G. Blaine, 
"is due the maintenance of loyalty in Maryland." "He made no compro­
mises. He stood by the flag at all hazards," wrote Charles Sumner.
1*5Sherman, Recollections, I, 194; New York Evening Post, 13 
January 1866.
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Davis early recognized that slavery would be a victim of the Civil War. 
Thus, when border state politicians rejected Lincoln's offer of 
compensated emancipation, Davis led the fight in Maryland for unqual­
ified, uncompensated, immediate emancipation. When returned to Congress, 
he became noted for his attempt to restore to Congress its constitu­
tional role of developing foreign policy and directly reconstruction.
He distinguished himself by opposing arbitrary arrests and the use of 
military courts to try civilians. And when most politicians feared to 
even mention Negro suffrage, Davis embarked on his last cause— the 
ballot for all men. "He looked to nothing less that the complete 
enfranchisement of his country,” recalled Sumner, "and the redemption 
of all the promises of our fathers in the Declaration of Independence."1*6 
Years after his death, James 6. Blaine speculated about Davis' 
career had he lived. "The friends who knew his ability and his 
ambition," Blaine recalled, "believed that he would have left the most 
brilliant name in the Parliamentary annals of America." Sumner wrote 
that "had he lived, I know not what height he might have reached." But 
Salmon Chase thought no speculation necessary. Davis had already 
completed "his noblest monument." To Henry Winter Davis "especially 
belongs the great honor of breaking the bonds of every slave in his 
native State," Chase declared. "The Free Commonwealth of Maryland, 
better than any star-pointing pyramid, will commerate his genius and 
his labors."1*7
^Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, 498; Sumner, Works, X, 
105-106.
**7Ibid.; Chase to Nancy Davis, 3 January 1866, in Steiner, Davis, 
384-385.
A NOTE ON THE SOURCES
Henry Winter Davis was concerned about his place in history. In 
the last year of his life he began an autobiography. Carefully he 
collected his correspondence, notes, newspaper clippings, and speeches 
and arranged them in a scrapbook. When Edward McPherson was preparing 
his history of the rebellion, Davis offered him the scrapbook containing 
Union party resolutions on the condition that he "be very careful of 
them." After Admiral Du Pont's death, Davis urged Mrs. Du Pont to save 
all the Admiral's papers, separate those of general interest, and make 
provision in her will for their publication. "If left to chance," he 
warned her, "they may be lost or mutilated or suppressed."
Ironically, Davis' own letters were either lost, mutilated, or 
suppressed after his own death. His wife carefully preserved her 
husband's letters and scrapbooks. She arranged for the return of many 
originals. When she died in 1902 her estate was left to her sole 
surviving daughter, Mary Winter Davis. When Miss Davis died in 1921 
she left her estate to her Howard family cousins. The only surviving 
descendant of the Howard family, Mrs. Lydia Howard de Roth of New York 
City, speculated that Davis' papers were destroyed in a 1904 Baltimore 
fire which burned several warehouses belonging to the family. Events 
tend to substantiate Mrs. de Roth's speculation. In 1916, Bernard 
Christian Steiner, Librarian of the Enoch Pratt Free Library in 
Baltimore, published a biography of Henry Winter Davis with his
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daughter's cooperation. Davis' manuscript autobiography compromises 
the first three chapters of Steiner's book. Had Davis' correspondence 
still existed in 1916 it is probable that Miss Davis would have allowed 
him access to it also.
Fortunately for the historian, Mrs. Du Pont hired a copyist, Miss 
Charlotte C. Russell, to make transcripts of 256 Davis letters before 
exchanging the originals with Mrs. Davis. The transcripts of the 1860 
to 1865 letters along with 194 Davis originals covering the period 1850 
to 1860 constitute the largest and most important collection of Davis 
correspondence. In addition to the 450 originals and transcripts, the 
Henry Francis du Pont Collection of Winterthur Manuscripts at the 
Eleutherian Mills Historical Library in Greenville, Delaware, contains 
over 700 pieces of ancillary correspondence which amplifies Davis' life. 
There are 190 letters from Du Pont to Davis, 120 letters from Mrs. Du 
Pont to Davis, and letters between Mrs. Du Pont and Constance G. Davis, 
Nancy M. Davis, Mary Winter Davis, Jane Mary Winter Davis Syle, the 
Reverend Edward Syle, Henry Winter Syle and others.
Additional letters were uncovered by Willard L. King in the attic, 
library, basement, and carriage house of the David Davis mansion in 
Bloomington, Indiana. Mr. King also photocopied some correspondence in 
the possession of Miss Irene Marguerite Syle of Philadelphia. Mr.
King's collection of David Davis Manuscripts at the Chicago Historical 
Society was a valuable source for the study of the Maryland Davis.
Other Davis letters are scattered throughout the country in a 
wide variety of collections. A list of manuscript souces is included in 
the bibliography. An asterisk denotes those collections which contain 
Davis letters.
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When, quoting from his letters, great care has been taken to 
transcribe Henry Winter Davis' often illegible handwriting. The 
spelling, capitalization, and punctuation of quoted passages has been 
faithfully reproduced except where confusion would have resulted. The 
abbreviation sic has not been used.
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